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This dissertation analyzes how statesmen and soldiers make decisions on 
war and peace and identifies key linkages between a state’s civil-military 
relations and its international relations. It shows that there is a clear 
connection between a state’s civil-military relations and the making of 
strategy.  This study analyzes how different patterns of civil-military 
relations affect a state’s propensity to use military force, as well as its ability 
to design effective military strategies to achieve its political objectives.  It 
develops a framework, which allows us to derive hypotheses as to the 
conditions under which policy-makers would be more likely to make 
informed decisions on the use of force. The dissertation studies how top 
decision-makers process information and advice and the political and 
psychological dynamics that affect the policy-making process.  I show that 
firm civilian control, while necessary, is not a sufficient condition and does 
not automatically translate into effective national security decision-making 
or victorious military strategies.  Even wealthy and powerful states with firm 
control over their militaries have paid, at times, enormous cost in blood and 
 
 
treasure due to poorly-conceived diplomatic and military strategies.  In the 
coming years, we are certain to have many occasions when the U.S. uses or 
considers the use of military force.  That is why scholars should continue 
studying the dynamics of the relations between civilian and military leaders 
at the pinnacle of government and their effect on the making of military 
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How do political and military leaders decide to use or threaten military force?  
How are we to explain the variance in the quality of the decision-making process?  Why, 
at times, in deliberations on national security issues do decision-makers manage to assess 
correctly the political and military aspects of their environment and the threat they 
confront and to design the most appropriate military strategy?  Why, at other times, is the 
decision-making process lacking a critical evaluation of the strategic situation and why 
can’t decision-makers match military means to political ends?  Is the creation of a “team 
of rivals” at the top of the government the surest path to effective national security 
decision-making?  Do democracies make better decisions on war and peace than non-
democracies?  The key to answering these questions, I argue, is found in the relationship 
between political and military leaders at the pinnacle of government.  This dissertation 
explains how statesmen and soldiers make decisions on war and peace and identifies key 
linkages between a state’s civil-military relations and its international relations. This 
study shows that there is a clear connection between a state’s civil-military relations and 
the making of strategy.  It analyzes how different patterns of civil-military relations affect 
a state’s propensity to use military force, as well as its ability to design effective military 
strategies to achieve its political objectives.  This dissertation develops a framework, 
which allows us to derive hypotheses as to the conditions under which policy-makers 





This dissertation shows that firm civilian control, while necessary, is not a 
sufficient condition and does not automatically translate into effective national security 
decision-making or victorious military strategies.  Even wealthy and powerful states with 
firm control over their militaries have paid, at times, enormous cost in blood and treasure 
due to poorly-conceived diplomatic and military strategies, the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq 
being the most recent examples.  In the coming years, we are certain to have many 
occasions when the U.S. uses or considers the use of military force.  That is why, scholars 
should continue studying the dynamics of the relations between civilian and military 
leaders at the pinnacle of government and their effect on the making of military strategy 
and national security policy. 
This study revisits one of the main debates in the literature on civil-military 
relations and policy-making regarding the usefulness of “assertive” and “delegative” 
civilian control (or “objective” control, in Samuel Huntington’s terms)1.  While I do not 
attempt to prescribe the “ideal” type of civil-military relationship that could work under 
almost all conceivable circumstance, this study does lead to a rejection of Samuel 
Huntington’s “objective control” model, which has been dominant in both the academic 
and defense policy communities for half a century now.2   I use Peter Feaver’s concept of 
“assertive” civilian control, which overcomes many of the problems of Huntington’s 
typology of “objective” and “subjective” forms of control, developed in The Soldier and 
the State.  Assertive civilian control is a more pro-active form of control than “objective” 
                                                            
1 Peter Feaver introduces the assertive-delegative typology of civilian control in Guarding the Guardians 
(1992). It is based on the civilians’ decisions how much to delegate to the military and how extensively to 
monitor the military’s actions.  Assertive civilian control is when civilians delegate little and monitor a lot, 
while delegative control involves higher degrees of delegation and lower forms of monitoring.  
2 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 





control, and allows “direct civilian supervision over the military, particularly over 
military operations.”3   Huntington’s model is found deficient both descriptively and 
prescriptively.  As Garofano argues, embracing objective control does not guarantee 
victory in any case.  On the contrary, the theory of objective control and the thought 
process and governmental arrangements that it entails hinder the process of making 
informed decisions on using force.  They do so by discouraging the inclusion and 
integration of relevant political, social, economic and country – or region-specific 
knowledge and information.  They also encourage a passive military approach to 
analyzing and presenting costs and risks…4 
Huntington’s model presupposes clearly defined political and military domains 
and also that both sides (the civilian and the military) respect the boundaries and refrain 
from interfering in each other’s domain.  According to this model, effective planning and 
conduct of a war would be achieved when civilian leaders are involved only in the 
“grand-strategic” realm while leaving the “tactical” and “operational” realms to the 
military.  Along these lines, Huntington explains why in his view the U.S. was successful 
in World War II: “so far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the 
military ran the war.”5   
                                                            
3 Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians:  Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 9. 
4 John Garofano, “Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control,” Orbis (Spring 
2008), p. 239. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 315.  For an argument that 
Huntington is wrong and that FDR was actually a very assertive commander-in-chief, see, among others, 
Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevel, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1987), especially pp. 14-15; Eliot Cohen, “A War That Was Not Left to the 





Such division of labor would reserve the dialogue between top civilian and 
military leaders only for the beginning and the end of a war.  At the beginning, the 
politicians should decide on the objectives and give the go-ahead to the military.  Then 
they should sit back and leave the military professionals to prosecute the war free of 
political interference. Or, as Helmuth von Möltke (the Elder) wished, politicians should 
fall silent the minute the war begins.  Huntington’s theory warns that if civilian leaders 
want to increase effectiveness they should not interfere with military professionalism.  
Civilians involving themselves in military matters would be equivalent to a patient 
advising her surgeon what kind of operation is needed and how to perform the surgical 
procedure.  The failures in Vietnam have been blamed on politicians’ failure to follow 
Huntington’s objective control. More recently, supporters of traditional theory were 
invigorated, saying that had Rumsfeld behaved according to the Huntington’s 
prescriptions instead of micromanaging the military, this country would not have been in 
such trouble in Iraq.6   
However, this study shows that Huntington’s theory has been the problem rather 
than the solution.7  As Clausewitz and others teach, war is indeed very political and since, 
at times, even the smallest tactical decisions may have significant political consequences, 
Huntington’s idea of a clear separation between the political and the military domain is 
very often impractical. 8   According to Matthew Moten, “The essential flaw in 
                                                            
6 See, for example, Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007), pp. 97-
108. 
7 For a similar view, see John Garofano, “Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective 
Control,” Orbis (Spring 2008), pp. 238-254. 
8 For a similar argument, and also for a detailed analysis as to how and why American civil-military 
relations have not conformed to Huntington’s “objective control” theory, see Peter Feaver, “The Civil-
Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and 





Huntington’s theoretical wall is that it splits the responsibility for policy from the 
responsibility for strategy.  This bifurcation demands too little both of military 
professionals and the civilian superiors.”9  Also, there is no “purely” military opinion or 
advice that could effectively serve the decision-making process.  As Clausewitz asserts:  
Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they 
are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice. But it makes even 
less sense for theoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be 
put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely 
military plans for a war or a campaign. 
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political 
factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence 
on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their 
quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence.10 
 
Cases of effective decision-making show that in order to be useful, military 
advice should be politically informed.  Such is the case of then Chief of Staff of the Army 
Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, for example, who violated the prescriptions to stay within the 
purely military realm and provided policy-makers with a more thorough assessment of 
what it would mean to commit U.S. forces in Indochina when President Eisenhower was 
considering the issue in 1953-54. Gen. Ridgeway gave the political leadership a 
comprehensive report, taking into account various economic and political factors, such as 
estimated casualties and their effects, cost of reserves mobilization, analysis of the 
domestic popular support of enemy forces, U.S. domestic political implications of a 
possible troops commitment, and others.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Supreme Command, Chapters 1, 7, and Appendix (“The Theory of Civilian Control”); John Garofano, 
“Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control,” Orbis (Spring 2008). 
9 Matthew Moten, “A Broken Dialogue,” in American Civil-Military Relations, the Soldier, and the State in 
a New Era, Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don Snider, eds., (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 
p. 60. 
10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 





Contrary to Huntington, most of my findings support Eliot Cohen’s conclusions 
as to what is needed for effective national-security decision-making and war leadership11 
and his “unequal dialogue” model although I find some deficiencies in his model as well, 
as discussed later on.  Cohen’s model is an improvement over Huntington to the extent 
that it accounts better for the political character of war and the intimate connection 
between politics and war.  This study provides additional new evidence in support for 
Cohen’s argument that a constant exchange of ideas between statesmen and soldiers and 
assertive civilian control lead to a more effective decision-making and conduct of wars. 12  
In Cohen’s “unequal dialogue,” civilian leaders, rather than sitting back, are querying, 
probing, and prodding, but without “dictating in detail” what the military should do.13  
My case studies show why Cohen is correct in emphasizing the importance of an on-
going, uninterrupted dialogue between civilian and military leaders during the planning 
and the conduct of a war.  Such a vigorous civil-military dialogue is needed in order to 
make military force serve the political objectives of a state.  It is crucial for an effective 
policy-making process.  For example, my analysis of the decision-making in the lead-up 
to the 1991 Gulf War shows that assertive civilian control and civilian involvement in 
operational matters actually enhanced the effectiveness of the strategy- and policy-
making process in several ways: by expanding the number of alternative strategies 
considered by decision-makers, by stimulating more creativity and novel ideas from both 
                                                            
11 Supreme Command (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2003). 
12 As explained in previous chapters, I use Peter Feaver’s concept of “assertive” civilian control, which 
overcomes many of the problems of Huntington’s typology of “objective” and “subjective” forms of 
control, developed in The Soldier and the State.  Assertive civilian control is a more pro-active form of 
control than “objective” control, and allows “direct civilian supervision over the military, particularly over 
military operations.”   See Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians:  Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in 
the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 9. 





the civilian and the military sides, by “keeping the military honest” and thus providing 
more accurate information during the policy discussions, and ultimately, by helping to 
match better military means and political ends. 
At the same time, my 2003 Iraq war case study shows that Cohen’s model also 
falls short because it does not convincingly draw a line between assertive civilian control 
and civilian micromanagement and does not explain when assertive control can 
contribute to a more effective decision-making process rather than turn into civilian 
meddling.  Assertive civilian control is insufficient for effective decision-making.  Based 
on Cohen’s model alone, it is very difficult to define the parameters of a civil-military 
relationship that would be conducive to effective strategy- and policy-making and 
implementation.  That is why this study specifies some of the problems with Cohen’s 
model and the circumstances under which assertive civilian control would be likely to 
turn into civilian micromanagement of the military and would have negative 
consequences for decision-making and policy implementation. Assertive civilian 
dominance could lead to some problems if the civil-military relationship is characterized 
by intense civil-military preference divergence, as we observed, for example, in the lead-
up to the 2003 Iraq war and in the Clinton Administration.  When civilian and military 
leaders hold highly diverging preferences, assertive civilian decision-makers may be 
tempted to monitor the military very extensively and to interfere often in order to make 
sure that civilian preferences will dominate. 
Resolving the Huntington-Cohen debate is of more than theoretical significance 
and has become even more urgent lately14 .  Some leading scholars and experts on 
                                                            
14 Eliot Cohen’s side has been joined by others, most notably, Peter Feaver with his book and, more 






national security have blamed the problems in Iraq on Rumsfeld’s and Wolfowitz’s 
assertive control of the military and have called for returning back to Huntington’s model 
of “objective control.”  Michael Desch, for example, argues that “it would have been far 
better for the United States if Bush had read Huntington’s The Soldier and the State 
rather than Cohen’s Supreme Command over his 2002 summer vacation.”15  Advising 
Defense Secretary Bob Gates on how to improve civil-military relations, Desch states: 
“The key is that Gates needs to recognize that Rumsfeld’s meddling approach contributed 
in significant measure to problems in Iraq and elsewhere.  The best solution is to return to 
an old division of labor: civilians give due deference to military professional advice in the 
tactical and operational realms in return for complete military subordination in the grand 
strategic and political realms.”16  While especially now it is very tempting to denounce all 
forms of assertive civilian control and equate them with Rumsfeldian micromanagement, 
this dissertation shows why the suggested “return to Huntington” would be the wrong 
solution.17  Familiar suggestions of the kind “give the military all they want and get out 
of the way” are not going to work and should not be taken seriously. 
This study highlights the very political nature of foreign policy decision-making, 
which may affect negatively the quality of the process of decision-making.  Decision-
makers’ political motivation (i.e., to see their preferred options adopted as the 
government’s policy) often leads them to distort the decision process in various ways in 
order to enhance the chances of their preferences winning.  A variety of manipulation 
                                                            
15 Michael Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86 Issue 3 (May/June 2007), p. 99. 
16 Ibid., p. 102.  
17 Along these lines, in a review of Cohen’s book Supreme Command, Russell Weigley argues for the need 
of “escaping the pernicious theory that civilians must keep hands off the conduct of war.”  In: The Journal 





strategies have been used during all stages of the decision-making process.  As my case 
studies show, such strategies include: a) manipulating the structure of the decision-
making group – e.g., excluding from discussions people who hold dissenting views 
and/or including others who espouse similar preferences; holding important meetings to 
debate policy options when one’s opponents are out of town; seeking advice from 
outsiders known to be sympathetic to one’s preferences, etc; b) manipulating the group’s 
operating procedures and/or the decision criteria (e.g., adopting tenets of the Powell 
Doctrine as the dominant standard for judging arguments); c) shaping the agenda of 
policy meetings and thus having the crucial say on what gets debated; d) framing the 
issues, e) salami tactics, and others.18  These manipulation techniques make the decision-
making process less effective.  In order for scholars to analyze them well, they need to 
use a framework which includes variables similar to the ones this study uses. 
The framework, developed in this dissertation, uses explanatory variables, such as 
the civil-military balance of power and preference divergence, which reveal important 
aspects of the decision-making process. Such approach emphasizes that the civil-military 
balance of power is indeed a variable even in mature democracies with firm civilian 
control over their militaries. It is better in demonstrating that while de jure in 
democracies civilians always have the authority, the de facto balance of power may, at 
                                                            
18 For a detailed discussion, see Paul Hoyt and Jean Garrison, “Political Manipulation within the Small 
Group: Foreign Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration,” in Paul ‘t Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt 
Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 249.  See also Garrison’s comparative study of the Nixon and 
Carter administrations which shows the bitter struggles between National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, whose strongly diverging preferences led them to 
manipulate the decision process in various ways in order to advance the policies they favored.  Jean 
Garrison, Games Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations (Texas A&M 





times, favor the military.  There are periods when the military may be able to dominate 
debates on the use of force and military preferences may prevail over civilian wishes. 
This approach is also useful in highlighting the importance of studying the 
preferences of policy-makers on issues of war and peace and their impact on the decision-
making process (in addition to systemic variables).  One could hardly provide a detailed 
explanation of the decision process without studying the ideas and belief of top policy-
makers.  If we study the preferences of political and military leaders on when and how to 
use or threaten force, we could predict the type of action they would recommend in a 
given situation. The civil-military balance of power tells us whose preferences (civilian 
or military) are likely to dominate in the final decision.  If, in addition, we examine the 
level of divergence in the views of statesmen and soldiers, we could anticipate how 
effectively they would share and analyze information, and how well they are likely to 
interact and coordinate with each other in the process of strategy-making and 
implementation.  For example, high levels of preference divergence affect negatively 
decision-makers’ processing of information and advice – top political leaders are more 
likely to discount advice (or not seek it at all) from military advisors with whom they 
disagree strongly.  Military advice is less trusted when civilian and military preferences 
are highly diverging.  Also, policy-makers would be less likely to share information with 
such advisors.  Furthermore, intense civil-military preference divergence leads civilian 
leaders to attempt to monitor the military very closely in order to make sure that the final 
decisions (and their implementation) reflect their preferences, and not the highly 
diverging preferences of the military.19  Such overly close monitoring often turns into 
                                                            
19 For the relationship between preference divergence and delegation of authority see, for example, Peter 
Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 





micromanagement of the military with very negative consequences.  High preference 
divergence very often produces alienation between political and military leaders and a 
rupture in the civil-military dialogue, which is indispensable for a healthy decision-
making process.  Hence, in order to have an effective decision-making process, it is 
important that the divergence between civilian and military preferences on the main 
issues is not so intense as to provide incentives to civilian and military leaders to distort 
the decision-making process in the ways described above.20  In her book, Risa Brooks 
develops an argument using similar independent variables and a different dependent one 
– strategic assessment.  Brooks convincingly argues about the importance of looking at 
preference divergence although she does not integrate this with some other literatures I 
have used, namely, findings from communication and persuasion theories and from 
rhetorics and  opinion change as to what makes advice persuasive. 
Focusing on the level of preference divergence between civilian decision-makers 
and their military advisors also allows us to integrate findings from communication and 
persuasion theory, which further demonstrate the central role the relationship between 
politicians and their advisors plays in the foreign policy-making process.  The dynamics 
created by this relationship affect directly the quality of decision-making. The 
persuasiveness of information and advice depends, to a large degree, on what decision-
makers think of the source of the information and not only of its content.  Decision-
makers are more easily persuaded by information coming from advisors who they believe 
share their preferences, interests and values, whom they trust, and consider 
                                                            
20 See Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton, NJ: 





knowledgeable on the issues in question.21  Decision-makers are more receptive to advice 
when they perceive there is only a low level of preference divergence between them and 
their advisors.  By focusing on the source of information and advice and how top 
decision-makers perceive this source, we can reveal some other ways in which the policy-
making process could be less than rational.  At times, perfectly good information could 
be rejected or discounted because it comes from the “wrong” source.  These are cases 
when we reject information and advice, maybe even automatically or without having seen 
it, only because we strongly disagree with or distrust the source of this information.  This 
is different from cases when advice is rejected because it does not fit with decision-
makers’ preexisting beliefs – this concerns the content of advice and how close the 
content is to the preferences of the decision-maker. When advice is rejected because of its 
source, it may be the case that the decision-maker has not even familiarized herself with 
the content of the information.  It could have been perfectly good information and very 
useful for the decision to be made; it could also have been information, which the 
decision-maker would have accepted had it come from another advisor.   Being sensitive 
to the fact that decision-makers could reject information only because they perceive as 
adversarial the advisor who provides that information could help us to search for ways for 
critical information to reach policy-makers and be taken into account.  
Examining the advisory process at the pinnacle of government through my 
theoretical framework leads to some counter-intuitive findings as well.  For example, my 
                                                            
21 See, for example, Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelley, Communication and Persuasion: 
Psychological Studies of Opinion Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), especially Chapter 2, 
“Credibility of the Communicator;” Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, eds., 
Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); and Arthur Lupia, "Who Can Persuade Whom? Implications from the Nexus of Psychology 
and Rational Choice Theory," In James H. Kuklinski, ed., Thinking About Political Psychology (New York: 





research shows that the so-called “yes-men” (here defined as the advisors who share the 
preferences of top decision-makers without the pejorative connotation this term usually 
carries) could enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process.  Conventional wisdom has it that it is harmful for decision-makers to surround 
themselves with “yes-men.”  In this view, the lack of vigorous dissent would lead to a 
failure to consider the full range of alternative options and, as a result, the policy choice 
would be sub-optimal.  However, by focusing on the effects of high preference 
divergence on the ways decision-makers search for and process information, my research 
reveals a more complicated picture.  Actually, at times, these “yes-men” are the only 
possibility for transmitting of dissenting views rather than being a barrier to 
alternatives. 22   As shown, decision-makers often disregard advice and information 
coming from a person whose views, ideas, and interests are highly divergent from their 
own.  If a decision-maker receives a dissenting opinion from someone with whom she 
disagrees on almost everything, this dissent would be discounted because it could be 
attributed to the “bias” of the “adversarial” source.  If, however, the contrary opinion 
comes from an advisor whose views and ideas have been similar to hers most of the time 
(i.e., a “yes-man”), the decision-maker is more likely to take such advise seriously and 
may even reconsider her position. 
By studying the preferences of top civilian and military leaders, we can also see 
other trends that may look counter-intuitive.  For example, especially after the Vietnam 
war, in US foreign policy and national security strategy debates, civilian leaders have 
been the ones more often pushing for the use of force, while military leaders have been 
                                                            
22 For somewhat similar reasoning, see Randall Calvert, “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational 





more dovish, often resisting the use of the military instrument and pushing for other 
means, such as diplomacy and economic sanctions.  Hence, to the extent that we observe 
a militarization of U.S. Foreign policy, it has been a civilian militarization – i.e., brought 
about by the more hawkish preferences of civilian leaders.23    
Ultimately, the case studies show that improving national security decision-
making is not a question of either enhancing the quality of the people in top positions or 
improving the quality of the process but of both – people and process.  In the words of 
Joseph Collins, “…no matter how the decision-making process is designed, it will be 
strongly affected by the beliefs and experience of the officials involved, especially the 
President who will set the tone for his or her administration. Sound national security 
decisions will require great people and effective and efficient processes. Both of these 
will require an engaged President attuned to both policy and process.”24 
 
Significance 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on international security by 
identifying key linkages between a state’s civil-military relations and its international 
relations and by explaining how statesmen and soldiers make decisions on war and peace.  
Since these are decisions of life and death, the purpose of my research is to enhance our 
understanding of how relations between top civilian and military officials affect a state’s 
ability to confront major threats to its security.  This dissertation also contributes to the 
scholarship on civil-military relations by showing the importance of shifting our focus 
                                                            
23 Michael Desch, "Civil-Militarism: The Civilian Origins of the New American Militarism", Orbis 50, No. 
3 (Summer 2006), pp. 573-583. 
24 Joseph Collins, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National 





away from traditional conceptions of civilian control and concentrating on the impact of 
civil-military relations on the process by which states decide to use or threaten military 
force.  Civilian control has been overemphasized as a dependent variable at the expense 
of other variables which are at least as important and much more interesting.  This is 
particularly true for countries like the U.S. and other mature democracies, where civilian 
control per se is not in question (hence, not a variable) and where a military coup is 
highly unlikely. 
Steeped in the democratic peace literature, many international security scholars 
take for granted that democracies make better decisions on war and peace.  However, I 
show that a democratic form of government is not sufficient to explain the variance in the 
effectiveness of decision-making processes.  My analysis of the impact of different 
patterns of civil-military relations on decision-making leads us to challenge the 
democracy/autocracy dichotomy.  Using insights from the Principal-Agent theory, as well 
as theories on communication and persuasion, I show that, regardless of regime type and 
even with firm civilian control, a government which is characterized by high levels of 
civil-military preference divergence could be prone to ineffective decision-making, 
miscalculations, and inability to match political goals and military means.  Hence, such a 
state could be dangerous to international security.  
Furthermore, it is not only this country’s national security that is at stake.  
Because of the U.S. hegemonic status and because of the size of its military, unlike in the 
past, the state of U.S. civil-military relations at present affects the rest of the world in no 
small measure.  It affects countries that are or could be targets of U.S. military force, 
states who are U.S. allies within NATO and beyond and partners who are struggling with 





to follow the U.S. model of civilian control.  While obvious, Eliot Cohen’s observation in 
this regard remains true.  “American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of 
American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders 
have global consequences.”25 
This study also helps fill a gap in existing scholarship on civil-military relations.  
The civilian side of the civil-military relationship is understudied and this dissertation 
attempts to remedy this.  Most of the research has been focused on the military – under 
what circumstances are they most likely to stage a coup and succeed or fail, what are the 
military preferences in regard to the use of force, and more recently, what are military 
attitudes toward Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWA), and others.  My 
dissertation shows that while menace to civilian control and national security policy-
making can come from the military, it can also come from the civilian leadership itself 
and the latter possibility should not be overlooked.  Often we ask “who’s to guard the 
guardians?” without asking who’s to guard the military from incompetent civilians.  In 
this connection, my research highlights the importance of analyzing the educational and 
professional background of top civilian and military leaders which traditional models of 
CMR downplay or neglect altogether. Civilian leaders’ lack of understanding of the 
military institution and the uses and, most of all, limitations of force as a tool of foreign 
policy can lead to disasters.  Civilians’ limited knowledge and expertise in national 
security can cause problems in either of two ways.  First, ignorant and assertive 
statesmen could mismanage the military, committing it to imprudent missions or 
interfering with or micromanaging its every action.  Alternatively, civilian ignorance 
                                                            






could also manifest itself as uncritical deference to military judgment, either because 
politicians cannot exercise the necessary oversight or because they lack the authority to 











In order to account better for states (like the US) whose militaries are socialized in 
the norms of civilian control, this study uses a model, which analyzes civil-military 
relations as a strategic interaction.  The two players in this interaction (the political 
leaders and the military) are strategic actors in that they have a range of choices and they 
decide how to act based not only on their own goals but also on their expectations about 
what the other side would choose to do in a particular situation.  For example, civilian 
leaders decide what monitoring mechanisms to use based on their expectations about 
whether the military will choose to follow closely political orders or whether they will 
choose to “shirk.”  Similarly, the military may choose one over the other based on their 
expectations about the likelihood of military shirking being detected and the severity of 
the expected punishment if caught disobeying or thwarting civilian orders.26   
Defense and foreign policy decision-making is seen as part of “politics as usual” 
or struggle for influence between civilian and military leaders, in which statesmen and 
soldiers are often in competition for control.  “Politics pervade civil-military relations 
even if there is no coup.”27  “Much as the executive branch and the Congress vie for 
control over policy, so do civilians try to assert control over military operations while the 
                                                            
26 See, for example, Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 2; Paul Hoyt and Jean Garrison, “Political 
Manipulation within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration,” p. 251. 





military endeavor to retain as much autonomy as possible.”28  In this approach, the 
civilians and the military are viewed as political (and not only bureaucratic) actors who 
make and implement policy decisions and, at the same time, pursue their own interests 
and political and institutional well-being. Under some circumstances, this may lead them 
to attempt to distort the decision-making process in a way that favors their preferences.  
For example, in its attempts to take care of its own organizational interests, the military 
may at times, have an incentive to thwart the goals of its civilian masters, especially in 
cases when civilian and military preferences diverge highly.  Precisely because the 
decision-making process is inherently political, participants in it may try to manipulate it 
in order to advance their preferred policies and such distortion of the process may make it 
less effective.29   
I develop a framework, which allows us to derive hypotheses as to the conditions 
under which policy-makers would be more likely to make informed decisions on the use 
of force.  My theory is premised on the straightforward assumption that the effectiveness 
of the national security decision-making process depends on the quality of the dialogue 
and interactions between top civilian leaders and their military advisors.  I argue that the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process depends, to a large extent, on two key 
variables of the civil-military relationship – the civil-military balance of power and the 
level of divergence between civilian and military preferences on issues related to U.S. 
national security and the use of force (Diagram 1 below). 
 
                                                            
28 Ibid., p. 124; Paul Hoyt and Jean Garrison, “Political Manipulation within the Small Group: Foreign 
Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration,” p. 249. 








The Quality of the Decision-Making Process as a Function of the Civil-Military 






















* The Civil-Military Balance of Power varies on a continuum with civilian 
dominance on the one end to military dominance, on the other.   
 
** The Level of Civil-Military Preference Divergence varies from “high” to “low.” 
 
 
In brief, the argument is that one can expect a more effective decision-making process 
when civilian decision-makers are dominant and the level of civil-military preference 
divergence is low than when, for example, the military dominates and civilian and 

















civilian dominance is preferable.  Regarding the differences in views and ideas between 
civilian and military officials, low levels of preference divergence is associated with a 
more effective decision-making process, while high levels of preference divergence 
usually lead to poor civil-military communication and coordination and inability to 
integrate political and military considerations into the strategies and policies.    
My theory is summarized in Table 2 below.   
Table 2 
The Quality of the Decision-Making Process as a Function of the Civil-













































While neither of the independent variables alone could explain the decision-
making process, in combination, the degree of preference divergence and the civil-
military balance of power provide important insights.  I argue that the quality of the 
decision-making process is shaped by the particular configuration of top civilian and 
military officials’ relative power and the level of divergence between their preferences, as 
shown in Table 2.  In each of the 4 settings in the table, we have a distinct pattern of 
civil-military relations, characterized by a particular combination of preferences and 
relative power.  Each of these patterns creates variable dynamics during the decision-
making process and could account for variations in a state’s ability to design strategies 
and deal with the challenges in its security environment.  Thus, by analyzing some of the 
possible configurations of the two independent variables (degree of civil-military 
preference divergence and the political-military balance of power), we can deduce several 
hypotheses about the quality of the decision-making process in those environments 
(reflected in the four quadrants of Table 2). 
 
Hypotheses 
What can we expect for cases that would fall in Quadrant 1 (civilian dominance 
combined with high levels of civil-military preference divergence)?   
 
Hypothesis 1 
When civilian leaders are dominant and civilian and military preferences diverge 





Why should we expect an ineffective decision-making process in that case? Under 
conditions of civilian dominance and intense preference divergence between statesmen 
and soldiers, I hypothesize that the high preference divergence (even when combined 
with strong civilian dominance) would create dynamics that would affect negatively all 
components of the policy-making and implementation processes.  More precisely, intense 
civil-military disagreement would make the functioning of the advisory process 
ineffective by decreasing civilian and military officials’ incentives to share information 
with each other and also by hampering their interaction and coordination in planning and 
implementing policy decisions. 
For example, intense civil-military preference divergence usually leads to 
significant problems with the exchange of information as well as with coordination and 
cooperation between civilian and military leaders.  The dominant side (in the case, the 
civilians) may try to marginalize opposing views by excluding some military leaders 
from policy debates or discounting in advance the merits of their judgment.  Excluding 
the military from many of the debates at the highest levels and ignoring or disregarding 
their advice could lead to a dysfunctional analysis of alternative options for military 
action and, ultimately, undermined strategy and policy.  Strong civil-military preference 
divergence could undermine the coordination and collaboration among leaders at the top 
because each side would like a different outcome.  This could lead to a failure to fully 
integrate military views with political and diplomatic policy.  Intense differences in 
civilian and military preferences could also lead to lack of trust, which often causes 
civilian micromanagement of the military, which further intensifies civil-military 








When the military is dominant and civilian and military preferences diverge 
highly, the decision-making process will be highly dysfunctional.  High civil-military 
preference divergence would result in poor communication and information sharing and 
it will also impede the cooperation and coordination between civilian and military 
leaders. 
My theory expects cases in Quadrant 2 (military dominance combined with a high 
level of civil-military preference divergence) to be the worst possibility from the stand-
point of decision-making.  In its attempts to protect its own preferences, each side may 
skew the decision-making process by undermining effective information gathering and 
analysis, as well as coordination and cooperation.  Because of the high level of preference 
divergence, one would not expect a free flow of information or an extensive analysis of 
alternative options.  Each side could have incentives to manipulate or withhold 
information.  High preference divergence could also lead to the use of leaks, foot-
dragging, and other tactics for blocking the preferred option of the other side.  Civilians 
would not necessarily get what they want.  Also, because of military dominance, the 
political and diplomatic perspectives may not necessarily be included in the analysis of 
options.  The implementation process would often be characterized by lack of integration 
between political objectives and military means.  At the same time, in order to restore the 
balance of power, civilians may be tempted to use intrusive monitoring, which may 
intensify the conflict with the military.  Dynamics which are characteristic for decision 








When civilian leaders are dominant and civil-military preference divergence is 
low, we expect an effective decision-making process.  Top civilian and military leaders 
will communicate and share information willingly, and they will coordinate and 
cooperate with each other smoothly during the policy-making and implementation 
process. 
Quadrant 3 (civilian dominance combined with low levels of civil-military 
preference divergence) seems to be the best of all worlds from the point of view of the 
quality of the decision-making process.  Civilian and military leaders are in agreement 
and, hence, neither side would have an incentive to withhold or manipulate information.  
Both sides are likely to share private information since they have an incentive to ensure 
that their mutually preferred outcome is realized in the best possible way.  The political 
leadership is likely to benefit from a more complete analysis and evaluation of the 
military aspects of the situation since military advisors would feel free to speak their 
mind.  The military is also going to benefit from a more open and frank discussion of the 
political constraints as seen by the civilian leadership and this could increase their mutual 
understanding and facilitate coordination.  Because of civilian dominance, assertive 
civilian control becomes an option.  Assertive control, however, would not deteriorate 
into micromanagement in such cases (and unlike in Quadrant 1) because of the 
commonalities in civilian and military perspectives.  Civilians would not feel the need to 
employ intrusive mechanisms of control because they would expect the military to carry 
out their orders without foot-dragging and in accordance with civilian preferences (which 





objectives and military means.  My case study on the 1991 Gulf War illustrates such 
dynamics.   
A note of caution is in order here.  At least hypothetically, there might be a 
problem if civilian and military leaders agree “too” much and the decision-making team 
starts suffering from group-think.  In such a case, not many alternative options would be 
considered, and the leadership would easily unite behind their common preference, which 
might not be the optimal solution.  However, as noted earlier, such a situation of full 
agreement should not be equated with “low” preference divergence, which is the 
healthiest option for effective decision-making.   
  
Hypothesis 4 
When the military is dominant and civilian and military preferences are close, the 
decision-making process will be of mixed quality.     
The quality of the decision-making process in cases falling in Quadrant 4 
(military dominance and low level of civil-military preference divergence) is expected to 
be “mixed.”  On the one hand, decision-making will benefit from the low level of 
divergence between civilian and military preferences; on the other, however, military 
dominance may lead to difficulties in integrating the military instrument with the political 
view.  As one of my case studies shows (the final stages of the 1991 Gulf War, including 
the armistice talks at Safwan), even in the case of success (i.e., a military victory), 
political objectives were not fully achieved because such integration was lacking.  The 
armistice talks, which Schwarzkopf had to conduct almost entirely on his own, illustrate 
this point.  The insufficient civilian involvement at the end of the 1991 Gulf War led to 





of the U.S. to turn a big military victory into a political one as well.  In this case, civilian 
leaders failed to ensure that their ground commander, Gen. Schwarzkopf, would take into 
account not only the purely military but the wider political and diplomatic implications of 
a tactical issue such as the Iraqi negotiators’ request to be allowed to use armed 
helicopters.  Schwarzkopf agreed to that request after making sure that the helicopters 
would not endanger in any way the security of U.S. and coalition forces.  As it turned out, 
however, this decision had much broader (and tragic) consequences -- Saddam Hussein 
used the helicopters to brutally suppress the Shiite uprising and keep himself in power.  
Such developments could have most probably been prevented had civilian leaders 
intervened in time to explain to the military commander the political implications of the 
Iraqi domestic situation and the importance of this decision for the overall success of US 
political objectives in the war. 
Comparing cases falling in Quadrant 1 and Quadrant 2, one may wonder why the 
quality of the decision-making process in the first one is expected to be better than in the 
second one (that is, for cases in Quadrant 1, I hypothesize “poor” quality while for 
Quadrant 2, my theory expects “worst.”)  Since the main problems for the decision-
making process for cases in both quadrants would stem from the high level of civil-
military preference divergence, can’t we hypothesize just the opposite (i.e., that for cases 
in Quadrant 1 the situation could be worse than in Quadrant 2)?  We should note, 
however, that what also matters here is whose preferences are dominant at the end.  My 
theory predicts a better overall decision-making process for Q 1 rather than Q 2 because 
in the former, civilians are dominant.  Certainly, it could happen (and has actually 
happened) civilians to be wrong about some or even all aspects of decisions regarding a 





impose their wrong preferences.  Still, from a normative perspective, this situation is 
preferable than a situation in which military preferences dominate.  After all, the real 
meaning of the principle of civilian control is that “civilians have the right to be wrong,” 
as Peter Feaver put it.30     
 
Methodology, Case Selection, and Alternative Explanations 
To test the above hypotheses about the quality of the decision-making process 
under varying conditions (as described in Table 1), subsequent chapters present in-depth 
case studies of US deliberations on the use of force and the making of strategy under 
presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.  The main purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the potential causal effects of civil-military relations on the 
quality of the decision-making process.  Hence, the test here is against the null hypothesis 
that there is no causal relationship between CMR and the effectiveness of the decision-
making process, and not against alternative theories.31  While there are other variables 
that affect the decision-making process, my claim is that civil-military relations are a 
necessary factor for the full understanding of its effectiveness.  This is not to exclude 
other variables that could potentially influence my dependent variable (and could be 
confounding factors). Where ever appropriate in the case studies, I discuss such 
alternative explanations, but I do not systematically disprove competing theories.  The 
                                                            
30 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 6. 
31 On two-cornered as opposed to three-cornered tests, see Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for 
Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).  For the distinction of “two 
cornered fights” and “three-cornered fights” see Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programs,” in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of 





task here is more limited – to show that civil-military relations have a consistent and very 
significant impact on the quality of the decision-making process.   
I use qualitative methods (and process tracing in particular) to test my hypotheses.  
Qualitative methods are the most suitable to evaluate my theory because it requires a 
detailed analysis of the ideas and beliefs of top civilian and military decision-makers, the 
sources of their influence over decision-making, and the process of their daily 
interactions.32  By using process tracing, we can find whether the behavior of policy-
makers in the various cases is consistent with the logic and expectations of my theory.  
As King, Keohane and Verba suggest, methods like process tracing are suitable because 
“within each sequence of events, process tracing yields many observations. … By 
increasing the number of observations relevant to the implications of a theory, such a 
method can help to overcome the dilemmas of small-n research and enable investigators 
and their readers to increase their confidence in the findings of social science.“33  My 
case studies are based on a variety of primary and secondary sources, as well as 
interviews with policy-makers and defense experts for the most recent cases.   
Cases were selected to provide maximum variation on the independent variables 
(level of civil-military preference divergence and civil-military balance of power) and to 
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Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); John Odell, “A Major Milestone with One Major 
Limitation,” Qualitative Methods (Spring 2006), pp. 37-40. 
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Certainly, there were other contemporary cases that could have been a good test 
for my theory and would have contributed to the historical record, but were rejected on 
other grounds.  For example, I decided that the case of the 1999 Kosovo intervention 
(Operation Allied Force) was not suitable because the main divisions at the time were not 
between top civilian and military leaders, but within the military and the political 
establishments.  Such selectiveness allows us to avoid cases in which there is no 
meaningful civil-military divide and, hence, speaking of civil-military preference 
divergence and its potential effects on decision-making would not shed much light on 
events.  Unlike in the Kosovo case, in the chosen cases the divisions within the civilian 
elite and the inter-service rivalries are at a very low level, which does not affect the 





Another motive guiding the case selection is the possibility to control for some of 
the confounding variables by holding them constant while CMR vary.  One alternative 
explanation could be that regime type determines the effectiveness of decision-making.  
It is widely believed that democracies make better decisions on war and peace than 
autocracies.34  By selecting US cases and holding regime type constant, I show that there 
is a high variation in the quality of the decision-making process within regime type.  
Democracies with intense civil-military preference divergence could also be prone to 
ineffective decision-making and miscalculations, and could exhibit an inability to match 
political goals and military means, leading to strategic failures.  This dissertation shows 
that the effectiveness of decision-making depends on changes in the patterns of civil-
military relations at the top of a government, regardless of regime type. 
Another alternative explanation could be leaders’ personalities. 35   One could 
argue that it was not the high level of civil-military preference divergence that affected 
negatively decision-making, but the personalities of leaders like President Clinton and 
Secretary Rumsfeld and their idiosyncratic characteristics.  After all, there some 
important personal characteristics that influence heavily how decision-makers process 
information, and thus, the policy-making process as a whole.  However, my cases studies 
show that personality as a variable is insufficient to explain the variance in the 
                                                            
34 See, for example, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002). 
35 On the importance of personality in foreign policy decision-making in general, and on structuring 
decision-makers’ advisory apparatus, see, for example, Patrick Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy 
Crises: Presidents, Advisors, and the Management of Decision-Making (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2002); Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective 
Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Alexander George, “Findings and 
Recommendations,” in Alexander George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: 
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effectiveness of decision-making.  The dynamics created by the relations between a 
state’s top civilian and military officials shape the decision-making process 
independently of leaders’ personalities.  Studying closely the relationship between top 
civilian leaders and their military advisors with the help of my theoretical framework 
shows that information is not necessarily “available” to leaders in the ways we usually 
assume and that leaders’ cognitive, emotional, and psychological characteristics are not 
the only barrier to searching and processing information.  The various dynamics created 
by different patterns of civil-military relations are as important for knowing what 
information and advice decision-makers would accept or disregard.  Hence, personalities 
matter, but decision-makers’ personalities operate in and are constrained by the broader 
setting, which consists of the relationships of the civilian leaders with their military 
advisors.  In the same way, as other contexts – the international environment, the state, 
and the bureaucratic contexts matter, my framework points to the context of the 
relationship, which empowers or constraints the personalities.   
One example from my case studies is Dick Cheney and his different behavior due 
to the different relationship settings he found himself in.  During the G. H. W Bush 
administration, there was a generally friendly, open, and trustful relationship between the 
civilian leaders and their top military advisors.  In this setting, the then Secretary of 
Defense behaves as an assertive and probing leading, but also one who was willing to sit 
back and let the military do its job, without micromanaging it.  In the administration of 
Bush, Jr., it was a very different Dick Cheney.  He found himself in a highly tense and 
adversarial civil-military relationship, defined by lack of trust and suspicion.  Both sides 
were trying to advance their diverging preferences and were, at times, distorting or 





exclude top military advisors from discussions, arguing their advice was not that useful 
because the Generals were either “stuck in the Cold War” or were not on the team and 









Power, Preferences, and Decision-Making: Operationalization and 
Measurement of Key Variables 
 
This chapter continues with defining the main variables in my framework, 
namely: the quality of the decision-making process (the dependent variable), as well as 
the two explanatory factors – (a) the civil-military balance of power and (b) the level of 
civil-military preference divergence.  In order to explicate better the logical 
underpinnings of my theoretical framework, I will also discuss contentious issues 
regarding the conceptualization of the variables as well as their operationalization and 
“measurement.”  While there is no consensus in the field as to “the best” way of 
measuring civilian and military “power” and “preferences,” let alone “quality of the 
decision-making process,” this dissertation uses some of the more often preferred 
indicators of these variables, and also addresses numerous conceptual difficulties and 
definitional debates along the way.    
 
The Quality of the Decision-Making Process 
The main focus of this study is the quality of the decision-making process on the 
use of force and what patterns of civil-military relations at the top of a government make 
the process more or less effective.  The process of decision-making is defined as the 
interactions between senior civilian and military officials generating policies on key 





rationality, I define an effective decision-making process as one during which policy-
makers:  
Ensure that sufficient information about the situation at hand is obtained and 
analyzed adequately so that it provides policymakers with an incisive and 
valid diagnosis of the problem… Facilitate consideration of all the major 
values and interests affected by the policy issue at hand. Assure a search for a 
relatively wide range of options and a reasonably thorough evaluation of the 
expected consequences of each.   Provide for careful consideration of the 
problems that may arise in implementing the options under consideration.36   
 
By contrast, defective decision-making most often exhibits the following 
characteristics: “incomplete survey of objectives and alternatives; poor information 
search; failure to work out contingency plans; selective bias in processing information; 
failure to examine risks or preferred choice37  A review of dysfunctional decision-making 
on the use of force confirms that the process in such cases most often includes: choosing 
a policy without presentation or evaluation of alternatives; suppressing information or 
advice; making decisions based on preconceptions or assumptions that are left 
unchallenged; lack of critical debate or analysis of the situation at hand; lack of careful 
assessment of the capabilities and political will of one’s own state and/or the adversary. 
What then are the characteristics of a healthy decision-making process?  Decision-
makers should: seek information that allows them to define adequately their internal and 
external environment (or the crisis situation at hand), the state’s interests at stake, and the 
threats to these interests; evaluate the available tools at their disposal to deal with the 
threats.  Based on a critical evaluation of the situation, decision-makers should be able to 
                                                            
36 Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information 
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choose a course of action that advances a state’s interests at acceptable cost.  Ideally, the 
decision-making process should include a “free and fair hearing” of different views and 
opinions and an open debate of alternatives.38  In reality, especially in a crisis situation, 
few American administrations and other governments have performed according to this 
ideal model.  However, keeping the ideal type in mind is useful for analytical purposes 
because it could provide us with a model for comparison with how particular foreign 
policy choices have been made.  For example, one could analyze whether in the lead-up 
to the 2003 Iraq war, top civilian decision-makers and their military advisors evaluated 
critically the kind of war they were embarking on.   
For the purposes of this study, effective decision-making is defined as a process 
characterized by a free flow and exchange of information between civilian and military 
officials in order to facilitate the analysis and evaluation of alternative options, as well 
as smooth interaction and coordination between them in order to achieve integration of 
political and military considerations in the adopted policy.  Informed decisions on the 
use of force require both political and military knowledge and effective interactions 
between civilian and military leaders who possess these two different kinds of wisdom.  
The dynamics of the interactions between civilian and military officials have a major 
impact on the quality of deliberations.  A continuing, uninterrupted, and vigorous 
dialogue between statesmen and soldiers is indispensable for effective national security 
decision-making.39  Hence, for the purposes of operationalizing the dependent variable 
                                                            
38 John Garofano, “Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the Role of Senior Military Leaders?,” 
Naval War College Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 40-64. 
39 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command; Andrew Bacevich, “Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-
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(quality of the decision-making process), we can disaggregate the decision-making 
process into the following components: 1) information sharing, analysis and evaluation of 
alternative options; 2) interaction and coordination between civilian and military 
officials; 3) choosing a policy from existing alternatives.40  Then we could analyze how 
the independent variables (civilian and military relative power and level of preference 
divergence) affect each of these components. 
Regarding the first component of the policy-making process, the free flow of 
information is crucial for a rigorous analysis of alternative strategies.  An effective 
decision-making necessitates relations between top civilian and military leaders that 
facilitate the deliberations among them, lead to a productive exchange of ideas and help 
statesmen cope with the complexity and uncertainty of their external and internal 
environments and the issues at stake.  What evidence of healthy decision-making are we 
looking for in regard to information sharing, analysis, and evaluation?  In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this component of the decision-making process, I have 
collected evidence for each case, showing: the extent to which there is a free flow and 
exchange of information between civilian and military officials (e.g., regular frank and 
open discussions between civilian and military leaders; no or few cases of concealing of 
information); whether both sides are willing to share their private information41; the 
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number and quality of alternative options proposed during the deliberations and whether 
there is a critical evaluation of their costs and benefits; the extent to which key 
assumptions are challenged and whether participants in the process attempt to address 
contradictory information and ambiguities; whether top political and military decision-
makers feel free to offer their honest advice; whether civilian or military officials attempt 
to conceal or distort information during the discussions (e.g., cases of inflated estimates 
of the costs or benefits of an intervention); the extent to which either side (civilian or 
military) attempts to prematurely foreclose less preferred options (through manipulation 
of information or through leaks, threats of resignation or by any other means), and others. 
Regarding interaction and coordination between top civilian and military officials, 
an effective decision-making process on the use of force and other issues of national 
security requires not simply military subordination, but also a constant consultation 
between top civilian and military leaders in order to match military means to political 
objectives and to be responsive at all times to the changing conditions of the diplomatic 
and military situation.  Successful policy-making requires that the military view is taken 
into account and at the same time, democracy presupposes that it is subordinate to the 
civilian view.  The making of reasoned policy and strategy requires that we combine “the 
uneven and conflicting stores of knowledge possessed by military and civilian 
advisors.”42  In order to have such an effective relationship, it is important that both 
civilian and military officials have certain knowledge of the other side, its responsibilities 
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and constraints.  They should attempt to understand each other’s assumptions and 
concerns.  As Russell Weigley so ably put it:  
The most desirable civil-military relations in a democracy are not simply those in 
which civilian leadership almost always prevails.  The most desirable civil-military 
relations are those in which there is a nearly altogether candid exchange of ideas 
between the soldier and the statesman, along with a consequent founding of a policy 
and strategy upon a real meeting of minds.  Only the former, lesser ideal has been 
realized most of the time in American history. The meeting of the minds has been 
relatively rare.43   
 
Smooth coordination between civilian and military officials is very important 
because it affects the degree to which political and military concerns would be integrated 
in the final strategy and, ultimately, the extent to which the military instrument would 
serve properly the political goals of a state.  In this connection, my case studies examine 
how civilian and military leaders interact with each other and how they participate in the 
joint advisory councils.  Evidence is collected to address the following questions in each 
of the case studies: How often do top civilian and military leaders interact?  Do they meet 
regularly?  Is, for example, one group marginalized by the other?  Do politicians look for 
military advice from outside of their regular circle of advisors?  Is the civilian or the 
military side trying to sabotage the decision or implementation process by foot-dragging 
or leaks?  What is the level of trust between top civilian and military officials? Do 
civilian leaders resort to micromanagement or other intrusive methods of control and 
monitoring of the military?   
In regard to the choosing of the final policy, one could look at whether, at the end, 
either the civilian or the military side has the power to impose its preferences and 
whether the final decision is a result of deliberations or whether the choice is “imposed” 
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unilaterally and has little to do with the merits of the preceding arguments. Or, in cases of 
conflict between civilian and military preferences, what kind of a compromise, if any, 
was achieved in the final decision?  Are there consistent and deliberate efforts on the part 
of decision-makers to link military analysis with political policy?  How well did 
statesmen and soldiers manage to integrate political and military considerations?  Did the 
chosen means serve the political ends? 
 While this study explains how different patterns of civil-military relations affect 
the quality of the decision-making process, there is no claim that effective decision-
making always produces effective policies and international outcomes.  In addition to the 
quality of the decision-making process of a state, the outcome depends also on the 
strategies of other actors, as well as on various circumstances some of which are beyond 
the state’s control (Diagram 2 below).  Hence, when my theoretical framework expects a 
high or low quality decision process, this does not mean one should necessarily predict a 










































As case studies show, a “good” decision-making process does not guarantee a 
good outcome. 44   While process and outcome are certainly linked, at times, good 
                                                            
44 Surprisingly, there are very few studies on the link between the quality of the decision-making process 
and the outcomes of the decisions.  (It is assumed rather than demonstrated that good process produces 
good outcomes.)  For an exception, see Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, “The Process-Outcome 
Connection in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 46 (2002), pp. 45-68.  The authors analyze 31 cases of decisions from 
























outcomes could come as a result of a bad policy-making process and vice versa.  
Decision-makers could blunder into success.  This is especially true for some types of 
outcomes and for particular countries.  For example, a country as powerful as the United 
States has a much bigger margin of error than other states.  Because of its overwhelming 
military advantage, no matter how incompetent at times U.S. strategy-making is, in the 
last decade or so, when engaging non-peer competitors, there has been little chance the 
US would lose a conflict militarily (although, of course, a military victory does not mean 
the achieving of political objectives.)  While a good outcome at times could be achieved 
merely by flipping a coin, having in mind how costly decisions on the use of force could 
be, my study proceeds on the assumption that an effective decision-making process in 
most cases would produce a better outcome and hence, it is vital to continue studying the 
factors leading to effective decision-making. 
In traditional scholarship on the subject, civil-military relations (CMR) have most 
often been the dependent variable.45  In contrast, this dissertation poses two key aspects 
of CMR -- namely, the relative power of top civilian and military officials and the degree 
of divergence in their preferences -- as the key independent variables, which, in 
combination, provide powerful insights into the quality of the decision-making process. 
 
The Civil-Military Balance of Power (BOP) 
The first independent variable -- the balance of power (BOP) between civilian and 
military officials -- represents the relative influence46 of civilian and military officials 
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necessarily correct.  Discussions on the differences between power and influence, however, go beyond the 





over decision-making.  Power is an elusive concept, which has defied definition. 47  
Analysts are even skeptical of the possibility of determining military influence on 
decision-making.  After all, only policy-makers themselves know who or what has 
influenced their thinking; at times, even they do not know or would not like to 
acknowledge.48  For the purposes of this study, I will define power as the blend of 
bargaining resources decision makers possess at any given time and their skills and will 
to use these resources in order to achieve an outcome consistent with their preferences.  
This definition borrows from one of the leading scholars on presidential power, Richard 
Neustadt, who argues that there are three sources of presidential influence: (1) “formal 
powers, often termed authority, vested by the Constitution, laws, or customs […] along 
with the status they confer…”  (2) “professional reputation, amounting to impression in 
the Washington community about the skill and will with which he put those things to 
use.”  And (3) “…prestige, his public standing…”49  Since power is issue- and time-
                                                            
47 See, for example, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science 
Review, 56 (1962); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to 
Geoffrey Debnam,” American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 900-904; Anthony de Crespigny, 
“Power and Its Forms,” Political Studies No. 16 (1968), pp. 192-205; Geoffrey Debnam, “Nondecisions 
and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz,” American Political Science Review No. 69 (1975), 
pp. 889-99; Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Colin 
Gordon, ed., Leo Marshall, John Merpham, and Kate Soper, trans., New York: Pantheon, 1980; Michel 
Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Steven Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1974); Richard Merelman, “On the Neo-Elitist 
Critique of Community Power,” American Political Science Review, No. 62 (1968), pp. 451-60; Nelson 
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Raymond E. 
Wolfinger, “Nondecisions and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review, No. 65 (1971), 
pp. 1063-80.  
48 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (2nd ed., New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), p. 5. 
49 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 





specific, the balance of power changes from one setting to another, depending on the 
issue and institutional framework. 
One important difference of my approach is that my theoretical framework 
emphasizes that both civilian and military power over decision-making does vary, even in 
democracies.   This is not difficult to see if we adopt the way the military is viewed in 
comparative politics – i.e., as a political actor which has sources of power that vary over 
time and which variance has important effects on the state, its governmental institutions 
and its policies.50  (This view is different from the one that portrays the military merely as 
a bureaucratic actor which implements policies decided upon by the government of a 
state.)  My theoretical framework assumes that military officials are not simply unbiased 
professionals who merely execute the orders of their civilian masters.  Military leaders 
are at the same time political actors who have potential sources of countervailing power, 
such as: the ability to narrow decision-makers’ options through controlling information 
and framing alternatives; bureaucratic maneuvering; building coalitions with supporters 
in Congress; appealing to favorable media/public opinion; leaks51 and resignations.52  The 
military could be ordered, but it could, at least to a certain extent, resist or twist the orders 
of its civilian masters when it disagrees with them.   
                                                            
50 See, for example, Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Citizens, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative 
Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Samuel Finer, The Man or Horseback (Middlesex, England: 
Penguin Books, 1962); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991).  
51 For a good discussion of how leaks are used during the decision-making process, see Morton Halperin, 
Priscilla Clap (with Arnold Kanter), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2006), pp. 184-90. 
52 I mean the use of rumors and/or threats of resignation.  Actual resignations (in the case of the U.S.) have 





The civil-military BOP varies on a continuum from “civilian dominance,” on the 
one end, to “military dominance” on the other.  Although power is a continuous variable, 
for the purposes of this study I discuss only two of its possible values: “civilian 
dominance” and “military dominance.”  “Military dominance” in this study does not 
equal “military” or “militarized” government – a government in which the armed forces 
rule directly or indirectly and dominate policy-making on domestic and foreign affairs.  
Even in stable democracies such as the United States, which have established robust 
norms of civilian control and a firm day-to-day hold over their militaries, the level of 
military influence over decision-making varies significantly.  There are periods when the 
military may be able to dominate debates on the use of force and military preferences 
may prevail over civilian wishes.53  “Military dominance” indicates precisely such a 
distribution of power favoring the military.  There is an important distinction between a 
military intervening or being dominant in the domestic politics and the governance of a 
country, on the one hand, and a military being involved in (and/or dominating 
temporarily) only the security policy of a state.54 
As analyses of defense and foreign-policy decision-making find and as my case 
studies show, temporary military dominance over decision-making in democracies may 
obtain in several ways.  One such path to military dominance – civilian “abdication” of 
control - is discussed in the chapter on the 1991 Gulf War. Other ways for the military to 
become dominant include circumstances when, for example, the civilians are divided 
while the military is united, when the statesmen lack experience and understanding of 
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national security matters and/or military officials are more politically and 
bureaucratically savvy than their civilian counter-parts, etc.55  The first several years of 
the Clinton Presidency, for instance, are a good illustration of such dynamics.  
Furthermore, I show that the variance in the civil-military balance of power has an 
important impact on the quality of the decision-making process and the content of 
specific policies, and needs to be taken into account.  The BOP tells us whose preferences 
– civilian or military – are going to dominate when preferences are in conflict. 
It is important to find “measures” of power that are independent from the outcome 
of political-military debates during the decision-making process.  We should not 
conclude, for example, that the balance of power in some case favored the civilians 
because at the end civilian preferences carried the day; we should determine the balance 
of power independently of whose preferences dominated at the end.  That is why, in order 
to establish the power status of each side – the civilian and the military56, I look at 
indicators of both formal and informal influence, such as:  
the legal (formal) powers of civilian and military officials (based on constitutional 
arrangements and other relevant legislation, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 
case of the US);  
the level of unity of civilian and military elites;  
                                                            
55 Christopher Gibson, Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through 
Madisonian Concepts, Ph. D. Dissertation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Michael Desch, 
Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999); Richard Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United 
States Today,” Naval War College Review (Summer 2002). 
56 Here the focus is only on top-level officials in the executive branch of a government. (In the case of the 





the availability (or lack) of public support for political and military leaders and specific 
policies under consideration57;  
the availability and strength of allies – e.g., Congress, the media, other influential 
political actors;  
the educational and professional background of top civilian and military leaders, their 
expertise in foreign and defense affairs, in particular, and their political and bureaucratic 
skills;  
related to the above, the ability of civilian leadership to exercise assertive civilian control; 
None of these indicators is without problems and there is no agreed upon method of 
measuring power.  Since evaluating these indicators and “calculating” the civil-military 
balance of power remains ultimately a subjective judgment, for each case study I also 
provide the opinions and evaluations of other scholars – experts on civil-military 
relations, who have made their independent evaluations of civilian and military influence 
on decision-making.  As imprecise as they may be, the above indicators help us 
determine the civil-military balance of power in each case well enough as to be able to 
situate the cases in Table 2 accordingly and, from there, to derive hypotheses for the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process as discussed later in this chapter. 
How then has the power of US political and military leaders varied over time and 
how could we use the above indicators to evaluate civilian and military influence?  As the 
case studies will show in more detail, the balance of power between statesmen and 
soldiers has been shifting along a continuum from civilian dominance to military 
dominance and this variance has had a significant impact over the decision-making 
                                                            





process.  In the words of Claude E. Welch, the extent of political and military influence 
changes over time depending on the “shifting balances between the strengths of the 
civilian political institutions on the one side, and the political strengths of military 
institutions on the other.”58  The next paragraphs discuss the sources of formal and 
informal civilian and military power in more detail and the evidence we should be 
looking for in order to determine the civil-military balance of power in each case.    
Legal powers  
My analysis of the legal/institutional powers centers on the main constitutional 
checks on the power of the military as well as key defense reorganization laws in order to 
examine how changes in institutional rules and norms have affected the relative power of 
top civilian and military officials and their relations.  Almost all definitions of the 
concept of civilian control emphasize the legal/institutional arrangements designed to 
safeguard civilian supremacy.  In the case of the United States, for example, scholars 
stress the importance of the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress – 
the President being the Commander-in-Chief while Congress having the right to declare 
war and the authority to provide for the common defense.  However, while the U.S. 
Constitution guards against an eventual attempt of the military to take over the civilian 
authorities, it does not insure effective day-to-day civilian control.  No constitution by 
itself can do that.  As Adam Yarmolinsky writes: “The three constitutional checks on the 
power of the military – the power reserved to the Congress to declare war, the two-year 
limitation on Army appropriations, and the specification of a civilian Commander in 
Chief – were all taken quite seriously by the Founding Fathers.  In fact, they have proved 
                                                            
58 Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, NY: State 





largely irrelevant to the central dilemmas of civilian control in the second half of the 
twentieth century.”59   
In discussing the legal powers of civilian and military officials, some defense 
reorganization laws require more attention since they have had a very significant impact 
on the balance of influence in US civil-military relations.   Let’s take, for example, the 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA).  It is ironic that this law in practice weakened 
civilian control since one of its main goals was its strengthening.60  The Goldwater-
Nichols Act, which has been called the most sweeping reform legislation in the history of 
this country, represents an organizational revolution and is among the key reasons for the 
increased influence of the military in the 1990s.61  This legislation helped change the 
balance of power in favor of the military in at least two ways.  First, it increased the unity 
of the military by centralizing military power in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and in the Joint Staff (CJCS).  Under this act, the CJCS becomes the principal military 
advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and has the right to give his opinion 
and advice not only when asked but even when not asked.  He (one day she) is 
empowered to develop the military’s budget proposals and strategic plans.  The chairman 
is also given complete control of the Joint Staff.  This legislation also increased inter-
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service cooperation and coordination.  The latter, however, together with the enhanced 
status of the Chairman of the JCS in practice facilitated the expression of united military 
preferences, which led to increased political power of the military.  (It became more 
difficult for civilians to play the services off one another.)  For example, discussing the 
consolidation of power of the military services and the empowerment of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Kohn writes:  
Civilian control … as it was intended by the Founding Fathers, has been eliminated 
by years of well-meaning reform legislation, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act. … In their understandable quest for efficiency, the military reformers have … 
disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service, and created autocracy in the 
Joint Staff and arbitrary power in the person of the Chairman.62   
 
The consequences of these institutional changes, which promoted jointness and 
strengthened the military formulation of strategy became quite obvious under Gen. 
Powell.  As a result, civilian leaders were often presented not with different military 
options from which they could choose but with a unified military position, which they 
could overrule or disregard “only at the greatest political peril.”63 
The second way in which the GNA increased potential military influence over 
decision-making was by re-enforcing previous attempts of the military to improve its 
members’ graduate education and by increasing the value of serving in joint assignments.  
The Act increased the professional expertise of top military officials.  A less-noted aspect 
of this legislation is that by making joint duty a requirement for promotion to flag-rank, it 
led to the increase in the quality of the officers serving on the Joint Staff.  Improving the 
quality of the Joint Staff may weaken civilian control and civilian influence on decision-
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making if it coincides with decrease in the military expertise of civilians at the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the lower-level political appointees.  Arguably, this 
is exactly what happened during the first Clinton Administration when civilian officials 
were, at times, overawed by their military counterparts.   
While it is true that the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthens significantly the voice 
of the Chairman as the nation’s highest ranking and most powerful officer, as I will argue 
in subsequent chapters against legislative/institutionalist determinism, this act in and of 
itself does not guarantee that military advice will be dominant.  As my case study on the 
2003 Iraq war and the relations between Secretary Rumsfeld and CJCS Gen. Richard 
Myers show, this legislation gives the top military leaders the right to be heard, but not to 
be heeded.  (Rumsfeld did not find it very difficult to disregard the Chiefs when he 
wanted to do so.)  More importantly, developments after the adoption of the GNA 
confirm that the power of top civilian and military leaders cannot be determined solely 
based on their legal powers.  The actual power of decision-makers cannot be derived 
from the texts of the laws alone.   
That is why I argue that in order to understand the civil-military balance of power 
better, scholars have to look beyond the legal or formal powers of each side and analyze 
the informal factors of influence discussed below.  The legal/institutional arrangements 
tell us how civilian control works in theory -- power to make decisions on foreign and 
domestic issues, in time of war and in time of peace, lays in the hands of civilian 
officials.  They decide where to draw the line between the military and the political 
realms, how much to delegate to the military and what monitoring mechanisms to use.  





Or as Kohn writes: “civilians possess not only all the face cards and all the trump cards, 
but make up the rules of the game.”64  
The reality of civil-military relations, of course, is much more complex and 
cannot be fully understood without taking into account the informal sources of power.  
As Richard Neustadt reminds us, constitutional “powers” are no guarantee for actual 
power.  In the every-day interactions of civilian and military decision makers, gathered 
together to make life and death decisions, persuasion rather than direct command is the 
rule.  Civilian leaders’ formal authority does not automatically translate into an ability to 
make the military do what they want them to do.  Civilian leaders do not simply 
command the military; they must argue and bargain in order to persuade.65  As Andrew 
Bacevich wrote: “The dirty little secret of American civil-military relations, by no means 
unique [to the Clinton Administration], is that the commander in chief does not command 
the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases 
it.”66  Command has only a limited role in leadership.  Exasperated Franklin Roosevelt 
once remarked:  
“ …But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared 
with the Na-a-vy.  The admirals are really something to cope with – and I should 
know.  To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed.  You 
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally 
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exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started 
punching.”67   
 
While very important, formal/institutional authority is not a good predictor of influence.  
Because of the insufficiency and/or inadequacy of direct command in civil-military 
relations (and in decision-making in general), scholars have looked beyond the legal 
powers in order to identify other factors influencing the civil-military BOP. 
One such factor is the extent of unity of the military and the civilian institutions.  
There are numerous cases when civilian or military officials have skillfully used the 
divisions in the opposite camp and wielded exaggerated influence.  In the case of the 
U.S., civilian control and oversight of the military have been further complicated by the 
fact that the civilian institutions responsible for control (the Congress and the President) 
have their power divided by law.  Scholars developing the principal-agent model for 
analyzing civil-military relations have emphasized the difficulties in controlling the agent 
when the principals are divided.68  All else being equal, the military has more influence 
when civilians are divided.  Civilians have also played the military services off one 
another when the military has not been united. 
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Such lack of unity among the civilians and the military is common and has clearly 
affected the balance of power.  Cases show that the civilian principals have disagreed on 
both policy goals and the means for achieving the goals.  Such disagreements between 
the principals make it easier for the military to disobey or to choose to align itself with 
the preferences of either the Executive or Congress depending on whose preferences are 
closer to what the military prefers.  Even when Congress and the Executive are more or 
less in agreement on policy goals, disagreement on the different methods for monitoring 
and oversight could make civilian control less firm.  In his discussion of the problem of a 
legislative-executive divide and its impact on civil-military relations, Betts concludes that 
“[t]he means at the President’s disposal for silencing the Chiefs are limited because the 
National Security Act in effect mandates end runs by reinforcing military access to 
Congress, and because congressional leaders exact commitments from the Chiefs in their 
confirmation hearings to keep Congress informed of their disagreements with the 
administration.”69  Furthermore, there are divisions not only between the President and 
Congress, but within Congress and the Executive as well.  For example, one such case 
when the divisions within Congress greatly strengthened the voice of the military was the 
major disagreements between Senator Nunn and Representative Dellums over the “gays 
in the military” controversy at the start of the Clinton Presidency.   
Another factor which has affected significantly the balance of power between 
civilian and military leaders and which has often been overlooked is decision-makers’ 
level of education and experience in national security matters.  Again, we should admit 
that we do not have a very accurate way of measuring the level of experience and 
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expertise of top civilian and military officials and which kinds of knowledge and 
expertise exactly lead to increased influence over the policy-making process.  For the 
purposes of this study, political and military experience and expertise are measured by 
the number and type of relevant assignments an individual has held, such as appointments 
with the OSD staff, or with the Executive and Legislative branches of government, or 
think-tanks and universities.70  While such measures may not be accurate and are not very 
adequate if one would like to quantify decision-makers’ education and experience as a 
source of power, this way of measuring is good enough for the purposes of my theoretical 
framework for which we only need to establish approximately the relative power of 
civilian and military officials so we know whether the balance of power favors the 
civilians or the military.   
How has the level of education and experience of civilian and military officials 
been changing over time?  In the last three-four decades, the U.S. military has become 
more politically and bureaucratically sophisticated.  My research shows that especially in 
the last decade or so the military has significantly improved its ability to compete with 
civilian officials at the higher political-military levels.71   This is due mainly to the 
increased number of courses on international relations and American politics currently 
taught at war colleges, and also to programs that expose some of the military’s best and 
brightest to politics and policy-making in Washington. (These include internship and 
fellowship programs in various executive agencies or on Congressional staffs.)  In 
comparison to the 1960s when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was ruling the 
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Pentagon with an iron hand, by the time President Clinton took office, military officials 
were better educated and with significantly more politico-military experience, having 
served as policy advisors or as senior staff officers at the Pentagon and other departments 
or agencies of the federal government.  Certainly, if taken on its own merits and out of 
the civil-military context, this development is quite positive and should have beneficial 
effects on decision-making – one would think that the more educated and experienced 
military advisers we have, the better.  However, as I show in subsequent chapters, the 
problem was not the rise in education and experience of top military leaders, but that, 
unfortunately, this increase in power potential on the military side was accompanied by a 
marked decline in civilian expertise in military matters, which led to increased military 
influence in the Clinton years and an inability by civilian leaders to preside 
authoritatively over the military and guide the making of strategy.   
For example, an analysis of the civil-military relationship under Lyndon Johnson 
and in the first Clinton administration illustrates how important it is to take into account 
leaders’ education and experience in explaining variations in civilian and military 
influence over decision-making.  In the McNamara’s Pentagon, the military team was no 
match for the civilian “Whiz Kids” who (with the creation of the Office of Systems 
Analysis) radically changed the evaluation criteria for determining the merits of 
alternative policy options – they substituted quantitative methods and systems analysis 
for military judgment.  Thus, by winning the debate over evaluation criteria, top civilians 
were able to win most of the subsequent debates on policy choices.  In a similar fashion, 
in the first Clinton administration, thanks to their increased competence and their political 
savvy and sophistication, military leaders managed to win over their civilian counter-





options; then in subsequent debates some alternatives were not even discussed fully but 
discarded from the start because they did not fit well with the requirements of the Powell 
Doctrine. 
As my case studies show, the level of national security education and experience 
of decision-makers affects not only the civil-military balance of power, but the quality of 
the decision-making process and the content of policies as well.  Lacking expertise in 
defense issues and not being militarily savvy, statesmen are not likely to ask the “right” 
questions during deliberations on the use of force; they would not be able to push the 
military to get more “objective” information and may be boxed into a decision simply 
because they have been unable to make the military provide more options.  At the same 
time, military officials lacking bureaucratic skills and knowledge and understanding of 
the domestic political process will be unable to stand up to civilian leaders when they 
believe politicians are wrong.  Because of lack of political expertise, such military 
officials may fear to express an opinion, which civilian leaders will dislike or will not be 
able to dissuade statesmen from scatter-brained actions.  In either case, policy-making 
will suffer. 
Studying decision-makers’ national-security related knowledge and experience 
then is important since they are a source of influence over the decision-making process; 
hence, they are important for estimating the balance of power between civilian and 
military leaders.  At the same time, however, my research shows that decision-makers’ 
knowledge and experience, while necessary, are not sufficient for making effective 
decisions.  For example, the administration of George W. Bush included some of the 
most experienced foreign- and defense-policy officials (e.g., Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, 





decision-making leading up to the 2003 Iraq war was highly dysfunctional. Former Vice 
President Dick Cheney notes an additional aspect of experience which needs to be taken 
into account:  
But even with all that background, we had made mistakes when we first started working 
together. The lesson here is that while experience matters, it’s not just each individual’s 
experience that’s important, but experience working together as a team. We learned a lot 
from our missteps during the failed coup as well as from our success with Just Cause. 
And I believe it was because we’d had real experience managing crises together that we 
were able to respond as well as we did eight months later when Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait.72 
 
Scholars have also found that top decision-makers’ lack of military service affects 
their propensity to resort to the use of force. Regarding military service, the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies (TISS) project on the “Gap Between the Military and 
Civilian Society” shows that until the mid 1990s, the percentage of veterans was always 
higher in the Congress than in corresponding age and educational groups in the 
population.  After 1995, however, there have been fewer veterans as a percentage in the 
political elite as compared to the population.73  In 1993-94, 62 percent of the Senate and 
41 percent of the House were veterans.  In the 107th Congress, however, these figures for 
the Senate and the House were 36 percent and 29 percent respectively.74  Such trends 
may affect the level of understanding of military policy in Congress, and the overall 
ability of the legislative branch to perform effective oversight of the military.  Moreover, 
                                                            
72 Richard B. Cheney (with Liz Cheney), In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 2011). 
73 Ibid., p. 10.  Bianco and Markham have found that there is both an absolute decline in the number of 
veterans in both houses as well as a relative decline in the number of veterans compared to the general 
population.  For details see William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, “Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of 
Military Experience in the U.S. Congress,” in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., pp. 275-287. 
74 Norman Ornstein, “The Legacy of Campaign 2000,” Washington Quarterly (Spring 2001), p. 102.  See 
also William M. Welch, “Most U.S. Lawmakers Lack Combat Experience,” USA Today, November 12, 





other related studies have found that the presence (or absence) of veterans has a strong 
effect on American use of force.  For example, studying U.S. military behavior from 
1816 to 1992, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi conclude that the higher the proportion 
of veterans in the political elite, the lower the probability that the U.S. would use force.75  
In the coming years, in trying to make predictions about US propensity to use military 
force in crises, such factors need to be taken into account – for example, there may be an 
increase in the number of veterans in Congress and in the White House since many of the 
those who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq have expressed willingness to run for 
elective office and some of them have already been elected. 
 
Level of Civil-Military Preference Divergence  
The second explanatory variable -- the level of civil-military preference 
divergence -- is the extent to which civilian and military preferences on key international 
security issues converge or diverge. “Preferences” are defined broadly to include views, 
attitudes, opinions, values, and interests.76  This study focuses mainly on civilian and 
military preferences on issues related to U.S. foreign policy and national security, their 
core vision of America’s role in the world, the role and uses of military power and other 
tools of statecraft, the character of war, and their understanding of civilian control and 
CMR.  The level of divergence between civilian and military preferences is coded as 
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varying from “high” to “low.”77  “Low” preference divergence does not mean a state of 
complete agreement or total overlap of the views and interests of civilian and military 
leaders.  When preference divergence is low, some disagreements between civilian and 
military officials do exist but they are more about the details or the minor issues; they are 
not major philosophical differences and there exists a basic overlap of perspectives. 
How do we establish the level of civil-military preference divergence at a given 
time?  This could be done by establishing the views of top civilian and military leaders on 
important issues related to Foreign policy and the use of force and then by evaluating the 
degree to which they are in agreement or conflict.  Examples of key questions that are 
considered in each case in order to establish the level of preference divergence include:  
what are the main US foreign policy objectives at the time? Which of these objectives are 
worth pursuing by force (e.g., regime change, defence of human rights, defence of key 
allies, defence of key resources, etc.)? How effective is military force for achieving 
certain foreign policy goals? What is the role of the military in general? Should force be 
used in the crisis in question? How force should be used? What kind of civilian control 
do they prefer?  If civilian and mil leaders’ preferences diverge on many or most of these 
core issues, there is a high level of preference divergence at the time.  High civil-military 
preference divergence denotes the existence of deep and lasting divides between top 
civilian and military leaders over security policy.  As discussed in more details in the case 
studies, there was a low civil-military preference divergence, for instance, in the 
administration of George H. W. Bush.  Examples of high civil-military preference 
divergence are the Clinton administration and the Rumsfeld Pentagon. 
                                                            





As evidence for the preferences of civilian and military leaders I use the 
recommendations they provide during the policy-making process, as well as various other 
sources revealing their ideas and beliefs on the issues – e.g., historical accounts, 
biographies, decision-makers’ speeches, interviews, memoirs, as well as opinion surveys 
and other academic studies of elite beliefs.78  Documenting preferences and the level of 
preference divergence in this way makes my approach different from those who assume a 
constant (as opposed to variable) level of divergence and conflict (just because civilians 
and the military do have different views on issues) or those who deduce civilian and 
military preferences from existing theories – e.g., some use organizational theory to argue 
that militaries always prefer offensive doctrines because they are seen as maximizing 
military autonomy and defense budgets, which are good for the  health of the military as 
an organization.  It is true that most of the time there is at least some level of divergence 
between civilian and military views79, but as I show the intensity of this divergence varies 
and it is important to know whether we have a high or a low level of preference 
divergence at a given time because this affects the way civilian and military officials 
make and implement policies.  My approach does not assume a priori either similarity or 
divergence of civilian and military preferences, but documents the extent to which 
preferences actually diverge at a given time and then analyzes how low and high levels of 
preference divergence respectively affect the quality of the decision-making process.  
When we analyze ideas and beliefs, we have to always be careful about endogeneity 
problems.  Stated ideas could be rationalizations of policies pursued on other grounds 
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79 See, for example, Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 





rather than causes of those policies.  In this sense, ideas may appear to explain the 
adopted strategy or policy while in fact they are a result of it. 
 Civilian and military preferences diverge for a variety of reasons many of which 
are beyond the scope of this study.  One such reason is that political and military leaders 
bring into the decision-making process their different backgrounds, perspectives, and 
concerns.  Politicians have to take into account a variety of social, economic, political 
and diplomatic considerations, and not only the military and security dimensions of an 
issue.  Also, as supporters of bureaucratic politics have argued, decision-makers’ 
preferences could be determined by one's position within the government bureaucracy – 
“where you stand depends on where you sit.”  An example for this would be General 
Marshall who, while Chief of Staff, opposed the idea of the State Department to use aid 
in order to promote reforms in the Chinese government, but once he became Secretary of 
State, started to support this idea and found himself in conflict with the new chief of staff.  
Another explanation for the origins of preferences on the use of force is past experience, 
especially something as dramatic as the Vietnam War.  The Powell Doctrine, for 
example, is directly traceable to General Powell’s service in that war.  Past experience is 
also not a uniform explanation because different people take different things from the 
very same experience; there were contradictory lessons from the Vietnam War, as well as 
from almost all major crises.   
Clashing civilian and military preferences could result from the struggle for 
control over some overlapping roles and functions of civil and military institutions.  
Statesmen and soldiers perceive as blurred the lines between the “properly” military and 
civilian prerogatives.  “Spheres of influence” that are at the uncertain border between the 





maximum operational autonomy while civilians prefer tighter control in order to ensure 
that the military instrument will truly serve the political objectives.  This dissertation does 
not attempt to explain in detail the causes of the preference divergence or the process of 
preference formation.  The emphasis here is on the fact that civil-military preference 
divergence is not constant but varies over time and that the degree to which civilian and 
military preferences overlap or are in conflict has a significant impact on the quality of 
the decision-making and implementation processes. 
Table 1 below summarizes what would be a case of clashing civilian and military 






Issue Civilian Preference Military Preference 
Use of Force in Crises 
(Whether to Use Force) 
With certain exceptions, 
civilian leaders have been 
more willing to use force 
than the military. The post- 
Cold War period especially 
has been characterized by 
“repeated clashes between 
promiscuous civilians and 
reluctant warriors.”80 
 
With the exception of some 
hawks, the military often 
prefers “force as a last 
resort.” 
Especially after the 
Vietnam War, the military 
has become more vocal in 
its opposition to the use of 
force.81 
Mode of Use of Force 
(How to Use Force) 
Limited force could be 
used, even on behalf of 
open-ended objectives, or 
for signaling, not 
necessarily for victory; 
political considerations 
always dictate how much 
force would be used; 
political logic (e.g., growing 
concern for civilian 
casualties or consideration 
of allies’ preferences) 
dominates over military 
logic; Civilian leaders have 
been more willing to use 
force and they are also more 
Prefer to use overwhelming 
force quickly and decisively 
to achieve clear and 
attainable objectives; prefer 
to use force only for the 
defense of vital interests 
and only if public and 
Congressional support is 
assured82 
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81 See David H. Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence 
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also, Colin L. Powell, “United States Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/93), pp. 
32-45.  Such views on the use of force are dominant among the Vietnam generation, especially in the 





likely to place constraints 
on the use of force. 
Control Over Operations Civilians prefer “assertive 
control” in order to ensure 
that military operations will 
not jeopardize political 
goals;  
The military prefer 
“objective control” – clear 
division of spheres of 
influence and civilian non-
interference in the 
“military” sphere; prefer as 
much autonomy over 
operations as possible; 
Believe that civilian 
meddling or micro-
management leads to 
battlefield disasters  
Political Objectives  Civilian leaders have 
multiple objectives which 
necessitate trade-offs; 
vagueness in objectives 
retains politicians’ 
flexibility; fuzzy objectives 
help maintain alliances 
and/or deflect opposition; 
they also allow statesmen to 
claim “victory” and 
extricate themselves from a 
conflict after declaring that 
the objectives have been 
achieved 
For the military, clarity of 
objectives is a must; the 
military believes this is one 
of the most important 
lessons of the Vietnam war, 
“lost” at least in part 
because of lack of clear 
purpose83 
 
The next paragraphs build intuition as to why elite civilian and military 
preferences are important and how the level of preference divergence affects the quality 
of the decision-making process.  The content of elite civilian and military preferences, 
together with the relative power of statesmen and soldiers, ultimately determine whether 
a country will go to war or will choose other means to achieve its goals. Perhaps counter-
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intuitively, in the United States, especially after the Vietnam War, the military has more 
often than not been opposed to the use of force and has preferred other means for 
achieving this country’s political objectives.  After the end of the Cold War, it is 
interesting that to the extent that there is militarization of American foreign policy 
(defined as overusing military means at the expense of other tools of statecraft), it is due 
to hawkish civilian leaders, and not to the military.84  In case after case, it is the generals 
who are trying to put the breaks on zealous politicians, pushing for the use of force in 
crises.  In order to predict whether, for example, in a crisis, a country will be more likely 
to choose use of force, one should study the preferences of its civilian and military 
leaders and their relative influence over the decision-making process. 
I argue that the level of divergence between civilian and military ideas and beliefs 
needs to be taken into account because it affects decision-makers’ incentives during the 
deliberation and implementation of policies.  The level of civil-military preference 
divergence also affects the key aspects of the decision-making process – i.e., the ways in 
which civilian and military leaders gather and exchange information, the 
comprehensiveness and rigor of their policy discussions, and the ways in which leaders 
coordinate and cooperate with each other in the decision-making and implementation 
phase.  An analysis of the level of preference divergence between top decision-makers 
and their advisors can also tell us how receptive leaders would be to the opinions and 
information provided by these advisors.  For example, the level of civil-military 
preference divergence is very important because of the different ways decision-makers 
seek and interpret information and advice depending on the source, which provides them 
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(as opposed to the content of advice).  Political leaders are more likely to discount advice 
(or not seek it at all) from advisors with whom they disagree strongly.85  At the same 
time, they are more receptive to sharing information with and listening to people whose 
preferences and interests they see as similar to their own.  Low levels of civil-military 
preference divergence are not only inevitable, but they could be beneficial for decision-
making as well.  Such conflict could be stimulating and lead to search of additional 
information and a more thorough evaluation of alternative options.   
The injection of dissenting views during deliberations and their critical evaluation 
could be crucial for effective decision-making.  Studies show that decision-makers could 
be receptive to discrepant advice when it comes from people who largely share their 
views.  At the same time, discrepant opinions given by advisors whose preferences are 
very different from the leaders’ preferences, are most often rejected or discounted.  For 
example, during the Vietnam war, Lyndon Johnson reacted very differently to similar 
advice provided by George Ball and Clark Clifford and this was mainly because Johnson 
and Clifford have been in agreement on almost everything concerning the war from the 
very beginning, while Johnson expected Ball to have dissenting views in almost all cases 
anyway.  That is why Ball’s views were discounted, while Clifford’s arguments that the 
war was un-winnable had a very strong impact on LJB.86   
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Studying the level of conflict in the preferences of decision-makers is important 
also from the stand-point of social identity theory.  Social psychologists show how 
conflicting views among decision-makers split them into competing factions formed 
around their preferred policies.  The higher the level of conflict, the more cohesive the 
“in-group” becomes; furthermore, the level of animosity towards the “out-group” 
intensifies as well.87  Such dynamics most often affect negatively the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process because decision-makers resort to various manipulative 
strategies in order to advance the policy preferences of the in-group and/or decrease the 
chances for success of the out-group.  Most recently, such was the case in the George W. 
Bush administration when the group around Vice President Cheney systematically 
excluded from the process people around Colin Powell, who, according to Cheney, were 
“not on the team.”   
Evidence shows that top policy-makers and their advisors (political, military, and 
others) have made numerous attempts to manipulate the foreign-policy decision-making 
process in order to advance their preferred policies.  The use of manipulation tactics is 
ubiquitous.88  Manipulating the decision process is especially pronounced precisely when 
preferences diverge highly and each side is bent on winning.  A variety of manipulation 
strategies have been used during all stages of the decision-making process.  Such 
strategies include: manipulating the structure of the decision-making group (i.e., who is 
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Making,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37 (2005), pp. 219-253. 
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allowed to attend meetings when policy options are presented and debated), manipulating 
the group’s operating procedures, shaping the agenda of policy meetings, framing the 
issues, salami tactics, and others.89  All of these manipulation techniques could make the 
decision-making process less effective.  For example, if one manipulates the make up of 
the decision group by regularly under-representing views one disagrees with, this could 
lead to distorting the decision-making process toward the preferred views of the 
manipulator which under “normal” circumstances may not have prevailed and may not 
have been the better policy choice. 
Also, consistent with the above and the logic of the principal-agent theory, I show 
that high preference divergence exacerbates the problem of private information inherent 
in the civil-military relationship.  In cases of intense preference divergence, both the 
civilian principal and the military agent have an incentive to withhold or distort 
information in order to support an outcome closer to their own preferences.  For example, 
if one side favors military intervention and knows that the other side disagrees, it is likely 
to de-emphasize the costs and risks of using force in order to make its preferred option 
more appealing.  Such manipulation of information could contribute to poor analysis of 
options during the formulation of strategy.  Furthermore, intense preference divergence 
increases the incentives of each side to pursue its own set of goals and, hence, it 
diminishes the chances for cooperation between civilian and military officials.  
Ultimately, this could lead to a failure to fully integrate military views with political and 
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diplomatic policy and a failure to match successfully political objectives and military 
means. 
My case studies illustrate in detail the impact of high and low levels of civil-
military preference divergence on the decision-making process.  While some level of 
“creative” civil-military conflict could improve the decision-making process, intense 
preference divergence leads to ineffective policy-making.  Defining and evaluating 
civilian and military preferences during the policy-making process is not easy.  It is not 
often the case that we find a near perfect line-up of all civilians on one side of an issue 
versus the military on the other.  At times, the civilians or the military or both are split 
internally.  The problem posed by such internal divisions could be solved by careful case 
selection as discussed later on in this chapter.   
 
Factors Affecting the Persuasiveness of Advice 
Military officials may provide the perfect advice but it will have no effect on the 
decision-making process unless policy-makers are receptive to it.  Hence, we need to 
investigate the conditions under which advice is more influential.   How do decision-
makers get persuaded to choose one course of action over another?  How do they decide 
to accept or reject information coming from their advisors? Two main factors influence 
decision-makers’ willingness to accept or reject advice: 1) the content of the message and 
2) the source of the advice (more precisely, policy-makers’ attitudes towards the 
source/the communicator).  Different aspects of the content of advice that affect the 
likelihood of its acceptance have been studied extensively in cognitive psychology, as 
well as communication theory (e.g., studies on motivated and unmotivated biases; 





dissertation finds support for many of the existing propositions of this literature. For 
example, the content of advice may be seen as problematic and may be rejected for 
several reasons.  It could be perceived as low quality.  It could be seen as good advice but 
very difficult to implement or impractical.  Or it could be that the content of the advice 
does not fit with the preferences of decision-makers; they could have already committed 
to a different course of action and the psychological and political costs of changing their 
mind at that stage may be prohibitive.  (Studies of various biases find that advice is more 
likely to be accepted if it fits with decision-makers’ pre-existing beliefs and ideas.)90 
The second factor, which affects the quality of communication between civilian 
and military officials and the reception of advice, is decision-makers’ attitude towards the 
source of advice.  It is an obvious but poorly-investigated variable and this study attempts 
to contribute some additional evidence on this count.  Evidence shows that decision-
makers, at times, reject advice not because they disagree with its content but because they 
have negative attitudes towards the advisors providing the information.  Regarding the 
source of advice, policy-makers usually reject the opinion of advisors who they perceive 
as incompetent or having views and goals different from their own.  Needless to say, 
those two reasons for rejecting advice (content and source) are not contradictory or 
mutually exclusive, and in some cases it could be difficult to separate them.  But 
differentiating whether advice was rejected because of its content or source could be 
useful, for example, in cases when decision-makers reject communications they would 
have accepted from an alternative source and when the rejection of such advice leads to 
costly errors.  Discounting or rejecting information only on the basis of who provides it 
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could be quite irrational, especially in cases when decision-makers dismiss advice out of 
hand, without even acquainting themselves with its content while the message could have 
been very convincing otherwise.  This happens when the source is perceived as 
adversarial.  Or, as theories of communication and persuasion show, if a source is not 
trusted, it will not be listened to.91  Such was the case with the “war” between DoD and 
State in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War and this affected the decision-making process 
very negatively.  In the words of Dov Zakheim, “A second equally compelling reason 
that the Defense Department rejected State’s planning effort for Iraq is that the two 
agencies were in a turf war and consequently responded to each other in a knee-jerk 
fashion.  … almost anything that State proposed was immediately rejected at some level 
of Defense simply because the idea was State’s.  And State reciprocated in kind.”92  The 
Chapter on the 2003 Iraq war analyzes this in more detail.   
Now I will turn to some of the most important factors that affect how much 
decision-makers trust a source of communication93: 1) The expertness of the source, 
including but not limited to his/her knowledge/expertise, intelligence, education, prestige 
(the public perception of the source’s expertness)  2) Decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
intent  and sincerity of the source – e.g., whether decision-makers believe the source may 
have a political or personal agenda, different from their own, which may cloud his/her 
judgment and recommendations;  3) past experience and interactions with the source  4) 
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the form and the way in which the source proffers his/her advice  - e.g., cases show that 
for high-ranking officials it matters significantly whether advice, especially dissenting 
views, are offered in private or publicly.  The next paragraphs discuss briefly each of 
these factors and how they may be related.   
All else being equal, decision-makers are more likely to be persuaded by advisors 
who are highly knowledgeable about the issues under discussion.  At the same time, 
knowledge and expertise alone do not guarantee that an advisor will be trusted.  Policy-
makers may believe that their advisors are highly expert and still reject their advice if 
they suspect them of having some self-serving motives.94  As Richard Kohn argues, 
“officers who are suspected by politicians and by the public of being influenced by their 
own ideology, or of possessing strong beliefs about the best policy, vitiate the credibility 
of their advice as being entirely professional.”95  The importance of decision-makers’ 
perception of the intentions of their advisors is confirmed by my case studies. 
Research also confirms that advice is influential precisely when decision-makers 
do not doubt the sincerity of their advisors and are not suspicious they are prioritizing 
their own personal or political interests.  Rumsfeld and Cheney explain Cheney’s big 
influence with President George W. Bush with two facts: the Vice-President did not have 
an agenda of his own and he scrupulously stayed out of the lime light and never shared 
publicly any of the advice he provided to Bush, especially in cases the two disagreed.  
Arguably the most influential Vice-President in American history, Cheney did not enjoy 
this status mainly because of his knowledge and experience in Washington, although they 
were important.  The reason Bush trusted him so much was that unlike other Vice-
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Presidents, Cheney had no political ambitions of his own. He was not going to run for the 
Presidency so Bush knew that his advice would not be colored by a personal agenda.  As 
Cheney himself writes: 
And the impact of my advice depended first and foremost on my relationship with 
the president. At the end of the day, it wouldn’t have mattered how many years of 
experience I had or how many other offices I’d held, if the president wasn’t interested in 
what I had to say.”  “First, I made clear early on that I would not be running for president 
myself in four or eight years. The president never had to worry that I was taking a 
position with an eye toward how it might be perceived by voters in Iowa or New 
Hampshire. I also decided to limit my exposure to the press.96       
Another important factor affecting trust is officials’ past experience.  This is 
among the most important influences and was also shown to be relevant to some of the 
top civilian officials examined in my case studies.  The past experience of decision-
makers and their previous interactions with military, diplomatic or intelligence advisors 
proves to influence behavior significantly.  A case in point is the way Vice President 
Dick Cheney formed his own unflattering attitude of the intelligence community and a 
reason why he treated the information the IC provided in the lead-up to the Iraq war with 
utter mistrust.  As Cheney himself admitted, he had many doubts about the intelligence 
precisely because of his past experience in government. In his view, the CIA has gotten it 
wrong more than once and they could be making a mistake again just because 
“intelligence is an uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances.”97 The CIA did 
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not warn us at the time the Soviet Union was so close to collapse.  There were other cases, 
even more pertinent to the decision on Iraq - Cheney remembered how the CIA did not 
predict that Saddam’s tanks will roll across the border into Kuwait and that intelligence 
analysts before the 1991 Gulf War underestimated how close Saddam was to developing 
a nuclear weapon.  After having felt misled (and even betrayed) by intelligence experts 
more than once, he thought it safer not to trust them anymore or, at least, to probe deeply 
the information which comes from them.   
Other examples come from the Kennedy administration – the President and 
SecDef McNamara lost a lot of respect and trust in the military because of military advice 
provided during the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis.  As JFK confided to his 
brother, “An invasion [of Cuba] would have been a mistake – a wrong use of power.  But 
the military are mad.  They wanted to do this.  It’s luck we have McNamara over there [at 
the Pentagon].”98  This negative experience affected JFK’s evaluation of the judgment of 
high-ranking military officials and made him think that his civilian advisors could 
provide better recommendations.  As H. R. McMaster writes: “In Kennedy's mind, the 
poor advice given by the JCS, coupled with a negative outcome of negotiations, started to 
close his mind to military advisers and forced him to seek ways in which to control the 
JCS.”99 While serving as Vice President, LBJ participated in the decision-making process 
in both cases – the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These experiences 
“reinforced his contempt of the Joint Chiefs and most other senior military officers who 
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Johnson alternatively ignored, cajoled, lied to and insulted during his administration.”100  
In the case of American civil-military relations, the Vietnam War is the experience that 
dramatically affected trust between the military and the civilians.  In the words of 
Richard Kohn, “The Vietnam War did much to destroy trust between civilians and the 
military in the government.  It led a whole generation of military people to distrust 
civilians and civilian control, and to vow never again to be sent into battle without 
adequate resources, a winning strategy, the support of the American people, and an exit 
strategy.”101 
The 4th factor affecting decision-makers’ trust – forms of structuring and 
presenting advice – is particularly important for dissenting advice and has often played an 
important role in civil-military relations.  One of the leading American scholars on civil-
military relations, Don Snider, finds that it matters significantly whether dissent is public 
or private and that private forms of dissent strengthen the trust relationship between 
civilian and military leaders.102                 
Top civilian officials have made it very clear that their attitude towards advisors 
and colleagues have changed when private dissent and criticism have been made public – 
deliberately or inadvertently, as confirmed by my case studies as well.   
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Relation between preference divergence and trust.   
 Preference divergence shows to be closely related with trust (high preference 
divergence is correlated with low levels of trust).  The next paragraphs discuss this 
relationship also because trust between civilian and military officials has proven to be 
very important for effective decision-making. 103   The level of trust affects the way 
civilian and military leaders communicate and interact with each other. It also affects the 
extent to which civilian leaders would be receptive to military advice.  My case studies 
show that the making of effective strategies and policies is very rarely possible if civilian 
and military leaders distrust each other.  Such was the case, for example, under 
Kennedy/Johnson/McNamara, Clinton and Rumsfeld - the civil-military relationship 
lacked trust and this affected negatively the ability of the US to produce coherent policies, 
integrating military and political considerations.  The lack of trust affects negatively the 
quality of the civil-military dialogue and, thus, the quality of the decision-making process 
itself.  More specifically, in cases when the civilians distrust the military, they usually 
ignore their advice and, at times, even exclude them from the debates.104  They turn to 
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relying primarily on civilian advice and thus, the expertise and input of the military 
cannot be integrated into the policies.  In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, distrust led to 
ignoring not only military advice, but also the expertise of State and the CIA.  All of this 
ultimately resulted into a flawed strategy.  Regarding civil-military interaction, lack of 
trust usually leads civilian leaders to micro-manage the military, Vietnam and the 2003 
Iraq war cases being the most obvious in this respect.  
The relationship between preference divergence and trust is a complex one. While 
there seems to be a correlation between highly diverging preferences and lack of trust, 
there is no causation. On many occasions, naturally, when decision-makers have seen that 
they and their top military advisors have very different preferences on the use of force in 
general, or about a particular operation, they have had doubts about the advice they will 
receive from the officers or the way the military will execute their orders.  In such 
circumstances, civilians have even resorted to close monitoring or micromanagement to 
ensure that civilian, and not military, preferences are fulfilled at the end.  However, high 
preference divergence does not always go together with lack of trust. We may strongly 
disagree with somebody and still trust him/her.  Likewise, we may have similar views 
with someone but not trust him/her.  Before discussing in more detail the relation 
between preferences and trust, let’s analyze what other factors also affect trust.   
The table below sums up 4 possibilities for the relation between preference 
divergence and trust.  If we apply this to the relationship between civilian and military 
leaders, Quadrant 1 will be a case of civilian and military officials having similar ideas 
and interests and trusting each other (e.g., the civil-military relationship under Bush, Sr.). 
Quadrant 2 will be a case where political and military officials have diverging ideas, 





making process during Operation Torch in 1942). Quadrant 3 is a relationship in which 
politicians and military officers have similar ideas but distrust each other. Quadrant 4 
refers to a relationship in which civilian and military officials disagree significantly on 
the most important issues and do not trust each other (e.g., the relationship between 
Rumsfeld and the military for the most part of the W. Bush Administration; civil-military 
relations under Kennedy/Johnson/McNamara; civil-military relations in the first Clinton 
Administration).  
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Based on this, we can think of the circumstances under which it is more likely for 
the conditions for a good-quality decision-making process to be fulfilled, namely: having 
a continuous civil-military dialogue - free and open communication and exchange of 
information and ideas between civilian and military leaders, and smooth coordination, 
interaction and cooperation between them. Civilian and military leaders would be most 





– having similar ideas and interests and trusting each other.  As my case studies show, 
under such conditions, political and military officials exchange ideas freely, do not try to 
distort, manipulate or conceal information, civilians are more likely to be open to hearing 
military advice, and the military is more likely to implement decisions without shirking.  
Civilian and military leaders will be least likely to design and implement good strategies 
and policies under conditions like the ones in Quadrant 4 - a situation in which the two 
sides have highly diverging views and interests and the level of trust between them is 
very low.  In such situations, communication and interaction between civilian and 
military officials is likely to be difficult and the relationship will most likely be tense. 
Both sides may be sharing information only selectively to benefit their own preferred 
course of action. Civilians may discount or reject advice coming from the military and 
may decide to micromanage the officers to ensure their compliance.      
Zakheim’s interesting observation about the Crusader story also links mistrust 
with the subsequent high levels of preference divergence over strategy making in Iraq, 
saying we cannot understand the latter without the former.  “The lack of trust presaged 
the bitter rift that opened up during the following year between Shinseki, on the one hand, 
and Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, on the other, over the size of the force that was required to 
prosecute the invasion and occupation of Iraq.  It is simply not possible to understand the 
latter without the former.”105  In this case, first trust was lost, then the lack of trust 
exacerbated the differences in the preferences of civilian and military officials on key 
issues of strategy-making on Iraq.  It is often the case that high preference divergence 







FDR and Marshall, who disagreed on a lot of occasions, sometimes bitterly, but they 
were still able to keep the civil-military relationship functioning effectively because they 
never lost trust in each other.  In this sense, trust could mitigate to some extent the 
negative consequences of high preference divergence.       
Most analysts offer the civil-military relationship under FDR (especially the 
relationship between the President and Gen. Marshall) as a useful model of well-
functioning advisory relationship which contributed significantly to the American success 
in the war.  How was it possible for a trustful and cooperative civil-military relationship 
to be preserved despite the significant differences in civilian and military preferences? As 
is well-known, FDR and Marshall disagreed on some key strategic and political issues – 
e.g., Marshall opposed sending munitions to Britain and the Soviet Union, arguing that 
they are needed more at home for the American rearmament; he disagreed with the 
President’s decision to occupy Greenland and Iceland in 1941 and to invade North Africa 
in 1942.  However, both sides did their best to build and maintain an effective civil-
military relationship.  President Roosevelt encouraged a frank dialogue and vigorous 
debates; he provided opportunities for the military to address important issues and to 
express their disagreements with civilian views.106  FDR showed genuine respect for the 
military leaders and did not micromanage.  As for General Marshall, according to Kohn, 
with his civilian bosses in the White House and Congress he “was often brutally frank, 
sometimes even confrontational, but always cooperative and never dismissive.”107 At the 
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same time, Marshall dutifully kept all his disagreements with the President private. 
“Marshall was honest and straightforward; he never leaked a word or undermined his 
bosses’ decisions.” 108   He was convinced that it was very important for the US 
government to present a united front both domestically and internationally. The general 
also understood that any indiscretion can ruin the trust between him and the President and 
diminish his influence in internal debates.  As George Marshall shares in an interview, “I 
thought it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member 
of the team and try to do my convincing within the team, rather than to take action 
publicly contrary to desires of the president and certain members of Congress.”109 Above 
all, FDR never doubted Marshall’s loyalty.  Even when he disagreed, Marshall always 
faithfully executed Presidential orders and never questioned FDR’s authority to decide on 
the use of military force.  For example, when Roosevelt rejected Marshall’s advice and 
ordered the invasion of North Africa instead of the cross-channel invasion, the military 
did their best to execute the order.      
Since trust is such an important component of the civil-military relationship and 
since it affects the quality of the decision-making process, the next paragraphs discuss 
briefly what the recent literature says about factors ruining trust between political and 
military officials and the ways to improve it.  Richard Kohn also discusses particular 
developments in recent history that have made civilian leaders distrustful of the military 
and have made them even more determined to exercise tougher control over the Pentagon.  
“Over a half century, bureaucratic maneuvering, end runs to Congress, sophisticated 
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public relations campaigns, leaks, and alliances with contractors and with local 
communities and veterans groups have aroused the political leadership’s suspicion and 
diminished its trust in the military, whatever its rhetoric of support for the military and 
national defense.”110 Kohn goes on to suggest steps that each side – civilian and military 
– can take in order to inspire more trust.  For example, military leaders should be candid. 
They should avoid activities that might be or be perceived to be maneuvering or 
manipulating the civilians in order to achieve outcomes according to military preferences, 
including “leaking, denying information, failing to implement orders or policies or 
slowing them down, end runs to Congress, or framing choices so as to limit or manipulate 
the options.”  Building trust also requires that civilian officials do not doubt the military 
would obey their orders. Also, "Flag officers should speak up but not out, that is, not 
speak publicly but keep their advice confidential, prevent their staff from leaking papers 
or advice, and not let either become public unless communicated in testimony when 
Congress asks for their personal views."111 
Civilians should also do their fair share for inspiring trust. They should learn to 
understand the military – its needs, culture, past experiences and their effects on its way 
of thinking.  While the proper civil-military relationship is one of subordination of the 
military, an effective decision-making process requires an ongoing dialogue in which the 
military should be encouraged to freely express its disagreements. “Civilians should treat 
military people and their institutions with genuine respect.  This does not mean 
automatically deferring to them, to their judgment or advice. … civilians should support 
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and defend the military against unwarranted or unfair criticism...[they] must hold the 
military accountable for its actions, [but] should also be accountable; they have no 
business hiding behind the military to cover for their own mistakes.”112  
  
                                                            






The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Civilian Control:  
The Unintended Consequences of Institutional Reforms 
 
 My analysis of the legal/institutional powers of civilian and military leaders 
centers on the main constitutional checks on the power of the military as well as key 
defense reorganization laws in order to examine how changes in institutional rules and 
norms have affected the relations between top civilian and military officials.  By 
examining the legal powers of top decision-makers, we can illustrate some of the key 
arguments started in the Theory Chapter: 1. When we analyze the power of civilian and 
military officials, both formal (legal/institutional) and informal sources of power (e.g., 
professional reputation, education and experience, public standing/prestige, support by 
key political actors, such as Congress and the public) are important in explaining the 
civil-military balance of power and its variance.  2.  While legal powers are certainly 
important, I argue against legal determinism in that laws in and of themselves do not 
guarantee that civilian or military officials will dominate or that military advice would be 
taken into account.  Developments after the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
confirm that the actual power of top civilian and military leaders cannot be determined 
solely based on their legal powers.  Hence, in order to understand the civil-military 
balance of power better, scholars have to look beyond the legal or formal powers of each 
side and analyze the informal factors of influence.  3. Laws like the GNA or any other 
institutional changes could and do affect the effectiveness of the decision-making process 
but only on the margin because they cannot be relied upon to fix problems in the civil-





between top civilian and military officials that matters for the quality of decision-making 
on the use of force.     
 More specifically, this chapter argues that, in practice, the Goldwater-Nicholas 
Act, has weakened civilian control, which goes contrary to one of the main goals of this 
legislation, namely, strengthening civilian authority and improving the effectiveness of 
the decision process.  I explain why this law, which has been called by some the most 
sweeping reform legislation in the history of this country, is one of the key reasons for 
the increased influence of the military in the 1990s.  This legislation helped change the 
balance of power in favor of the military in at least three ways: 1) by unifying the 
military and thus strengthening it in debates with civilian officials; 2) by enhancing the 
relative power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and transferring to him key functions; 
and 3) by increasing significantly the competence and preparedness of the officers, 
serving in joint staffs, while failing to do the same for their civilian counterparts.  These 
changes in practice facilitated the expression of united military preferences, which led to 
increased political power of the military. It became more difficult for civilians to play the 
services off one another. The consequences of these institutional changes, which 
promoted jointness and strengthened the military formulation of strategy became quite 
obvious under Gen. Colin Powell.  As a result, civilian leaders were often presented not 
with different military options from which they could choose but with a unified military 
position, which they could overrule or disregard only if they were willing to pay a very 
high political price. 
 While it is true that the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened significantly the 
voice of the Chairman as the nation’s highest ranking and most powerful officer, as I 





guarantee that military advice will be dominant.  As my case study on the 2003 Iraq war 
and the relations between Secretary Rumsfeld and CJCS Gen. Myers show, this 
legislation gives top military leaders the right to be heard, but not heeded. 
 Furthermore, this chapter shows that in order to understand the civil-military 
balance of power, scholars have to look beyond the legal powers of each side.  The 
legal/institutional arrangements tell us only how civilian control works in theory: power 
to make decisions on foreign and domestic issues, in time of war and in time of peace, 
lays in the hands of civilian officials. However, the every-day aspects of civilian control 
and how civil-military relations affect the decision-making process are better explained 
through a model of strategic interaction, which takes into account the sources of informal 
influence of civilian and military officials during the decision-making process, as well as 
the intensity of preference divergence between them, as explained in Chapters II and III 
of this study.  The analysis of the consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act confirms 
the importance not only of informal power, but also some particular sources of such 
power, which the theory of this study has used to explain the overall balance of power 
between top civilian and military officials.  Such sources of power are, for example: the 
level of education and experience of top political and military decision-makers, their 
political and bureaucratic skills, and whether they are united or divided within. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows: The first section discusses briefly the reforms 
prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) 113  and sets the context for the reform 
legislation of the mid 1980s. It points to the importance of the legal/institutional 
framework of the civil-military relationship but argues that it is not sufficient to explain 
                                                            
113 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99–433, 99th U.S. 





important aspects of the decision-making process, such as why, for example, civilian 
leaders reject military advice. Secondly, I discuss the main objectives and provisions of 
the GNA and how they affected the main actors in the decision-making process. The third 
section analyzes the extent to which the objectives of the law have been met.  It 
challenges the conventional wisdom of the GNA as a success by pointing to some of its 
serious negative consequences. This section ends with a brief comparison between 
Generals Colin Powell and Richard Myers as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
which shows that while they served under the same legal provisions, their role and 
influence while being the principal military advisor to the top civilian leadership differed 
significantly.  This once again makes the case against legal determinism.  The fourth 
section discusses the positive and negative aspects of recent proposals to use the GNA as 
a model for Interagency reform and the fifth section concludes.    
 
I. Institutional Reforms Prior to the GNA 
 The passing of the GNA in 1986 was preceded by two other major re-
organizations of the U.S. Armed forces and the National Security apparatus after World 
War II. The first one happened with the adoption of the National Security Act in 1947 
(signed into law on July 26 by President Truman). This legislation set up a unified 
military command known as the National Military Establishment (NME).  It also created 
the CIA, the NSC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.114 The National Security Act shifted 
responsibility away from the service secretaries and gave the OSD authority over the 
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national military establishment.115 Although this law placed the NME under the control 
of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), at first, this newly-established position had very 
limited powers.  This started to change in 1949 when the original Act was amended and 
the NME was renamed the Department of Defense. 
 The National Security Act of 1947 also “mandated a chairman to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS), but did not define his power, stipulating that the JCS were the principle 
military advisors to senior civilian leadership, the President, NSC and the SecDef.”116  
The Tydings Bill, a supplement to the amended National Security Act, left the Chairman 
of the JCS with limited powers.  It listed the following duties of the Chairman: 1. Serve 
as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2. Provide the agenda for meetings of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3. Inform the Secretary of Defense and when appropriate the 
President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not 
been reached.117 This shows the Chairman was first among equals. He did not have the 
ability to control the Service Chiefs. The reluctance to give more substantial powers to 
the Chairman resulted from the fear of creating a Czar-like position. Parochial service 
interests dominated and the inter-service rivalries often made it impossible for the JCS to 
provide effective advice.118  
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 The problems created by the inter-service rivalries motivated the second major 
reform, which happened under President Eisenhower with the adoption of the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958. The new law provided the mandate for unified and specified 
commands, continued to consolidate power in the Secretary of Defense and strengthened 
the organization of the JCS.  The act sought to "centralize control over the services, 
remove redundancies, streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian 
control at the Pentagon."119  It stripped the JCS of most of their power, shifting it to the 
Secretary of Defense. Even though the JCS retained the status of principal military 
advisers, they were taken out of the chain of command. 
 The reforms in the late 1940 and 1950s aimed at improving bureaucratic 
efficiency and concentrated authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Robert 
McNamara was the first to put to use the enormous authority accumulated in his office.  
Critics argued that the powers of the Secretary of Defense not only made him in charge of 
strategic planning and operational direction of forces but also marginalized military 
expertise.  “Whirlwind DOD reorganization … resulted in a command structure that 
marginalized the judgment of senior officers. In 1965, for example, prior to the critical 
decision to send ground forces to Vietnam, JCS met with the President only twice.”120 
 The above logic leads to the conclusion that the legal provisions at the time, 
namely, the Chairman’s institutional weakness together with the concentration of power 
in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, are to blame for the flaws in the decision-
making process during the Vietnam War. As this argument goes, because of the 
                                                            
119 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the Lies That Led to Vietnam, p. 14. 
120 Major Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” Joint Forces 





legislative changes, for the most part in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 
Secretary McNamara managed to cut the JCS out of the loop and did not consult with 
them. In the words of Major DeWind, “McNamara disregarded military advice and 
closely directed the war himself. The Joint Chiefs disagreed with operational directions 
from the National Command Authorities (NCA), but the National Security Act as 
amended provided few checks against a strong-willed Secretary ignoring or suppressing 
their advice.”121  
 However, while certainly important, the legal/institutional framework is 
insufficient to explain the deficiencies in the national security decision-making process 
during the Vietnam War. Analysts should look into the quality of the civil-military 
relationship for a better understanding.  That Kennedy, Johnson, and McNamara often 
disregarded military advice could be explained with their low opinion and even disdain of 
the military leaders and the profound lack of trust, characteristic of the civil-military 
relationship at the time.122  Had top civilian leaders believed that the Joint Chiefs and the 
commanders on the ground had something useful to say, they would have certainly 
consulted with them more often.  There was nothing in the laws that would have 
prohibited or discouraged frequent exchange of ideas.  
 The problem was that for a variety of reasons – e.g., strong preference divergence 
between civilian and military leaders, as well as civilian decision-makers’ disappointment 
with the quality of military advice in previous cases (the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, among others), the Presidents and the Secretary of Defense did not trust 
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and had little respect for the expertise of their top military officers. In such circumstances, 
it is not surprising that civilians would disregard the military’s recommendations. Dale 
Herspring’s and H.R. McMaster’s case histories of the Vietnam War, for example, have 
documented how because of the SecDef disdain for the military, he rerouted the lines of 
communication from the JCS to the President directly through his office and often would 
not forward the military’s communiqués to the Commander-in-Chief.123 McNamara’s 
successor as SecDef, Clark Clifford, trusted and respected the Joint Chiefs more. Because 
of that, he was more willing to listen to their opinions and advice. As a result, 
communication between top civilian and military officials improved during his brief 
tenure although the provisions of the relevant laws did not change.124 
 On occasion political leaders reject military advice because it conflicts with their 
preferred policies, not because it is of low quality or the institutional arrangements are 
flawed and the military are cut out of the process.  As Holloway writes, “the use of 
military force from the Bay of Pigs to Beirut shows that the President often does not 
accept JCS advice when it conflicts with his chosen course.” 125  With or without the 
GNA, accepting or rejecting military advice will remain the prerogative of the President 
and the Secretary of Defense. Hence, in order to understand better the decision-making 
process, we have to analyze not only the institutional arrangements but also the variables 
determining the civil-military relationship at a given time. 
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II. Main objectives and provisions of the GNA126   
 By the beginning of the 1980s, many analysts and policy-makers saw a growing 
need for another reform of the defense establishment.  Despite all the efforts in the past, 
the problems stemming from what were seen as excessive inter-service rivalries had not 
been overcome. Most saw inter-service rivalry as almost entirely bad and not as a source 
of competition and diversity.  After all, inter-service rivalries had produced some of 
America’s most humiliating military disasters, such as Desert One.  The services seemed 
to be bitterly fighting for their parochial interests, at times at the expense of the national 
interest.  (In the heat of the Cold War, in the Navy office at the Pentagon, there was a 
sign saying: “Don’t forget the real enemy: the U.S. Air force.”)  Such rivalries were 
causing inefficient allocation of resources and producing redundant capabilities – an 
unnecessary burden on the budget.127 Inter-service rivalries were to blame for military 
forces that often were not only grossly ineffective but also very expensive.  This 
argument motivated yet another round of legal reforms.   Congressional leaders wanted to 
pass legislation in order to empower the Chairman of the JCS and to make sure the 
services can truly operate in a joint manner rather than having each service fight the wars 
on their own.  The perceived need for a legislative reform grew when General David 
Jones himself, the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went before the House 
Armed Services Committee in a closed session on February 3, 1982 and made a dramatic 
statement, urgently calling Congress to action. The General said: “The system is broken. I 
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have tried to reform it from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate 
necessary reforms.”128   His remarks were particularly important because he was the 
serving Chairman and it was for the first time such a high-ranking officer has spoken out 
so critically of the system.  Soon afterwards, the then Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Edward 
Myer, made an even more radical appeal for reform.129 
 Some of the main concerns at the time were related to what many perceived as an 
imbalance between service and joint interests and the almost total dominance of the 
services.  The services had weakened the unified commanders and had a de facto veto in 
debates in the Joint Staff.     “Initiatives in the Joint Staff went through five levels of 
review, in which each service had, effectively, a veto. Papers tended to be reduced to the 
lowest common denominator, inoffensive to any service, even before they reached the 
chiefs themselves, where the necessity for unanimous agreement caused them to be 
denatured even further.”130 However, on issues of major interest to them, the services 
aligned with each other in opposition to the secretary of defense.131  
 General Jones organized a selected group to study the problems and to propose 
possible reforms.  The report of the Chairman’s Special Study Group concluded that 
“[t]he problem is one of balance. A certain amount of service independence is healthy 
and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the services too much, 
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and the larger needs of the nation’s defense too little.”132 Because of the fierce battles for 
funding among them, each service often saw the others as “the real enemy.”  Involved in 
the zero-sum competition for resources, the services failed to reach an agreement on 
numerous occasions and the military leadership seemed paralyzed.  During the Vietnam 
War, for example, the military was almost constantly divided and could not present an 
alternative strategy of its own. This strengthened McNamara’s position even further and 
made it easier for civilian preferences to dominate unchecked during the decision-making 
process.  Such divisions were affecting not only the relative influence of the military on 
decision-making, but also the effectiveness of the policies and strategies.  When the 
military voice is so weakened, civilian leaders have to make their decisions based either 
on narrow service interests from the Chiefs or relying on civilian advisers and 
disregarding military opinion altogether.  
 The failures of the Vietnam era contributed to the calls for reform but were not the 
only factor.  Several military operations, including the aborted 1980 Iran Hostage Rescue, 
the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, and URGENT FURY, revealed multiple 
problems in the ability of the services to work together and in command and control 
arrangements, in general. Also, a series of procurement scandals at the DOD questioned 
the ways in which tax payers’ money was spent and the efficiency of many of the 
Pentagon’s practices, more broadly. After thorough reviews of the state of the military 
establishment, law-makers expressed their high dissatisfaction with the following issues: 
severe inter-service rivalries; poor quality of military advice; ineffective civil-military 
relations; imbalance between the responsibility and authority of unified commanders (i.e., 
                                                            
132 Chairman's Special Study Group, The Organization and Functions of the JCS: Report for the Chairman, 





their responsibilities were significant, while their authority was weak); cumbersome and 
confused operational chains of command;  ineffective strategic planning (i.e., much more 
attention was devoted to programming and budgeting while long-range planning was 
neglected); and others. It took about five years of fierce debates and intensive 
bureaucratic infighting before the Goldwater-Nichols reform could be passed. 
 
Objectives of the Act 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act set up nine objectives, aimed at improving the effectiveness 
of the DOD.133  They included:   
• Strengthen civilian authority 
• Improve military advice to the President as commander in chief of the armed forces, 
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council 
• Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission 
accomplishment  
• Ensure that a unified commander’s authority is commensurate with his responsibilities 
• Improve joint officer management 
• Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning  
• Provide for the more efficient use of resources 
• Enhance the effectiveness of military operations 
• Improve Defense Department management and administration.134 
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 The first objective was to strengthen civilian authority. The authors of the Act 
hoped to achieve this in several ways.  First, they solidified the power of the Secretary of 
Defense (SecDef). The law clearly stated who was in charge of the Department of 
Defense …"the secretary has the sole and ultimate power within the Department of 
Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act."135  Second, to strengthen 
further civilian control, the law made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) a 
powerful ally of the Secretary.  The chairman was relieved from the obligation to 
negotiate with the service chiefs.  This made his institutional perspective similar to that of 
the SecDef and easier to be on the same team. The 1986 legislation also strengthened the 
roles of the service secretaries and specified the responsibilities of each service secretary 
to the defense secretary. 
 The second objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to “improve military advice 
provided to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense”.  As 
explained earlier, before the enactment of the GNA, the Chairman of the JCS had less 
power than the Joint Chiefs (JCS) themselves and this power was relatively ill-defined.  
The CJCS did not have much leverage over the Joint Staff.  Since the Chairman did not 
have the powers to adjudicate among the Service Chiefs, service parochialism was left 
unchecked.  The military advice for the civilian leadership had to be agreed upon by the 
Service Chiefs, and reaching an agreement or a compromise among all 4 services was 
quite difficult.136 In order to get everyone on board to support them, recommendations 
were often watered-down and of little use. In the words of General Jones, “The corporate 
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advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very 
influential.”137 James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975, was even 
more critical: “The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost 
always disregarded.”138 
 In order to mitigate service rivalries and to address the problems with military 
advice, the Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the CJCS the principal military advisor to 
the SecDef and the President (Title II of the Act) 139  and “transferred all corporate 
functions of the JCS to the chairman.” 140   Under this act, the chairman need not 
“coordinate” his advice with the service chiefs and unified commanders although of 
course he may decide to consult with them.  If the chiefs are not unanimous, in the words 
of the Act, “the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the 
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and 
opinion with respect to that matter.” 141  In addition, the President may “direct that 
communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and [the CINCs] be 
transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (Presidents Reagan and 
G.H.W. Bush did exactly that.)  
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 To assist the Chairman, the GNA also created the position of Vice Chairman of 
the JCS – the second highest ranking officer in the Armed forces but also without 
command authority over combatant forces (Title II).  The creation of the position of the 
Vice Chairman ended the practice of rotating Service Chiefs through the CJCS position 
during the times the Chairman was absent. Further, the GNA made the Joint Staff 
responsible exclusively to the Chairman.142 The law was credited with eliminating the 
messy and confusing channels through which military advice made its way to the top 
civilian leadership. It was believed a good idea that the GNA empowered the CJCS to 
speak with a strong coherent voice on behalf of the military. With the new provisions, the 
Chairman acquired unique access and potential influence with the top civilian decision-
makers.  The CJCS was given additional responsibilities and was thus empowered to 
coordinate and synchronize the services to be able to operate successfully in a joint 
environment. These additional responsibilities of the CJCS, codified in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and listed in Chapter 5, Title 10 U.S. Code included: providing strategic 
direction, strategic planning, contingency planning, advice on requirements, programs 
and budget, as well as developing joint doctrine, training and education, and a 
comprehensive examination of the National Military Strategy each even numbered 
year.143  
 The third and fourth important objectives of the GNA had to do with the power 
and responsibility of the unified combatant commanders (CoComs).144  More specifically, 
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they aimed to place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission 
accomplishment and to ensure that a unified commander’s authority is commensurate 
with his responsibilities.  To solidify the responsibility of the Combatant Commanders, 
the GNA clarified their chain of command, now going from the CoComs to the SecDef 
and the President and cutting out the JCS and the CJCS. Some have argued that this 
change has been very effective, as recently demonstrated in the relationship between 
President Bush and the CoCom in relation with the Surge in Iraq.145 Further, the GNA 
removed the JCS from the operational chain of command.  It also required all combat 
forces, regardless of service, to be assigned to the unified commanders (Title I of the 
Act).146 Before the passing of the law, the services could move forces in and out of 
regional commands without the approval of the CINCs.  The GNA gave the CINCs the 
authority and responsibility for their commands 
 The fifth objective related to improving joint officer management.  The authors of 
the law took special care to improve the quality of officers in joint positions by 
establishing a joint officer specialty occupational category and personnel policies to 
provide incentives to attract officers to joint duty assignments (Title IV of the GNA).  
Prior to the reforms of 1986, the problem was that military officers serving in joint-duty 
assignments were insufficiently qualified, both in terms of education and experience.147  
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This was a result of the fact that joint duty was held in low regard or even considered “the 
kiss of death” as far as someone’s military career was concerned.  The studies done by 
Congress found that most officers were unwilling to serve in joint assignments and were 
concerned that their work in joint billets would be monitored for loyalty by their services. 
That is why the GNA included several elaborate provisions to attract high quality officers 
to the Joint Staff and to the staffs of the unified commanders in chief. For example, the 
Act mandated that: “officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments 
are expected as a group to be promoted at a rate not less than that for all officers of the 
service in the same grade and competitive category.”  And also, “officers may not be 
selected for promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless they have 
served in a joint duty assignment.” (Title IV of the GNA) 
 
III. The Unintended Negative Consequences of the GNA  
 How well have the objectives of the GNA been met? According to traditional 
evaluations, the GNA has been largely successful in accomplishing its objectives.148 The 
following section analyzes the successes and failures of the GNA and challenges many 
aspects of the conventional wisdom by pointing to various unintended negative 
consequences of the Act.  
 Analysts and policy-makers argue that the successes of the GNA include:  
strengthened civilian control; improved quality of military advice; increased cooperation 
and interoperability among the services; enhanced military effectiveness; improved 
                                                            





professional military education; and the unification of the national military command 
structure.  
 Regarding civilian authority, many agree that the role and the stature of the 
secretary of defense have been buttressed. “The SecDef clearly is the ultimate authority 
in the Department of Defense, and his role in the chain of command is clear. He enjoys 
the independent military advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”149  Civilian 
experts and military leaders are also convinced that the GNA strengthened the role of the 
Chairman as well, although they disagree as to the effects of this on civilian control and 
the quality of the decision-making process.   
 As for the quality of military advice to the commander in chief and the Sec Def, 
some of the top civilian and military officials have described it as greatly improved. 
Richard Cheney, as the secretary of defense under President George H.W. Bush, thought 
it represented “a significant improvement” over the “lowest common denominator” of the 
past.150  General Shalikashvili said, “We have been able to provide far better, more 
focused advice.”151   
 Another accomplished objective of the GNA, according to the conventional 
wisdom, is the improvement of jointness. The goal was, by extending jointness in some 
areas to produce superior military and co8alition operations. Even critics of the GNA 
admit that the law has succeeded in this regard and that “some of the parochialism and 
obstructionism of the services conceivably has diminished in the face of the growing 
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power of the chairman of the JCS, the Joint Staff, and the theater CINCs.” General Colin 
Powell also shares this view: “Performance of the Armed Forces in joint operations has 
improved significantly and Goldwater-Nichols deserves a great deal of the credit.”152 
Eliot Cohen, however, cautions that jointness should not become orthodoxy. It “requires 
a critical examination and a dispassionate review of its impact on long-term strategic 
thinking and civilian control.” 153 Jointness should not be treated as an end in itself, but a 
means to achieving improvements in areas of importance to national security. 
 Many argue that the most notable achievement of the GNA has to do with 
improved military effectiveness. The GNA is credited with the success of the US military 
in the operations since the law came into effect. High-ranking officers have supported 
this view.  For example, both General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the 
Army, and General Merrill McPeak, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, emphasize 
that the successful operations are proof that the GNA has achieved the objectives of its 
authors.154 
Supporters of the law maintain that the GNA should be credited for the improved military 
effectiveness because it successfully clarified the chain of command and the mission 
responsibility of the unified commanders in chief.155 Military and civilian officials have 
often praised the benefits of the shortened chain of command.  For example, General 
Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command during Desert Storm, 
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found it very important for the success of the Operation that his responsibilities had been 
clarified.  “Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority 
and responsibilities for subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective 
fighting force.”156  Goldwater-Nichols has also fulfilled another main objective of the 
reform: it has made the authority of the unified commanders commensurate with their 
responsibilities.  
Another important success of the law is what is universally agreed to be a 
substantial improvement in the quality of officers serving in joint duties. The GNA 
succeeded in creating incentives for the military’s best officers to seek joint service, joint 
training, and joint education.  In the words of James Locher, “The qualifications of joint 
officers have improved dramatically.  These officers have come to see joint experience as 
something that can promote their careers or provide useful skill sets for the future.”157  
 
The Unintended Negative Consequences of the Act 
 The next paragraphs discuss some problems with traditional evaluations of the 
GNA as largely successful and draws attention to the unintended negative consequences 
of the law.  The conventional wisdom is that “for the most part, the GNA has achieved 
what it was meant to achieve, as evidenced in the outstanding performance of the military 
in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and current operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.” 158  According to James Locher, “Overwhelming successes in 
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military operations and peacetime activities have provided visible evidence of the 
positive results.”159 
 Critics of the conventional wisdom have challenged the achievements of the GNA 
along two lines: I. The GNA is perhaps neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
the U.S. successes in the military operations after the adoption of the law.  II. The GNA 
has had some very serious negative consequences which may outweigh its benefits.  This 
chapter discusses some of those negative results, including: diminution of civilian control; 
reducing the sources of military advice and thus, making it harder for decision-makers to 
arrive at the best policy choice; militarization of U.S. Foreign policy; attenuation of long-
term thinking in military planning.  
 According to the first line of critique, analysts challenge the causal logic of those 
who judge the GNA as a success because of subsequent US military successes. 160  
Supporters of the law contend that since the US has been victorious in so many military 
operations after the passing of the law, the GNA has been a success. For example, 
Operation Desert Storm is often taken as demonstrating the success of the 1986 law. This 
judgment is widespread, shared by both Republicans and Democrats, civilian and military.  
At the time, the Washington Monthly  concluded that "Goldwater-Nichols helped ensure 
this war had less inter-service infighting, less deadly bureaucracy, fewer needless 
casualties, and more military cohesion than any major operation in decades."161 Forbes 
magazine also saluted "[t]he extraordinarily efficient, smooth way our military has 
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functioned in the Gulf [as] a tribute to [the GNA], which shifted power from individual 
military services to officials responsible for coordinating them."162 
 The evidence supports better a more nuanced evaluation. In the case of Desert 
Storm, in particular, the operation was not truly joint; the services actually fought their 
separate wars.  The land invasion was preceded by a thirty-seven-day air campaign; the 
Marine thrust into Kuwait was poorly synchronized with the Army's "left hook" 
maneuver into southern Iraq. In general, many have argued that the military successes in 
the operations in the 1990s and to this day were not a surprise since the US did not fight a 
peer competitor and would have won militarily even without the GNA, having in mind its 
total superiority.  Winning the peace after having won the war has been one of the main 
problems for the US in most of these interventions and the GNA has not been able to help 
sufficiently on that count. 
The next paragraphs detail the second line of critique, namely, how some of the 
law’s provisions have had effects that go counter its objectives.  In the words of Professor 
Mackubin Owens of the Naval War College, “The contributions of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act . . . are marginal at best, and . . . the unintended consequences of the act may 
well create problems in the future that outweigh any current benefits.”163  The unintended 
negative consequences that analysts are most concerned about include: diminution of 
civilian control; reducing the sources of military advice and thus, making it harder for 
decision-makers to arrive at the best policy choice; militarization of U.S. Foreign policy; 
attenuation of long-term thinking, and others.  No one argues that the GNA is the cause 
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of the above negative developments but that it has contributed to them, together with a 
variety of other factors, and this needs to be taken into account for a full evaluation of the 
consequences of the law.    
The weakening of civilian authority may be among the most serious unintended 
results, having in mind that the Act aimed at precisely the opposite. Critics of the GNA 
(e.g., John Lehman, Richard Kohn, Eliot Cohen, and others) argue that it has actually led 
to the erosion of civilian control in three ways: 1) by unifying the military and thus 
strengthening it in debates with civilian officials; 2) by enhancing the relative power of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and transferring to him key functions; and 3) by 
increasing significantly the competence and preparedness of the officers, serving in joint 
staffs, while failing to do the same for their civilian counterparts.164   
1) One of the main criticisms against the Goldwater-Nichols Act is that it 
centralized military power in the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 
thus diminished civilian control. Those concerned about the diminution of civilian control, 
like Christopher Bourne, argue that the GNA “gave inordinate political power to the 
military by elevating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost to the level of his 
nominal superior, the Secretary of Defense, thereby jeopardizing civilian control.”165 The 
structural changes, imposed by the GNA, unified the military.  This made it difficult for 
civilian leaders to play off the service chiefs against each other or the views of the chiefs 
against the theater commanders. While the military side of the DOD is more united as a 
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result of the GNA, civilians are often divided (along party and/or institutional lines – e.g., 
White House vs. Congress).  And just like in battles, the side which can deliver a strong 
and coherent effort almost always wins against a disjointed adversary. 
 2) Especially after Gen. Colin Powell’s tenure as CJCS, many were concerned 
that the Goldwater-Nichols Act may have shifted power too far in the direction of CJCS 
and the Joint Staff.166  Analysts, concerned about the changing balance of power between 
civilian and military officials, blame the provisions in the Act having to do with the 
relative authority of the Secretary, Chairman, and Joint Staff. Christopher Bourne, for 
example, argues that the GNA has damaged civilian control by dramatically reducing the 
secretariat and transferring several key functions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. “The Secretary is now largely limited to formulating general defense policy. The 
Organization and Functions Guidebook lists his duties as “the formulation of general 
defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DOD, 
and . . . execution of approved policy.” At the same time, the GNA made the Chairman 
“responsible for strategic direction; strategic planning; contingency planning; 
requirements, programs, and budget; doctrine, training, and education; and roles and 
missions.”167  
Some even complained of the creation of an “imperial Joint Staff” and warned that the 
US needs to take into account that German failure in two world wars was, in part, due to 
“monolithic general staff that failed to provide for serious debate and alternative 
perspectives.”168 
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 3) Another factor that led to the weakening of civilian control and the shift of 
influence towards the military was the increased quality of the officers serving on the 
Joint Staff. In and of itself, enhancing the competence and preparedness of military 
officers to serve on joint staff is undeniably a good thing.  The problem was that the GNA 
failed to enhance the quality or power of their civilian counterparts. “As a result [of 
Goldwater-Nichols], the weight of influence within the Pentagon has shifted decidedly in 
favor of the Joint Staff, which has an increasingly strong hand in bargaining with OSD 
and sometimes takes positions at variance with it.”169  Late Secretary Les Aspin has 
confirmed the shift in the quality of people working on the military and the civilian side 
of the Pentagon.  “Because of Goldwater-Nichols, the quality on the military side has 
gone up tremendously, where the reverse has happened on the civilian side. Revolving-
door restrictions have made government service so unattractive that the pool from which 
you can pick political appointees is not as rich as it once was.”170 
As Secretary Les Aspin noted, during the process of making decisions, “the side 
capable of making the best arguments will normally prevail.”171  With the incentives 
introduced by the GNA, the Joint Staff has become superbly capable of making winning 
arguments at the expense of its civilian counterparts at the Pentagon and the 
Congressional Committees that oversees the DOD.  Thus, as a result of the GNA, in the 
corridors of power in Washington a unified and better qualified military staff often stands 
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up against divided and less competent civilians. This is the exact opposite situation from 
the one we had when McNamara and his Wiz Kids were running the show at the 
Pentagon when the military leaders could barely keep up with their civilian bosses, not to 
mention win an argument.  The gap in the quality of the civilian and military staffs was 
very visible under the first Clinton Administration, for example, and this had significant 
influence over the decision-making process, as Chapter 6 of this study shows.  Due to 
their increased political competence and bureaucratic savvy the military was very often 
winning the debates on the use of force and thus, military preferences dominated. 
Combining all three factors, the diminution of civilian control in this argument is 
due to making the Chairman responsible for the most important decisions related to 
national security policy and also giving him sole control over the military staff, which is 
more effective than the civilian staff. 
 Regarding the provisions amending the formal powers of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs - the key here is that the law provides only 
potential influence for both officials. The GNA does not definitively determine the power 
of top civilian and military officials.  It is true that the law gave the Chairman significant 
new functions that could make him an important player but the law also says that in 
carrying out those duties, the CJCS is “subject to the authority, direction, and control of 
the President and the Secretary of Defense” (10 U.S.C. 153).  The Chairman only makes 
recommendations to them and it is up to the President and SecDef to accept or reject his 
advice.  The law on paper is often different from the law in reality.  For example, the 
GNA in theory should buttress a weak Chairman against an overbearing Secretary of 
Defense.  But, as many analysts have noted, things did not quite work that way under 





 The GNA does provide for the Chairman of the JCS to be able to advise the top 
civilian leadership but there is nothing in the law that guarantees he/she is going to be 
listened to or heard.  Whether top civilian leaders are going to listen to the CJCS (as it 
happened during the tenure of George Bush, Sr.) or not (as was the case most of the time 
under Bush Jr./Rumsfeld) depends not entirely and not mainly on the legal provisions, 
but on factors such as level of divergence of civilian and military preferences, balance of 
informal power (including factors such as the personality, education and experience of 
the position-holders), the quality of the civil-military relationship, etc.  The law provides 
potential influence but whether this influence will be exercised and how big it is going to 
be in reality depends on the above factors which go beyond the institutional framework 
given by the law.  For example, as shown, Colin Powell’s personality with his 
background and experience had a lot to do with him becoming the most powerful CJCS 
(since Gen. Maxwell Taylor), as most agree, and not only the institutional/structural 
changes mandated by the GNA.  That is why, in order to understand better the decision-
making process, the quality of military advice, and the influence top military leaders have 
on decision-making, one needs to use a framework, including the explanatory factors this 
study proposes rather than focus solely on legislative provisions. 
 Regarding the increased competence and enhanced experience of top military 
staffers, the solution is not to try to reverse this, of course, but to attempt to enhance the 
quality of their civilian counterparts.  In this connection, there have been some proposals 
that could be effective.  For example, in order to provide incentives for DOD civilians to 
pursue professional development or to broaden their experience and skills through 
education, training, or interdepartmental and interagency rotations, the Beyond 





Professional Corps to attract the best and brightest civilians to DOD and to expand 
opportunities for professional development and career advancement.”172 
Critics of the GNA have argued that the law also fails in its objective of 
improving military advice.  Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman believes that 
making the Chairman the principal military adviser (10 U.S.C. 153) and cutting the 
Service Chiefs out of the decision-making process has “limited not only the scope of 
military advice available to the political leadership, but also the policy- and priority-
setting roles of the service chiefs and civilian service secretaries.”173  Along the same 
lines, Eliot Cohen argues that the GNA has reduced the sources of military advice and 
thus made it more difficult for civilian decision-makers to make the best choice. 174  
Having diversity of opinions is very important for an effective decision-making process.  
American military successes in World War II were due, in part, precisely to the ability of 
top military leaders to express freely diverse views. 175  They knew that they could 
disagree with FDR without fearing negative repercussions for their careers. Decades later, 
many of their colleagues, advising Rumsfeld/Bush Jr., did not think this was possible and 
this undoubtedly affected the quality of their advice and, thus, the decision-making 
process.  But this was only partly due to the GNA and more directly related to 
Rumsfeld’s personality and leadership style and the civil-military relationship at the time.     
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Cohen and others are correct to point that the president and secretary of defense 
need more than one senior military adviser in order to avoid biases and distorted 
perceptions any single advisor naturally has developed over his/her years of service.  In 
the words of John Garofano, the Chairman of the JCS, whoever he/she is, “cannot 
possibly possess the background necessary for including and integrating the pools of 
expertise relevant to decisions for war.”176  It is true that the GNA does not prohibit 
civilians from seeking advice from the other chiefs.  However, it discourages such actions. 
The law permits a Chief who disagrees with the Chairman to submit separate advice, and 
the President, National Security Council, or Secretary may request dissenting views. 
However, insiders well-acquainted with the decision-making process correctly note that a 
dissenting officer could present a divergent position to the National Command 
Authorities (on his own initiative or by request) perhaps once or twice during his tenure 
and remain effective. 177  In this way, the GNA inhibits dissent and does not support an 
advisory system of multiple sources of advice. As a result, during the 1991 Gulf war, then 
secretary of defense Cheney had to resort to some creative methods in order to generate 
additional military options, which he was not getting from the Chairman and the JCS. 
(Chapter 5 of this dissertation on the 1991 Gulf War discusses this in more detail.) 
Another problem, reinforcing the above negative effects, is that the law enables the 
Chairman to control the issues considered by the Joint Chiefs by controlling the agenda 
of the JCS meetings. 
The upshot, then, is that contrary to its stated objectives, the GNA has not made it 
easier for the top political leaders to get high-quality military advice. An effective 
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decision-making process requires that top civilian officials receive a range of alternative 
opinions on the issues. If we limit the diversity of advice, we limit the options of 
decision-makers and increase the chance of them not making the optimal choice. It is true 
that the process of making a decision is facilitated if we limit decision-makers’ options, 
but in this way we also decrease their chances to design effective policies. 
Critics of the GNA argue that recent US military interventions are a good 
illustration of the above problems with military advice.  One such example is the 1991 
Gulf War, when, according Thomas Donnely, then Chairman of the JCS Gen. Powell and 
the senior civilians of the G H. W. Bush administration committed a blunder by failing to 
think through how the war should end. “The increasingly centralized command of U.S. 
armed forces only helped to narrow the discussion of alternative strategies.”178 Also, the 
performance of recent chairmen of the JCS--Army General Hugh Shelton, Air Force 
General Richard Myers, Marine Corps General Peter Pace, and Admiral Michael Mullen 
– in providing advice to the Bush, Jr. Administration raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the advisory system itself.  However, it would be incorrect to link the 
various misfortunes of the US in the W. Bush’s wars exclusively with the advisory 
system and the GNA.  Many other factors contributed to them. Some analysts have 
blamed, for example, the secretive nature of the top officials in the administration and the 
controlling personality of the Secretary of Defense – factors that could also explain, in 
part, how and why dissent was stifled and alternative views often suppressed.  Still, it 
remains an important counterfactual – whether a less centralized advisory system could 
have led to better results. As we know, the then Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, 
                                                            





had different views on the number of troops needed for the post-invasion stage of the 
operation.  Had the system encouraged more open discussions with the inclusion of the 
Chiefs, things might have turned out better. Very often it is known only with hindsight 
which was the “right” advice in a particular situation.  But the way to increase the 
chances of designing effective strategies and policies is to have an open dialogue between 
top civilian and military leaders.179 Again, such an advisory system cannot be achieved 
only through legislative reforms. 
 Another unintended consequence is that the GNA may have led to the increasing 
imbalance in US Foreign and national security policy between military and non-military 
tools of statecraft.  Could it be that what many perceive as the militarization of foreign 
policy (overusing military means at the expense of other tools of statecraft) is, in part, 
due to the Goldwater-Nichols reforms?  It is argued that the Clinton Administration, 
using the GNA, tasked regional combat commanders to use a variety of non-military 
approaches in their regions as well and this turned those commanders into 
“Proconsuls.”180 They became the point persons not only for US military policy, but for 
American diplomacy and foreign policy as well.  “[These commanders] are perceived by 
states and other actors to hold a position of preeminence, as the most influential United 
States government regional representative. The result, as experienced in Iraq, is that the 
United States has relied on its military to carry out diplomatic, foreign assistance, 
stabilization, reconstruction, and governance activities for which the military instrument 
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is ill-suited and ill-trained.” 181  Certainly, the GNA is not the only cause of such 
developments.  The decreasing budget of the State Department, the ratio between the 
budgets of the State and the Pentagon, and the overall diplomatic atrophy have also 
contributed to the current situation.  But the role of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in this 
connection should not be overlooked.   
 The GNA has had other unintended consequences that could affect negatively the 
decision-making process.  One such development is an attenuation of long-range thinking. 
This is due to the weakened voice of the services and their exclusion from planning.  
Hence, debates and decisions are dominated by the short-term perspective of the Joint 
Staff and the regional and functional commanders, who are naturally more interested in 
the military operation at hand and the current needs of the armed forces rather than future 
needs and trade-offs.   
 Another negative development Eliot Cohen and others have warned about is the 
weakening of competition for resources and missions among the services. “In all other 
walks of life, the United States has traditionally appreciated the merits of competition. 
Yet in the Pentagon the trend has been towards centralized control and allocation of 
resources. Particularly as technology allows the services to compete for roles and 
missions (in the area of deep strike, for example), it makes sense to enhance rather than 
diminish the competitiveness that has been so valuable in the past.”182 
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Brief case study – a comparison between Generals Colin Powell and Richard Myers 
as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 This brief case study shows that the provisions of the law themselves are not 
definitive either for the balance of power between civilian and military leaders or the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process.  It all depends on how the Chairman and 
his civilian counterparts use the legal provisions.  The first person to serve as Chairman 
under the GNA was General Colin Powell.  The power and influence General Powell 
held as Chairman were unprecedented.  A comparison between his tenure and the tenure 
of some of his successors shows that the informal power of the Secretary of the Defense, 
the Chairman and the other top political and military officials matters significantly, and 
not only the prerogatives which the laws formally give them.  General Powell’s approach 
in carrying out his duties as Chairman contrasted with that of General Richard Myers. 
Both generals served their Chairmanship under the same law, but they executed their 
duties in very different ways.  Reviewing the experiences of these two officers helps 
explain how they approached their roles as Chairman and why they did it in different 
ways. 
 There is a consensus that General Powell made full use of the powers given him 
by the GNA.  As Colonel Touzinski argues, Powell “took full advantage of his position 
by actively pursuing and safeguarding the interests of the US Military.  He also 
understood that his tenure would establish the limits and boundaries of power for the 
Chairman as he put into execution the newly assigned responsibilities specified in the 
GNA.”183  A big difference in how Generals Powell and Myers saw the role of the 
                                                            





Chairman is visible in the different ways they acted during the 1991 Gulf War and the 
2003 Iraq war respectively.  Powell was much more activist and assertive while Myers 
was more pliant and deferential to Rumsfeld.  During the 1991 Gulf War, Gen. Powell 
deftly placed himself between the then field commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
Commander of U.S. Central Command and the then Secretary of Defense, Dick 
Cheney.184  He knew that the Goldwater-Nichols Act had taken the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs out of the chain of command, and that the Combatant Commanders worked 
directly for the Secretary of Defense. Powell also realized that information is power and 
he guarded vigorously his ability to have as much information from the top players as 
possible, so he could shape events according to his preferences on the use of force.  By 
inserting himself between the top civilian leadership and Schwarzkopf, General Powell 
effectively filtered most information requests from the White House, the Secretary of 
Defense and Congress that were directed for General Schwarzkopf. He was always in the 
information flow, and he made the best use of his position. His efforts also allowed 
General Schwarzkopf to focus on war fighting. 
 As CJCS, Gen. Powell was adamant in avoiding what he judged were the errors of 
the Vietnam War, and especially civilian micromanagement. A primary objective of 
General Powell was in mitigating the impact of the notorious 6,000 mile screw driver, 
made infamous during the Vietnam War when the top civilian leadership was picking 
bombing targets from the Oval Office.  In his memoirs, he is very clear about the 
enormous influence Vietnam had on him, “I had been appalled at the docility of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, fighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to 
                                                            





lay out clear objectives for them. Before we start talking about how many divisions, 
carriers and fighter wings we need, I said we have to ask to achieve what end?”185 
 As Chairman of the JCS during the 2003 Iraq war, Gen. Richard Myers played a 
different role and did not insert himself between the Secretary of Defense and the 
CENTCOM Commander, Gen. Tommy Franks. Secretary Rumsfeld usually spoke 
directly with his subordinate combatant commanders and this was very much in 
accordance with the command and control relationship as designed in the GNA.186 These 
differences in the role of the Chairman of the JCS under Generals Powell and Myers 
cannot be explained by differences in the institutional arrangements since the law did not 
change. Some argue that the differences in the personalities with their experiences and 
beliefs matter profoundly and need to be taken into account as well.187  General Powell is 
described as assertive, pro-active, independent and willing to stand up against his civilian 
bosses, while General Myers - as a pliant team-player, who avoided expressing a personal 
opinion, especially if it was different from the opinion of the SecDef.188  Touzinsky, 
among others, explains such differences with their different experiences during the 
Vietnam War and the lessons they took from it.  “In one case, we have an officer [Colin 
Powell] who experienced war in a very personal manner given the fact that he was on the 
ground witnessing the bloodshed. When given the opportunity, he acted aggressively 
with his civilian supervisors in avoiding the errors of a previous war. In comparison, the 
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other officer’s experience in war was perhaps less personal in that he never saw the 
carnage since he never stepped foot on Vietnam soil.”189  
 While important, this certainly does not tell the whole story either.  We cannot 
fully explain the differences without also looking at the civilian side of the equation in 
these cases and at the civil-military relationship at the time.  As Secretary of Defense, 
Don Rumsfeld asserted himself and was determined, in the name of civilian control, not 
to allow Myers or any other military officer to become another Powell.  As Herspring 
writes, “Regardless of Goldwater-Nichols, which made the chairman the President’s chief 
advisor on military affairs, Rumsfeld was determined to decide what role, if any, the 
Chiefs would play. If he wanted them to advise the President, he would say so-although 
in practice this would not happen very often." 190   The quality of the civil-military 
relationship was also very different in both cases.  That President Bush, Sr. allowed 
communications between him and the field commander to pass through the Chairman 
was due to the fact that G. H. W. Bush trusted Colin Powell and valued his advice.  In the 
administration of the Senior Bush, the civil-military relationship was amiable while under 
Bush, Jr./Rumsfeld, it was highly adversarial, dominated by mutual distrust and even 
dislike.191 
 This shows that the institutional/legislative factors are insufficient to explain the 
quality of the civil-military relationship, the balance of power in it, or the process of 
decision-making. While the power of civilian and military officials is certainly based on 
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the prerogatives given to them in the Constitution and the laws, the sources of informal 
power are also very important. According to Richard Kohn, the sources of General 
Powell’s power included “his experience, his shrewdness and adeptness, his personal 
charm and charisma, the web of contacts of people who knew and trusted him, his 
obscurity-to-fame personal story and his race.” 192  Roncolato adds to this list: “His 
[Powell’s] truly joint perspective, his political savvy and his ability to forge coalitions 
within the bureaucracy were unsurpassed.”193  The different roles Generals Powell and 
Myers played while serving as Chairman of the JCS, and the experience of the other 
Chairmen show that the letter of the law has been the same but its spirit has been 
constantly re-interpreted by the people in office, depending on their views and beliefs, 
their preferences regarding the issue under discussion, the level of their political and 
military knowledge and bureaucratic savvy, and the quality of the civil-military 
relationship at a given time.  That is why it is not very productive to try to analyze the 
civil-military relationship and the decision-making process by focusing exclusively on 
the legal provisions.   
 
IV. Is the Goldwater-Nichols Act a good model for reform of the Interagency? 
 Many of those who argue that the GNA is the paradigm of military effectiveness, 
naturally see it as a model worth emulating in other reform efforts.  They have argued 
that the consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have been so positive for the DOD 
that other departments and agencies need to be reformed using the GNA as a blueprint. 
More recently, after severe disappointments with interagency cooperation and 
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coordination in Afghanistan and Iraq, some have called for an interagency reform based 
on the GNA.  They contend that the GNA has proved that jointness and centralization are 
the winning trend for the future and that they should be institutionalized in the 
Interagency, just like the DOD did after the adoption of the GNA. “In order to meet the 
national security demands of the 21st century, the structure of interagency organizations, 
as well as the process used to coordinate these organizations, legislative reform 
equivalent to an interagency GNA will be required.”194 
 The predominant view has been that the US government should adopt new 
approaches to national security policy-making and design a system, which emphasizes 
“integrated effort, collaboration, and agility” in order to better combine military and non-
military policy tools. 195  “Thus our programs would no longer be disparate and 
fragmented, we’d be looking at them in a holistic way. In other words, we would be 
doing for government what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the military.”196 What is 
the reasoning behind this claim and how convincing is it? 
Everybody would agree that in order to respond effectively to current challenges and 
threats, the U.S. government will need cooperation from all departments and agencies, 
working across traditional agency lines to formulate coherent and comprehensive 
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responses.197 Certainly this is easier said than done. Currently, cooperation among the 
different government agencies is not proceeding smoothly for a variety of reasons, among 
which: turf battles, policy disagreements caused by diverging perspectives and different 
priorities and goals, disagreements about the causes and consequences of various crises 
around the world and the role the US should play in them, if any. As a result, U.S. 
response to crises has often been slow and ineffective.  Lack of unity of effort among 
government agencies has been one of the major culprits.198  For a dramatic failure of the 
inter-agency process, we need look no further than the US experience in the 2003 Iraq 
war. 
 Why exactly the GNA could serve as a model for the interagency? In this view, 
the GNA is a powerful example of how a large and complex organization could be 
restructured and how its reform could produce positive results in meeting the strategic 
needs of the US.  More specifically, supporters of this argument maintain that currently 
the interagency is plagued with many of the same problems experienced by the 
Department of Defense prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  
U.S. Government departments and agencies over time have tended toward bureaucratic 
stove piping. They also exhibit many of the parochialisms demonstrated by the services 
prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The lack of clear leadership and 
responsibility within the interagency for national security issues are reminiscent of the 
military prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, the interagency lacks the ability 
to coordinate effective strategy and planning development. A final point of friction within 
the interagency is the lack of interagency education and training necessary to increase 
awareness and cooperation within the interagency framework.199   
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 Some analysts have challenged the argument that the GNA, and more 
centralization, is a good model for reforming the government.  Their main counter-point 
is that centralization may be unwise and even dangerous because it can lead to loss of 
diversity of opinions.200  The supporters of this argument are not against greater unity of 
effort on the part of the various government agencies. They do agree that this is necessary.  
But they are concerned that increased centralization may stifle flexibility. As a recent 
study analyzing the GNA observes, the "most relevant [principle of organization] is that 
in an era of fast-moving, unpredictable challenges, government should be more agile."201 
Agility could be lost, however, if the GNA is applied too strictly to the Interagency, 
maintain critics.     
 The GNA might not necessarily be the right model to use to reform the 
interagency, as a growing number of analysts contend, because centralization is not 
necessarily what is needed.  They argue that it is actually decentralization that should be 
credited for the US recent counterinsurgency successes, which are due to more autonomy 
for commanders on the ground.202  As Major Borkowski, among others, shows, some of 
the successes in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from decentralized practices and 
creative effort on the ground:  
The startling improvement in the counterinsurgency capabilities of U.S. forces has come 
from the bottom up--from the frantic reading of the classic literature on the subject, to the 
ad hoc improvisations of small unit commanders in combat, to practical wisdom 
circulated on websites established by soldiers and Marines, and even to the writing of the 
Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual (which had little, if anything, to do with 
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the turgid joint doctrinal apparatus at Joint Forces Command)--rather than from the top 
down. Similarly, where interagency processes have proven successful--such as provincial 
reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the partnerships between Petraeus and 
Crocker in Baghdad or between former presidential envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and 
Lieutenant General David Barno in Kabul--it has come from people responding to 
situations as they find them rather than following orders from headquarters.203   
  
 Others warn that we should be very cautious when using the analogy of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act because of the significant differences between the DOD and the 
Armed Forces on the one hand, and the interagency community, on the other.  In this 
view, the Interagency should not adopt the GNA model wholesale because of these 
substantial differences – e.g., the military services are much more alike than the 
Department of the Interior and the Department of Homeland Security, for example.  
Furthermore, “the armed services have always been united by a common core mission—
to protect and defend our nation on the battlefield. In contrast, each of the federal 
departments and agencies has a unique purpose and mission that it often does not share a 
great deal of in common with the others.”204  Hence, the GNA analogy should not be 
overextended. 
 Another problem with using the GNA as the model for interagency reform is 
related to some suggestions that would alter the education of government officials.  
Supporters of this idea believe that the GNA-stimulated education reform is relevant to 
the current needs of public servants.  Discussing the changes which should be made, 
Borkowski writes: “Education would be necessary for interagency personnel. For 
personnel to reach the Senior Executive or General/Admiral (Executive) level they would 
be required to work and receive credit for interagency experience.  This experience would 
                                                            
203 Major David Borkowski, p. 6. 





include a formal academic program and work experience within interagency.” 205  
However, before engaging in radical reforms one has to answer the question what kind of 
education such officials need. The answers that have been provided so far are less than 
convincing.  Certainly, there is nothing wrong in studying about and having some 
experience with different agencies.  But if the recent wars teach us anything the problem 
is not only and perhaps not even mainly about the lack of knowledge about the inter-
agency process.  Many analysts have correctly emphasized the need for high-ranking 
government officials to study languages and to know more about the history, culture and 
traditions of foreign countries.206  If they possess such knowledge, they would be able to 
understand better what kind of role, if any, the US could play in certain situations and 
whether any kind of intervention, including military, is warranted. In this way, officials 
would not be left to wonder after a botched intervention why the government apparatus 
could not solve the problems. Some crises are simply beyond outside help and no “can do” 
attitude can change that.   
Politics and military affairs today require greater level of expertise than before.  As John 
Garofano writes, ”in the early 21st century, narrowly defined political or military 
expertise is not the only – or even the most valuable – currency for effective civilian and 
military leaders.”207  He goes on to suggest “a trio of knowledge skills: deep regional or 
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functional knowledge relating to international security; integrative thinking; and 
appreciation for linkages among strategic levels of analysis.”208 
 There also is a problem with overestimating the possibilities of a legislative 
reform and expecting it can deliver things that in reality no law can do.  In this 
connection, there are some ludicrous suggestions and quite unrealistic hopes related to 
what changing the law can accomplish.  For example, Major Brandon DeWind proposes 
“… a revision of Goldwater-Nicholls at the level of whole of government reform. … an 
update should include a National Security Council centric organization that would force 
the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security to operate on equal footing, 
sharing power within the government. This would ensure that government in whole 
would speak with one voice. The reform would be focused on a whole of government 
transformation, modeled on how the Goldwater–Nicholls Act reformed the Department 
of Defense.”209  No US government (not even the Executive Branch of the government) 
could ever speak entirely with one voice unless we change the political system and 
institute some form of dictatorship.  It is worth reminding that even under communism, 
there were bureaucratic divisions and infighting in the Soviet Government.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 The Goldwater-Nichols Act case study offers several lessons. First, institutional 
organization is important and it deserves serious study.  Legislative changes in the 
organization of the U.S. defense establishment over the years have had important effects 
on the making of national security policy. Periodic re-organizations may be necessary. 
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“Congress came to the department’s rescue in 1986, but today the Pentagon’s 
organizational problems are again stacking up, and at an ever faster pace.”210 But such 
reforms should not be relied upon as panacea.  After a dramatic failure, the political 
pressure to reform the apparatus of government and especially those agencies that are 
perceived to have failed, may become irresistible.  The changes in government agencies 
after the 9/11 attacks are a case in point.  As often happens, some of these changes have 
had negative consequences. Pointing to the intense political pressure after 9/11 to reform 
agencies and departments, Paul Pill argues that some of these reforms were unnecessary 
and/or have led to unsatisfactory results. As an example he uses the creation of the 
National Counter-terrorism Center, which in his view, duplicated and complicated many 
of the existing responsibilities of CTC, where Pillar had served.211 Furthermore, many 
problems lie beyond institutional organization and they cannot be solved through 
legislative reforms.  Institutional tinkering is not sufficient, and at times, it may not be 
even necessary. 
 Every law has unintended consequences and many of them are negative.  Hence, 
it is quite difficult to predict whether the benefits of passing an institutional reform will 
outweigh the costs.  Most likely, we will solve some problems but will create new ones. 
The brief history of legislative reforms prior to the GNA confirms this.  As Bourne 
argues, “Presidents Truman and Eisenhower thought that their amendments to the 
National Security Act improved civilian control by empowering the Secretary [of 
Defense]. But the unintended consequence was grossly distorted civilian control.”  The 
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GNA is no exception and, as some contend, its unintended consequences may outweigh 
the successes. 
 This chapter shows that the traditional evaluations of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
as an overall “success, given subsequent joint operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, 
and Somalia”212 does not take into account the many unintended negative consequences 
the Act has had.  Some of the most troubling results of the Act - diminution of civilian 
control; reducing the sources of military advice and thus, making it harder for decision-
makers to arrive at the best policy choice; militarization of U.S. Foreign policy; 
attenuation of long-term thinking in military planning - go demonstrably counter its own 
objectives and affect negatively the policy-making process.  We should take such 
analyses into account before deciding on whether the GNA is a suitable model for 
reforming the Interagency.  While thinking of future reforms, we must keep in mind that 
“organizational reforms are rife with unintended consequences. With the national security 
of our country on the line, the first principle must be to do no harm.”213 
 This chapter shows that the legal/formal powers of decision-makers alone are 
insufficient to shed light on the civil-military balance of power (or the state of civilian 
control) and to understand the civil-military dynamics at the top of the government.  That 
is why we need to analyze decision-makers’ informal power as well.   Just like we 
cannot legislate morality into top-ranking government positions, such laws cannot 
address the broader dimensions of civil-military relations that are much more directly 
related to the effectiveness of the decision-making process on the use of force. Changing 
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the legal framework would not be sufficient to improve the quality of the decision-
making process because, as shown in this chapter, the process depends much more on 
particular dynamics of the civil-military relationship and not so much on the legal 
framework.  Legislative reforms would be in vain if top civilian and military leaders 
cannot build an effective working relationship with each other.  Even if it were possible 
to design a law that produces perfect military advice, it will be useless unless policy-
makers are receptive to it. In the words of Henry Kissinger, “Presidents listen to advisors 
whose views they think they need, not to those who insist on a hearing because of some 
organizational chart.”214  Changing organizational diagrams and creating well-organized 
advisory systems cannot guarantee good decisions.  To paraphrase George Marshall, the 
price of civilian control and of effective decision-making is eternal vigilance on the part 
of both soldiers and civilians. No law by itself can solve the problems. 
  
                                                            
214 Quoted in Harry Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 







The Influence of Civil-Military Relations on Decision-Making  
in the Gulf War of 1991 
 
Previous chapters developed the argument of this dissertation about the influence of 
different patterns of civil-military relations on the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process.  We saw that the ability of statesmen and soldiers to make informed decisions on 
the use of force depends primarily on two key variables of the civil-military relationship: 1) 
the civil-military balance of power (which can vary between civilian dominance and military 
dominance), and 2) the level of divergence between civilian and military preferences on 
issues related to US national security and the use of force (varying on a continuum from 
“low” to “high”).215 This chapter focuses in more detail on one particular pattern of civil-
military relations, which is characterized by a combination of assertive civilian dominance 
and a low level of divergence between civilian and military preferences (Quadrant 3 of 








215 The dependent variable of this study is the effectiveness of the decision-making process and the two 
explanatory variables are: 1) the civil-military balance of power and 2) the level of civil-military preference 






The Effectiveness of the Process of Decision-Making as a Function of the Civil-




Level of Civil-Military 
Preference Divergence 
(Ideational Conflict)  
 
 
Civil-Military Balance of Power 
 


















The argument in brief is that one can expect a more effective decision-making 
process when civilian decision-makers are dominant and when the level of civil-military 
preference divergence is low (i.e., cases in Quadrant 3) than when the military dominates 
and civilian and military preferences on the issues under debate diverge highly (as in 
cases that fall in Quadrant 2).  
This chapter continues to flesh out several of the theoretical issues which are the 





process of decision-making and policy implementation.216 Another related issue is clarifying 
the conditions under which assertive control could slide into civilian micromanagement of 
the military and, thus, have negative effects on strategy-making and/or military 
effectiveness.  These issues are discussed in the context of the on-going debate between two 
contending models from the literature which offer solutions as to what should be the 
relations between top civilian and military officials in order to achieve effective decision-
making, planning and conduct of a war – Samuel Huntington’s “objective control” model 
and Eliot Cohen’s “unequal dialogue” model.217 
Huntington’s model, which has dominated the field for half a century now, 
presupposes clearly defined political and military domains and also that both sides (the 
civilian and the military) respect the boundaries and refrain from interfering in each other’s 
domain.  According to this model, effective planning and conduct of a war would be 
achieved when civilian leaders are involved only in the “grand-strategic” realm while 
leaving the “tactical” and “operational” realms to the military.  Along these lines, 
Huntington explains why in his view the U.S. was successful in World War II: “so far as the 
major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war.”218  Such 
division of labor would reserve the dialogue between top civilian and military leaders only 
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for the beginning and the end of a war.  At the beginning, the politicians should decide on 
the objectives and give the go-ahead to the military.  Then they should sit back and leave the 
military professionals to prosecute the war free of political interference. Or, as Helmuth von 
Möltke (the Elder) wished, politicians should fall silent the minute the war begins.  
Huntington’s theory warns that if civilian leaders want to increase effectiveness they should 
not interfere with military professionalism.  Civilians involving themselves in military 
matters would be equivalent to a patient advising her surgeon what kind of operation is 
needed and how to perform the surgical procedure.   
However, as Clausewitz and others teach, war is indeed very political and since, at 
times, even the smallest tactical decisions may have significant political consequences, 
Huntington’s idea of a clear separation between the political and the military domain is very 
often impractical.219  Take an example from America’s most recent war.  On April 11 and 12 
of 2003, the National Museum of Baghdad was looted while U.S. soldiers stood by.  
Sending a platoon most probably would have sufficed to protect this symbol of Iraqi culture 
and history.  But, in the heat of battle, no one ordered the troops to stop the looting.  This 
certainly looks like a purely military decision, which should be left to commanders on the 
ground.   Had one of Rumsfeld’s civilian aides in Washington picked up the phone to issue 
such an order, s/he would have been accused of violating the precepts of proper civil-
military relations.  What happened as a result of the looting?  Besides irreparable damage to 
Iraqi cultural heritage, the looting and especially the widespread perception that U.S. troops 
did not do much to stop it, had a serious negative effect on US military and political goals.  
                                                            
219 For a similar argument, and also for a detailed analysis as to how and why American civil-military 
relations have not conformed to Huntington’s “objective control” theory, see Peter Feaver, “The Civil-
Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and 
Society (Winter 1997), pp. 149-178.  See also Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians; Eliot Cohen, 





After such a miserable start of U.S. post-war presence in Iraq, it became much more difficult 
to earn the trust of the local population and pacify the country enough as to start its 
reconstruction.   This created a situation of chaos and lawlessness and the perception that US 
troops were not actually in charge.  The numerous reports of violence and unrest tarnished 
the spectacular military victory of coalition forces and the US was accused of being 
interested only in Iraq’s oil (when it turned out that the Oil Ministry was the only building 
defended by U.S. troops).  Thus, a small military action (or inaction) ended up having 
enormous political consequences.  This episode is a good illustration of how interwoven 
military decisions even at lower levels of war are with political objectives.  It also shows the 
need for continuing vigorous civil-military dialogue in order to make military force serve the 
political objectives of a state. 
In Eliot Cohen’s alternative to Huntington -- the “unequal dialogue” model, a 
constant exchange of ideas between statesmen and soldiers and assertive civilian control 
lead to a more effective decision-making and conduct of wars.  In Cohen’s “unequal 
dialogue,” civilian leaders, rather than sitting back, are querying, probing, and prodding, but 
without “dictating in detail” what the military should do.220   This chapter shows why Cohen 
is correct in emphasizing the importance of an on-going and uninterrupted dialogue between 
civilian and military leaders during the planning and the conduct of a war and it provides 
more supporting evidence for the argument that assertive civilian control could enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision-making and implementation process.  Cohen’s model is an 
improvement over Huntington to the extent that it accounts better for the political character 
of war and the intimate connection between politics and war.  But Cohen’s model also falls 
                                                            





short because it does not convincingly draw a line between assertive civilian control and 
civilian micromanagement and does not explain the conditions under which assertive 
civilian control could turn into micromanagement rather than lead to good policy and 
strategy-making.   While a careful reading of Supreme Command should make clear even for 
Cohen’s critics that he does not advocate civilian micromanagement, based on his model it 
is very difficult to define the parameters of a civil-military relationship that would be 
conducive to effective decision-making and implementation. For example, in the 
“Afterward” of his book Cohen talks approvingly of George W. Bush administration’s 
performance in the lead-up to and after the taking of Baghdad in 2003.  “One thing was 
clear: the planning and conduct of the Iraqi war of 2003 followed the model of the unequal 
dialogue, and though it may have been painful, it yielded a swift and relatively cheap victory 
on the battlefield.  In that respect, at the very least, Rumsfeld won his war.”221   In an 
interview with the History News Network Cohen said, “It appears that Rumsfeld is a very 
active secretary of defense, rather along the lines essential for a good civil-military dialogue: 
pushing, probing, querying.  But not, I think, dictating in detail what the military should 
do.”222  However, while Rumsfeld should be given credit for returning to the principles of 
assertive civilian leadership, often under him assertive control turned into civilian 
micromanagement of the military and increased willingness to override military advice on 
operational and even tactical issues, at times with disastrous consequences.  (One of the 
most well-known examples is his interference in the phasing of troops deployments.)  
Although, contrary to Huntington, most of my findings support Eliot Cohen’s 
conclusions as to what constitutes effective war leadership and Cohen’s “unequal dialogue” 
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model, this study goes a step further by specifying some of the problems with assertive 
civilian control, especially when combined with high civil-military preference divergence.  
For example, my case study of the 2003 Iraq war -- a combination of firm civilian 
dominance and a high level of preference divergence (Table 1, Quadrant 1) -- shows why 
assertive civilian control is insufficient for effective decision-making.  Furthermore, this 
case illustrates how the combination of assertive civilian dominance with intense divergence 
between the preferences of civilian and military officials could lead to a variety of problems, 
such as poor sharing of information during the decision-making process, disregarding 
relevant information because it comes from the “wrong” source, insufficient analysis of 
policy options, and civilian micromanagement.  That is why, this study contends, contrary to 
Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen, that we cannot define the kind of the civil-military 
relationship that would best serve the decision-making and implementation process based 
solely on the type of civilian control (e.g., assertive or delegative) or lack of it, and whether 
civilians or the military interfere or stay out of each other’s domain.  We also need to take 
into account another key variable, namely, the intensity of preference divergence between 
civilian and military officials. 
This chapter illustrates the dynamics of the decision-making process in cases when 
civilian leaders are dominant and when the divergence between civilian and military 
preferences is low (Table 1, Quadrant 3).  One of the main hypotheses of the dissertation is 
that this particular pattern of civil-military relations leads to a more effective decision 
process. Why would my theoretical framework predict a “good” quality decision-making for 
such cases?  The logic is that conditions of assertive civilian dominance and a low level of 
civil-military preference divergence would affect positively the main activities of top 





exchange and analysis of information; formulating and discussing of alternative options for 
action; and cooperation and coordination in the implementation of the chosen policy.  More 
specifically, this chapter tests the following hypotheses expected to hold when civil-military 
preference divergence is low and the civilian side is firmly in control (cases in Quadrant 3):   
1. When there is a low level of civil-military preference divergence (i.e., no large difference 
in the views, opinions, and goals of civilian and military leaders), both sides would have an 
interest in maximizing the availability of information.  Sharing information should be 
unproblematic and decision-makers would not feel a need to misrepresent or hide 
information. 
1-a When there is a low civil-military preference divergence, there will be a free flow and 
exchange of information between civilian and military leaders.  
1-b When there is a low civil-military preference divergence, more policy options would be 
presented and analyzed and both sides (the civilian and the military) would feel free to speak 
their mind during the deliberations. 
1-c When there is a low civil-military preference divergence, civilian officials would be 
more receptive to military views.  They would be likely to consult often with their military 
advisors and will be less suspicious of the content of military advice. 
2. When civilian and military officials hold similar preferences, both sides have more 
incentives to cooperate with each other.  Alignment in civilian and military preferences 
leads to a smoother interaction and coordination between civilian and military leaders during 
the decision-making process and in the conduct of military operations. 






2-b When there is a low civil-military preference divergence, the civilians are more likely to 
trust the military to follow closely dominant civilian preferences. 
2-c When there is a low preference divergence, civilian officials (or the dominant side) 
would not perceive a strong need to monitor intrusively the military.  Hence, civilian micro-
management (or meddling in military affairs) would be less likely.     
If the above propositions hold, we are likely to have an effective decision-making 
process – that is, top civilian and military officials are more likely than not to assess 
correctly the political and military aspects of a crisis and the threats and opportunities 
they’re facing, and to formulate and implement strategies that successfully achieve their 
military and political objectives.   
This chapter proceeds as follows:  In the first two sections, I discuss the balance of 
power between civilian and military officials under George H. W. Bush and Dick Cheney 
and the level of civil-military preference divergence in order to show why the 1991 Gulf 
War belongs in Quadrant 3 of Table 1.  Regarding the civil-military balance of power, my 
findings debunk conventional wisdom that the 1991 Gulf War was the Generals’ War.   
While analyzing the preferences of political and military leaders on key issues of US 
Foreign policy and the use of military force, I find important similarities and overlaps in the 
views and ideas of top political and military officials at the time.  By analyzing the process 
of decision-making and war planning for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and, more specifically, 
how the civil-military balance of power and the low divergence between civilian and 
military preferences affected the making and implementation of US military strategy and 
policy, the third section confirms the hypotheses of this chapter.  The last section explores 
the final stages of the 1991 Gulf War, characterized by civilian abdication of control, and the 






The Civil-Military Balance of Power in the George H. W. Bush Administration 
The first independent variable -- the balance of power between civilian and military 
officials -- represents the relative influence of civilian and military leaders over decision-
making, and varies on a continuum from civilian dominance to military dominance.   Saying 
that the balance of power favors the civilians over the military, for example, means that in 
most cases when civilian and military preferences diverge, civilian preferences will 
prevail.223  It is important to emphasize that even in countries such as the U.S., with robust 
norms of civilian control, the civil-military balance of power is actually a variable.224   
The following section shows that the civil-military balance of power in the 
administration of George H. W. Bush is best defined as assertive civilian dominance (Table 
1, Quadrant 3).  (As explained in more detail later on, this is true with the exception of the 
very last stages of the war, where the decision-making process is characterized by civilian 
abdication.)  The role and power of the civilian leadership in Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm are clouded by convenient misreading of both the Vietnam and the Gulf War.  
The Vietnam war is usually portrayed as the classic case of failure due to civilian 
micromanagement, while the 1991 Gulf War is given as a counter-example – a great success 
due to enlightened civilian leadership who knew how to give a clear mission to the military 
and all the resources it needed, and then step aside and leave the professionals to do the 
fighting.  Operation Desert Storm and its success are seen by many as the triumph of the 
                                                            
223 See, for example, Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
224 For a similar argument, see for example, Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  See also Risa Brooks, Institutions 
and the Domestic/International Nexus: The Political-Military Origins of Strategic Integration, Military 





Huntingtonian ideal of “objective civilian control,” an example of civilians setting clear 
strategic objectives and then letting the military use overwhelming force to achieve them.  
The conventional wisdom about the 1991 Gulf War is that Desert Storm was not only 
fundamentally different from the Vietnam War, but that it was fought in the “right” way 
precisely because of the lessons the military learned in Vietnam. 225   This conventional 
portrayal of the civil-military relationship in the Gulf War is not merely inaccurate but its 
implications could be dangerous for our understanding of issues of civilian control, as well 
as for the making of policy and military strategy.226   
Contrary to the widely-held perception of the 1991 Gulf war as the Generals’ War227, 
from the very start of the decision-making process, the civilians asserted control and made 
clear to the military that some decisions would be reserved only for the politicians and they 
would be the ones to draw the line between what was considered political and what was 
military.  Without meddling unnecessarily, in most cases, civilian leaders made sure that 
political considerations were taken into account. 
President Bush “was clearly the person in full command of decision-making.”228  
Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defense, saw affirming his authority as the civilian in charge 
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of the Pentagon, as his first task upon coming to the building.229  Civilian leaders understood 
they had to deal with very outspoken military officers, who believed that in order not to 
repeat the mistakes of the Vietnam War, they should advise the civilians not only on how to 
fight a war but on whether it should be fought in the first place.  Furthermore, some in the 
military believed they should not merely advise but should insist that their input on strategic 
matters be taken into account.230  Disturbed by media reports saying he knew little of the 
military and was not in control of the DOD, Cheney “seized an early opportunity to say, I 
am not afraid of generals and admirals.  In this job, I run them.”231  Right after he was 
confirmed as Defense Secretary, he chose to rebuke publicly the Air Force chief of staff, 
General Larry Welch, for appearing to be negotiating with Congress over the modernization 
of land-based nuclear missiles.232  Cheney knew that such “chastisements” of top officers 
were usually done in private; he also found out that actually Gen. Welch had done nothing 
inappropriate.  However, Cheney chose to stand firm and show who was in charge.  As far 
as his power and control were concerned, Cheney knew that in Washington what appeared 
to be happening was as important, or even more so, than what was actually happening.  He 
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could not allow generals to even be perceived as negotiating with Congress on strategic 
issues behind the Secretary’s back. 
The civilians, and President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney, in particular, 
explicitly asserted their authority when they thought the military might be overstepping the 
proper boundaries. For example, during one of the very first meetings of the principals on 
August 3 when Colin Powell asked whether it was worth going to war to liberate Kuwait, 
Cheney asked him to leave such political issues to the politicians.  The Secretary remarked: 
“Colin, you’re Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You’re not Secretary of State.  You’re not the 
National Security Advisor anymore.  And you’re not Secretary of Defense.  So stick to 
military matters.”233 While Powell thought it was his duty to bring up questions that would 
lead policy-makers to think of what kind of American involvement would be supported by 
the public and to request clarity of objectives from his political leaders (e.g., defend Saudi 
Arabia vs. eject Iraq from Kuwait), the general agreed with Cheney that he had overstepped 
in this case.   
In September of 1990 the Defense Secretary did not hesitate to fire General Michael 
Dugan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, after the latter made statements to reporters from the 
Washington Post and Los Angeles Times that did not exactly coincide with official 
administration policy.234 After a visit with U.S. commanders in Saudi Arabia, Gen. Dugan, a 
passionate (and blunt) advocate of air power, was quoted by the Washington Post as saying 
that “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that U.S. military air power – including a 
massive bombing campaign against Baghdad that specifically targets Iraqi president Saddam 
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Hussein – is the only effective option to force Iraqi forces from Kuwait if war erupts…”235  
More troublesome than the above comment, which enraged the other services and the Army 
General in Colin Powell, was Dugan’s  suggestion that he did not “expect to be concerned” 
with political constraints when selecting bombing targets.236  While Secretary Cheney was 
impressed by the good work Gen. Dugan had done from the start of his term as Air Force 
Chief of Staff, he decided to fire him nevertheless in order to show that the civilian 
leadership would not tolerate any stepping out of bound by the military.  “Cheney thought 
long and hard.  Policing the four-stars was part of his ongoing job managing the building.  
Dugan was not the first, nor would he likely be the last, officer to step out of line.”237  On 
another occasion, Gen. John Chain, the commander of Strategic Air Command, at a meeting 
with reporters, made comments that implied doubt about the feasibility of the 
Administration’s plan to ban land-based missiles with multiple warheads.  As a result, the 
general was ordered to Washington for a “private dressing down” by Cheney.238   
Such cases of disciplining of generals, especially since they occurred early on in the 
administration, clearly showed the military that the civilian leadership was willing to punish 
what it viewed as unacceptable behavior on the part of its uniformed subordinates.  The 
military got the message.  As Gen. Powell wrote, “It was not lost on me that Mr. Cheney has 
shown he knew how to fire generals.”239  Times and again, civilian leaders showed that they 
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would oversee the military closely and would not allow to be misled.  For example, when in 
doubt about reports coming from the Air Force, Dick Cheney ordered the Air Force 
Inspector General to investigate the performance of the F-117 in Panama because it seemed 
the planes had not been as accurate as the Air Force had claimed.  This and similar cases 
sent a signal to generals and admirals that the civilian leadership was not going to tolerate 
“shirking.”  As the principal-agent theory would predict in such cases, the military 
understood that under this civilian leadership “shirking” would have high probability of 
being detected, and that when detected, punishment would be severe.240 Hence, such an 
understanding contributed to the military’s willingness to comply with civilian directions 
and ultimately guaranteed a balance of power favoring the civilians. 
Besides close civilian involvement and oversight, another very important 
determinant of influence over decision-making is the professional preparation and 
experience of top civilian and military officials.241  For example, research shows that when 
top civilian leaders have had an advantage in professional preparation over their military 
counterparts, policy choices have on the whole reflected civilian preferences.  That is why, 
professional preparation and experience should be taken into account in any analysis of the 
civil-military balance of power at the top. Based on these criteria, the civilian leadership in 
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the Bush White House could be ranked among the very top. 242  George H. W. Bush himself 
was one of the most experienced presidents in foreign policy and national security affairs.243 
Besides being a naval aviator in World War II, he had also served as a CIA Director, Chief 
of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, Ambassador to the United Nations, and Vice President.  
(Bush confided to an advisor that these various professional experiences made it easier for 
him to see “all the pieces” in a crisis situation.244)  He kept in office people like Jim Baker 
and Richard Clarke who had amassed significant national security experience in the Regan 
administration.  The President’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air 
Force Lieutenant General, had an extraordinary 29-year military career of his own. He 
understood the military’s point of view and was sensitive to their concerns.  The President 
also brought in new advisors with excellent preparation, knowledge, and ability to deal with 
military affairs. 
Compared to top brass in the 1960s who were overpowered by McNamara’s Whiz 
Kids and their quantitative systems analysis, top military leaders in the 1990s were not only 
much better educated, but also more experienced in policy-making because they had served 
as senior staff officers and/or policy advisors to civilians in the Pentagon and the White 
House. “Having served as national security advisor, [Powell] understood the workings of 
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government better than anyone else in uniform, and just as well as any of the civilians.”245  
Precisely because of his service as a National Security Advisor in the Reagan 
Administration, Powell could also understand much better the views of Bush’s National 
Security Advisor (Scowcroft) and the challenges he was facing.  As shown later, their 
common backgrounds led to better mutual understanding and more trust between civilian 
and military leaders, which in turn contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process. 
That Gen. Colin Powell was possibly the most powerful and influential Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent history has led some to claim that the balance of power in 
the Bush administration favored the military over the civilians.  In fact, as my analysis 
shows, this is incorrect. True, Powell’s influence on military decision-making was 
significant.  It came as a result of several factors: the expanded powers given to him under 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, his vast military and political experience, and his congenial 
personality.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 strengthened the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the field Commanders.  Under this legislation, the Chairman became the 
primary military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and, unlike in the 
past, did not have to present to them the lowest-common-denominator of all the service 
Chiefs’ opinions.  This law also placed the Joint Staff under the personal control of the 
Chairman and not the services.  Colin Powell used these new arrangements to the fullest and 
“as a result [of this legislation], [he] wielded power and influence beyond that exercised by 
previous chairmen.”246  Although this is largely correct, it is misleading to characterize the 
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decision-making process as being dominated by Powell and the military.  As this chapter 
shows, in the few cases when civilian and military preferences diverged, civilian preferences 
dominated at the end.  This was not the Generals’ war, as it is popularly referred to.    
While it is true that Colin Powell was among the most political of generals and that 
he had significant influence on the decision-making process, some of the harsher critiques of 
him are misplaced.247 In what is perhaps the most scathing criticism of General Powell, the 
prominent historian and expert on civil-military relations Russell Weigley concluded that 
Powell had managed to resist or twist the wishes of his civilian masters more successfully 
than any of his predecessors. 248  However, one should note that the evidence for Weigley’s 
conclusions about Powell overstepping the proper civil-military balance is relevant to the 
General’s role and influence in the decision-making on Bosnia in the Clinton 
Administration, and not the Gulf War.  In this case, however, in the only situation where 
Powell seemed to have been the dominant influence on decision-making - namely, the 
decision for secession of hostilities at midnight of Feb. 28, 1991, discussed later in this 
chapter -- it was not because he usurped control, but because it was ceded to him by his 
political bosses. 
This section showed that the balance of power favored the political leadership.  This 
was due to the fact that top political decision-makers were united around the President, that 
they possessed a sufficient experience in national security affairs, and that they stayed 
deeply involved in military affairs, thus making the military know that shirking will not be 
tolerated. 
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Elite Civilian and Military Beliefs and the Level of Civil-Military Preference 
Divergence249 
This section illustrates that in the run-up to Desert Storm, civilian and military 
preferences on most of the major issues were in convergence.  Top civilian and military 
leaders in the Bush White House viewed key issues of war and peace in remarkably similar 
ways.  Decision-makers and their military advisors shared many views and beliefs about 
America’s involvement in international politics and the use of force as a tool of statecraft. 
Top civilian and military officials were largely in agreement on both issues related to the use 
of force in general, as well as on many issues specific to the conduct of Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm. In general, civilian and military leaders believed that military force was a legitimate 
and effective instrument, which should be used with the support of the American people.  
Some of those who had served in World War II and were to a large extent shaped by this 
experience, believed that isolationism is not an option for the United States.  For President 
Bush, for example, what Saddam Hussein had done to Kuwait was reminiscent of Hitler’s 
invasion of Czechoslovakia – a case of blatant aggression of the strong against the weak.  In 
such a situation, the United States and the international community, Bush thought, could not 
stay idle.  The US had the duty to reverse this unconscionable act in order to avoid another 
“Munich.”  As one of Bush’s advisors said of the President, “He is deathly afraid of 
appeasement.  His generation had to fight a war over it, and he feels that if he blinks today, 
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he will be leaving a real mess for the next generation to clean up.”250  While the Munich 
analogy had a powerful impact, even more important was the influence of Vietnam.251 
One cannot entirely explain decision-makers’ preferences on key foreign policy 
issues without understanding the enormous impact of the Vietnam War on both civilian and 
military officials. Vietnam was the defining experience for generals Powell and 
Schwarzkopf who had served two tours in that war and this experience was the key to 
understanding their views on statecraft and the use of force.  What then Major Powell 
learned in Vietnam was what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell would assert: 
“And when we go to war, we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; 
we should mobilize the country’s resources to fulfill that mission and then go in and win.”252  
The military believed that it had fought in Vietnam with one hand tied behind its back, the 
political objectives were unclear, and that tragedy had resulted from political 
micromanagement. 
The “lessons” of Vietnam had ultimately crystallized in the Weinberger Doctrine, 
which became the driving force behind the military’s preferred way of making war. (The 
Doctrine could be summed up as follows: The U.S. should use force only if vital interests 
are at stake; troops should be committed only if there is a clear intention of winning; troops 
should be committed only if they have clearly defined objectives and the capacity to 
achieve them; the relationship between the objectives and the size of troops committed 
                                                            
250 Quoted in Kenneth T. Walsh, “Commander in Chief,” U.S. News and World Report, December 31, 
1990, p. 25. 
251 For the influence of the “lessons of Munich” and the “lessons of Vietnam” on foreign  policy decision-
making see, for example, Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and 
Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002). 





should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary; troops should not be committed 
without public and Congressional support; use of force should be considered only as a last 
resort.)253 Although among civilian leaders the Weinberger Doctrine had always had its 
fierce opponents254, within the military it was elevated to a creed.  Secretary Weinberger’s 
six principles for the use of force were considered the basis for sound strategy and were 
later re-enforced by the “Powell Doctrine” of overwhelming force.255 A lot more could be 
said about the lessons learned by the military from Vietnam and how this war shaped the 
ideas and beliefs of top leaders, but this would go beyond the purposes of this chapter.256  
As I have argued elsewhere, some of the “lessons” the military learned from that time were 
incorrect, some were self-serving.  While it is important whether the military and the 
civilians learn the “right” lessons from a war, what matters even more for the argument 
here is the content itself of the elite civilian and military ideas and beliefs about the use of 
force (right or wrong) and the extent to which these civilian and military preferences 
diverge.   
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Importantly, at the time of the Gulf War, unlike in many of the other cases, the basic 
principles of the Weinberger Doctrine on the use of force were widely shared among senior 
civilian and military officials.  Most of the senior civilian leaders in the administration of 
George H. W. Bush had an understanding of the “lessons” of the Vietnam experience 
which was very similar to that of their military advisors.257  George Bush’s interpretation 
was the following: “Never fight a war with a hand tied behind your back.  Never send a kid 
into battle unless you’re going to give him total support.  Don’t send him in 
underequipped.  Don’t send a mission in undermanned.  Don’t send them in where you tell 
commanding officers what they can’t do.”258  On more than one occasions, civilian leaders 
referred to the commonly accepted version of the Vietnam War and reassured the military 
that the coming war with Iraq would be radically different.  For example, President Bush 
declared:  
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every 
necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection 
possible for American and allied service men and women.  …this will not be another 
Vietnam … Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will 
not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.  I’m hopeful that this fighting 
will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.”259   
These exact same words could have been spoken by any military commander because they 
were a re-iteration of the Doctrine and were an expression of the military’s own 
preferences as to the “right” way to go to war: resist civilian “meddling”; use 
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overwhelming force to achieve a quick and decisive victory; withdraw troops immediately 
after objectives have been achieved, without getting involved in a protracted and bloody 
aftermath.260 
One of the key shared ideas of civilian and military officials was a preference for a 
decisive use of overwhelming force.261  The military preference for overwhelming force 
was made abundantly clear during the decision-making process, and especially during the 
numerous discussions of the plan for the ground campaign.  For example, in order to even 
start thinking seriously about an offensive option for getting Iraq out of Kuwait, General 
Schwarzkopf repeatedly requested an additional two-division corps from Europe.  Powell 
not only supported such force levels but added up to them.  In his words, “We had learned 
a lesson in Panama. Go in big, and end it quickly.  We could not put the United States 
through another Vietnam.”262  From the very beginning, civilian leaders also pledged to 
avoid “the mistakes” of Vietnam, among the biggest of which was “gradualism.”  The 
military was firmly against gradual application of limited force.  The civilians concurred 
and promised that instead of applying force incrementally, they would allow the military to 
use massive force for a quick and decisive victory.  The military was glad to see that the 
politicians had kept this promise earlier, during the 1989 invasion of Panama.  At some 
point during the planning process for Operation Just Cause, President Bush had said: “If 
you need two men to do a job, send four.  And I want our people to have whatever they 
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need to do the job.”263  The generals could not agree more.  The massive build-up of 
American forces for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was also meant to show exactly how 
much both civilian and military leaders wanted to make it clear that the coming invasion 
would not resemble Vietnam in any way.   
In other cases of decision-making on the use of force, there have often been severe 
differences between the military and civilian authorities as to how much force ought to be 
used, and such differences have at times disrupted the decision-making process.  (Other 
chapters document at length the high preference divergence between top civilian and 
military leaders on key issues related to the use of force in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war 
and how these big ideational differences impeded the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process.)  In this case, however, of great importance was the fact that the military 
preference for massive force, among others, was shared by the top civilian officials.264  In 
the lead-up to Desert Storm, the political leadership in Washington fully backed up the 
requests of Powell and Schwarzkopf for massive force.  For the offensive option, for 
example, the generals had requested doubling of the forces already deployed in the region 
for the defensive/deterrent strategy, including moving the VII Corps from Europe. 
“Cheney supported Schwarzkopf and Powell without conditions. … Finally, Bush said, ‘If 
that’s what you need, we’ll do it.’”265 
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Another important point of civil-military agreement concerned the sensitive issue 
of control over operations.   While, in general, political leaders did not hesitate to practice 
assertive civilian control, they had a healthy respect for the military’s need for operational 
autonomy.  Dick Cheney had been in the White House during the Mayaguez incident and 
“had seen first hand the tendency of the people at the top … to meddle needlessly and 
counterproductively in military operations. “  That is why, as Secretary of Defense, he 
favored “a clean, clear-cut chain of command – as short as possible.  And no meddling 
from the top.  Stay out of their hair.”266  As Secretary Cheney characterized himself and the 
President, they belonged to what he called the “‘Don’t screw around’ school of military 
strategy.’ ”267 Bush himself promised: “I would avoid micromanaging the military.”268  His 
leadership style was liked by the generals.  Just like the officers, the President believed in a 
clear chain of command and giving clear instructions.  According to Colin Powell, 
“President Bush, more than any other recent President, understands the proper use of 
military force.  In every instance he has made sure that the objective was clear and that we 
knew what we were getting into.”269 
Another important issue of agreement between civilian and military leaders was 
that air power alone could hardly win a war.  While deciding on how to deal with Saddam 
Hussein, neither the civilians nor the military (with the exception of some in the Air Force) 
were comfortable with the “air strikes only” option.  Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force 
Lieutenant General, “was not prepared to say air power could win a major conflict.  It 
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never had.  He was aghast that the Air Force chief was pushing that line…”270  Bush, 
Cheney, and Powell also believed that ground troops would be needed. 271  Colin Powell 
warned that “[t]he trouble with airpower is that you leave the initiative in the hands of [the] 
enemy” to decide whether he has had enough punishment. 272 Air-only strategies would not 
be successful, according to him, because the enemy “can hunker down [or] dig in, [or] 
disperse to try to ride out such a single-dimension attack.  … Such strategies are designed 
to hope to win, they are not designed to win.”273  That is why the Chairman preferred to 
plan “a full campaign – air, land, sea, and space – to remove the decision from Saddam’s 
hands.”274 
Regarding preferences on whether to use force for getting Saddam out of Kuwait, 
most traditional accounts of the 1991 Gulf crisis overstate the extent to which civilians 
supported the use of force while the military advocated economic sanctions.  In fact, the 
civilians, just like the generals, wanted to give every non-military option a chance before 
the country decided to use force.  The difference actually was not that the generals were 
stubbornly insisting on the use of economic sanctions while the civilians were pushing for 
the use of force, but rather on how much exactly both sides were willing to wait for 
sanctions to produce the desired effect.  Civilian decision-makers were somewhat less 
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patient than their military counter-parts and less convinced that economic coercion would 
work. 
Conventional wisdom overstates Powell’s support for economic sanctions and 
opposition to the use of force in this case in particular.  While the then-Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs could be correctly labeled “the reluctant warrior” (especially in comparison 
with some of his civilian masters from the first Clinton Administration), his reluctance to 
commit US troops was much higher in cases of humanitarian interventions (e.g., Somalia, 
Bosnia, Haiti, or the so-called “operations other than war”), and not in the lead-up to 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where he was assured the military could fight in its preferred 
conventional way.  President Bush Sr. himself has denied the existence of the alleged wide 
gap between his views and Powell’s on the use of force option.275  That civil-military 
preference divergence on economic sanctions was not very high becomes clear also from a 
closer reading of two key events in the decision-making process: the September 24, 1990 
meeting of Bush, Cheney, and Powell to discuss alternative options to respond to the Gulf 
crisis and Powell’s and Cheney’s Congressional testimonies on December 4, 1990.   
During the September 24 meeting, Powell and Bush discussed primarily two courses of 
action: 1) an offensive option and 2) what the Chairman saw as an alternative to war – 
“sanctions and strangulation.”276  Regarding the military option, Powell wanted to make 
sure that the military leadership had explained the details of the deployment schedules and 
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given civilian decision-makers enough time to decide as to what they wanted to do next.  
At the meeting, the President and Colin Powell also discussed another option – continuing 
the defensive build-up and, at the same time, keeping economic sanctions in place.  
According to the Chairman, “Containing Iraq from further aggression through the 
defensive strategy and strangling her into withdrawal through sanctions remained a live 
option.”277  What has remained largely unnoted is that at that time, Powell brought to the 
attention of the President what he called “a serious disadvantage” of economic sanctions – 
importantly, it was that “sanctions left the initiative with the Iraqis to decide when they had 
had enough.  And history has taught us that sanctions take time, if they work at all.”278   
Interestingly, the Chairman did not advocate either of the options.  Although at the 
time he himself preferred to give economic sanctions a little bit more time, he stopped 
short of advocating this.  As Woodward writes, the Chairman “pulled away from the brink 
of advocating [containment and economic strangulation] personally.”279  This may be a 
surprise for those who exaggerate Powell’s support for economic sanctions.  However, 
such a position is entirely consistent with Powell’s understanding of his role as the 
principal military advisor to the president – he was trying not to advocate but to present the 
alternatives as fully as possible in order for civilian decision-makers to be able to make 
their choice based on a sound knowledge of the consequences of each option.  Powell 
believed that he owed civilian leaders a full account of all possible options for action 
(military and non-military alike), with their advantages and disadvantages.  He thought that 
he needed to bring all aspects of an issue to the attention of decision-makers so they could 
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fully understand the consequences of their choices.  As he wrote: “My responsibility that 
day was to lay out all options for the nation’s civilian leadership.  However, in our 
democracy it is the President, not the generals, who make decisions about going to war.  I 
had done my duty.  …. If the President … decided it must be war, then my job was to 
make sure we were ready to go in and win.”280 
Along similar lines, in his congressional testimony on December 4, 1990, Colin 
Powell was very careful not to argue for or against sanctions or the use of force.  Again, he 
stopped short of advocating continuing with economic sanctions.  Testifying before the 
House Committee on Armed Services, Powell described some of the existing war plans 
and emphasized that the military was preparing a combined air, ground, and sea attack in 
order to achieve a quick victory and minimize casualties.  The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff made a very strong argument against relying on air power alone, saying it 
could not provide a decisive victory.  Notably, Powell carefully avoided making a 
recommendation in favor or against the use of force.281  The Chairman did not take sides 
on the question of whether economic sanctions would work and how long should the US 
wait before deciding sanctions were not successful and, hence, military force should be 
used.  As to whether to continue with economic sanctions, Powell correctly believed that 
“how long to wait is a political, not a military, judgment.”282  The fact that Powell made a 
strong and passionate argument against relying solely on air power (in case military action 
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was taken) showed that the Chairman was not afraid of being outspoken and presenting a 
strong opinion, which might not be liked by everyone.  At the same time, that Powell did 
not advocate the use or non-use of military force showed that he knew his proper role in 
the chain of command and respected the prerogatives of the civilian leadership.   
That Gen. Powell did not make an argument in favor of continuing with economic 
sanctions shows that his preferences were not that much different from civilian preferences 
at the time.  This could also be shown by comparing Powell’s and Cheney’s testimonies.  
At the same hearing, Secretary Cheney presented a clearer argument for the use of force.  
He stated that since he had not seen evidence showing that economic sanctions could be 
made to succeed, force would be the only sure way to guarantee that Saddam is expelled 
from Kuwait.  The Defense Secretary noted that his thinking on the utility of sanctions has 
evolved “because of Iraq’s decision to call off gasoline rationing and new Administration 
analyses about Iraq’s ability to increase farm production and mobilize additional 
troops.”283  He argued that waiting for sanctions to produce a decisive result might have 
negative consequences.  For example, economic sanctions were hurting American allies 
such as Turkey more than they were hurting Saddam.  Cheney argued that, in the absence 
of more decisive actions, Hussein would continue to pillage Kuwait.  He would also 
mobilize more of his troops and strengthen Iraqi fortifications. Such measures could make 
a future military campaign against him more difficult.  In addition, the Secretary of 
Defense warned that, if military action were delayed, the fragile international coalition 
could falter.  Colin Powell expressed similar concerns:  
Let me also say a word about the impact of sanctions and the concept of exercising patience.  
The sanctions are having an impact, they couldn’t help but have one, and probably a serious 
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one.  But none of the learned witnesses who have appeared before this committee know 
whether or not sanctions will work of when they will work.  … Also, the nation of Kuwait 
and the people of Kuwait continue to suffer terribly, the world economy suffers, the political 
and diplomatic pressure that we have been able to apply, it seems to me, will start to fracture 
over time.  So, waiting is not without its own cost.  In the final analysis, how long we wait is 
a political judgment.  The Armed Forces must be ready to accomplish their assigned mission 
whether the answer to the question of waiting is 6 months, 8 months, 12 months, 18 months, 
or any other number of months that our political leaders and the leaders of the coalition 
decide to wait. 284 
   
In other words, small differences between civilian and military leaders did exist to 
the extent that some in the military believed for longer than the civilians that economic 
sanctions might be successful against Saddam.  What is also important here, however, is 
that both civilian and military officials were in agreement that the determination as to 
whether the US would stop relying on sanctions and turn to force was for political leaders 
to make and when they did make it, the military obliged. 
As shown, civilian and military preferences on most of the important issues were in 
convergence.  Civilian and military leaders had many similar ideas regarding broadly the 
role and use of force in foreign policy, and they also shared views in regard to issues 
specific to the crisis in the Gulf.  Political and military leaders agreed on the objectives of 
the war against Saddam; there was almost no disagreement on the conduct of the war 
either. 285   Other analysts have pointed out the low level of civil-military preference 
divergence in this case as well. For example, Rick Atkinson notes what he calls a “striking 
congruence” in civilian and military preferences during the term of Bush, Sr.286  Eliot 
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Cohen as well points to the preference convergence between civilian leaders and the 
Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff.  “This widely popular general … shared many policy 
outlooks with his civilian superiors.”287  General Schwarzkopf in his autobiography also 
makes a similar statement regarding the ideas and beliefs of the key decision-makers: “We 
ended up in unanimous agreement on every major issue."288 
It is important to note that this kind of convergence in the preferences of civilian 
and military leaders does not happen very often.  As the rest of the case studies in this 
dissertation show, it has more often been the case that civilian and military officials 
disagree on how force should be used – the military most often favors the quick and 
massive use of force in accordance with the criteria of the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, 
while politicians prefer incremental use of measured force.289  The 1991 Gulf War case 
differs markedly from other situations when the use of force has been considered, for 
example, under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In this case, the George 
H. W. Bush administration “had no quarrel with the Powell Doctrine,”290 while in the other 
cases we observed a high level of civil-military preference divergence - most civilian 
leaders sharply disagreed with some of the main tenets of the Powell Doctrine, while the 
military still held on to it, as shown in other chapters.291  Importantly, this high level of 
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civil-military agreement was known from the very early stages of the decision-making 
process when the top civilian and military decision-makers started discussions on 
Operations Plan 02-1001 on August 4 at Camp David.  While some analysts of decision-
making on the use of force have noted the variance in the level of divergence between 
civilian and military preferences in the different cases, its impact on the process of decision 
making has rarely been explored.  The next sections will do exactly that and show how, as 
expected by my theoretical framework, the low preference divergence in combination with 
assertive civilian control contributed to positive decision-making climate and facilitated the 
making of military policy and strategy.292 
 
Decision-Making in the 1991 Gulf War 
In this particular case, I will show 1) how the combination of assertive civilian 
dominance and low level of divergence between civilian and military preferences, as it is 
for cases in Quadrant 3 in Table 1, contributed to a more effective decision process; and 2) 
how “civilian abdication” and ceding control to the military in the final stages of the Gulf 
war led to ineffective process, and ultimately, did not allow the military victory to be 
turned into a political triumph as well.  (A mismatch between political goals and military 
means or inability to make military means serve political objectives is precisely what my 
theoretical framework would lead us to expect for cases of military dominance or civilian 
abdication -- Quadrant 2 and Quadrant 4). 
The next paragraphs show that, in contrast with conventional wisdom, in the lead-
up to the 1991 Gulf War and for most of the military campaign itself, this country had an 
                                                            





active civilian leadership – querying, probing, prodding, challenging the views of their 
military advisors, not afraid to involve themselves into the details of military planning, and 
denying the existence of a separate “purely military” sphere in which civilian intervention 
would be unacceptable.  Furthermore, the decision-making process and the conduct of 
military operations were more effective because of this assertive civilian leadership and 
not in spite of it, as supporters of the Huntington’s theory would argue.  At the same time, 
due mainly to the low level of divergence between civilian and military preferences, 
civilian leaders refrained from “micromanagement.”  The decision-making process 
reflected both a mixture of civilian and military preferences, and a firm civilian 
direction.293 
Contrary to predominant interpretations of this case as the classic example of 
benign civilian neglect and almost total freedom of the military, during the planning and 
the execution of the campaign the civilian leadership was not only involved in the details 
of military planning, but at times was quite assertive about it.  While the relationship 
between top civilian and military leaders was respectful and collegial, political leaders did 
not hesitate to assert control or to displease the military on occasion. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom portraying the civilians as detached and leaving almost everything to 
the military, it was not lost on Gen. Powell that President Bush was interested in “all the 
details.  He wanted to be the player, the guy who made as many of the calls as possible.”294 
For eight years, Bush had been observing Reagan’s style and found it overly delegative.  
He did not approve of such detached leadership. “Mr. Bush likes the expression ‘hands-
on,’ which in politics signifies involvement of the President in details of issues.  Mr. Bush, 
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the longtime insider, the close observer of past mistakes, is striving for that happy medium 
– neither too involved nor too remote.  To achieve that light hands-on touch, he tries to 
avoid both dominating his ‘team’ and letting it manipulate or define him.”295  As described 
by his aides, the President provided confident and assertive leadership.296  This stemmed 
from his extensive diplomatic and political experience and his deep interest in foreign 
policy issues.   
The Defense Secretary as well showed a keen interest in military planning and got 
deeply involved in the decision process.  Cheney was an activist and a probing leader.  
Contrary to popular accounts, he liked to immerse himself into the details of war plans.  
For example, early in the process, he requested that the Joint Staff give him some highly 
classified briefings on offensive war planning.  “Beginning November 26, he was given a 
series of nuts-and-bolts tutorials on such subjects as Building an Air Attack Plan; Target 
Categories for an Air Campaign; Breaching Iraqi Forward Defenses; Logistics 
Sustainment; …Army Anti-Armor Capabilities; Amphibious Operations; and other 
sensitive topics like special operations and intelligence.”297  On a daily basis, Secretary 
Cheney kept asking Gen. Powell and other military leaders numerous questions in order to 
make sure he was familiar with all the necessary details and could convey them to the 
President.298  According to Schwarzkopf, during one of Cheney’s and Powell’s visit to 
Riyadh: “Cheney peppered us with questions on everything from the truck shortage to 
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possible terrorist threats…”299  The Secretary of Defense had adopted a skeptical view and 
did not take anything on faith.300  He was following one of Powell’s own maxims: “Don’t 
be afraid to challenge the pros, even in their own backyard.”301  “Cheney had learned the 
value of questioning everything.  … He had brought the generals and admirals into his 
office for repeated grilling, taken them to the White House for special briefings, ordered a 
dozen studies and insisted on answers.”302  Bush Sr., Cheney and the other civilian leaders 
behaved like Eliot Cohen’s model statesmen – they were not afraid to question and 
challenge the military professionals on their turf. 
The effectiveness of the decision process was helped by this determination of 
civilian leaders to watch the military closely and evaluate incoming information critically.  
When civilian leaders show the ability and willingness to grasp military plans in detail, this 
not only gives them a fuller understanding of the military aspects of the situation, but also 
further deters the military from trying to get away with incorrect information or keeping 
secrets.  Probing civilian leadership mitigates the possibility of receiving incomplete or 
biased information and, thus, makes it less likely that politicians would fall prey to military 
parochialism. 
Also, the activist and assertive attitude of civilian principals helped enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision process by generating options that otherwise would not have 
been forthcoming.  The Defense Secretary drew on numerous sources of information, 
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including his own military advisors, outside experts, and media reports, in order to 
stimulate debate.  Based on these sources, as well as his own extensive reading on the Iran-
Iraq war, Cheney compiled a list of questions he used to “pulse the system for 
information” during the planning process.  For example, when at the start of the 
deliberations the Secretary of Defense was feeling that the generals were responding 
somewhat slowly and not presenting him and the president with a full range of military 
options, he decided to prod the military into action. Cheney wanted to get more options 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was willing to try different channels.  He asked his 
military assistants, Admiral Bill Owens and Colonel Gary Trexler, to go to their own 
services and provide him with information as to what the military could do if the civilians 
wanted to consider, for example, a surgical air strike as retaliation for Saddam’s actions.  
The Defense Secretary ordered them to “bang on the system and find out what we can do 
and how fast we can do it.“303   
Assertive civilian leadership ensured that there would be additional strategy options 
put on the table.  The Administration’s discussions of the military plan for Desert Storm 
illustrate this point.  When in mid October of 1990, both the air and the ground offensive 
plans were briefed to the President and the rest of the Group of Eight (better known as the 
“Gang of Eight”),304 top civilian leaders liked the plan for the air offensive.305  Both 
civilian and military officials agreed that the air campaign plan was a good start and, with 
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some improvements, could be implemented.  However, the ground campaign plan was 
found weak, especially by civilians, but even by Gen. Powell.  One of the most serious 
problems of this plan was the envisioned main attack which was supposed to drive through 
the middle of the Iraqi main defenses.  Critics of the plan argued that if such an attack were 
implemented, American forces would be outnumbered and an easy target for the enemy.  
Powell and the other Chiefs believed that while with the currently allocated ground forces 
(one corps) any plan would be problematic, the currently-proposed one was just 
“faulty.”306  Civilian leaders were even more disappointed with the briefing and did not 
hide that. Secretary Cheney called it “high diddle diddle right up the middle.”  Brent 
Scowcroft was particularly critical, while Bob Gates compared Gen. Schwarzkopf to Gen. 
McClellan.  Cheney required a new version of the offensive plan “with a little imagination 
this time.”307 
Feeling that general Schwarzkopf was being cautious, Cheney got his own staff to 
do some planning and began presenting the CENTCOM commander with their ideas about 
how to fight Saddam (including the so-called “Western excursion”).  The generals did not 
see these ideas as a stroke of military genius.  In his memoirs, Schwarzkopf related some 
of them with irony: “What if we parachute the 82nd Airborne into the far western part of 
Iraq, hundreds of miles from Kuwait and totally cut off from any kind of support, and seize 
a couple of missile sites, then line up along the highway and drive for Baghdad? … The 
most bizarre [idea] involved capturing a town in western Iraq and offering it to Saddam in 
exchange for Kuwait."308 The CENTCOM commander described such planning as being 
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"as bad as it could possibly be...” and admitted he was rattled.  Certainly, the planning 
efforts of Cheney’s staff would be considered a violation of Huntington’s preferred 
“objective control” model, a political intrusion into the military sphere.  But, contrary to 
Huntington, such efforts were beneficial and largely successful in their purpose – Cheney’s 
goal in conducting these planning exercises was not to write the military plan for the war, 
but to spark more creative thinking from the military.  “Even if the Western Excursion was 
not the perfect plan, it had already accomplished one of Cheney’s goals: it had lit a fire 
under the military.  They would not be coming back with any more ‘high diddle diddle 
plans.’”309  
Cheney correctly felt that “he needed multiple sources of information.  ‘There was 
no way he was going to let himself be captive of the JCS or Collin Powell.’”310 Going 
directly to the services for information (rather than through the Joint Chiefs) was Cheney’s 
way to prod the military to act faster.  The Secretary also decided to have a one-on-one 
meeting with Gen. Powell in order to explain again how important it was for President 
Bush to be presented with workable military options. 311   While the military did not 
necessarily like Cheney’s activism, it got the message that the political leadership was very 
serious about exploring military options and obliged.  Thus, political leaders and the 
decision process itself benefited from a wider range of military options than it would have 
been the case without this kind of civilian prodding.  In the end, the two-corps ground 
campaign the military executed was significantly improved and included various creative 
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ideas from the planning efforts of several groups, sparked to life by the military’s fear that 
if they did not plan better, the civilians would make them execute a version of the hated 
“Western Excursion.”312 
Rather than being hands-off as usually portrayed, top civilian leaders spent a lot of 
time during the planning process inquiring with the military about targeting in order to 
ensure that political considerations for minimizing collateral damage are taken into 
account.  Gen. Powell described the process this way: “We went over the target list one last 
time.  [Cheney] seemed to have memorized it.  He spent hours in the National Military 
Command Center peppering my staff with questions.  He left his briefers drained.”313  
Three days before the start of the air campaign, Bush and Cheney reviewed the target list 
yet again, paying special attention to targets that could cause political controversies.  The 
President asked several targets -- statues of Saddam Hussein and triumphal arches -- to be 
dropped.314 After the meeting with Bush, Secretary Cheney went over the target list again 
with Gen. Powell to ensure that the military understood the political constraints -- civilian 
casualties should be kept to a minimum and Iraqi national and religious symbols should be 
protected. 315   The military showed understanding for the limitations under which its 
civilian bosses were operating.  “Powell had worked hard with Schwarzkopf to make sure 
the offense showed some restraint.  Collateral damage had to be minimized.  Of the half 
dozen bridges inside the Baghdad city limits, the air campaign was, at Powell’s urging, 
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only going to hit two.”316 This firm civilian control, combined with careful civil-military 
coordination and cooperation during the planning process, led to the war being fought with 
minimal civilian casualties. 
Another example of assertive and competent leadership without micromanagement 
was the meeting held by Cheney and Wolfowitz on December 19 during their visit in 
Riyadh.  They wanted to report to Bush on the state of readiness of the troops. During the 
meeting with Gen. Schwarzkopf, through re-examining the war plan, they made sure that 
everything was proceeding according to civilian orders.  Both Cheney and Wolfowitz had 
many questions about the war plan, and especially about the ground offensive, which they 
thought would be more complicated than the air war.  The two leaders requested a series of 
briefings to cover all aspects of both the air and ground campaign plans. “Cheney fired 
away with questions. He didn’t want anyone making optimistic assumptions; he wanted to 
make sure the command was stocking up supplies for a long conflict.”317  Civilian and 
military officials also discussed the possibility of Saddam using chemical weapons, as well 
as the target selection and anticipated casualties.  Cheney and Wolfowitz, together with 
military leaders, re-examined the alternative options and considered again their 
consequences.  Political leaders understood that at times such questioning could be 
unpleasant for the officers and be seen as a challenge to their authority, but they tried to 
draw them out on all aspects of the air and ground war plans.  Once they were convinced 
that the military understood political guidance and was going to follow it, Cheney and 
Wolfowitz reassured the uniforms that this would not be another Vietnam and that the 
military would not have its hands tied behind its back. 
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Contrary to Huntington’s precepts, the politicians did not shut up once the war had begun.  
Civilian leaders asserted control during the military campaign as well, and not only prior to 
its start.  They did not hesitate to impose political restraints when they thought the situation 
required it. Such was the case with Iraq’s Scud missiles, for example.  From the very start 
of the air campaign, when Iraq launched Scuds at Tel Aviv, the civilian leadership’s main 
political concern was to make sure that Israel did not retaliate because, in this case, US 
leaders feared the Arab states would leave the coalition.  That is why, civilian officials 
decided they had to do everything possible to destroy the Iraqi Scud launchers, or at least 
to convince Israel that the US military would put a sufficient effort into this task.  From a 
military standpoint, however, the effort to suppress the Scuds made little sense.  The 
missiles were very inaccurate and, in this sense, they were considered militarily 
unimportant. Thus, Schwarzkopf and other military leaders argued that diverting air planes 
for the purpose of chasing Scuds was useless and it was hindering the broader air 
campaign. But Cheney made sure political considerations dominated and insisted that 
CENTCOM put more sorties on the missile launchers.318  Secretary Cheney demanded and 
received daily detailed progress reports from the military about the Scud-hunting.  The 
decision as to whether it was worth it to divert sorties from the air campaign and focus 
them on the Scud-hunt was a political one and Bush and Cheney did not hesitate to make 
that judgment, knowing full well that they angered many in the Air Force.319  As a result of 
this firm civilian control, Washington managed to prevent Israel’s entry into the war.  
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Another example of civilian assertiveness and involvement in the details of military 
planning was the careful vetting of targets in Baghdad which started after the bombing of 
the Al Firdos bunker which killed 204 civilians and turned into a PR disaster.  After the 
incident, Washington started reviewing all targets in the Iraqi capital proposed by the air 
planners. 320   The air force generals, supported by Schwarzkopf himself, fought back, 
saying that Washington’s interference was unduly truncating the air campaign.  They 
argued that Saddam had just started to feel the enormous pain about to be inflicted upon 
him and his war machine and these restrictions were coming at the worst possible moment.  
The civilian leadership, however, thought that another Al Firdos could lead to loss of 
domestic and international public support and overruled the purely military logic of their 
commanders. 
This pattern of civil-military relations (low civil-military preference divergence 
combined with assertive civilian dominance) did have a significant positive impact on the 
way policy-makers collected and processed information and on the quality of their analysis 
of the strategic situation.  When civil-military preference divergence is low, my theoretical 
framework expects that the principal-agent problem of private information would not be 
severe, and thus, the effectiveness of the decision process would be enhanced.  In other 
words, when civilian and military officials have similar preferences, both sides would have 
an interest in sharing information, rather than in concealing or distorting it, as is the case 
when preferences diverge highly and each side has an incentive to skew the decision 
process in order to bolster its own preferred outcome. Under such circumstances (similarity 
of civilian and military views and interests) both sides would be more willing to exchange 
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information with each other, and this would create a better climate for open discussions 
and analysis of various policy options, thus, contributing to the effectiveness of the 
decision process.  The National Security Council (NSC) meetings under Bush Sr. provide a 
good illustration.  The President used these meetings to gather information and to listen to 
different views from top officials.  As Schwarzkopf writes about them, “President Bush 
wanted to look at every facet of the crisis. … I was impressed by his willingness to listen 
to what everybody had to say and not make snap judgments or decisions before he had the 
complete picture. He went around the table, searching for specific information…” 321  
Similar was the atmosphere during the meetings of the Group of Eight - Bush’s chief 
advisors with whom he made decisions.322 Without being confrontational, the President 
enjoyed policy debates and “did not get upset when others disagreed with him.”323  His 
openness to debate created good conditions for a lively ongoing civil-military dialogue on 
national security issues.  But it was not mainly Bush’s open-mindedness that affected 
positively the decision process.     
More importantly, in this case, the high level of civil-military agreement on key 
issues meant that neither side had an interest in manipulating or withholding information.  
This led to a generally free flow of information between civilian and military leaders and 
facilitated the exchange of ideas and deliberation between them.  For most of the time, 
there was a good decision-making climate which allowed frequent uninhibited discussions 
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between military and civilian officials.  Technical military, as well as domestic and 
international political issues were considered during numerous meetings of Bush’s top-
level advisors.  Richard Armitage describes the sessions in the Tank between the Defense 
Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as having “plenty of discussion.”  “People speak.  
People go back and forth.  This is particularly true with Secretary Cheney who was wont to 
argue with his service chiefs.”324  Time and again, top civilian and military officials would 
discuss each other’s concerns about different military options, and Bush and Cheney would 
encourage the military to share their doubts and reservations. 
Re-assured by the similarities in their philosophies of war and peace, civilian and 
military leaders felt free to disagree and contradict each other.  Military leaders were 
determined to provide accurate information to the civilian leadership. As Gen. 
Schwarzkopf asserted (not necessarily self-servingly): “Every shred of information we 
gave the President would be the most accurate we had, even if it reflected unfavorably.  If 
we told him we could do something, we would be able to deliver on our promise.”325 Gen. 
Powell also did not hesitate to give the politicians “the cold bath of reality.”326  Unlike 
during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, when uniformed leaders often did not feel free to 
express their views to Secretary Rumsfeld, in this case the military was not afraid to 
discuss openly.   “Powell felt free enough to speak up when he believed a canon of military 
operations was being violated, and Cheney was prepared to protect his chairman.”327  
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During a Congressional testimony shortly before the beginning of the war, Senator Bill 
Cohen asked Colin Powell whether Powell “stood in awe” of his civilian bosses and 
whether he felt free to give honest advice.  The Chairman replied: “I am not reluctant or 
afraid to give either the Secretary of Defense, the President, or any other member of the 
National Security Council, my best, most honest, most candid, advice.  Whether they like it 
or not.”328  When military leaders do not feel the pressure to sugarcoat their information in 
order to please their civilian bosses, it is less likely that top civilian decision-makers would 
make a bad choice because of faulty information.  After the war, President Bush re-iterated 
his gratefulness to Gen. Colin Powell, Admiral David Jeremiah, and the other military 
leaders for providing honest advice.  “We had a lot of meetings.  And General Powell 
leveled with me, and Admiral Jeremiah leveled with us, and Norm Schwarzkopf leveled 
with us … And he [Powell] gave me straightforward advice … he spoke his mind; he did it 
openly.”329  Another sign of the existence of free and open discussions was that during this 
period, compared to the time in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, there were much fewer 
leaks from the military to the media or congressional leaders.     
As shown in Chapter 7 on the 2003 Iraq War, decision-makers are likely to 
discount advice (or not seek it at all) from sources with whom they disagree on many key 
issues or who they perceive as having different interests in a given situation.  (In other 
words, in cases of high civil-military preferences divergence, civilian leaders tend to 
disregard military advice.)  For example, in the lead-up to the 2003 war with Iraq, 
Secretary Rumsfeld and his civilian colleagues at the Pentagon believed that there was a 
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wide gap between their views on national security issues and the beliefs held by their 
military advisors.  Rumsfeld thought that many in the military top echelon were incapable 
of fully understanding and adapting to the new realities.  He believed some uniformed 
leaders were adamantly opposed to his transformation efforts and to a war with Iraq and 
that they were very risk-averse and with no desire to modify the way the military prepare 
for and fight America’s wars.  Hence, because of the high divergence between civilian and 
military views, Rumsfeld was not very interested in advice coming from his uniformed 
leaders who he saw as being “stuck in the Cold War.”  As Arthur Lupia shows, “perceived 
common interest [is] necessary for persuasion… persuasion is impossible when the speaker 
and listener have conflicting interests.  For when the listener perceived a speaker to have 
conflicting interests, her best response is to ignore the cue.”330    
Unlike in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, during the 1991 Gulf Crisis, due mainly 
to the low level of conflict between civilian and military views and beliefs, political leaders 
consulted with the military on a regular basis and were receptive to what uniformed leaders 
had to say, without of course always agreeing with their recommendations.  Unlike 
Rumsfeld in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, President Bush Sr. wanted military advice 
and “sought it at every turn.”331  The military was included in every major decision.  As 
Gen. Powell says: 
…we were blessed with a group of political leaders, a President, and a secretary of 
defense who … allowed the military to participate in the decision-making process 
from the very beginning, and allowed me as chairman to be a part of the inner 
sanctum.  When discussions were going on, the secretary of defense and I were there 
to make sure that the military input was there in the beginning and not sort of after 
the fact, after political judgments had been made.  So there was, as close as possible, 
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integration between political issues and political thinking and military issues and 
military decisions.332   
 
In this case military leaders felt that their opinions were valued and respected.333 
In sharp contrast with the decision-making process leading to the 2003 Iraq war when 
Rumsfeld often disregarded military advice, in the administration of Bush Sr., civilian 
officials made sure military opinion was well represented and this helped enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision process.  For example, during the debate on the effectiveness 
of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, while Cheney himself was becoming less and 
less convinced that containment or “economic strangulation” would be sufficient to 
achieve the goal of getting Saddam out of Kuwait, he wanted the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs as well to be able to express his views on this issue directly to the President.  
Knowing full well that Powell might have views somewhat different from his own, the 
Secretary of Defense nevertheless arranged a special visit with Bush in order Powell to be 
able to present his arguments on both use of force and economic sanctions.  This situation 
was radically different from the way the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs (Generals Hugh 
Shelton and Dick Myers) were treated in the George W. Bush administration. Rumsfeld 
curbed the influence of the Chiefs significantly, and at some point even suggested to Gen. 
Shelton that military advice should go through Rumsfeld rather than directly to the 
President.334  This went contrary to the intent of the Golfwater-Nichols Act and ultimately 
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hurt the quality of the decision process.335 The effectiveness of the advisory process at the 
top of the government could suffer if the independence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
is undermined because in that case the President would not have any alternative views to 
consider – a situation, which could be particularly dangerous in case the civilian view 
(coming to the President from the Secretary) happens to be wrong.  By making sure that 
Gen. Powell had an additional meeting with Bush during this crucial debate, Cheney was 
protecting the integrity of the decision process and, in particular, the ability of the 
Commander-in-Chief to get information and advise directly from his top military leader. 
Thus, this pattern of civil-military relations, characterized by a combination of low 
level of civil-military preference divergence and assertive civilian leadership, contributed 
to a free flow and exchange of information between political leaders and their chief 
uniformed advisors.  Unlike in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war when the civil-military 
dialogue was truncated mainly because of the very high level of preference divergence 
between Rumsfeld and the generals, this time the policy-making process benefited from 
presenting and evaluating a full range of military and non-military opinions; and the 
rigorous analysis of alternative strategies ultimately increased the effectiveness of the 
decision process. 
The level of civil-military preference divergence affects not only the information 
gathering and analysis during the decision process, but also the cooperation between 
civilian and military officials.  Smooth civil-military collaboration is very important 
because it affects the degree to which political and military concerns would be integrated 
in the final strategy and, ultimately, the extent to which the military instrument would 
                                                            
335 Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, making the Chairman the primary military advisor to the 






serve properly the political goals of a state.  In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, the 
similarity in civilian and military views and ideas was also the basis for the cordial and 
respectful relationship established between top policy-makers and their key military 
advisors, which facilitated the decision process. A civil-military relationship of mutual 
respect and trust, essential for effective planning and conduct of wars, is much more likely 
to develop when civilian and military leaders hold similar beliefs on major national 
security issues.  The personal and professional backgrounds of top civilian and military 
officials contributed further to the good understanding between them, which facilitated 
their cooperation during the decision-making process.  As shown earlier, most of the top 
civilian officials had a solid grasp of national security affairs, including military matters.  
Unlike in the Clinton administration, the military had enormous respect for George H. W. 
Bush as its commander-in-chief.  Besides being the youngest Navy pilot in World War II, 
George H. W. Bush had won the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal “for 
heroism and extraordinary achievement.”  The President’s experience in World War II had 
given him a clear understanding of and sensitivity to the human costs of war.  It also gave 
him confidence in his ability to make the tough calls in time of crisis.  As Bush said, 
“When it came time for me to send our kids to Panama, and later to the Middle East, I 
thought back on my own experiences in combat and what it was like to be shot at.”336  This 
was very important for the military, since they knew they were ordered to war by civilian 
leaders who knew what being in combat meant.337 
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Another factor that contributed to the effective civil-military coordination and 
collaboration in the decision process was that just like their civilian counterparts, senior 
military leaders also possessed considerable political sophistication and experience in 
working at the highest levels of government.338  Colin Powell, the “political general,” 
understood better than most in his position the political and diplomatic pressures under 
which his President was working.  “George Bush was under enormous pressure, and I 
could see it in his taut features.  He was trying to balance Arab states, Israel, Western 
allies, the Soviets, Congress, and the American public, like a juggler spinning plates on the 
tops of poles, wondering how long he could keep everything in the air,” the general wrote 
in his memoirs. 339   Powell’s deep understanding of the domestic and international 
challenges confronting his political leaders earned him their trust.  When political and 
military leaders have similar preferences on the key questions regarding the use of force 
and when civilian leaders trust that their military advisors understand their political 
considerations, the former feel much less need to monitor intrusively the military and are 
more willing to give them a freer hand.  In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, civilian leaders 
trusted their military advisors and had confidence in their abilities.  President Bush said of 
Chairman Powell, “When he briefed me, I found there was something about the quiet, 
efficient way he laid everything out and answered questions that reduced my fears and 
gave me great confidence. I admired his thoroughness and above all his concern for his 
troops.”340  
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Even more important for the collaboration between top political and military 
officials was the fact that while the political leaders stayed actively and closely involved in 
strategy-making and military planning, they did not micromanage the military.  “Bush 
allowed the military professionals to handle operational matters … he believed it was their 
job to implement policy.”341  After ensuring that the political perspective was taken into 
account, civilian leaders kept their promise to refrain from interference. Unlike in the lead-
up to the 2003 Iraq war when civilian micromanagement was common, in this case its lack 
promoted the smooth interaction between political and military leaders.   
Since a combination of civilian assertiveness and lack of political meddling is an 
essential condition for good civil-military cooperation, and, thus, for effective decision-
making, we should establish the conditions under which it is possible to have dominant and 
assertive civilian leaders who, at the same time, refrain from micromanaging the military.  
A careful examination of the civil-military relationship during the 1991 Gulf War with the 
help of my theoretical framework, which emphasizes the importance of the level of civil-
military preference divergence, in addition to the level and type of civilian control, 
provides an answer.  We see that when civil-military preference divergence is low (as was 
the case in the George H.W. Bush administration), even assertively dominant civilian 
officials do not feel much of a need to micromanage because they trust that the military 
would follow closely their preferences (since these, more or less, happen to be the 
preferences of the military as well).   
The sharp contrast between the decision-making process in the 1991 Gulf War and 
the one under George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld provides a good illustration of this 
                                                            





logic. Bush Jr. and Rumsfeld were very strongly impressed by Eliot Cohen’s book 
Supreme Command and believed in assertive civilian leadership.342  Secretary Rumsfeld 
did everything by the book and was credited with strengthening civilian control, trying to 
push transformation through the Pentagon bureaucracy, and awakening the military to the 
realities of the post-9/11 strategic environment and the “new kind of war”.  However, 
decision-making and implementation for the Iraq War were significantly flawed.  The 
decision process under Rumsfeld did not have many of the benefits which firm and 
involved civilian direction usually brings because Rumsfeld’s assertiveness often turned 
into micromanagement and, for the most part, he cut off military advice.  Why did 
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others end up interfering almost constantly with the military 
professionals while Bush Sr. and Cheney managed to be assertive and involved without 
being micromanagers?  Rumsfeld and other political leaders often meddled and 
micromanaged their military subordinates because they were faced with a very high level 
of civil-military preference divergence.  As chapter 7 shows, civilian leaders knew very 
well that the military’s views on issues regarding the use of force in general and on Iraq, in 
particular, were very different from their own.  When there is a high level of conflict in the 
views and ideas of civilian and military officials, civilians fear that the military has an 
agenda of its own and they think they have to monitor the uniforms very closely to ensure 
that the military would follow civilian preferences rather than its own.  That is why my 
theoretical framework suggests that we should examine not only the firmness of civilian 
control but the level of civil-military preference divergence as well.  When we have a 
pattern of civil-military relations, characterized by civilian dominance and a high level of 
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civil-military preference divergence, it is very likely that civilian dominance would often 
turn into civilian meddling because civilian leaders would fear that the military might 
pursue its own preferences if not managed and monitored tightly and constantly. 
 While decision-makers’ individual characteristics and leadership style are certainly 
important, I have argued that what matters more is the particular pattern of civil-military 
relations, defined by the variation in the level of civil-military preference divergence and 
the civil-military balance of power. The lesser importance of the influence of personal 
characteristics could be seen also in the significant difference in the relationship of Dick 
Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz with the military during the 1991 and the 2003 wars with Iraq.  
As a Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, when they and the 
military held similar preferences on key issues, Cheney and Wolfowitz practiced assertive 
civilian control without being micromanagers.  In the George W. Bush administration, as a 
Vice-President and a Deputy Secretary of Defense, when there was a high level of civil-
military preference divergence, Cheney and Wolfowitz were squarely in Rumsfeld’s camp 
of assertive civilian officials who were often meddling with the military.343 
 
Decision-Making on War Termination 
Decisions to end a war are among the most difficult choices policy-makers face.  Since war 
termination unavoidably combines considerations from both the political and the military 
realms, the interaction between political and military leaders at this stage is crucial.  
History is replete with cases where battlefield victories have been squandered due to a 
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clumsy ending of the war.344  The next part of this chapter shows that in the final stages of 
Operation Desert Storm (more specifically, during the decision-making on war termination 
and the preparation for the armistice talks) civilian officials in the Bush administration 
abdicated control to the top military leadership (mainly to Gen. Powell). This led to a poor 
integration of political and military actions and, ultimately, to the failure to make the 
military victory serve political objectives to the fullest.345  The brief comparison between 
the decision process and outcomes in the two periods in this case (the first one, 
characterized by assertive civilian leadership and the second – by civilian abdication) gives 
further support to Cohen’s argument that a country in a crisis would be better served if its 
statesmen practice the “unequal dialogue” with their military subordinates rather than the 
Huntingtonian version of delegating to the military professionals. 
How did the 1991 Gulf war end and who made the critical decisions about the 
timing of the cease-fire?  The decision to end the war was based on important political 
judgments and the civilian leaders, rather than making those judgments themselves, left 
them largely to the military.  This is the essence of abdication of control.  In the final 
stages of the campaign, there were two key decisions to be made: 1) were U.S. objectives 
accomplished so that the war could be ended, and 2) how to conduct armistice 
negotiations.  Both of these decisions were clearly political and they should have been 
made by the President and his key civilian advisors, in consultation with the military 
leadership.  The civilian leadership, however, mismanaged the process.  Besides the 
question of whether it was a good choice to end the Gulf war at 100 hours in its ground 
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campaign, it is important to analyze how effective the decision process that led to this 
choice was and how one could explain it, using my theoretical framework.  This section 
analyzes the particular pattern of civil-military relations and their impact on decision-
making first in the decision to end the ground campaign and then during the preparation 
and conduct of the armistice talks.  (While at that time, the level of civil-military 
preference divergence remained low, due to civilian abdication, these decisions should be 
placed in Quadrant 4 of Table 1.) 
How was the decision to terminate the war made? Gen. Colin Powell appears to 
have been the dominant influence in making the choice on the timing of the “secession of 
hostilities”.346 Atkinson states that the initiative for ending the ground war after 100 hours 
“clearly came from the American military, and, given the chairman’s dominance over the 
Joint Chiefs, that meant Powell.” 347 Eliot Cohen also puts the main responsibility on the 
Chairman. “Gen. Powell made the recommendation, arguing that the president’s victory 
conditions have been fulfilled. … By all accounts, the political leadership went along with 
Powell’s recommendation.”348 On February 27, 1991 (in mid afternoon, Washington time, 
and approximately 10 pm in the theater), President Bush held a meeting of his senior 
advisors to discuss the situation on the ground and a possible secession of fighting.  At this 
meeting, Gen. Powell made a very powerful presentation on how coalition forces had 
achieved the objective of expelling Iraq from Kuwait.  “Both Norman and I feel that we’re 
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within the window of opportunity to end this.  It’s clear that the Iraqi army is broken.  If 
anything, they’re just trying to get out.  That was our mission: to get them out.  And I can 
report to you that they are well on their way to being out.  In fact, we’re crucifying large 
number of them.”349  Powell strongly argued that the political goals had been achieved and 
it was time to end the war since fighting which did not serve political purposes was simply 
wanton killing. Continuing the attack, he said, “would be un-American and unchivalrous” 
because it would inflict horrible carnage on already fleeing enemy units without serving 
any political objectives.350  When President Bush asked him whether the military wanted 
another day, he responded: “By tonight there really won’t be an enemy there.  If you go 
another day, you’re basically just fighting stragglers.”351 
In order to understand better how the decision to terminate the ground war at 100 
hours was made one should also look at the critically important relationship between 
Washington and the CENTCOM Commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf.  While the 
CINC’s role in the decision process was certainly not insignificant, in this case, just like in 
most other cases of disagreements, he yielded to Powell.  On February 27, at a briefing in 
Riyadh (“the mother of all briefings”), Gen. Schwarzkopf stated that the coalition forces 
had accomplished their mission.  Regarding the retreating Iraqi forces, the CENTCOM 
Commander incorrectly added: “‘The gates are closed.  There is no way out of here.  All 
Republican Guard divisions in the theater had been destroyed except for ‘a couple that 
we’re in the process of fighting right now.’  When asked, though, whether ground forces 
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were blocking the roads to Basrah, Schwarzkopf replied, ’No.’”352  Later on, at the same 
press conference, the CINC amended his previous statements, saying: “When I say that the 
gate is closed, I don’t want to give the impression that absolutely nothing is escaping.  
Quite the contrary.  What isn’t escaping is heavy tanks, what isn’t escaping is artillery 
pieces … I’m talking about the gate that is closed on the war machine that is out there.”353   
From his headquarters in Riyadh, about 300 miles away from the theater, Schwarzkopf did 
not have a clear view of what was happening on the battlefield.  Partly due to the fog of 
war, the CINC did not fully realize that the roads to Basra had not been entirely sealed off 
and he did not manage to make this clear in his phone conversations with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff in Washington.354   Schwarzkopf could be criticized for not consulting the field 
commanders who had a better view of the situation on the battlefield and knew that it 
could take another day or more of hard fighting to trap the remaining Republican Guard 
forces. 355   (He consulted only the high-level officers in Riyadh.) While certainly 
Schwarzkopf could have done more to clarify the situation on the ground, the civilian 
leadership should bear the primary responsibility for not urging him more vigorously to do 
that. 
Privately, Schwarzkopf and other senior military officers were either unsure or in 
opposition to the idea to stop the fighting and preferred that the military be given one or 
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two more days to accomplish the objectives.356 But Schwarzkopf failed to make such a 
recommendation or in anyway to express strong disagreement with Washington.  “… when 
given the opportunity to urge that the fighting continue – to Powell, to Cheney, and to 
Bush – Schwarzkopf demurred.”357  Had Schwarzkopf been more assertive in requesting 
another day to finish the job, he would have gotten it.358  However, as I explain below, 
Schwarzkopf most likely did not feel he was in a position to do that because of Powell’s 
strong preference for ending the war. 
If he felt ending the fight was premature, why did not Schwarzkopf object more 
vigorously to such a recommendation and present evidence that the troops still had work to 
do?  It is most likely that Schwarzkopf felt pressured by Powell and did not think his or 
any other commander’s objections would make any difference because of the way Powell 
had presented to him the views of the civilian leadership.   
Powell warned Schwarzkopf as early as Monday, February 25, that the mood [in 
the White House] was shifting toward an early end to the fighting …Powell 
repeated the warning on Tuesday, February 26, and Wednesday, February 27.  
Schwarzkopf … argued each time that he needed more time to close the loop 
around the Iraqi forces.  But he, too, saw the handwriting on the wall, and he put 
out the word in Riyadh to prepare to shut down the offensive. 359 
                                                            
356 In an interview with David Frost after the war (March 27, 1991), General Schwarzkopf said that his 
“recommendation had been … continue the march.  I mean, we had them in a rout and we could have 
continued to wreak great destruction upon them.  We would have completely closed the doors and made it 
in fact a battle of annihilation.  And the president made the decision that we should stop at a given time, at 
a given place, that did leave some escape routes open for them to get back out…”  Soon after this 
interview, the White House and the Pentagon issued statements denying this and Schwarzkopf apologized 
to the President for “a poor choice of words.” In his autobiography, the General clarifies that when asked 
his opinion he had said he had no problem with such a decision. In: H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter 
Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1992), pp. 469-70.     
357 Rick Atkinson, Crusade, p. 476.  See also, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals’ War, p. 
429. 
358 This is confirmed by Powell himself.  In his memoirs he writes, “And there is no doubt in my mind that 
if Norm or I had the slightest reservation about stopping now, the President would have given us all the 
time we needed.”  My American Journey, p. 508. 






Powell did not exactly asked Schwarzkopf for his opinion as to the timing of the 
cease-fire but told him that the White House was leaning toward ending the war (which 
was actually Powell’s own preference). When Bush asked of Schwarzkopf’s views, Powell 
got on the phone with the CINC and told him, “I’ve presented our views [to Bush] and the 
thinking [at the White House] is that we should end it today,”360  The CINC would hardly 
disagree with such a formulation; he would feel that his consent is required.   
The finale came when Powell and Bush called Schwarzkopf from the Oval Office 
to discuss the exact timing of the cease-fire.  Powell talked first, during the midday 
meeting of the Gang of Eight.  But ‘Powell had already told Schwarzkopf ahead of 
time that the president was going to stop the war,’ a Pentagon source claims.  ‘The 
way Powell presented it to Schwarzkopf, how could he object?’  Bush then got on 
the phone to see if Stormin’ Norman had any objection.  Schwarzkopf, evidently 
trying to be a good soldier, voiced no protest on the cease-fire or its timing to the 
commander in chief.361 
 
Most probably, that’s why Schwarzkopf also did not raise with the Chairman the 
objections of the field commanders. Some of them were very angered by the decision to 
announce “cessation of hostilities” at that time because they were convinced they could 
have cut off much of the Iraqi army without slaughtering them.362  Gen. McCaffrey, among 
others, was incredulous, but all commanders felt they had to comply with the orders.363 
In making the decision to terminate the war, civilian leaders were strongly 
influenced by Powell’s arguments.364  Secretary Baker explained after the end of the war 
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that he made up his mind based on what Powell was saying at these meetings.  As he 
remembered, Gen. Powell told them that “we were killing literally thousands of people.”365  
“As for the senior civilians in the Bush administration … they were also laboring under a 
misimpression.  After hearing Powell’s presentation, Scowcroft and Wolfowitz thought the 
Republican Guard was essentially cut off and all but destroyed.”366  Secretaries Cheney 
and Baker and National Security Advisor Scowcroft agreed with Powell’s recommendation 
without much additional questioning of other military advisors.  Civilian leaders, however, 
did not have to take these claims on faith.  Had civilian leaders been more inquiring, they 
would have known, for example, that Powell’s recommendation was not a collective 
decision of the Joint Chiefs and this understanding might have led them to get the opinion 
of other senior military leaders as well.  Powell did not ask the Chiefs as to their opinion 
on this issue.  This decision came as a fait accompli for them.367  He anticipated no 
disagreement from any of the Chiefs.  While that was largely true for the majority of them, 
the Air Force Chief, Tony McPeak, at the time had very serious doubts about it and 
thought the war should be continued for another two or three days to achieve American 
objectives.368   
There were some important political judgments involved in Powell’s 
recommendation and civilian leaders should not have left those to him.  For example, 
Powell was very sensitive to media accounts of the ground and air offensive and what he 
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thought could become a public relations problem, hurt the image of the military, and cloud 
the spectacular victory the troops had achieved on the ground.369  He worried about the 
television coverage of the so-called “Highway of Death,” and that, in his view, the media 
was “starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”370  
Especially troubling was a Washington Post story, which said that American pilots 
“swarmed over Iraqi armor and truck columns, slaughtering the scattering vehicles by the 
score in a combat frenzy variously described as a ‘turkey shoot’ and ‘shooting fish in a 
barrel.’”371 The military leadership worried that international and domestic publics could 
see the ongoing campaign as coalition troops trying to kill an enemy that was already 
beaten and surrendering.372   
It is natural in such situations for U.S. military leaders to care about the reputation 
of their institution and also to have the inclination to end the fighting quickly and bring 
their soldiers home alive.  But it is the responsibility of statesmen to decide when even 
legitimate and wise military concerns as those should be overridden by political ones.  
When politicians abdicate this responsibility, even the most brilliant military victory may 
not lead to the achievement of their goals.  Civilian leaders should have been actively 
involved in making these critical political judgments.  Even if one agrees with this 
particular decision373, it was not up to the military to decide, for example, as to whether US 
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reputation would have suffered (if fighting was to be continued).  And it certainly was not 
up to Colin Powell to judge that political objectives had been accomplished and, hence, 
offensive operations could be suspended. 
The decision for ending the ground campaign at 100 hours seems to have been 
guided by public relations concerns more than political and military considerations.  As it 
turned out, the media stories about the “Highway of Death” were not true.  Military leaders 
on the ground (and other observers) reported that while a lot of enemy vehicles and other 
military equipment were destroyed, almost no people were killed because the Iraqis 
abandoned the vehicles and ran away.  As Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper stated, “I walked the 
whole thing. I don't think I counted more than maybe 13, 14 dead Iraqis. So yes, there was 
a lot of destruction in that so-called Mile of Death, but not a lot of death.”374  Gordon and 
Trainor charge that Powell and Schwarzkopf wanted to end the war quickly not only to 
save lives, but also “to win bragging rights for himself [Schwarzkopf] and the U.S. 
Army.”375  According to them, that is why, for example, the general proposed to end the 
war on February 28 - a 5-day war, which would beat the 1967 Arab-Israeli war by one day.  
(At the end, after consulting with his aides President Bush decided to suspend offensive 
operations at midnight EST, which made it the 100-hour war.376)   
Rather than accepting uncritically Powell’s narrow definition of achieving the political 
objectives (i.e., getting Saddam out of Kuwait), civilian leaders could have insisted on 
achieving an end state that was more fully consistent with the originally stated political 
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objectives.  If they were not fully satisfied with the results, they could have reminded the 
military that victory on the battlefield does not equal victory in war.  As critics of the 
decision to end the ground campaign after 100 hours argued, the ending of the war at the 
time left key US goals, such as the destruction of the Republican Guard in the Kuwait 
Theater of Operations, unaccomplished.377  Back in November of 1990, President Bush 
formulated US political objectives as follows: “The immediate, complete, and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s 
legitimate government… and the restoration of security and stability in the region.”378  A 
day before the start of the campaign, National Security Directive 54379 stated its goals in a 
similar way: 
a. to effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait; 
b. to restore Kuwait's legitimate government; 
c. to protect the lives of American citizens abroad; and 
d. to promote the security and the stability of the Persian Gulf.  
        
Importantly, the civilian leadership had instructed the military to destroy the 
Republican guard.  In its Operations Order 91-101 of January 17, 1991, CENTCOM 
translated political goals into military objectives in the following way: “Attack Iraqi 
political-military leadership and command-and-control; gain and maintain air superiority; 
sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; destroy 
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Republican guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait.” 380  This was 
CENTCOM’s own terminology as well – not simply to defeat it, to make it “combat 
ineffective,” or to expel it from Kuwait - the Republic guard had to be “destroyed.”381  But 
the objective of destroying the Republican Guard in the Kuwait Theater of Operations 
(KTO) was not fully achieved.  
In a testimony to Congress, Gen. Schwarzkopf claimed that the coalition had 
destroyed all of Iraq’s forty-two divisions in the KTO.  This turned out to be an 
exaggeration.  “By subsequent Army calculations, about one third of all Iraqi forces got 
away.”382 According to the CIA After Action Evaluation, half of the Republican Guard 
Armor got away, including the Hammurabi Division, which in 1994 threatened Kuwait 
again.  Estimates showed that half of the Republican Guard tanks and nearly 70% of their 
troops escaped.383  When Powell advised ending the military campaign, he stated that the 
US objective to eject Iraq out of Kuwait was achieved. 384   Civilian leaders did not 
challenge this narrowing down of objectives and did not insist on continuing the fighting 
until the goal of destroying the Republican guard in the KTO was achieved.  (Military 
experts differ on this, but according to most, the accomplishment of this goal would have 
taken another 2-3 days.) 
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Later on, some administration officials had second thoughts and claimed they 
would have objected ending the ground war at that time had they known that so many of 
the enemy’s tanks and troops were going to escape.  Everyone’s favorite culprit – the fog 
of war – was blamed for declaring secession of hostilities at 100 hours.  Officials explained 
that their decision to end the war was based on intelligence reports assessing the damage to 
the enemy which later proved to be wrong.  For example, on Wednesday (Feb. 27, 1991), 
the Joint Staff told Secretary Cheney that the Republican Guard had already been cut off 
from retreat to Basrah, which as it turned out later, was not true since not all enemy forces 
were encircled.  “CENTCOM’s daily intelligence summary for February 27 reported that 
‘the Republican Guards are encircled … They have few options other than surrender or 
destruction.’ ”385  This, however, goes to the heart of the problem of what I defined as 
“civilian abdication.” Civilian officials were supposed to insist on more complete battle 
damage assessments, and to wait for those if need be, rather than make such a crucial 
decision based on fragmentary reports.  As Col. Mark Garrard (USAF) correctly advised, 
“US leaders must resist the temptation to rush the decision-making process on war 
termination and allow the relevant facts to develop more fully during the interagency 
process. Let the next Saddam sit and sweat while we hold his territory, consult with our 
coalition partners, and patiently explore our options.”386 
While analysts of the decision-making process have correctly blamed Schwarzkopf 
for not doing more to dispel the fog of war and provide more accurate information, it was 
primarily the responsibility of the civilian leadership in Washington to clarify the nuances 
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and contradictions in the statements of the CINC at the Feb. 27 news briefing and to 
require more information as to what exactly had been destroyed and how much more time 
commanders needed to accomplish the job, if there was any doubt that the military 
objectives were achieved.  Furthermore, the civilian leadership was the one responsible to 
ensure that political and strategic goals would be taken care of together with the military 
objectives. For most of the time, Bush and Cheney were leaving Powell to communicate 
with the theater commander.  It was Powell and not the Commander-in-Chief or the 
Secretary of Defense, who was on the secure phone with Schwarzkopf.  Powell was 
presenting the views of the White House to Schwarzkopf and then Schwarzkopf’s 
reactions back to the top civilian leadership.  Bush and Cheney should have been more 
active at the time and conducted at least some of the communication with the Theater 
themselves, rather than relying on Powell acting as a conduit between them and 
Schwarzkopf.  Civilian leaders should have made sure that the CENTCOM commander 
knew their views of what was going on and what needed to be done and not what Powell 
believed those views to be. Schwarzkopf himself admitted after the war that he had 
difficulties understanding when Powell was expressing his own views and when he was 
presenting the views of the civilian leadership in Washington.  “I never knew what was 
Powell, what was the JCS, what was the NCA [National Command Authority].  I never 
had the ability to sort out what was Powell, what was Scowcroft, what was Cheney, what 
was the President.”387     
What could have civilian leaders done better under the circumstances and how a 
more active political leadership at this point could have led to a more effective decision 
                                                            





process?  Besides insisting on clarifying the ambiguities in Gen. Schwarzkopf’s briefing, 
top civilian officials could have made sure to ask (directly or indirectly) field commanders 
for their views; then they would have found out how different were Powell’s and 
Schwarzkopf’s views from those of the ones on the battlefield. Further, decision-makers 
could have taken more time to examine incoming intelligence, rather than act on 
fragmentary and conflicting reports from the field.388 
The bigger controversy was whether restoring stability in the region included 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, some of the political 
objectives were much less clear than traditionally assumed. 389   This naturally led to 
ongoing debates as to whether objectives other than the liberation of Kuwait had been 
achieved when decision-makers declared end of hostilities. For example, the objective to 
"promote security and stability in the Gulf" has been interpreted variously to mean: 1) the 
liberation of Kuwait only; 2) the destruction of Iraq’s WMD capabilities and also its 
offensive conventional military power, so that Iraq is not a threat to its neighbors; 3) the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein who many considered perhaps the biggest threat to regional 
stability.  Were this objective referring only to the ejection of Saddam out of Kuwait, 
however, it did not have to be stated because Kuwait’s liberation was an objective that was 
declared separately (i.e., “to effect the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal 
of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” and “to restore Kuwait’s legitimate government”).  The 
vague phrasing (“promote security and stability in the Gulf”) allowed this objective to be 
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accepted by US coalition partners before the UN vote, but at the same time it also 
contributed to conflicting interpretations as to when the US could consider it achieved and 
terminate the war. 
Top civilian and military leaders claimed that it was not their objective to 
overthrow the Iraqi dictator.  As Gen. Powell stated, ”in none of the meetings I attended 
was dismembering of Iraq, conquering Baghdad, or changing the Iraqi form of government 
ever seriously considered.  We hoped that Saddam would not survive the coming fury. But 
his elimination was not a stated objective.”390  In an interview after the war, President Bush 
said that the war ended when it did because the U.S. administration believed it had 
achieved its objectives: liberating Kuwait and destroying Iraq’s ability to threaten its 
neighbors. Continuing the destruction of Iraqi forces after the objectives of the war had 
been achieved, the President argued, would have violated what he called “the basic 
decency” of “our men and women in uniform.”391  Further, America and its allies did not 
want to embitter opinion in some of the Arab countries, whose publics would not have 
liked to see them occupying Baghdad and installing a government there.  Furthermore, 
there were good geopolitical reasons for not completely destroying Iraq’s military 
machine.392  The U.S. did not want to leave a power vacuum in the Middle East and thus 
strengthen the influence of Iran.  Iraq needed to be preserved relatively strong to counter-
balance Iran.  George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft make clear in their memoirs that 
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the stability of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East was a primary goal.393  As Jim Baker 
also stated, the administration’s “one overriding strategic concern was to avoid what we 
often referred to as the Lebanonization of Iraq, which we believed would create a 
geopolitical nightmare.”394 
While U.S. leaders did not want to have to invade Baghdad and occupy the country 
in order to remove Saddam, they did want his ouster from power.   Their desired end state 
actually was an Iraq militarily weakened but left intact as a unified state, and Saddam 
removed by internal opposition (or forced into exile by humiliating military defeat). 
Although no official document formally states so, this end state was widely understood and 
most top officials have testified to this effect.   For example, President Bush described the 
end state decision-makers had in mind in the following words: “While we hoped that a 
popular revolt would topple Saddam, neither the United States nor the countries of the 
region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state.”395  Making a similar claim, Colin 
Powell wrote, “What was hoped for frankly, in a postwar Gulf region was an Iraq still 
standing with Saddam overthrown.”396  Furthermore, because of the rhetoric in the lead-up 
to the war, many argued that Saddam’s ouster had become an undeclared goal of the war.  
In the months prior to the military campaign, George H. W. Bush compared Saddam to 
Hitler, authorized bombing of his palaces, and appealed to the Iraqi people to get rid of 
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him.  “In the privacy of the White House, he [the President] referred to Saddam not only as 
another Hitler but also as ‘that lying son of a bitch.’”397  What some (including Colin 
Powell) called “the demonizing of Saddam” led the public to expect that his regime would 
be ended.  That is why the fact that he was not removed from power was perceived by 
many as a failure.398  As Margaret Thatcher sadly observed, “There is the aggressor, 
Saddam Hussein, still in power. There is the president of the United States, no longer in 
power. There is the prime minister of Britain, who did quite a lot to get things there, no 
longer in power. I wonder who won?”399   
While ending the war when it was ended and not marching to Baghdad could still 
have been the right decision, the situation could have been better had civilian leaders been 
more assertive and had they tried to keep political objectives and military means more 
closely aligned.  Had they not abdicated control at this critical time, most probably they 
would have achieved an end state much closer to what they intended.  What more 
specifically could political leaders have done under the circumstances?   Rather than 
leaving almost everything to Powell and Schwarzkopf, they could have participated more 
actively in the decision-making process by suggesting, searching for and analyzing some 
additional options for action.  For example, one of the possibilities could have been to stop 
the campaign but not declare a cease-fire. In other words, coalition forces could have 
discontinued their offensive without announcing this publicly.  This option had the 
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advantage of keeping the pressure on Saddam Hussein.  By not openly declaring 
termination of military action, the US and its allies might have encouraged Saddam’s 
internal enemies to overthrow his regime.  One of the few key advisors at the time who 
expressed reservations about the decision to end the ground war after 100 hours, Paul 
Wolfowitz, then undersecretary of defense, argued that if the war end was announced at an 
early time, the Iraqi opposition could lose incentives to overthrow Saddam because it 
would think the world had apparently reconciled to living with him in power.  “By telling 
the world that the ground war was over, the allies would in effect issue a reprieve to the 
Iraqi leader.” 400  While discussed briefly, none of Wolfowitz’s objections and/or 
suggestions was given much thought.  Another option could have been to stop only the air 
attacks, but let the Army (with close support from the air) complete Gen. Franks’s “double 
envelopment” or encircle Basrah to block the escape of Iraqi troops.401  Such a scenario 
was not discussed either.   
Another, even more serious, mistake which could have been avoided had civilians 
not abdicated control at the time, came when Schwarzkopf announced during his  briefing 
that the US and its allies had no plans to capture Baghdad. 402  While this was true, 
Schwarzkopf did not have to reveal it to the Iraqis.  At that moment, Saddam did not know 
what the US and coalition really planned to do, but he feared a possible march to Baghdad. 
Had Schwarzkopf not volunteered this crucial information, the US would have had much 
more leverage in the situation.  When Saddam was publicly told that a coalition attack on 
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Baghdad was not going to happen, he probably felt so much freer to turn his whole 
attention and resources to his domestic enemies.  In this way, unwittingly, the general 
made the future work of US diplomats more difficult and this was another consequence of 
the lack of more assertive civilian involvement in the process.  Had civilian leaders 
communicated better to the military what they were hoping for at the time (namely, that 
uncertainty about U.S. actions would keep the pressure on Saddam and that an implicit 
threat to go to Baghdad could still encourage a coup or a rebellion against the Iraqi 
dictator), Schwarzkopf would have been more careful.  Political leaders, however, did not 
make sufficient effort to prepare the military commander accordingly.  The ongoing 
intense civil-military dialogue that served the decision-making process so well during the 
planning and implantation stages of the campaign seems to have failed at this critical 
moment.      
Lack of political direction bordering on civilian abdication was observed in the 
preparation for and the conduct of the armistice talks at Safwan as well403.  Importantly, 
again, it was not a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a determined CINC 
who wanted to dominate decision-making and usurped control in this case.  It was a lack of 
strategic direction by the civilian leadership.404  While many civilian leaders were unhappy 
with the way the generals were handling the cease-fire arrangements, they did not 
intervene to give additional instructions to the military.405  Thus, by inaction, they actually 
let political and diplomatic concerns be subordinated to military ones. 
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Examination of the events at the time shows that regarding the armistice 
negotiations Gen. Schwarzkopf received very little political guidance if at all.406  He was 
given only two days to prepare for the cease-fire talks with the Iraqis and had to write his 
own “terms of reference.”  Schwarzkopf related how surprised he was by a conversation he 
had with Colin Powell in which the Chairman informed him about this.  “It had never 
crossed my mind that I’d have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals – and we spent a couple 
of minutes discussing how this might be arranged.” 407  When Schwarzkopf wrote the 
“terms of reference” and sent them to Washington for feedback, there was almost none.  
The State Department only changed the word “negotiate” to “discuss” in all places in the 
text.408  
Understandably for a military commander, Schwarzkopf thought of the coming 
encounter with the Iraqis as simply military-to-military talks.409  In this situation, the 
civilian leadership, understanding well the political importance of these talks and knowing 
that at this level almost nothing is “purely” military, should have ensured that the US 
military delegation was instructed properly.  Left on his own, it was not surprising that 
Schwarzkopf planned almost exclusively military and technical issues.  For example, the 
CINC wanted to establish a demarcation line to separate clearly the coalition from Iraqi 
troops; he sought an immediate release of prisoners of war and information on people 
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missing in action; another clause required that the Iraqis identify minefields and WMD 
storage sites in the Kuwait theater of operations.  It is natural for the military to be 
concerned first of all and primarily with military matters. This is where the civilian 
leadership needs to step in and make sure that political objectives have been served as well. 
Lack of political guidance in the armistice talks not only led to mistakes and missed 
opportunities but was ultimately detrimental to achieving US political objectives.410 For 
example, a crucial moment during the Sawfan talks between the US and the Iraqi 
representatives came when the Iraqis asked Schwarzkopf whether they would be allowed 
to use helicopters.  (They said that they needed the helicopters for transportation and 
logistical purposes because the highways and the bridges were badly damaged by the 
bombings.)411 Schwarzkopf accepted Iraq’s request (even after its representatives clarified 
they were talking about armed helicopters), provided they made sure not to fly over U.S. 
positions and did not in anyway threaten American troops.412  From his strictly military 
point of view, this decision made sense – Schwarzkopf was concerned mainly with the 
safety of US and allied troops.  However, due to insufficient civilian guidance, the 
CENTCOM commander lacked the broader political perspective, namely how his 
concession to the Iraqis could affect the internal situation in Iraq and, hence, U.S. political 
goals.  Schwarzkopf did not take into account the fighting between Saddam’s regime on 
the one hand, and the Shiites and the Kurds, on the other.  In this broader political context, 
his decision to allow the armed helicopters turned out to be a tragic mistake -- later on, 
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Saddam used these helicopters in his brutal suppression of the Shiite uprising and, thus, 
managed to keep himself in power.  While in the case of the helicopters, Schwarzkopf 
erred out of generosity and his desire not to humiliate the defeated Iraqis, it was the 
responsibility of civilian leaders to make sure that the general would stick to his brief and, 
more importantly, of course, that this brief was scripted with the big political picture in 
mind. 
Another serious error during the armistice talks came with Schwarzkopf’s readiness 
to promise a rapid American withdrawal from the Iraqi territory seized at the time.  The 
CENTCOM commander declared: “There will not be one single coalition force member in 
the recognized borders of Iraq, as soon as, as rapidly as we can get them out.”413  This 
statement is remarkable: in history almost never have the victors made such firm and 
generous promises to the vanquished.414  It is obvious that the political leadership had not 
taken the time to confer with the military and discuss some of the political implications of 
the enormously favorable US military position at that time.  The US had two Army corps 
deep in Southern Iraq, the coalition had total control of the skies, and the Iraqi army had 
just suffered a monumental defeat – such a situation was not to be repeated and could have 
been taken advantage of.  The U.S. could have used its de facto occupation of parts of Iraq 
to press for further concessions.  Instead, political and military leaders let that opportunity 
pass. 
How can one explain the civilian abdication at the end of the war?  Civilian leaders 
believed in the “lessons” of Vietnam, namely that civilian “micromanagement” had led to 
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the tragedy.  The President was disinclined to reject Powell’s recommendation to stop the 
fighting because he did not want to be seen as intruding in the military’s domain.  
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Gen. Powell was very politically sophisticated and 
civilian officials trusted his judgment and thought that there was less need for control.  
Also, political leaders regarded highly the technical competence of the military and their 
professionalism.  Another reason for abdication of control was the fact that civilian leaders 
themselves had not entirely thought through the end state of the war and what a military 
victory should achieve in political terms. 415  As it has often happened, they had planned 
for the conduct of the war much more than for its aftermath. They did not have an end war 
strategy beyond getting Saddam out of Kuwait.416 While most of the top decision-makers 
believed that after such a devastating defeat on the battlefield Saddam would be toppled 
from within, they did not have a plan to accomplish his overthrow. “They [the civilians] 
had come to accept, by default, the military’s definition of victory as a battlefield outcome, 
in which the relationship with political objectives was defined as narrowly as possible.”417     
Overall, in this case, civilian abdication in the final stages of the war resulted in a failure to 
keep the synchronization between political and military objectives.  Left on their own, the 
military fell back on their instincts to end the war as fast as possible so the troops could be 
withdrawn.  Powell’s and Schwarzkopf’s desire to withdraw quickly after the military 
victory and the way the conflict was ended left the US without much influence on 
developments in post-war Iraq.   The argument here is not that the US should have gone on 
to overthrow Saddam; but, rather, that even without a march to Baghdad, the situation 
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could have been better had civilian leaders stood firmly in charge and had they taken more 
care in communicating and guiding the military in making the best out of the extremely 
favorable US military position on the ground.  Had the Republican Guard in the KTO been 
destroyed, the aftermath of the war could have been significantly different – for example, 
part of the Iraqi regular Army (much of which was Shiite) could have switched sides and 
supported the Shiite uprising.  It would have been more difficult for Saddam to remain in 
power were it not for the reconstituted Republican Guard.  Also, ironically, the rush to end 
the war achieved precisely what the Powell doctrine admonished against and what the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to avoid at any cost, namely, the tying up of US 
troops and resources in the region for more than a decade, and, ultimately, another war in 
2003 to “finish the job.”     
 
Conclusion   
The 1991 Gulf War case confirms the hypotheses of this dissertation regarding the impact 
of a combination of assertive civilian dominance and low levels of preference divergence 
on the effectiveness of the decision-making process.  I find that alignment in civilian and 
military preferences combined with assertive control leads to a more thorough collection, 
sharing and analysis of information, more rigorous analysis of alternative policy options, 
and more effective coordination between statesmen and soldiers during the planning and 
conduct of war.  Such conditions lead not only to a more open exchange of information 
between statesmen and soldiers but also to a more effective cooperation between them 
during the decision and implementation process.  We find that when civilian and military 
leaders are in agreement on most of the key issues regarding the use of force, neither side 





leadership is likely to benefit from a more complete analysis and evaluation of the military 
aspects of the situation since military advisors would feel free to speak their mind.  The 
military is also going to benefit from a more open and frank discussion of the political 
constraints as seen by the civilian leadership and this could increase their mutual 
understanding and trust, and facilitate the integration and political, diplomatic, and military 
considerations.  Thus, in cases when preference divergence is low and civilians are 
dominant, the decision-making process will most likely be characterized by: a more 
effective information search and analysis; much less withholding or manipulation of 
information; a more complete analysis and evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
alternative strategies; a better interaction and coordination between top civilian and 
military officials; and, ultimately, a more successful match between political ends and 
military means.   
Due mainly to the low level of preference divergence between statesmen and soldiers in 
this case, there was a free flow of information in both directions.  The military felt free to 
discuss military issues candidly with its civilian leaders, who were also sharing openly 
their own political and diplomatic concerns.  Different military and non-military options 
were presented and discussed at length.  There is no evidence that either side was trying to 
conceal or manipulate information.  Both civilian and military leaders tried to understand 
the constraints under which the other side was operating.  Colin Powell, especially, as the 
go-between the top civilian leadership and commanders in the theater, showed a keen 
understanding of his civilian bosses’ political concerns and tried to act accordingly.  The 
mutual understanding and trust made for a positive decision-making climate.  Such 
circumstances enhanced the effectiveness of the decision-making process because they 





In the lead up to Desert Storm, while the process of war planning did not always 
run smoothly, the low level of preference divergence between civilian and military leaders 
served well the assessment and re-assessment of initial war plans.  The military strategy 
that resulted from a vigorous give and take between soldiers and civilians proved to be 
very successful in quickly defeating Iraq’s military and liberating Kuwait.  However, 
“civilian abdication” at the end of the war did not allow this military victory to be turned 
into a political triumph as well.  The insufficient civilian involvement in the final stages of 
the war explains the failure to integrate military and political policies and, ultimately, the 
inability of the US to turn a big military victory into a political one as well.   
Another important aspect of this chapter is that it debunks dominant interpretations 
of the policy-making and implementation in the 1991 Gulf War, according to which 
victory was achieved because of “wise” civilian leadership which provided all the force the 
military wanted and then let the generals fight the way they wanted.  The main lesson of 
the 1991 Gulf War is not that it was successful because civilian leaders followed 
Huntington’s theory and stayed away from military matters. This case study shows first 
that civilian leaders were much more assertive and interventionist than they were given 
credit for418, and, second, that actually when they did abdicate control at the end of the war, 
this did not lead to victory, but to the failure to turn a military victory into a political 
triumph.  This chapter showed how the presence of a civilian leadership that is highly 
interested in matters of national security, knowledgeable, and assertively involved in 
military matters increases the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
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Furthermore, as this case study shows, assertive civilian control does not always 
result in civilian meddling or micromanagement of the military. In combination with low 
divergence between civilian and military preferences, assertive political leadership 
improves the effectiveness of the decision-making process.  At the same time, one must 
emphasize that the benefits of assertive civilian control are not very likely to be realized 
when there is high civil-military preference divergence.  (If the level of civil-military 
preference divergence is high, assertive civilian leadership could slide into 
micromanagement – i.e., civilian leaders would likely feel the need to intervene more often 
and to monitor more closely in order to ensure that civilian wishes will be faithfully 
executed by a military which strongly opposes them.)   
The evidence presented here also challenges the conventional wisdom that the 
civil-military relationship under Bush and Cheney was friendly and calm most of the time 
due to the fact that civilians did not “meddle.”  The traditional argument is that because the 
politicians gave the military a free hand in the planning and conduct of the war, relations 
between soldiers and statesmen were friendly and cordial, and should serve as a model for 
future civilian leaders, especially those who are tempted to exercise assertive control.  
However, as I show, the relative calm in civil-military relations at the time is to be 
explained not with the alleged “hands-off” approach of civilian leaders, but with the 
remarkable convergence between the preferences of civilian and military officials on most 
of the key issues related to the use of force in general, and the 1991 war against Saddam, in 
particular.  The constant, at times heated and contentious, dialogue between civilian and 
military leaders during the planning and execution of Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
worked relatively smoothly throughout due to the fact that senior decision-makers and 





military force in the service of its foreign policy objectives, and about the proper 
relationship between those who make decisions on the use of force and those who 
implement them.      
Unlike in the case of the 2003 Iraq war, when the military’s wish for more troops 
was time and time again contradicted by Secretary Rumsfeld, in 1991 the civilian 
leadership was in agreement with its generals about the need to use massive force and 
approved the troops levels requested by generals Schwarzkopf and Powell.  The cordial 
and trustful relationship between civilian and military leaders, which resulted from shared 
views and beliefs on major national security issues, allowed each side to better understand 
the position of the other and to feel free to express its own.  Besides the lack of severe 
disagreements, another factor that contributed to a positive decision climate, was the fact 
that civilian decision-makers genuinely consulted their military advisors and made the 
military feel that their opinions were respected and valued, even in cases when the 
politicians would choose not to follow military advice at the end.  Top civilian and military 
officials managed to establish a close and mutually respectful working relationship, but it 
did not come about as a result of civilian non-interference in military matters.  Both 
President Bush and Secretary Cheney were actively involved in military decision-making.  
The relative calm in the relationship came as a result of several factors, among the most 
important of which was the high level of agreement between civilian and military officials 
about the use of force and its role in international politics. 
This chapter confirms the value of studying elite ideas and beliefs because of their 
powerful impact on decision-making (as drivers as opposed to justifications).   Take Gen. 
Powell’s very influential recommendation to end the ground campaign at the time it was 





war’s end?  His strong views on the “proper” way to apply military force shaped his 
recommendation.  Use overwhelming force to prevail quickly and then withdraw 
immediately to save lives: these were the dictates of the Powell doctrine itself.  This 
chapter also shows the significance of analyzing the level of divergence between civilian 
and military preferences and its impact on decision-making.  If we study the preferences of 
top civilian and military officials on the use of force (together with their relative 
power/control over the decision-making process), we could predict whether the leadership 
of a country would be more likely to choose military force as a tool of statecraft.  
Furthermore, if in addition we study the level of divergence between civilian and military 
preferences, we could anticipate how effectively political and military leaders would share 
and analyze information and how effectively they are likely to interact and coordinate with 
each other in the process of strategy-making; in other words, we could anticipate how well 
a state would be able to match its military means and political objectives.   
Furthermore, the 1991 Gulf War case illustrates another interesting aspect of the 
way different levels of civil-military preference divergence affect the quality of the 
decision-making process.  While in general most of the evidence from the case studies 
presented in this study supports my hypothesis that low levels of preference divergence are 
conducive to effective decision-making, too much agreement among top advisors is not 
necessarily good either.  Although intense disagreements between civilian and military 
preferences hinder decision-making, a complete preference overlap is dangerous as well 
since decision bodies that are very homogenous could fall prey to “groupthink.”  Creative 
thinking about various policy options and/or the choice of innovative solutions would not 
be stimulated if there is not at least a modicum of disagreement.  In the final stages of 





would have been more likely to be challenged by civilian leaders were they not sharing the 
exact same precepts which Powell espoused.  In the words of William Safire, “as a result 
of the Bush emphasis on calm seas, internal order and at least the appearance of unanimity, 
we miss the Rooseveltian turbulence that often leads to original thinking.”419 
As for lessons for decision-making and the conduct of war, these findings do not 
contain much good news.  My conclusions, largely in support of assertive civilian 
leadership, would not be liked by most in the military who are socialized in the 
Huntingtonian norms of “objective” civilian control and desire military autonomy, above 
all.  Calls for vigorous and continuing civil-military dialogue during the planning and 
conduct of a war are not likely to be embraced by the military, especially after Rumsfeld’s 
second tenure at the helm of the Pentagon.  While this model of civilian control is more 
attuned to the needs of political leaders, not many civilians are going to be very 
enthusiastic about it either.  As shown elsewhere, in order to be successful, besides 
similarity in civilian and military preferences, such assertive leadership would impose 
heavier intellectual and moral responsibilities on political officials as well.  In order to be 
able to exercise assertive control, civilian leaders would need the courage and integrity to 
listen to bad news without shooting the messenger.   They would have to possess the breath 
and depth of knowledge about national security and military affairs, which very few 
political leaders at the top have possessed and not many are interested in acquiring.  In 
order to be able to effectively immerse themselves at the operational level of war, civilian 
leaders should master their military briefs as thoroughly as their civilian ones, as Eliot 
Cohen advises.  They would also need the experience and expertise, the confidence, and 
                                                            






the energy to be highly pro-active and engage their military leaders in exhausting and 
contentious battles over strategy along the way, and also the wisdom to know when to step 








Military Dominance and Diverging Civilian and Military Preferences in the First Clinton 
Administration and Their Effects on the Decision-Making Process 
 
This chapter examines the very complicated civil-military relations under 
President Bill Clinton and how they affected decision-making on the use of force.  As I 
have argued in previous chapters, the quality of decision-making is shaped by the 
particular configuration of top civilian and military decision-makers’ relative power and 
preference divergence, as shown in Table 1 (p. 2).  This chapter examines how a pattern 
of civil-military relations characterized by high civil-military preference divergence and 
military dominance affects decision-making on the use of force (Quadrant 2 in Table 1).  
The case study on Bosnia illustrates an important part of the argument, namely, that the 
influence of civilian and military officials over decision-making varies not only across 
regimes but within democracies, as well as within one country over time.  This chapter 
analyzes several possible ways through which temporary military dominance over 
decision-making in democracies may obtain and how such a favorable for the military 
balance of power affects the decision-making process.420  It also examines how high 
civil-military preference divergence and increased military influence, which in practice 
meant dominance of the Powell Doctrine, affected U.S. decisions to intervene in 




420 As explained in the Introduction, “military dominance” should not be equated with military rule or a 
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The debate on the crucial impact of civil-military relations on US foreign policy 
was re-invigorated in the mid 1990s, when the Clinton administration seemed to have a 
lot of trouble controlling the military. An air-force general at the time even referred to 
President Clinton as “our pot-smoking, gay-loving, draft-dodging, womanizing 
commander in chief.”421  But this debate largely missed the point.   After all, even those 
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who were afraid that the military was getting out of control admitted that a military coup 
is not in the cards.  In the very same article, titled “Out of Control,” Richard Kohn, the 
leader of the “crisis” school, stated that “a coup has never been a serious threat, and the 
chances today, even of an attempt, are virtually nil.”  Kohn admitted that “the real 
problem of civilian control is the relative weight or influence of the military in the 
decisions the government makes, not only in military policy and war, but in foreign, 
defense, economic, and social policy (for much military policy can have vast implication 
for various aspects of national life).”  Obviously then, the principle of civilian control 
itself was not at stake.  Michael Desch, who argued that there had been a weakening of 
civilian control in the post-Cold War period, also emphasized that “there is little danger 
that the U.S. military will launch a coup d’etat and seize power.  Nor is it likely to 
become openly insubordinate and disobey direct orders.”422  What was at stake, but was 
at times lost in the debate, was 1) whether military influence in decision-making has 
really increased and, if so, what were the main reasons for increased military influence, 
and 2) how such increased military influence affects U.S. decisions on the use or the 
threat of military force.    
As explained in more detail in the Theory Chapter, in order to better account for 
states (like the US) whose military are socialized in the norms of civilian control, this 
study uses a model, which analyzes civil-military relations as a strategic interaction.  In 
this approach, the civilians and the military are viewed as political (and not only 
bureaucratic) actors who make and implement policy decisions and, at the same time, 
pursue their own interests and political and institutional well-being. Under some 
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circumstances, this may lead them to attempt to skew the decision-making process in a 
way that favors their preferences.  For example, in its attempts to take care of its own 
organizational interests, the military may at times, have an incentive to thwart the goals 
of its civilian masters, especially in cases when civilian and military preferences diverge 
highly.   
 
Hypotheses 
Similar to the analysis of the other case studies, in order to show how the specific 
pattern of civil-military relations characteristic for the first Clinton administration (i.e., a 
combination of military dominance and high civil-military preference divergence) 
affected the decision-making process, I will focus on the following key aspects of the 
decision process: 1) information gathering, analysis and evaluation of alternative options; 
2) interaction and coordination between civilian and military officials; and 3) choosing a 
policy from existing alternatives.  An effective decision-making process is characterized 
by a free flow and exchange of information between civilian and military officials in 
order to facilitate the analysis and evaluation of alternative options, as well as a smooth 
interaction and coordination between them in order to achieve integration of political and 
military considerations.  In what follows, I discuss how my independent variables – civil-
military balance of power and level of civil-military preference divergence – affect the 
information sharing and the coordination and cooperation between top civilian and 
military officials.  
More specifically, this chapter tests the following hypotheses expected to hold for 
cases in Quadrant 2 – cases characterized by military dominance and a high level of civil-





1) When their preferences diverge highly, the civilians and the military would be 
less likely to share information with each other.   They may be tempted to withhold or 
distort information in order to favor their preferred course of action.  This will lead to 
skewed discussions and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative strategies may 
not be debated fully.    
2) When their preferences diverge highly, civilian and military leaders would not 
have incentives to cooperate and coordinate with each other.  This could lead to an 
inability to integrate the political/diplomatic and military aspects of a policy and to match 
military means to political goals.   
3) When preference divergence is high and the balance of power favors the 
military, military “shirking” is likely to increase.  Shirking (in the form of foot-dragging, 
leaks, and other attempts to stall) would decrease the effectiveness of the decision and 
implementation process.          
4) When the balance of power favors the military, military preferences would 
often prevail in the final decision.  
 
In the following 2 sections on the civil-military balance of power and the level of 
preference divergence I explain why I have situated this case in quadrant 2 of Table 1 and 
after that, in the section on decision-making, I proceed to test the above hypotheses.   
 
 





Although power is a continuous variable, for the purposes of this study I discuss 
only 2 of its possible values: civilian dominance and military dominance.423  Even in 
stable democracies such as the United States, which have established robust norms of 
civilian control and a firm day-to-day hold over their militaries, the level of military 
influence over decision-making varies significantly. 424   As analyses of defense and 
foreign-policy decision-making find and as previous chapters of this study show, 
temporary military dominance over decision-making in democracies may obtain in 
several ways.  One such path to military dominance – civilian “abdication” of control - 
was discussed in the chapter on the 1991 Gulf War. Other ways for the military to 
become dominant include circumstances when, for example, the civilians are divided 
while the military is united, when the statesmen lack experience and understanding of 
national security matters and/or military officials are more politically and 
bureaucratically savvy than their civilian counter-parts, etc.425  The first several years of 
the Clinton Presidency, as shown below, are a good illustration of such dynamics.  Before 
analyzing the civil-military balance of power under President Clinton, we should note 
that it is important to find “measures” of power that are independent from the outcome of 
political-military debates during the decision-making process.  We should not conclude, 
for example, that the balance of power in some case favored the civilians because at the 
end civilian preferences carried the day.  That is why in order to determine the balance of 
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power independently of whose preferences dominate I use the following indicators of 
influence:  
the legal (formal) powers of civilian and military officials (based on constitutional 
arrangements and other relevant legislation, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 
case of the US);  
the level of unity of civilian and military elites;  
the availability (or lack) of public support for political and military leaders and 
specific policies under consideration;  
the availability and strength of allies – e.g., Congress, the media, other influential 
political actors;  
the educational and professional background of top civilian and military leaders 
and their expertise in foreign and defense affairs, in particular, and their political and 
bureaucratic skills;  
related to the above, the ability of civilian leadership to exercise assertive civilian 
control; 
None of these indicators is without problems and there is no agreed upon method 
of measuring power.  Since evaluating these indicators and “calculating” the civil-
military balance of power remains ultimately a subjective judgment, for each case study I 
also provide the opinions and evaluations of other scholars – experts on civil-military 
relations, who have made their independent evaluations of civilian and military influence 
on decision-making.  As imprecise as they may be, the above indicators help us 
determine the civil-military balance of power in each case well enough as to be able to 
situate the cases in Table 2 accordingly and, from there, to derive hypotheses for the 





As shown in other chapters as well, one of the very important ingredients of 
power is the education and (national security-related) experience of top political and 
military officials.426  While in the previous Bush administration, most of the top civilian 
official possessed substantial political and military expertise and experience, this was not 
true for the Clinton incoming team.  President Clinton himself had much less national 
security experience in comparison with his predecessors.  He was the first president after 
FDR without military service.  As a former Governor from Arkansas he had little, if any, 
national security experience as well.  But even worse for his standing with the generals 
was the fact that he had avoided the draft during the Vietnam war and that he had said 
some three decades earlier that he “loathed” the military.427  (What Clinton actually wrote 
in a letter to his ROTC commander at the time was: “I am writing too in the hope that my 
telling this one story will help you to understand more clearly how so many fine people 
have come to find themselves still loving their country but loathing the military, to which 
you and other good men have devoted years, lifetimes, of the best service you could 
give.”428)  Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, did have extensive knowledge 
of national security issues, had served in the US Army, and also as Chair of the House 
Armed Services Committee, but his team at the Pentagon was much less prepared.429 
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Transition periods (when a new party takes control of the White House) have 
often been a time of shifts in the civil-military balance of power.  Christopher Gibson, 
among others, has shown that the national security expertise in the Executive Branch 
declines when a new party assumes control in eight or more years.430  Civilian leaders in 
the first Clinton administration, which came to power after 12 years of Republican 
control of the White House, had among the lowest professional preparations in national 
security.  Gibson describes the Clinton team in the Defense Department by saying that 
“apart from the Secretaries of Defense (Aspin and Perry), civilian appointees mostly 
came to their key jobs without the quality and quantity of experience – training and 
exposure to defense politics – that their military counterparts had.”431  Research on the 
educational and professional background of top military and civilian personnel at the 
DOD shows that ever since the 1980s, the balance has started to change in favor of the 
military – i.e., officers on the Joint Staff, for example, have had much more political-
military experience than their civilian counter-parts.  (Political and military experience 
and expertise is measured by the number and type of relevant assignments an individual 
has held, such as appointments with the OSD staff, or with the Executive and Legislative 
branches of government, or think-tanks and universities.)432  As Gibson finds, “civilian 
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appointees in the 1990s came to the job with significantly less prior military experience.  
Even more general defense-related experience is down…”433 
Because of the change in political parties in the White House, the new President 
did not keep any of the top-level civilians at the Pentagon, who could have contributed 
national security expertise and, also, much needed experience in dealing with the military.  
The incoming political appointees at DOD lacked the professional experience of the 
previous administration and this showed in their interaction with their military 
counterparts, and also during debates on US post-Cold War policy and strategy. Also, as 
Gibson and Snider found, these difficulties were exacerbated by Clinton’s slowness to fill 
top civilian positions at the DOD.434   The majority of the top civilian posts in the 
Department of Defense were left unfilled months after the new administration took office.  
In the words of an unhappy military official, “There’s a secretary who’s getting a 
pacemaker and a deputy.  That’s it.  The military has some rude things to learn – namely, 
that this guy [Clinton] doesn’t care about them.”435  According to reports, the military 
was not pleased with the Aspin team; it felt top civilian decision-makers were lacking 
experience and were not providing a firm direction.  “The sense among many [military 
leaders] is that the Aspin team is not quite sure of where it’s going or what it’s doing.”  
“‘The mood in the Pentagon ranges from disappointment to deep dismay,’ Alcala [a 
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retired Army colonel] says.  ‘People feel there are some significant gaps in experience’ in 
the civilian policy-making team.”436 
Not only was the civilian side weakened by its lack of national security expertise, 
but, at the same time, civilian officials were facing military leaders who were very well 
versed in bureaucratic politics.  The start of the Clinton presidency was especially 
difficult in terms of civil-military relations because the less experienced civilian leaders 
had to contend with no other than Gen. Colin Powell, the most assertive Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the best political and bureaucratic operator the military has ever 
had at the top.  As a result of the 1991 Gulf War, the general had a reputation of a 
national hero.  As Richard Kohn put it, “In Colin Powell, the military had its most 
formidable leader since the Second World War.  And in Bill Clinton, the administration 
had a president with less experience, interest, understanding, and credibility in military 
affairs than any since the 1920s.”437  In addition to the newly acquired powers from the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act438 , Powell’s professional expertise and experience, combined 
with his personal charm, established him as the most influential Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  As Andrew Bacevich commented on the civil-military balance of power 
at the time: 
By 1993, the JCS chairman had established himself as perhaps the dominant figure 
in Washington … The ultimate testimony to Powell's influence lies in the "Powell 
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Doctrine" -- the general himself defining the criteria for when and how the United 
States would fight its wars .439 
 
“Powell’s greatest strength – his resume – was Clinton’s greatest weakness; both 
of them knew it, and they knew that the Congress and the public at large knew it as 
well.”440   Powell was not only a superb military leader, but he was also a masterful 
bureaucrat who had honed his influence not only inside the White House, but on Capitol 
Hill as well.441  Powell and other senior officers at the time understood well the political 
scene in Washington and knew how to influence it.442  In the words of Richard Kohn: “it 
was under Colin Powell's tenure that civilian control eroded most since the rise of the 
military establishment in the 1940s and 1950s.”443 
The crucial importance of the informal powers of the actors is most eloquently 
expressed in George Stephanopoulos’ portrayals of one of the first meetings between 
Clinton and the Joint Chiefs.  “While Clinton was their host and boss, he didn’t hold the 
balance of power in the room.  Yes, he was commander in chief, but Clinton’s formal 
powers were bound by the fact that he was a new president, elected with only 43 percent 
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of the vote, who had never served in the military and stood accused of dodging the 
draft.”444 
Informal power in the civil-military relationship is also a function of the extent to 
which top civilian policy-makers, and especially the president, commit their political 
capital and day to day attention to foreign and defense policy issues.  “The more time [the 
president] spends personally on an issue, the more the administration’s position can 
prevail over intransigent bureaucratic actors, including the military ones.”445  Unlike 
President George H. W. Bush who was tremendously interested and involved in foreign 
policy, President Clinton lacked this passion and was, at least initially, disengaged from 
foreign and defense policy issues.  “He seemed not very interested in foreign policy [and] 
uncomfortable talking about it.  Unlike every President since Truman, Clinton had no 
regularly scheduled meetings with his foreign policy team.”446  In him, the military saw a 
president who was much more interested in domestic affairs.  He had a very ambitious 
domestic agenda and, as he himself had explained, wanted “to focus like a laser beam on 
the economy.”447  When civilian leaders are relatively disinterested in national security 
policy, the military perceives a less firm civilian control and knows that civilians are not 
likely to monitor very closely.  “The military felt that Clinton focused a disproportionate 
amount of his attention on domestic policy.”448 
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As my theoretical framework (based on a principal-agent model) would expect in 
such cases, this perception (or the reality) of a lack of interest on the part of the civilian 
principal could lead to military “shirking” in cases when the principal’s and the agent’s 
preferences and goals diverge.  This is often the case because the military would believe 
that shirking either would not be detected or, if detected, would remain unpunished by a 
principal pre-occupied with domestic and other matters.  In the words of Peter Feaver, 
“one of the most significant changes from the Bush administration to the Clinton 
administration was the dramatically lower profile given national security issues by 
President Clinton. … The diminution of the President’s role in this area inevitably 
weakened the hand of the civilians against the military and, by extension, contributed to a 
lower expectation of punishment, especially in Clinton’s first term.”449 
Contributing to the problems caused by Clinton’s lack of leadership was the 
absence of regular NSC meetings with the President’s participation.  “Clinton’s absence 
from the vast majority of NSC meetings dealing with issues such as Bosnia and Kosovo 
was inexcusable.”450  Although at times civilian leaders would need to focus on domestic 
issues, they, and especially the president, cannot allow to be seen as “uninterested” in 
national security and foreign policy matters without this having a strong negative impact 
on their influence over the decision-making process.  “The military wants to know 
someone is in charge, and it wants clear and concise orders, even if it does not approve of 
them.”451 
                                                            
449 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants, p. 210. 
450 Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, p. 374, 375. 





Another factor that naturally contributes to strengthening the position of the 
military and tilts the balance of power in its favor is a division between the civilian 
principals (in the case of the United States – divisions between the President and 
Congress, or divisions within the White House).452  In this case, clear divisions existed 
between the Executive Branch and the Legislature on key foreign and military policy 
issues.  For example, Congressman Dellums, who became Chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee in 1993 (after Les Aspin left Congress to become Secretary of 
Defense), was strongly in support of Clinton’s campaign promise regarding gays in the 
military.  At the same time, Senator Sam Nunn, the then very influential Chair of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, was openly opposed.453  After the new administration 
took office, Clinton’s plan to lift the ban on homosexuals ran into strong opposition on 
the Hill.  Senators Byrd and Nunn felt especially strongly about that issue.  As George 
Stephanopoulos recalled, Senator Nunn held the Family and Medical Leave Act hostage 
to the ban.454  The opposition in the House of Representatives was perhaps even stronger.  
With a large majority, the House passed a resolution against Clinton’s proposal.455 
Likewise, increased military influence on decision-making resulted from that fact 
that top civilian leaders in the White House did not always have the support of 
Congressional civilians on key foreign policy issues either.  There were some significant 
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differences in civilian preferences on foreign policy in the Executive and in Congress and, 
at times, influential Congressional members were in alliance with the military against the 
administration.456  For example, not everybody in Congress liked Clinton’s foreign policy 
strategy of “enlargement and engagement.”  The activist role for the US in foreign policy 
favored by civilian officials in the Clinton administration was opposed by many 
Republicans and even by some conservative Democrats in Congress.  They questioned 
the need for US sustained and active involvement and argued that after the end of the 
Cold War, it would be better to focus on domestic priorities and intervene abroad only 
when US vital interests are threatened.   
On Bosnia, in particular, while many in Congress shared the moral outrage of the 
White House, key Congressional leaders, such as Representatives Dick Gephardt (D-MO) 
and Tom Foley (D-WA), were reluctant to intervene military, and were thus closer in 
their preferences to the caution espoused by military leaders.  For example, in May of 
1993, when top civilian decision-makers at the White House seemed to have decided to 
go with the “lift and strike” option, many in Congress on both sides of the isle, were 
strongly opposed, as was the military.457  As the principal-agent theory predicts, it is 
easier for the military to prevail in debates on foreign policy and the use of force, when 
civilian principals are divided.  When there are divisions among the principals, the agent 
could unite with those principals whose preferences reflect more closely its own 
preferences and thus increase its influence.  Regarding Bosnia, in particular, Richard 
Holbrooke explains this well, noting that “If the military openly opposed the deployment, 
our [the diplomats’ and other key civilian decision-makers] political difficulties would be 
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vastly increased….  We had to have their [the military’s] backing to get congressional 
and public support for the mission, which meant they had the upper hand in the debate 
over what their mission would be.”458  
 Furthermore, the unfavorable balance of power for civilian leaders was also a 
result of their unwillingness and/or inability to exercise assertive control.  As 
administration insiders attested, Clinton was "unwilling to exercise full authority over 
military commanders."459  David Halberstam wrote that Clinton “was intimidated more 
by the military than by any other political force he dealt with.  [Said] a former senior 
NSC official who studied [Clinton] closely, ... 'he was out-and-out afraid of them.’”460  
The case study on the 1991 Gulf War showed that assertive civilian control, without 
micromanagement, had a very positive impact on decision-making and implementation. 
Unlike in the previous Bush administration, military officials under Clinton saw that their 
new civilian bosses would not necessarily monitor closely and attentively and that, at 
times, defying the politicians’ wishes would not cost them much.  Clinton’s failure to 
assert control was criticized by Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense, 
who said that the military had taken advantage of the president’s lack of military service 
and had “shown him little respect.  Clinton cannot spend the rest of his time in office 
fearful of alienating the Pentagon.  He ought to tell his new defense secretary to get 
control of the Pentagon or else.”461 
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This section showed that the civil-military balance of power in the first years of 
the Clinton administration favored the military.  As a prominent analyst of civil-military 
relations argued, “under Colin Powell’s leadership the military, and especially the Joint 
Staff, had become so powerful – while at the same time the civilian sectors of the 
national security establishment, under a weak and vacillating president and a 
disorganized and disheveled Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, had become so weak – that 
the military was essentially dictating policy to its civilian masters.”462  In the words of a 
senior civilian official at the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “exercise an incredible 
veto power… There is no interest on the civilian side of this building in challenging the 
Joint Staff on issues like Bosnia.” 463   More importantly, this balance of power, 
unfavorable to civilian leaders, was mainly of their own making as it was due primarily to 
the lower level of national security experience and expertise among top civilian officials 
in the Executive branch, as well as the divisions between civilian principals in the White 
House and Congress on key issues.  The impact of this favorable to the military power 
configuration on the making and implementation of US policy is discussed in the section 
on decision-making later in the chapter.    
 
High Civil-Military Preference Divergence under Clinton 
This case study confirms again the importance of studying elite civilian and 
military preferences (broadly defined here as ideas, beliefs, opinions, and interests) on 
national-security related questions.  We see that variations in the scope and intensity of 
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preference divergence do affect the decision-making process.  The higher the gap 
between civilian and military leaders, the more both sides would be tempted to 
manipulate the decision-making process in order to advance their own preferences and 
the various distortions of the process decrease it effectiveness.  The intuition behind this 
claim is that how far apart civilian and military preferences are, shapes the incentives of 
civilian and military officials to share or not their private information with each other, to 
discuss openly alternative courses of actions, and to cooperate and coordinate during the 
decision and implementation process.  Decision-makers seek and interpret information 
and advice in very different ways depending on the source, which provides them (and not 
only on the content of advice).  Political leaders are more likely to discount advice (or not 
seek it at all) from advisors with whom they disagree strongly.464  At the same time, they 
are more receptive to sharing information with and listening to people whose preferences 
and interests they see as similar to their own. 
The injection of dissenting views during deliberations and their critical evaluation 
could be crucial for effective decision-making.  Studies show that decision-makers could 
be receptive to discrepant advice when it comes from people who largely share their 
views.  At the same time, discrepant opinions given by advisors whose preferences are 
very different from the leaders’ preferences, are most often rejected or discounted.  For 
example, during the Vietnam war, Lyndon Johnson reacted very differently to similar 
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advice provided by George Ball and Clark Clifford and this was mainly because Johnson 
and Clifford had been in agreement on almost everything concerning the war from the 
very beginning, while Johnson expected Ball to have dissenting views in almost all cases 
anyway.  That is why Ball’s views were discounted, while Clifford’s arguments that the 
war was un-winnable had a very strong impact on LJB.465   
Studying the level of divergence in the preferences of decision-makers is 
important also from the stand-point of social identity theory.  Social psychologists show 
how conflicting views among decision-makers split them into competing factions formed 
around their preferred policies.  The higher the level of conflict, the more cohesive the 
“in-group” becomes; furthermore, the level of animosity towards the “out-group” 
intensifies as well.466  Such dynamics most often affect negatively the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process because decision-makers resort to various manipulative 
strategies in order to advance the policy preferences of the in-group and/or decrease the 
chances for success of the out-group.  Most recently, such was the case in the George W. 
Bush administration when the group around Vice President Cheney systematically 
excluded from the process people around Colin Powell, who, according to Cheney, were 
“not on the team.”  As discussed in greater detail in the Theory Chapter, evidence shows 
that top policy-makers and their advisors (political, military, and others) have made 
numerous attempts to manipulate the foreign-policy decision-making process in order to 
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advance their preferred policies.  The use of manipulation tactics is ubiquitous. 467  
Manipulating the decision process is especially pronounced precisely when preferences 
diverge highly and each side is bent on winning.   
Also, consistent with the above and the logic of the principal-agent theory, I show 
that high preference divergence exacerbates the problem of private information inherent 
in the civil-military relationship.  In cases of intense preference divergence, both the 
civilian principal and the military agent have an incentive to withhold or distort 
information in order to support an outcome closer to their own preferences.  For example, 
if one side favors military intervention and knows that the other side disagrees, it is likely 
to de-emphasize the costs and risks of using force in order to make its preferred option 
more appealing.  Such manipulation of information could contribute to poor analysis of 
options during the formulation of strategy.  Furthermore, intense preference divergence 
increases the incentives of each side to pursue its own set of goals and, hence, it 
diminishes the chances for cooperation between civilian and military officials.  
Ultimately, this could lead to a failure to fully integrate military views with political and 
diplomatic policy and a failure to match successfully political objectives and military 
means. 
Quite in contrast with the George H. W Bush administration, which displayed one 
of the most harmonious relationships between civilian and military leaders, the Clinton 
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administration was characterized by very high civil-military preference divergence.468  
Many of the civilians on the Clinton team were former members of President Carter’s 
foreign policy team and their foreign policy preferences differed markedly from those of 
the top civilian leadership under George H. W. Bush.  The “Liberal Humanitarianists” on 
the civilian side clashed with the more “Realist” thinking of their military.  The changed 
international environment after the end of the Cold War contributed to this clash by 
giving rise to international conflicts which did not threaten U.S. vital interests but, at the 
same time, were difficult to ignore because of moral and humanitarian concerns. 
 
Elite Civilian and Military Preferences on Foreign Policy Issues and the Use of 
Force  
The underlying high civil-military preference divergence in the Clinton 
administration is well-captured by Dale Herspring:  
“[T]hroughout his [Clinton’s] presidency a fundamental disagreement stood between 
those in his administration who favored using force around the world and the Chiefs.  
The latter had little interest in becoming involved in ‘civil wars or other 
unconventional conflicts preferring … emphasis on massive, prompt, and decisive 
application of overwhelming force to defeat any aggressor.’  This approach, 
however, ran counter to main senior civilians’ belief that the Unite States had an 
obligation to help build a multinational community by providing military forces 
when necessary.  The Chiefs would constantly resist the Administration’s efforts to 
involve them in causes, and Powell in particular attempted to dissuade such 
involvement as long as he was on the scene.”469 
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Civilian and military officials espoused different philosophies regarding the use of 
military force. 470  With the Cold War over, the Clinton administration saw the need to 
define anew appropriate uses of military force in a world in which a variety of smaller 
conflicts posed no vital threat either to American power or American existence.  In its 
attempts to do that, the Administration clashed with a military configured to deal with 
major wars and averse to the smaller ethnic and religious conflicts more likely to present 
a challenge in the new security environment.  The military views were summed up in the 
Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force.  In an article in Foreign Affairs, Gen. Powell 
defined the standards the military preferred to use when deciding on whether the US 
should commit armed forces in a crisis.  As Powell wrote:  
When a "fire" starts that might require committing armed forces, we need to evaluate 
the circumstances. Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to 
achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy 
means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the 
gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it 
is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences? … When 
the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks 
are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with 
diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be 
given to the armed forces.471 
 
Top civilian officials in the Clinton Administration disagreed strongly with the 
Powell Doctrine, embraced by the military as the “right way” to use force and they 
wanted to “steer foreign policy further away from the tenets of the Doctrine.”472  While 
the military preferred force to be used very selectively (and rarely), civilian leaders in the 
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Clinton administration were much more willing to see military force as an appropriate 
tool of statecraft in humanitarian and other crises that do not necessarily threaten 
American vital interests.  In his inaugural address, President Clinton stated: “When our 
vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is 
defied, we will act – with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when 
necessary.”473   Unlike the military, civilians were seeing a wider range of roles for 
military power to play in a post Cold-War world – one such role could be keeping the 
peace in ethnic fights similar to the ones in the 1990s in the Balkans.  Les Aspin argued 
further that at times the constraints of the Powell doctrine could be damaging to US 
foreign policy. He stated: “Real leadership requires a willingness to use military force, 
and force can be a useful backdrop of diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a 
temporary alternative.”474  During US involvement in Somalia (1992-93), Les Aspin 
defended the use of force for “nation-building” – an idea which in essence was contrary 
to some of the main postulates of the military orthodoxy regarding the need for clearly 
defined political and military objectives and a quick exit after victory.475 
Civilian leaders faced a military establishment, which, proud of its 1991 victory in 
the Gulf, felt little need or incentive to reconsider the way it fought its wars or the kinds 
of wars it wanted to enter in the first place.  Civilian leaders saw the military as haunted 
or even paralyzed by the Vietnam syndrome.  They believed that while the use of 
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overwhelming force had served the country well in conventional conflicts such as the 
1991 Gulf War, the humanitarian crises of the post-Cold War era were more likely to 
need a rather selective use of measured force.  Most in the military at the time were 
deeply skeptical of peace-keeping and nation-building missions, or what they called 
“Operations Other Than War.”  They thought that such operations would strain the 
military and detract from its combat readiness. 
The Clinton administration embraced multilateralism and saw a need for US 
leadership in cases of rebuilding failed states and other mainly humanitarian missions.  
For example, regarding Somalia, Warren Christopher stated that “there will be a sturdy 
American role to help the United Nations rebuild a viable nation state.”476  On the 
contrary, the military was alarmed by what they saw as civilians’ activist approach and 
their willingness to participate in UN humanitarian missions.   Among the Joint Chiefs, 
there was no enthusiasm for such missions at all.  They found them vague and open-
ended and not necessarily involving US vital interests.  “He [Clinton] was facing a 
Pentagon … unwilling to enter a small conflict whose political objective was to bring the 
parties to the negotiating table.”477   
Among the most telling examples of highly diverging civilian and military 
preferences was the famous exchange between Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell on 
the role and use of the US military in foreign policy.  Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, inquired: “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always 
talking about, if we can’t use it?”  Colin Powell thought he “would have an aneurysm.  
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American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game 
board.” 478  It was not that Albright and her civilian colleagues were eager to engage the 
country in a war – precisely because they did not want war, they argued, they were 
willing to use the threat of force for coercion, which, if successful, will make war 
unnecessary.  In the words of Madeleine Albright: “We’re talking about using military 
force, but we are not talking about a war.  I think this is an important distinction.”479  The 
military opposition to this argument was that acts like “surgical” air strikes could lead to 
escalation and involve the US into protracted and messy wars. 
The divide between civilian and military preferences largely coincided with the 
divide between supporters of the “Limited Objectives” School and the “All-or-Nothing” 
approach.480  The clash between these two schools of thought on the use of force certainly 
did not start in the Clinton administration.  While not new, this debate was re-invigorated 
under Clinton mainly because of the changed strategic environment after the end of the 
Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which allowed and tempted the US to 
intervene in conflicts it would not have considered intervening in the past.  Opponents of 
the Powell doctrine like Les Aspin, who labeled it the “all-or-nothing” approach, argued 
that its precepts had become outdated and that it could not address well the problems of a 
world in which the Soviet threat had been supplanted by civil wars and ethnic 
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conflicts.481  They questioned the applicability of the Doctrine to situations where the US 
might need to rely on force (or the threat of force) in order to stop ethnic cleansing or 
achieve other non-traditional missions.  Civilian leaders were concerned that by insisting 
on decisive force, the Doctrine could tie the hands of decision-makers.  Aspin’s and 
others’ argument was that the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet 
threat allowed the US “more flexibility to use military force in an incremental fashion in 
regional trouble spots … without fear of being sucked into long-term quagmires.”482  The 
civilians believed the military was being stymied by dogmatic adherence to a doctrine 
that was not very suitable to the changed international circumstances.  State Department 
officials argued that the military was still being haunted by the “Vietnam syndrome,” 
which was preventing it to think constructively about intervening in places like the 
Balkans.  As a senior diplomat remarked, “It’s the Vietnam syndrome – the idea that you 
don’t get involved in any application of military force unless it is overwhelming and the 
purpose is to win a ‘victory.’”483 
 
Civilian and Military Preferences Regarding the Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia 
Civilian and military preferences regarding the crisis in former Yugoslavia and 
the US potential role in it differed significantly. They reflected the underlying 
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philosophical differences between top civilian and military officials on the use of force, 
analyzed in the previous section.  During the presidential campaign, Clinton emphasized 
that if elected, his foreign policy initiatives would be guided by moral and humanitarian 
concerns to a larger extent than the policies of President George H. W. Bush.  “President 
Bush’s policy toward former Yugoslavia mirrors his indifference to the massacre at 
Tiananmen Square and his coddling of Saddam Hussein,” Clinton accused.  “Once again, 
the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own 
democratic values.”484  He also said that unlike Bush, he would use American air power 
if necessary in order to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.485  During the campaign, 
Clinton called for increased US involvement, including military pressure, in order to stop 
the atrocities in former Yugoslavia.486  Among the military options suggested by the then 
governor were “punitive air strikes, raids to seize the detention camps, and the lifting of 
the arms embargo.” 487  
The clash between civilian and military preferences became obvious during the 
very first conversation between the newly-elected Commander in Chief and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs.  On November 19, 1992, Bill Clinton met separately with George H. 
W. Bush and Colin Powell to be briefed on major national security issues.  Clinton used 
these meetings to urge the outgoing Bush administration to take a more active stance on 
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Bosnia, but Colin Powell strongly opposed.  According to Powell’s memoirs, Clinton 
inquired whether “we could influence the situation [in Bosnia] through air power, 
something not too punitive.”488  The military’s opposition to an involvement in Bosnia 
remained unchanged since the Bush administration.  At the time, “any military initiative, 
including enforcing a no-fly zone, lifting the arms embargo, air strikes, or a military 
presence on the ground, was opposed by senior US military officers who feared it would 
trigger a Serb reaction.”489  The Chairman and the other Joint Chiefs were concerned that 
the civilians in the Clinton administration would pressure them to embark on yet another 
“do good” mission with no clear objectives.  As Powell wrote, “There it was again, the 
ever-popular solution from the skies, with a good humanitarian twist; let’s not hurt 
anybody.”490  After this first tense meeting between the president-elect and the Chairman, 
Clinton observed that Powell’s opposition to such an idea was firm and blunt; the general 
“did not hold back on any subject.”491  In subsequent meetings with the Principals to 
discuss options for action in Bosnia, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs repeatedly asked 
what the political objective was and what would happen if using air power did not 
achieve the objective, thus showing again his and other officers’ strong misgivings about 
military involvement in Bosnia.492 
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At meetings of Clinton’s principal advisors on Bosnia in March and April of 1993 
the military maintained its strong opposition to the use of force in the Balkans, arguing 
that the US could be sucked further into an un-winnable conflict. 493  A US military 
intervention in Bosnia did not fit well the criteria of the Powell Doctrine and, for this 
reason, was strongly resisted by the military.  One of their arguments was that the 
military and political objectives of the intervention seemed vague and it was not clear 
whether they were achievable with military force.494   As Gen. Powell wrote in his 
memoirs for the last months of his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Clinton, 
“My constant, unwelcome message at all the meetings on Bosnia was simply that we 
should not commit military forces until we had a clear political objective.”495     
Similar to civil-military divisions in other cases when the use of force was 
considered, the military again was uncomfortable with proposals for limited military 
action.  As Michael Gordon wrote,  
General Powell also angrily rejected suggestions by former Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher of Britain and others that the West undertake limited air strikes to deter the 
Serbs from shelling Sarajevo and continuing their attacks.  General Powell said: “As 
soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a 
result or not. As soon as they tell me 'surgical,' I head for the bunker.”496 
 
According to reports, during deliberations on Bosnia in the Clinton 
Administration, Defense Secretary Aspin “made clear” that the US should consider the 
use of force in “a wider variety of shapes and sizes” than the George H. W. Bush 
                                                            
493 Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, p. 356. 
494 Christopher Gibson, Countervailing Forces, p. 235; Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, 
p. 355. 
495 Colin Powell with Joseph Persico, My American Journey, p. 37. 
496 Michael Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia,” New York 





administration has been willing to do.497  On the contrary, Gen. Powell and the rest of the 
military leadership strongly disagreed with proposals for limited bombing of Serbian 
artillery or other military targets.  They argued that the Serbs could disperse its artillery to 
churches, mosques, schools, and other places difficult to hit without endangering 
civilians.498  “I do not know how limited bombing will stop the Serbs from doing what 
they are doing,” the Joint Chiefs Chairman argued.499  More importantly, the military was 
also concerned that limited bombing may quickly escalate to a much larger U.S. 
involvement in the conflict.  They worried it could ultimately lead to a Vietnam-style 
quagmire.  As Colin Powell stated, “We should always be skeptical when so-called 
experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited 
attack. When the ‘surgery’ is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of 
experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—more bombs, more men 
and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making.”500 
Civilian leaders believed that the US should be willing to use force not only to 
achieve victory, but also to bolster diplomacy – in the case of Bosnia, for example, to get 
the Serbs to negotiate seriously, or for the purposes of deterrence.  As Les Aspin, when 
he was still the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, asserted, “Those who 
disagree with the all-or-nothing school are unwilling to accept the notion that military 
force can’t be used prudently short of all-out war.  If we say it is all or nothing and then 
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walk away from the use of force in the Balkans, we are sending a signal to other places 
that there is no downside to ethnic cleansing.  We are not deterring anybody.”501 Civilians 
at the Defense Department argued for a strategy of coercion.  “ ‘Compellance’ is the 
word now being heard in the Pentagon.  It means the use of air power to persuade by 
punishment.”502 Contrary to civilians’ belief in the effectiveness of air power for coercive 
purposes, Colin Powell argued that air power “alone would not be decisive in halting the 
Serbian forces.”503 
Some significant differences in civilian and military preferences continued to 
exist after the signing of the Dayton agreement (December 14, 1995) as well and during 
the implementation phase of the Accords, starting at the end of December of 1995 when 
IFOR entered Bosnia.  In his book on the Bosnia conflict, Richard Holbrooke listed 11 
major differences between the State Department and other civilian leaders, on the one 
hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other, less than a week before the Dayton 
agreement.504  The more important ones included:  
-- military resistance to an obligation “to respond to ‘over the horizon’ reports of attacks 
on international civilian personnel or gross violations of human rights”;  
-- military opposition to being involved in “any aspects of civilian implementation, 
including elections and securing freedom of movement”;  
-- strong  military resistance to any mandate to arrest indicted war criminals;  
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-- military opposition to a mandate to investigate “past incidents of attacks, atrocities or 
human rights violations,” and others.505   
The military’s unwillingness to undertake such missions stemmed mainly from their 
“lessons learned” from the Somalia fiasco and the fears of “mission creep.”  Emphasizing 
the seriousness of those differences, Holbrooke called them “the battle lines” between the 
two diverging viewpoints concerning the peace-keeping operation and acknowledged that 
the diplomats strongly contested every single issue, “winning some, losing many others” 
to the military.506    
 As this section showed, civilian and military preferences on the use of force and 
other foreign policy issues diverged significantly.  In the words of David Halberstam, 
“[T]the Clinton people began their first year in office with a major foreign policy crisis in 
Bosnia still unresolved, and a major philosophical split dividing them and the military.  If 
they had taken over the White House, they had yet to take over the government.”507  The 
next section discusses how this high level of preference divergence combined with the 
dominance of the military affected the making and implementation of US policies. 
 
Decision-Making 
When the balance of power favors the military over the civilians, we expect 
military preferences to dominate in the decision-making process most of the time 
(Hypothesis # 4).  The next paragraphs analyze briefly some of the most important cases 
where civilian and military preferences diverged substantially and military preferences 
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carried the day.  This is confirmed also by an analysis of cases of clashing civilian and 
military preferences from this time period by other authors.  The most authoritative such 
analysis, conducted by Michael Desch, examines more than 70 cases of civil-military 
disputes from 1936 to 1997 and finds that during the Cold War, for example, civilian 
preferences prevailed in almost all cases --  59 out of the 63 times when civilian and 
military preferences were in conflict.508  However, in the post-Cold War period, military 
preferences were dominant in at least 7 of the 12 cases when preferences diverged. 509  In 
the first Clinton administration, in particular, some of the most prominent examples of 
military preferences dominating over civilian ones include the following: the issue of 
gays in the military, the debates on the change in military roles and missions, the Bosnia 
policy debates, the role of women in combat, and others. 
Arguably, the issue with the most negative consequences for the subsequent 
interactions between civilian and military leaders and the one that inflicted the most 
severe damage on civilian control was the debate on gays in the military.  As a result of 
the early clash between civilian and military leaders regarding the ban on homosexuals 
and that civilians did back off, “Clinton got his nose bloodied … and placed himself even 
more on the defensive against the powerful military faction already opposed to him.”510  
This first civil-military “fight” was won by the military and it gave them the impression 
that the newly-elected civilian leadership was weak and could cave when pressed.  Many 
believed that in later debates on issues related to use of force, including Bosnia, Clinton 
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was in no position to override military advice because of the debacle over resolving the 
gays in the military issue.511  As Richard Kohn argued, “Nothing did more to harm the 
launching of the Clinton administration than ‘gays in the military,’ for it announced to 
Washington and the world that the President could be rolled.  If the one group pledged by 
law and tradition to obey could roll him, then everyone could--or at least could try.”512 
During the presidential campaign, Bill Clinton emphasized his intent to lift the 
ban on homosexuals in the military.  On his first visit to Washington, DC as president-
elect, when faced with strong opposition not only from the Joint Chiefs but also from 
some members of his own party in Congress, Clinton “backed off just a bit, saying he still 
intended to carry out his campaign promise on the issue, but was prepared to discuss it 
and find common ground.”513  The civil-military relationship turned quite sour when the 
newly elected president announced that he would abolish the ban immediately.  
Regardless of whether this was done because of ignorance or arrogance, of which the 
new administration was immediately accused, the lack of consultation on this very 
sensitive issue poisoned civil-military relations further.  Powell and the Joint Chiefs 
openly resisted such a move.   
“Powell himself was very conservative on the issue [gays in the military], and 
friends remember him becoming quite irate when the argument was made that integrating 
gays into the military was a stop not unlike integrating blacks some forty-five years 
earlier.  Powell was also speaking for many of his colleagues who were decidedly 
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unenthusiastic about the idea.  Opposition on the part of the Joint Chiefs and within the 
entire military cadre would be very, very strong, he said …”514  The military considered 
Clinton’s attempts to lift the ban as an assault on military culture.  “[The military] 
resented his [Clinton’s] attempts to use the military as a laboratory for social engineering.  
They believed the military was crafted to fight and win wars, not to carry out 
experiments.”515 
Clinton’s announcement (only several days after he took office) that he intended 
to lift the ban on homosexuals united the military against him to an unprecedented degree.  
“Joining the Chiefs in opposition to Clinton were the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the 
American Legion, the Retired Officers Association, and the Association of Non-
Commissioned Officers.”516  Politically, such opposition was very difficult to overcome, 
especially for the position Clinton was in, without full Congressional support on the issue.  
At the time, rumors appeared in the media that the Joint Chiefs would resign over the 
controversy and these rumors were not denied.  Says Stephanopoulos about a meeting 
between Clinton and the Chiefs, discussing the ban on homosexuals: “[The Chiefs’] 
message was clear: Keeping this promise will cost you the military.  Fight us and you’ll 
lose – and it won’t be pretty.”517 
At the end, with the help of Congressional Democrats, a “compromise” was 
reached.518  The Clinton administration abandoned the idea of an executive order, which 
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was supposed to reverse the injustice “with a single stroke of the pen“.  Instead, newly-
crafted regulations would prohibit commanders from asking about a serviceman or 
servicewoman’s sexual orientation, but any overt evidence of homosexuality still 
remained a basis for discharge.519  The agreed-upon “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy did not 
reflect civilian preferences and was actually seen as a victory for the military.  Not only 
were civilian wishes thwarted, but, more importantly, this first interaction gave the 
military a reason to believe that “shirking” might not necessarily be punished.  From the 
perspective of a principal-agent model, Clinton’s failure to prevail in his challenge to the 
military preferences on this issue weakened his relative power position “and contributed 
to greatly reduced expectations of punishment on the part of the military.”520  Even more 
importantly, this also made civilian leaders much less willing to challenge military 
preferences on other issues as well.  As Andrew Bacevich writes: 
Powell proved that the JCS chairman could now in effect tie the president's 
hands. … He questioned the wisdom of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans 
and elsewhere; and he torpedoed President Bill Clinton's efforts to permit gays to 
serve openly in the military. 521 
The gradually established dominance of the military in the first Clinton 
administration could be seen also in the evolution of the administration’s policy on 
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peace-keeping. 522   At the start of their term in office, Clinton’s top civilian policy 
advisors and cabinet members, including the US Permanent Representative to the UN at 
the time, Madeleine Albright, were expressing a pro-active attitude towards peacekeeping, 
and emphasizing the need of US involvement in such missions, as well as a desire to 
strengthen the role of the UN.523  However, having met a strong opposition from the U.S. 
military, the language of “assertive multilateralism” started to disappear.  In a speech at 
the United Nations on September 27, 1993, President Clinton announced some significant 
restrictions on US involvement in peace-keeping operations, including the conflict in 
Bosnia.  His speech contained many of the arguments characteristic of the “Never Again” 
school, coinciding with the military perspective on the use of force and military 
preferences on when and how force should be used.  As far as US involvement in the 
Balkans, Clinton asserted that before the country was committed, certain preconditions 
needed to be fulfilled.   
“I would want a clear understanding what the command and control was.  I would 
want the NATO commander in charge of the operations.  I would want a clear 
timetable for the first review and ultimately the right to terminate American 
involvement.  I would want a clear political strategy along with a military 
strategy.  … And I would want a clear expression of support from the United States 
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Congress. Now, there are 20 other operational things I would want, but those are the 
big policy issues.”524   
 
President Clinton and other high-ranking civilian officials at the time often 
phrased policy choices in language borrowed from the Powell doctrine.  For example, in 
his speech to the nation on November 27, 1995, describing the Bosnia mission, the 
President said that it would be “precisely defined, with clear, realistic goals that can be 
achieved in a definite period of time” and that American troops would have everything 
they need to respond to challenges and violations of the agreement with “overwhelming 
force.”525  Due to political weakness and insufficient experience and expertise in military 
matters, the civilian leadership accepted the dominance of military preferences on 
MOOTW.  Even in cases when it was trying to deviate from the requirements of the 
Powell Doctrine, it used the military-preferred terminology to justify this, as if it was 
afraid of angering the military.  “But he [Sandy Berger] did note a slight mutation away 
from the Powell approach: When air campaigns can be conducted with no American 
casualties and no American ground troops, there is ‘another generation of thinking that is 
not inconsistent with the doctrine of using overwhelming force – and that is using force 
for more limited purposes but in a way that gives us overwhelming advantage,’ Mr. 
Berger said.”526 
Another win for military preferences was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 
25, which established the parameters for the deployment of US forces in peace-keeping 
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operations and was signed by President Clinton in May of 1994.  Sections of the 
document restated the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine almost word for word, affirming that 
U.S. participation in peace-keeping missions would be predicated on the following 
conditions: “clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified; 
domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshaled; command and control 
arrangements are acceptable; there exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to 
achieve clearly defined objectives; there exists a plan to achieve those objectives 
decisively.”527  The language of clear political objectives and exit strategies was very 
much in line with military preferences on US involvement in peace-keeping missions.  As 
if to underscore this, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, at the time Director for Strategic Plans and 
Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, participated at the news conference at which Tony 
Lake presented PDD 25 and commented that “the military had played a major role in 
defining the command and control aspects of this PDD.”528  This presidential directive 
and similar policy statements were very different from the views the Clinton civilian 
team started with.529  Christopher Gibson observed correctly that “this policy is a major 
political victory for the military and those subscribers to the Powell Doctrine as it 
encompasses most of those tenets versus the more activist visions initially articulated by 
the civilian leadership at the outset of the Clinton administration.”530 
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Another good illustration of the civil-military clash over peace-keeping missions 
and the fact that military preferences dominated at the end was the negotiation over the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) for the Dayton Accords, discussed in more detail later on 
in the chapter.  Press reports at the time showed that the overcoming of the military 
opposition to that peace-keeping mission was achieved only by satisfying all the 
conditions the military insisted on and excluding from their duties tasks such as: pursuing 
war criminals, conducting humanitarian missions, mine clearing, providing election 
security or other police functions.  After such compromises on the part of civilian 
decision-makers “even the most skeptical commanders express[ed] confidence that the 
NATO force, including 20, 000 American troops, can achieve a tightly circumscribed set 
of goals with minimum casualties.  That is largely because the agreement meets virtually 
every condition the American military insisted on for success: clear goals, a powerful 
force, NATO command and control, robust rules of engagement, a one-year limit and the 
expressed cooperation of the rival factions.”531  
The military representatives in the negotiations at Dayton drafted the following 
clause which became part of the final document: “The Parties understand and agree that 
the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any 
Party, to do all the Commander judges necessary and proper … The violating Party shall 
be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure 
compliance with the Annex.”532  Having the “authority,” according to the military, meant 
having the ability to choose not to do something if they did not want to.  The military 
                                                            
531 Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Confident, but Some Serbs ‘Will Fight’; Military Now Says Bosnia Peace Plan 
Will Work,” New York Times, November 27, 1995, p. A1, emphasis added; See also Warren Strobel, “This 
Time, Clinton is Set to Heed Advice from Military,” Washington Times, December 1, 1995, p. 1. 





commanders on the ground needed such a statement in order not to be “obligated” to go 
after war criminals, something that they did not want to do, while the civilians wanted 
them to do.  Also very significant from the military’s point of view was that they 
managed to insert the phrase “without interference or permission of any Party” – it would 
keep off their backs civilians who wished to tell the military commanders what to do and 
how to go about their business.  As discussed later in more detail, the concessions the 
military managed to extract ultimately narrowed the military mission to the extent that 
the political effectiveness of the mission was compromised.   
The dismissal of Defense Secretary Aspin after less than one year in office was 
another win for military preferences.  It was seen as a sacrifice the generals insisted 
Clinton make.  The military wanted Aspin to take the blame for failing to send the 
reinforcements they had requested for Somalia.533  An administration official related a 
conversation at the time between Bill Clinton and Colin Powell, in which the General 
told the President that under Aspin “relations with the military have reached a nadir.”534  
At least in part, military dislike for Aspin stemmed from the fact that he was perceived as 
one of the strong advocates for a pro-active U.S. foreign and military policy, which 
would have required a much higher involvement of the military in peace-keeping and 
peace-building operations.  As one observer summed up the end of the Aspin controversy, 
“In future this administration will deploy troops only to defend America’s vital national 
interests. …  Peacekeeping has been abandoned.”535   
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The fact that Clinton nominated a former Navy officer, retired Admiral Bobby 
Ray Inman, to replace Aspin, was seen as yet another sign of Clinton’s insecurity in his 
relations with the military.  Inman’s nomination was the president’s way of finding 
someone who would please the uniforms and, at the same time, would be able to protect 
Clinton from being rolled by them.  The situation became almost ridiculous when at the 
White House ceremony after his nomination was announced, Inman, in front of the 
Commander-in-Chief and key members of his national security team, said bluntly that he 
had voted for Bush and that, before accepting the nomination, he had had to reach “a 
level of comfort” in the President’s abilities as Commander-in-Chief.536 
In debates on US Bosnia policy in the Clinton administration civilian and military 
preferences clashed again and the military often managed to get the upper hand.  In the 
last months of the Bush administration, the pressure to use force in Bosnia increased 
significantly.  Although almost no one was advocating the use of ground troops, pressure 
from Congress, international organizations and various domestic groups mounted – the 
demand was to use force in order to ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered to Bosnia 
and also, to reconsider the arms embargo, which was considered to be favoring the Serbs.  
Top military officials remained strongly against the use of force and pointed to the 
various risks even a limited military involvement would entail.  Some of the pressure on 
Washington to act was coming from presidential candidate Bill Clinton, who on August 5, 
1992537 at a campaign stop, stated that that the Bush Administration was not doing 
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enough to stop the violence in the Balkans and that use of force might be necessary.  “I 
would begin with air power against the Serbs,” Clinton concluded.538  On December 11, 
1992, at a news conference, President-elect Clinton suggested that the US should “turn up 
the heat a little” and enforce more vigorously the no-fly zones.539 
With Clinton in office, the disagreements between top civilian and military 
officials on the role of American military power in foreign policy took central stage.  The 
numerous debates on Bosnia showed again the very different views held by the military 
and the civilians on the role of military force – the civilians believed that the threat and 
use of force should be an integral part of U.S. diplomatic efforts, while the military 
believed that force should be used only after diplomacy and all else had failed.540  In this 
particular case, most civilian leaders thought that US intervention could improve the 
situation without necessarily leading either to a quick resolution of the conflict or to a 
quagmire.  They proposed that air strikes and lifting the arms embargo should be 
considered.  To the contrary, the military argued that if the US decided to use air strikes 
and/or to lift the embargo on arms shipments to the Muslims, this would only broaden the 
conflict rather than achieve a solution.  Military officers argued that there was no military 
solution to the Balkan conflict and that the US should continue with diplomatic initiatives. 
In the first months of the new administration, civilian leaders attempted to fulfill 
Clinton’s campaign promise for a more vigorous and effective US involvement in Bosnia 
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and supported the Vance-Owen peace plan.541  The administration conducted a policy 
review on Bosnia, which was presented on Feb. 10, 1993 by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher.  Christopher allowed that the US would be willing to use ground troops in 
the Balkans in order to implement and enforce a peace agreement, but if and only if the 
parties were to reach such an agreement.542  This idea was met with strong resistance 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “and Clinton was not inclined to challenge the 
military on that score.”543  General Powell “forcefully questioned even the most limited 
intervention to protect the Muslims, reflecting the concern that such steps would involve 
the United States in a quagmire without stopping the fighting.”544 
In the early months of the administration, due to strong military opposition, 
civilian officials gradually moved away from Clinton’s campaign promises for a more 
active US participation in the Balkan conflict.  “The initial Clinton decisions on Bosnia 
primarily reflected military thinking, both in terms of the issues to be considered and the 
outcome recommended.”545  For example, in April of 1993, Secretary Aspin and other 
civilian leaders still believed “that air strikes should be considered and [were] 
sympathetic to the notion of lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims.”546  The military 
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has been opposing a policy of “lift and strike” and “the administration quickly abandoned 
the use of force option and focused on finding an alternative to the peace plan developed 
by the UN and the EU, which they regarded as rewarding the Serbs for aggression.”547 
The next section analyzes the effects of high preference divergence on the quality 
of the decision-making process.  The level of divergence in the preferences of top civilian 
and military officials affects all aspects of decision-making and implementation but its 
effects are especially notable in regard to information sharing and analysis (as is also 
shown in the chapter on the 2003 Iraq war).  When there is a big gap between civilian and 
military preferences, my theoretical framework expects that both sides would have an 
incentive to withhold or misrepresent information in order to boost their own preferences.  
The evidence confirms that high preference divergence often results in concealing or 
misrepresenting information and this undermines the comprehensiveness of policy 
discussions.  It makes it less likely that alternative policy options would be brought up 
and debated or that strongly-held assumptions would be challenged.   
In this particular case, the military, which was strongly opposed to intervention in 
Bosnia, presented the case against US involvement in the Balkans in the starkest possible 
terms.  One Army colonel likened Yugoslavia to ‘two parts of Lebanon and one part 
Vietnam.’“548  The situation in the Balkans, the military argued, was extremely difficult 
and there was hardly anything there that could be accomplished with the use of military 
force.  For example, Powell’s strong opinion was that bombing would not be successful 
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in coercing Milosevic.  The generals argued that because of the mountainous terrain in 
Bosnia, it would be difficult to locate and destroy Serb artillery.  It would be next to 
impossible to distinguish friend from foe because the positions of the warring parties 
were intertwined, so precision strikes would be very difficult.  Furthermore, such strikes 
could provoke the Serbs who could retaliate by seizing members of the UN humanitarian 
mission on the ground.549  Gen. McCaffrey warned that the US and coalition forces 
would have to be inserted in a chaotic environment, amid well-armed warring factions of 
Serbs, Muslims and Croats numbering over 200, 000.  “Much of the violence is going on 
at night.  It’s in forested country.  We do not have a ground collection system on the spot.  
We do not have the ability to mark targets for air strikes.”550 
Along the same lines, when preferences diverge highly, we observe that both 
civilian and military officials may be tempted to conceal or misrepresent information 
about the intentions and capabilities of the adversary in order to present in more favorable 
light their own preferred course of action.  In this case, for example, the generals 
portrayed the Serbs as militarily very strong and proficient, and determined to fight.  
During the deliberations with top civilian decision-makers, military officials pointed out 
that Hitler had sent 38 Infantry Divisions to the Balkans without much success against the 
Serbs – the US could not do better, officers argue, especially having in mind that, at that 
time, the country had only 12 divisions on active duty.  Based on this image of the enemy, 
the generals argued that a military operation could result in a quagmire.  According to 
Gen. McCaffrey, “it would take considerable amount of time … Oh, I think it would be a 
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very bitter struggle.”551  Quite the contrary, top civilian officials thought that the Serbian 
military forces “may be overrated and that an air attack might be effective in deterring 
Serbian attacks.”552  Holbrooke and other civilians argued that the Serbs were “not the 
North Vietnamese … This was not hardened Communist cadre who suffered by the 
millions.  This was a bunch of ragtag thugs and bullies.” 553   U.S. Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann shared Holbrooke’s views.  In such situations, when 
both sides have an incentive to conceal or misrepresent private information, it is unlikely 
that policy discussions would be productive and, thus, the quality of the decision-making 
process as a whole would suffer significantly. 
Discussions between top civilian and military officials about the number of US 
troops needed to intervene were, at times, also marred by contradictions and 
exaggerations.  As a former state department official joked, during debates on Bosnia, no 
matter what the question was, the military answer always came as “several hundred 
thousand troops.”  The military argued that if force had to be used, the US would need a 
massive deployment.  For example, Lt. Gen. Barry McCaffrey told a Senate committee 
that if the US wanted to intervene in Bosnia to stop the violence, that would require 
“perhaps a field army … in a year or so, one could drop the level of violence … I would 
guess it would be a field army.  It would be around 400, 000 troops.” 554  And the 
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operation would be more difficult than the guerrilla fighting in Vietnam, the General 
advised.  On the other hand, civilian officials who were supportive of a US role in Bosnia 
argued that using air strikes and lifting the arms embargo could bring improvements in 
the situation and there would be no need of a large ground-troop presence.  When in July 
of 1993 the Bosnian Serbs intensified their siege of Sarajevo, President Clinton called for 
new policy options, including military ones.555   Secretary Christopher, supported by 
Madeleine Albright, called for the use of ground forces.  At a meeting of the principals on 
July 13, “[the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff] Adm. Jeremiah said that 70, 000 
troops would be required to take Sarajevo.  A week later Powell proposed several options 
that used fewer than the 70, 000 soldiers suggested by Jeremiah.  Nevertheless, the 
numbers were still too high for some members of Congress.”556  Earlier, in a Senate 
hearing, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, then a senior aide to Gen. Colin Powell, had stated that 
60, 000 to 120, 000 troops would be necessary in order to secure the flow of medical 
supplies and food to Sarajevo. 557  Some senior officers had claimed that “seizing the 
[Sarajevo] airport and distributing relief supplies would be far more complex and costly 
than [was] generally understood. 
Many analysts and some policy-makers at the time thought that the military was 
using such troops estimates in order to discourage the civilian leadership from 
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intervening (by repeatedly stating preconditions of “overwhelming” and “compelling” 
force).  Brent Scowcroft, among others, found those estimates “probably” exaggerated by 
the Joint Chiefs, who wanted to make US involvement in the conflict seem prohibitively 
costly.558  Halberstam also claims that Powell’s high estimates were an attempt to test 
civilian resolve.  The fact that the U.S. ultimately committed a little more than 35, 000 
troops (at its peak) and that this number was very different from the military estimates 
offered during the debates could suggest that at least some of those estimates were 
intended to make the price of the mission seem prohibitive to civilian leaders and hence, 
preclude an option.559  Most scholars and policy-makers agree that military advisors 
should honestly advise on the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and 
should not knowingly and artificially increase the costs and risks of a policy option in 
order to dissuade decision-makers from undertaking it.560  While, ideally, this should not 
happen, in real life it does and the contribution of an approach to civil-military relations 
and decision-making which takes into account the degree of preference divergence 
between civilian and military leaders, alerts us to when and why military advisors may 
resort to precisely such tactics.  This is not to argue that there was no merit in the 
military’s arguments, but to highlight circumstances and conditions under which we are 
more likely to have both civilian and military leaders distort information and skew 
debates (i.e., conditions such as high civil-military preference divergence).       
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As this section showed, when preferences diverge highly, both sides may be 
tempted to distort information in order to support an outcome closer to their own 
preferred choice.  In such situations, communications between civilian and military 
leaders will most likely deteriorate; discussions will not necessarily be informative and 
productive, assumptions could remain untested.  Richard Holbrooke, for example, 
complained that in the debates on Bosnia quite often the word “Vietnam” was thrown 
around, but civilian and military leaders did not agree on the lessons of Vietnam and 
whether they were applicable to the situation at hand.  However, the pattern of civil-
military relations at the time precluded an open discussion about what Holbrooke and 
other civilian leaders believed were the “fundamental differences” between Bosnia and 
Vietnam. “Discussion of such distinctions was not welcome.”561  Many of the military 
assumptions on that score remained unexamined because of the high civil-military 
preference divergence, which often precluded frank discussions and rigorous analysis of 
alternative options and because of military dominance and the inability and unwillingness 
of civilian leaders to challenge military preferences.  High civil-military preference 
divergence impeded information sharing and strained civil-military communication.  Just 
like in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, the intense civil-military disagreements in views 
and attitudes in this case led to truncated discussions and missed opportunities to debate a 
full range of military and non-military alternatives and to correct flawed assumptions.  
Thus, high civil-military preference divergence led to the skewing of U.S. policy choices.  
“…flawed estimates translated into the perceived need for massive US forces for any 
                                                            





intervention, with both forces and casualties predicted on a scale that was automatically 
politically unpalatable.”562 
The degree of preference divergence also affects another important part of the 
decision and implementation process, namely, the cooperation and coordination between 
civilian and military leaders.  Intense civil-military preference divergence, I hypothesize, 
would increase the incentives of each side to pursue its own set of goals and, hence, 
diminish the chances for cooperation between civilian and military officials (because they 
want very different things).  As a result, diplomatic and military aspects of the decision 
could often remain uncoordinated.  In most cases, high preference divergence would lead 
to a failure to fully integrate military views with political and diplomatic policy and a 
failure to match successfully political objectives and military means.  As my theoretical 
framework expects, high preference divergence did have negative effects upon the 
cooperation and coordination between civilian and military officials in the Clinton 
administration as well.   
Lack of integration between the diplomatic and the military effort was all too 
obvious in Operation Deliberate Force (August 30 - September 14, 1995), for example.  
According to many, during that Operation, civil-military tensions escalated to a peak and 
this led to inability to integrate the bombing with the diplomatic strategy.  In order to get 
the Serbs to negotiate, the politicians wanted to use the threat of air strikes or actual 
bombing, if the threat failed, as a coercive tool.563  To achieve this, Holbrooke pressed for 
tighter integration between the diplomatic and the military arms, and in accordance with 
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the principle of civilian control, this would have translated into greater control by 
Holbrooke over the operation.  This was strongly resisted by senior military officers on 
the ground.  After 2 days of NATO air strikes, Admiral Smith and Lieut. Gen. Bernard 
Janvier, the then commander of UN forces in Yugoslavia, recommended a pause in the 
bombing because the Serb Commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, had promised to start 
withdrawing his forces.  The American diplomats and the other civilians who had insisted 
for the bombing in the first place were “stunned” by the military’s recommendation.564  
They argued that Mladic’s promise should not be believed because the general had a 
history of broken commitments.  The diplomats insisted that the bombing continued until 
the Bosnian Serbs complied with NATO’s demand to pull back their heavy weapons.  
They attributed Smith’s recommendation to his “naivete” and lack of knowledge of the 
Balkan conflict.  The generals, however, after achieving the bombing pause (and being 
reluctant to bomb in the first place), were not very willing to resume the air strikes, as the 
civilians urged.  The situation became so tense at one point that Adm. Smith told 
Holbrooke he would not take orders from Washington as to whether to continue with the 
bombing or not.  As Holbrooke remembered, the Admiral told him that as a commander 
he was solely responsible for the safety of his troops, and “he would make his decision, 
under authority delegated to him by the NATO Council, based on his own judgment.  In 
fact, he pointed out, he did not even work for the United States; as a NATO commander 
he took orders from Brussels.”565   
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Holbrooke and other diplomats insisted on the bombing to continue and argued 
that such military pressure was very important in their negotiations with the Serbs.  In a 
now famous cable, Holbrooke implored: “History could hang in the balance tonight.  
Give us bombs for peace.”  However, coordination between the diplomatic and the 
military effort became almost impossible because Admiral Smith had ordered Gen. 
Michael Ryan, the air force commander in charge of the bombing, “to have no contact 
with [Holbrooke’s] negotiating team.”566  Since Holbrooke and his team played the key 
role in the diplomacy with both the Bosnian Serbs and President Slobodan Milosevic, the 
lack of communication between Holbrooke’s team and the military meant that there was 
almost no coordination between the diplomatic and the military effort.  “Indeed, the U.S. 
military opposed making bombing part of a larger policy.  No one was more outspoken in 
his opposition to a bombing campaign than Adm. Leighton “Snuffy” Smith, who was 
both commander of all U.S. forces in southern Europe and commander of all Naval forces 
in Europe.”567  Richard Holbrooke wrote of Smith that he “was edging into an area of 
political judgments that should have been reserved for civilian leaders.”568  At the time, 
Holbrooke and his aides even suspected that “the military dissembled to the senior 
national security policy-making team about whether it was running out of approved 
Serbian targets to strike.”569  The officers, on their part, were offended that the civilian 
leadership trusted them so little as to accuse them basically of “lying.”  After 4 days of 
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civil-military bickering, Smith agreed to resume the bombing campaign but only when it 
became obvious that NATO demands were not met, and after Gen. Clark, Holbrooke’s 
military liaison officer at the time, reiterated the order to him.570  Thus, high preference 
divergence led to lack of coordination between the diplomatic and the military arms of 
the mission and this insufficient coordination often caused serious problems in 
implementation.571   
After the signing of the Dayton agreement, civil-military preferences continued to 
diverge on some key issues related to peace enforcement and the resulting almost total 
lack of cooperation between top US civilian and military officials on these issues had a 
damaging effect on the peace enforcement mission.  The most contentious issues were 
whether IFOR (and, hence, the US military on the ground) would be responsible for 
pursuing accused war criminals and for assisting with the relocation of refugees.  
Civilians believed that in order to make the Dayton agreement work, the military should 
enforce it rigorously, including this part of the agreement which called for the arrest of 
alleged war criminals Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and others.  The military was 
very much opposed to what civilians were urging it to do.  When civil-military preference 
divergence is high, my theoretical framework anticipates that the agent, unwilling to 
carry out the principal’s preferences, would be more likely to shirk.  “Shirking” could 
involve foot-dragging or various other attempts to stall.  In this case, for example, one 
form of shirking was the refusal of military commanders on the ground to arrest alleged 
war criminals.  For example, Admiral Leighton Smith, the U.S. commander of the 60, 
000 NATO force in Bosnia, argued that the military was not going to go after war 
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criminals because this could lead to armed confrontations with both sides.  The military, 
according to the Admiral, was “not trained to do police work.  Training to be a policeman 
is entirely different than training to be a soldier.”572  He said he did not want his soldiers 
to have to take sides in the conflict because this would make it difficult “to perform their 
primary task, which is to separate the warring parties and maintain peace.”573  Admiral 
Smith refused to chase and/or arrest anyone unless he was ordered specifically by 
President Clinton.  Smith’s opposition was so intransigent that President Clinton, who 
made clear he himself supported the arrest of war criminals, accused Smith of 
insubordination.574   
Another case of shirking was the military’s unwillingness to act when in March of 
1996, NATO and the headquarters of Carl Buildt, the international coordinator for the 
implementation of the Dayton accords, proceeded with the agreed upon handover of five 
Serb-held neighborhoods to the Bosnian government.  Then, according to many, “the 
worst catastrophe” ensued.  Many of the buildings were burned or looted while the 
military stood by.  Western diplomats accused Admiral Smith of inaction and thus 
“facilitating the looting of Bosnian property” and of letting “slip the last opportunity to 
build a multi-ethnic society. With some resolve, things could have been different, but he 
[Smith] refused to confront the Serbs,” who were doing the looting.575  Civilian leaders 
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believed that had the military not dragged its heels, this tragedy could have been avoided 
and the chances for reconciliation could have increased. 
Such military foot-dragging, resulting from the high civil-military preference 
divergence over how to enforce the peace agreement, was all too common in the case of 
Bosnia.  U.S. diplomats and other civilians argued that military commanders were overly 
cautious and unwilling to enforce the agreement and that their behavior was ultimately 
hurting the chances for peace.  Speaking angrily of Adm. Smith’s timidity and non-
compliance, a senior diplomat said: “He should nab these war criminals and pursue 
justice.  The consequences of not doing this are that he will have an excellent year, he 
will spend billions of dollars, he will have fewer people hurt than if they had all stayed 
home in the United States, and there will be no peace.”576  The conflicts in the Balkans, 
more generally, are a good illustration of the impact of high civil-military preference 
divergence on the decision and implementation processes.  In each case the big gap 
between the views of civilian and military officials on how to deal with these conflicts 
produced reluctance on the part of the generals to develop military options or to enforce 
peace agreements.   
 In addition to problems with communication, information sharing, and 
coordination between civilian and military leaders, evidence shows that high preference 
divergence leads to the increase of the number of “strategic” leaks.  The logic of this is 
straightforward: when there is a high preference divergence both the civilians and the 
military may be tempted to resort to the help of other major actors who support their side 







Congress or the media in order to influence the internal debate.  In most cases, leaks have 
had negative impact not only on the decision-making process itself, but on the state of the 
civil-military relationship as well.  Just like in the period prior to the 2003 Iraq war, 
characterized by very high preference divergence between the civilian leadership and top 
military officials, during the debates on Bosnia, leaks were common on both sides.  One 
of the more important documents that was leaked to the press was Madeleine Albright’s 
paper, “which advocated bombing strikes.”577  As a report correctly noted, “top military 
professionals have not been shy about making their discontent known” not only to the 
press, but to “lawmakers and to groups of retired senior officers, who often serve as 
channels for such complaints.”578   Similarly, to shore up support for their preferred 
course of action, civilians from the State Department made “public” their letter to the 
Secretary of State, protesting what they defined as the US policy of inaction in the face of 
“Serbian genocide.” 
High preference divergence also contributed to what one expert called “the 
toxicity of the civil-military relationship”579 which further complicated decision-making 
on the use of force.  The civilian mistrust of the military was more than reciprocated by 
the military’s passionate dislike and even disdain for the President and his civilian aides.  
The Clinton presidency, at times, was marked by open hostility by the military for its 
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commander in chief rarely seen in the past.580  For example, in the Navy Times, a Marine 
Major called Clinton “an adulterous liar” and a “criminal” (in 1998).  A retired Army 
Colonel and the director of strategy for the While House Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, James McDonough, wrote in an op-ed,  
“Implicit in our faith and confidence was the presumption that [US troops] would be 
committed only with the careful consideration and wisdom of our national decision 
makers.  As it turns out, on at least one occasion during his deliberations in 1995, 
President Clinton might not have had his mind fully on the enormous responsibilities 
he was incurring by putting U.S. troops in harms’ way.  According to the Starr 
report, during a phone call to Rep. H.L “Sonny” Calahan (R., Ala.) on Nov. 17 to 
secure his vote against an attempt to deny funds to commit troops to Bosnia, the 
president was simultaneously receiving sexual favors from Monica Lewinsky.  … It 
saddens the heart to learn that President Clinton, during this one moment at least, 
was arguing for sending America’s armed forces into potential danger even as he 
must have been significantly distracted. … the act of casual sex at a moment of great 
importance smacks of callous indifference, sophomoric arrogance, and reckless 
disregard of the sanctity of U.S. soldiers’ lives.”581 
 
Another officer questioned whether the military is obliged to obey orders issued by 
“a morally defective leader with a demonstrated disregard for his troops.”582  At one point, 
the situation became so bad that the military leadership had to issue orders reminding 
officers that the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibited the use of “contemptuous 
words” about civilian authority.  This strained civil-military relationship damaged the 
decision-making process in several ways: “first, by paralyzing national security policy; 
second, by obstructing and in some cases sabotaging American ability to intervene in 
foreign crises or to exercise leadership internationally; and third, by undermining the 
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confidence of the armed forces in their own uniformed leadership.”583   While high 
preference divergence between civilian and military leaders was not the only factor 
responsible for poor civil-military relations (among other factors being Clinton’s 
personality and some of his actions in office), the big gap in the ideas and preferences 
between the politicians and the generals was a major factor as well.      
We also observe significant positive changes in decision-making and 
implementation when civilian and military preferences became more alike as a result of 
new military appointments at key positions, and especially the appointment of Gen. 
Shalikashvili as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The next paragraphs 
analyze this policy change, how it related to a higher level of preference convergence and 
what were the overall consequences for decision-making.     
The new Bosnia policy of the Clinton administration was more active and more in 
line with the original civilian preferences.  After the massacre in Srebrenica (July 15, 
1995), Bill Clinton stated that “the United States cannot be a punching bag in the world 
anymore.”584   Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and Chairman Shalikashvili were also 
furious.  When on August 28, 1995 the Serbs shelled the Sarajevo marketplace, the 
President and his new Chairman decided that NATO should begin air strikes.  Thus 
August 31 became “the busiest day of military action in NATO history, with planes 
ranging across all of Northern and Western Bosnia.”585  Arguably, the air campaign, 
together with the ground offensive of the Croatian army, helped the political and 
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diplomatic effort and brought the Serbs to the negotiating table.586  On September 14, 
1995, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to stop their offensive in Sarajevo, to remove heavy 
weaponry from the area, to open a land route out of the city, and to reopen the Sarajevo 
airport.  NATO threatened to resume bombing if the Serbians do not follow through, but 
they did.  On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Agreement was reached, and, as a result, 
20, 000 American troops (a part of a 60, 000 NATO force, IFOR) replaced the UN troops 
in Bosnia.   
A big part of the explanation for this policy change lies in the retirement of Gen. 
Colin Powell and the appointment of Gen. Shalikashvili as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.  Significantly, this appointment caused a decrease in civil-military preference 
divergence at the top, which led to improved communication and cooperation between 
civilian and military leaders.  Many analysts have noted the important differences in the 
views of Generals Powell and Shalikashvili.587  Dale Herspring, for example, writes:  
The Clinton administration – as well as some of Shali’s colleagues on the Joint 
Chiefs – thought that the new chair’s views were closer to Clinton’s than 
Powell’s. … They [the Administration] also liked the fact that Shalikashvili believed 
in greater flexibility in using military force.  Early in his tenure, he indicated that he 
wanted to modify the Weinberger Doctrine, which specified that the United States 
should become involved militarily only when the vital interests of the US were at 
stake.  Shalikashvili wanted to drop the word ‘vital.’  He could envision numerous 
situations in which a president would wish to advocate the use of troops even if no 
threat were posed to the nation’s vital interests.  He also recognized that the Cold 
War had ended and that the United States would inevitably become involved in what 
the Pentagon called ‘Operations Other Than War.’588 
 
As a result of Gen. Powell’s retirement, civilian and military preferences grew 
closer.  The new Chairman modified the Powell Doctrine to the extent that he was more 
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receptive to the military being involved in the so-called Operations Other Than War.  He 
stated, “A president must have in his tool bag, in addition to the diplomatic tools, the 
economic tools, also the tool of military power to protect American interests.” 589  
Powell’s successor thought that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not “put a 
notice on his door saying, ‘I’m sorry – we only do the big ones.’”590  Importantly, 
“Clinton told aides that he was more comfortable with Shali than he had been with 
Powell.”591  Other civilian policy-makers have also reported a better relationship with 
Shalikashvili.  Richard Holbrooke writes fondly of the Polish-born General for whom 
English was a fourth language.  According to Holbrooke, Shali had “a quick smile and 
disarming manner,” was “open and friendly,” and “universally liked by his civilian 
colleagues.”  Unlike other military officers Holbrooke had to deal with, Shali “never tried 
to strong-arm or overwhelm civilians in a discussion, but simply stated his position and 
held his ground as long as possible.”592  That Shalikashvili was more flexible allowed for 
a richer variety of military options to be considered during the decision-making process.  
Cooperation between civilian and military leaders also improved. 
Similar changes were observed on the ground in Bosnia.  The military reluctance 
there prevailed until the summer of 1997, when the second and more assertive Clinton 
civilian team was able to put in place different military commanders in NATO and 
locally in Bosnia.  By then, on the civilian side, Secretary Christopher was replaced with 
                                                            
589 Quoted in Steven Erlanger and David Sanger, “On Global Stage, Clinton Finds Balance as Leader,” New 
York Times, July 29, 1996. 
590 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 391. 
591 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge, p. 410. 





a more assertive and pro-interventionist Secretary Madeleine Albright. Albright teamed 
up with new National Security Advisor Sandy Berger – himself as “hawkish” as his 
predecessor Anthony Lake but far closer to the president and so a more potent player in 
civil-military squabbles.  Both of them backed a more vigorous pursuit of war criminals 
in Bosnia.593  In order to overcome military resistance and facilitate the desired change in 
the Clinton approach to Bosnia, civilian leaders replaced NATO commander General 
Joulwan with General Wesley Clark, a former military aide to Holbrooke.  Admiral 
Smith was replaced with General Shinseki, who did not interpret IFOR’s rules of 
engagement as narrowly as his predecessor.  Gen. Clark’s views of the military mission 
were much closer to the civilian views.  These changes significantly decreased military 
resistance to enforcing fully the provisions of the Dayton accords. 
Besides the degree of preference divergence, the civil-military balance of power 
also affects the quality of the decision-making process and the content of policies.  In the 
first Clinton Administration, the dominance of military views was reflected in the 
increased ability of top military officials to establish criteria for discussing and evaluating 
policy options on the use of force. 594   Military dominance in practice meant the 
dominance of the principles of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine.  The precepts of the 
Doctrine became the dominant decision criteria on the use of force.595  They set firm 
                                                            
593 See, for example, Jeffrey Smith, “Push on Bosnia War Crimes Pledged; Berger Says U.S. Plans ‘More 
Effective Steps’ against Those Indicted,” Washington Post, December 9, 1996, p. 2; Michael Dobbs, “In 
Bosnia, a Dubious Peace Process,” Washington Post, May 2, 1997, p. 2; William Drozdiak, “Call for 
Pursuit of Bosnian War Criminals Resisted,” Washington Post, June 13, 1997, p. 36; Steven Erlanger, “On 
Bosnia, Clinton Support Albirght against Cohen View,” New York Times, June 12, 1997, p. 1.    
594 Christopher Gibson, Countervailing Forces, p. 228. 
595 For a similar argument, see Cori Dauber, “The Practice of Argument: Reading the Conditions of Civil-
Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1998), pp.  435-446. See also Christopher Gibson, 
Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through Madisonian Concepts, 





preconditions to civilian intentions to employ the military instrument.  More importantly, 
the Doctrine implied that once a decision to use force had been made, civilian leaders 
should not mess around and allow the military professionals a free hand in the 
implementation. 596   Because the Doctrine claims exclusive military control over all 
operational decisions it allows for military criteria and considerations to shape political 
goals. 597   More specifically, the dominance of military preferences constrained the 
decision-making process in several ways discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The dominance of the Weinberger Doctrine resulted in limiting the military 
options available to civilian decision-makers.  This happened in both the Bosnian and the 
Kosovo crises in the Clinton Administration and in earlier stages of the Bosnian conflict 
in the first Bush administration. As Cori Dauber states, “The result was an unspoken 
assumption that whenever military force is to be deployed, America confronts a binary 
choice.  Military interventions will always be either another Desert Storm or another 
Vietnam: there are no other alternatives, no sense that a spectrum of options may be 
available.”598  Using military force to fight a war is only one option for the employing of 
force. (The other options include: deterrence, preventive attacks, compellence, punitive 
attacks, peacekeeping, peace-making, nation-building, interdiction, humanitarian 
assistance, and rescue.)599  A full spectrum of military options should exist not only in 
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theory; otherwise, national security policy would be undermined by a lack of suitable 
military options.600 
The Weinberger Doctrine does not provide much guidance for politicians on how 
to approach conflicts that do not necessarily involve U.S. vital interests.  For example, 
precise “end states” would not be relevant to some perfectly “good” and legitimate uses 
of force in constabulary and other missions, which could go on for a very long time.601  
The Doctrine’s solution for such conflicts is either to be avoided at any cost or to be dealt 
with using overwhelming force.  The problem, of course, is that in most cases of the so-
called “complex emergencies” neither of these options would be appropriate.  Limiting 
the military options ultimately undermines the goals of civilian leaders.  “President 
Clinton’s goals were undermined by the means he had available, and after the failure in 
Somalia, policy was reformulated in line with the Army’s limited and self-referential 
thinking.”602  The Weinberger/Powell doctrine could be a limit on U.S. flexibility in 
situations which may require the use of force, but not necessarily an all-out war.  As Eliot 
Cohen has argued, the doctrine could yield “a military posture … likely to provide 
civilian leaders with only the harshest of military choices, or indeed none at all”603 
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Furthermore, critics of the Powell Doctrine argued that its all-or-nothing approach 
could paralyze foreign policy-makers by excluding the possibility of success of limited 
measures.  They also maintained that even limited military objectives could be precisely 
defined so not to lead to a quagmire, and that in the case of Bosnia, while limited 
measures may not necessarily bring a quick resolution of the conflict or a victory, they 
could still be preferable to “doing nothing.” 
Analyzing the content of military preferences and how the dominance of these 
preferences affected the decision-making process shows that during the discussions some 
policy options were not considered seriously (or were automatically excluded) because 
they did not conform to major precepts of the Powell Doctrine.  One such option, for 
example, was the use of a threat of force.  Following the precepts of the doctrine makes it 
difficult to use threats of force for coercive purposes.604  “[Powell’s] tests [for the use of 
force] effectively deny the legitimacy of force as a tool of coercive diplomacy by 
restricting its use to circumstances involving clear and present threats to manifestly vital 
interests.”605  On more than one occasion in the crisis over former Yugosalvia, when top 
civilian officials attempted to use military threats to pressure the Serbs to achieve a 
diplomatic solution, their efforts were undercut by public statements of military officials, 
rejecting any use of force.606  This is not to argue that a strategy of coercive diplomacy 
would necessarily have been successful most of the time or that this strategy was the best 
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one in all cases when civilian decision-makers wanted to use it.  As recent research on 
coercive diplomacy shows, this strategy, although a popular tool for American policy-
makers, is actually quite difficult to apply, even for the only super-power, and “fails more 
often than it succeeds.”  According to Robert Art, coercive diplomacy succeeds in 
achieving a state’s policy objectives only 20 % of the time.607  And it is not to say that the 
military critique was necessarily wrong.608   The point here is that civilian decision-
makers, even if they happen to be wrong, should not be undercut by military reluctance 
or lack of options, but that this is likely to happen when civilian and military preferences 
diverge and the balance of power favors the military.   
It is a truism that if force is to be used successfully as a tool of coercive 
diplomacy, U.S. credibility should not be in doubt.  U.S. leaders would not be able to 
credibly threaten the use of force if American adversaries are convinced that self-imposed 
restrictions make its use unlikely.609  In his book No More Vietnams, Richard Nixon 
wrote, “our ineptness in Vietnam led many Americans to question the wisdom of using 
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our power at all” and this has turned the US “into a military giant and a diplomatic 
dwarf.”610  Nixon cautioned that the “outstretched hand of diplomacy will have a very 
weak grip unless a President holds the scepter of credible military power in his other 
hand.”611  Under the dominance of the Powell Doctrine, the United States and its allies 
failed to make credible threats of force against Serbia’s advances because it was clear to 
the Serbs that the US and allies were unwilling to actually use force in a convincing 
manner.  As a result, more than once, Milosevic called the allies’ bluff during the Bosnia 
crisis and later, in the Kosovo crisis, rejected NATO’s ultimatum.612 
Another consequence of the U.S. being seen as unwilling to use its power is that 
not only its coercive, but its deterrent capability as well, could be weakened.  In this way, 
the Powell doctrine, rather than saving lives and treasure, may end up having the opposite 
effects.613  As Donald Kagan observed, the US “must face the fact that whenever it 
chooses to stand aloof from challenges that may concern it, there is a price to pay in 
damage to the credibility of its policy of deterrence.”614  Failure to use force in some 
situations may threaten US leadership as well.  If US adversaries believe that the US 
would be unwilling to boost its threats or promises with force, American diplomacy is 
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weakened.  President Clinton himself admitted that US stance on Bosnia was weakening 
its status in the world, saying it “is killing the U.S. position of strength in the world.”615 
Implicit in the Doctrine is that only operations that would not require a large 
number of casualties are permissible.  This constraint may have encouraged American 
foes to test US resolve.  During the Bosnia crisis, for example, a Senior Serbian official 
said in an interview for a Belgrade TV station: “Clinton has his own problems … He 
can’t afford to have even a few soldiers killed in Bosnia.’ ”616  As analysts maintained, 
some statements during that period which emphasized the role of “force protection,” 
seemed to rule out the use of the military in combat in complex emergencies. 617  In a 
military still recovering from Vietnam, force-protection had become the mission.  Deeply 
rooted in the military culture of the 1990s and due to the dominance of military 
preferences, “casualty aversion” had started to dominate civilian decision-makers as well.  
For example, when sending troops to Haiti, President Clinton stated: “My first concern, 
and the most important one, obviously, is for the safety and security of our troops. 
General Shalikashvili and Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, our commander in Haiti, 
have made it clear to all involved that the protection of American lives is our fist order of 
business.”618 
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Similarly, in his speech to the nation on the night Operation Allied Force began, 
President Clinton ruled out the use of American ground troops in Kosovo.  This was done 
in order to re-assure American and Western publics that there would be minimal 
casualties and they could continue to support the air campaign.  Of course, publicly 
announcing that no ground forces would be used619 only emboldened Slobodan Milosevic 
and decreased US/NATO coercive leverage.  This might have ultimately led to a much 
longer air war.620  “If it is discovered, as a matter of doctrine, that the United States 
cannot stomach casualties, future Saddams, and Osama bin Ladens would be 
emboldened.”621 
Another consequence of the dominance of the Powell doctrine during this period 
was the delay in US response to the Balkan crisis.  “The prevailing paradigms had a built-
in bias against taking rapid and decisive steps which might have been effective at an early 
stage in stopping much of the ethnic cleansing or even in preventing it altogether, as well 
as in facilitating a reintegration of Bosnia.”622  According to former US Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, this slow reaction of the US cost some 100, 000 dead 
and 2.5 million internally displaced people.  For the same reasons, analysts allege, in 
1991, the first Bush administration could have limited the fighting in Croatia and likely 
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headed off the war in Bosnia entirely had it conducted air attacks against the Serbs.  At 
the time, strong opposition from Gen. Powell prevented such action. The then Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs argued that a U.S. involvement, in order to be effective and not end in 
a quagmire, would require hundreds of thousands of troops.623  This was enough to 
dissuade President Bush from taking action.  As Bush, Sr. shared in an interview about a 
year after he had left office, “they [the military] told me ‘It’ll take 250, 000 American 
troops. And we can’t tell you it would be entirely successful, given the complicated 
terrain.  And we can’t tell you when it would end.’ And I made the decision [that] I 
simply couldn’t send a quarter-of-a-million troops into another military quagmire.”624 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter confirmed the argument that under conditions of high civil-military 
preference divergence and military dominance the decision-making process could be very 
dysfunctional.  It was shown that this particular pattern of civil-military relations affects 
negatively all the key aspects of the decision-making and implementation processes – i.e., 
sharing and analysis of information, discussion of alternative options, and cooperation 
and coordination between civilian and military leaders.  This chapter also confirms the 
importance of studying the two independent variables of my theoretical framework - the 
level of civil-military preference divergence and the civil-military balance of power.  It 
shows how the gap between civilian and military views and ideas on the use of force 
affected both decisions on when force was used and also on how it was used.  The bigger 
the gap between civilian and military preferences, the higher is the incentive of the 
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military to thwart civilian wishes.  I showed that due to the high degree of preference 
divergence, both the military and the civilians were not very willing to share information; 
when they did, information was at times skewed in order to bolster their respective 
preferences.  This affected negatively the quality of the discussions on policy and strategy.  
By limiting the scope of debate, many key assumptions remained unchallenged.  The 
dominance of military preferences precluded some options from even being discussed 
seriously because they did not fit well with the military’s paradigm.  High civil-military 
preference divergence also produced poor coordination between politicians and the 
military and led to difficulties in matching political objectives and military means.      
High preference divergence combined with a balance of power in favor of the 
military increased not only the incentives of the officers to shirk but also their ability to 
do so.  As Peter Feaver notes, “While the civil-military conflict rarely if ever rose to the 
level of open insubordination, there were numerous instances of behavior that could 
constitute shirking.”625  Lack of cooperation between civilian and military officials was 
notable.    Military leaders often resisted successfully civilian attempts to use threats of 
force or limited force for coercive purposes.  The civilians were exasperated because they 
felt their hands were tied by military reluctance to act or by the generals’ slowness to 
develop adequate military options.  Although formally civilian control was not in 
question and the military was not openly insubordinate, in day to day decision-making 
the generals enjoyed substantial influence and were in a position to challenge or block the 
wishes of their civilian masters. 
                                                            





This chapter shows that civil-military relations in a democracy could still be 
interesting, if examined through a model that is different from the traditional conceptions, 
dominant in the IR and comparative politics literature, that focus primarily on civilian 
control or military coups.  While at no time under the Clinton administration there was 
the possibility of anything approaching open insubordination of the military, there were 
numerous cases of military foot-dragging, end runs to Congress or the public, leaks, 
offering of inflated estimates. 626  Such actions were conducted in an attempt to block a 
civilian policy or preference, which the military strongly opposed.   Such events and the 
dynamics of the civil-military relationship at the pinnacle of a government are better 
explained through a framework, which treats the civil-military relationship as a strategic 
interaction between two political actors, and focuses on variables such as the civil-
military balance of power and the level of civil-military preference divergence.627  In the 
words of Andrew Bacevich, “On the surface – with only occasional exceptions – the 
appearance of civilian control prevailed.  That is, Clinton pretended to give orders and the 
military pretended to obey.  Beneath the surface, a complex process of give-and-take 
preceded and informed policy decisions, affecting everything from progress toward 
‘military transformation’ … to the use of force.”628 
 By focusing on explanatory factors such as civil-military preference divergence 
and relative power, this chapter also challenges the conventional wisdom that 
democracies make better decisions on war and peace and questions whether regime type 
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is what really determines the quality of the decision-making process.  My findings show 
that a democracy characterized, for example, by high preference divergence between its 
top civilian and military officials, would most likely be prone to ineffective decision-
making, miscalculations, and inability to make its military means serve its political 
objectives.  Regardless of regime type, leaders of states which exhibit such configurations 
of their civil-military relations at a particular point in time are unlikely to match 
successfully military means to political objectives and to manage international crises.  
My theoretical framework (and the focus on civil-military balance of power, in 
particular) also helps us to see that while civilian control is certainly one of the important 
characteristics of a democracy, both civilian and military influence in democracies vary 
substantially over time and this variance has important effects on the decision-making 
process.  Based on the evidence presented here, one can make some tentative conclusions 
about the reasons for erosion of civilian control in a democracy (or causal conditions for 
military dominance).  These reasons lie in big part not with the military, but with the 
civilian leadership, mainly with its level of experience and expertise in foreign and 
defense matters, and also its unity or lack of such, as it was under Clinton.  This chapter 
showed that it was not so much eagerness on the part of the military to take control.  
Rather, the problem was a civilian leadership that was not sufficiently prepared to 
exercise firm control and was often divided over key foreign policy issues, including the 
use of force.  As Yarmolinsky wrote, “The problem is not the overweening military, but 





exercise effective control. The danger... is not that the military may take over the country, 
but that the country is not able to preside over the military.”629 
The responsibility of the civilian leadership for its defective relationship with the 
military and the negative consequences of this relationship for decision-making are at 
times overlooked.  Many are willing to put all the blame on the military leadership for 
being overly assertive; however, civilian leaders were equally or even more at fault 
because they were the ones who were not prepared to challenge military judgment.  For 
example, Clinton and the other key foreign policy officials could have made a case for 
the adoption of new criteria for the use of force that would challenge the precepts of the 
Powell doctrine, but they did not.  The lack of civilian assertiveness led, more generally, 
to the civilian leadership abdicating its right to make strategy.  The making of strategy is 
the making of choices – the dominance of the military thinking (and the Weinberger 
doctrine in particular) often denied choice to civilian leaders, but they were complacent 
about it and did not reclaim their right to make the calls.  As a result, “the imbalance of 
civil-military relations under Clinton … damaged US strategy and strategic thinking.”630 
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The Impact of High Levels of Civil-Military Preference Divergence  
on Decision-Making: The 2003 Iraq War 
 
Previous chapters showed that the ability of statesmen and soldiers to make 
informed decisions on the use of force depends primarily on a combination of two key 
variables of the civil-military relationship: the civil-military balance of power and the 
level of divergence between civilian and military preferences on issues related to national 
security and the use of force.  This chapter focuses in more detail on one of the possible 
patterns – a civil-military relationship characterized by a combination of assertive civilian 
dominance and a high level of divergence between civilian and military preferences 
















The Effectiveness of the Process of Decision-Making as a Function of the 







































The first part of the chapter lays out the hypotheses generated by my theoretical 
framework about the effects of this particular type of civil-military relations on the 
decision-making process.  In the second part, I test these hypotheses with a case study of 
the decision-making process leading to the 2003 US war with Iraq. 
This case study shows that strong and assertive civilian control, while desirable, 
does not guarantee effective decision-making.  In the late 1990s, amid Bill Clinton’s 
enormously troubled relationship with the military, when experts worried that the 





one of the leading scholars on civil-military relations and national security remarked that 
if during the decision-making process in cases when civilian and military officials are in 
disagreement, civilian preferences prevailed most of the time, there was no problem.  If, 
however, “the military does, there is a problem.”631  In the lead up to the 2003 Iraq war, 
civilian preferences dominated almost all of the time.  However, most agree that the 
decision-making process and the implementation had significant flaws.  Strong civilian 
control does not necessarily translate into effective national security decision-making or 
victorious military strategies.  Civilian dominance by itself says little about the 
effectiveness of the policy-making process, unless it is considered in combination with 
other characteristics of the civil-military relationship, such as the level of civil-military 
preference divergence.  When we take into account the latter as well, we see that 
assertive civilian dominance in the context of high preference divergence could lead to 
civilian micromanagement and/or discounting of military advice; this, in turn, would 
affect negatively the effectiveness of the decision-making process.     
This chapter also takes up in more detail another aspect of the civil-military 
relationship during policy-making, namely, decision-makers’ receptiveness to advice.  
My evidence shows that it is important to pay attention to cases when advice is rejected 
not because of its content but because of the source which provides it. We see that 
dissenting advice is more likely to be accepted if offered by a trusted source whose ideas 
and preferences are not very different from the preferences of the decision-makers.   
The conventional wisdom about the decision-making process in the lead-up to the 
2003 Iraq regarding 1) civilian control is that civilian assertiveness is among the main 
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reasons for American misfortunes, i.e., Rumsfeld and other top civilians constantly 
meddled in tactical and operational matters, which not only drove the military to utter 
frustration, but also made strategy-making very ineffective; and 2) regarding the reasons 
for which top political leaders rejected advice:  decision-makers discounted or rejected 
dissenting advice because it did not fit with their strongly-held preferences on whether to 
invade Iraq and remove Saddam from power and how to prosecute the war.  This chapter 
shows that the conventional wisdom is partly wrong on both counts.   
Regarding the first, as the chapter on the 1991 Gulf War shows, assertive civilian 
control is not to be feared but to be praised.632  In this case also, assertive control in and 
of itself was not the problem.  The problem comes from the fact that strong civilian 
dominance was combined with high levels of civil-military preference divergence, and 
this combination led at times to civilian micromanagement, excluding or discounting the 
views of military advisors and other consequences that impacted negatively the decision-
making process.  But we would have no way of knowing this, using traditional 
frameworks of analysis because they focus almost completely on civilian control – i.e., 
whose preference dominate, and do not take into account other variables, such as 
preferences and preference divergence.  Regarding the second issue, traditionally, it is 
argued that top decision-makers made important and costly mistakes because they 
suppressed dissenting opinions and did not consider alternatives.  Advisors who provided 
critical views were isolated from the decision-making process, disregarded or even 
punished.  Had decision-makers considered seriously military dissent, this argument goes, 
some of their wrong assumptions could have been corrected; they would have designed 
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and implemented a strategy that would have integrated military means and political 
objectives better and lives and treasure would not have been wasted.    
This view is misleading in part because it implies that military (and civilian) 
advice was rejected because of its content (i.e., because it was dissenting).  Bush, Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, Faith and the other top civilian decision-makers, it is argued, surrounded 
themselves with “yes-men” and did not accept views that differed from their own.  But 
this is not necessarily correct.  In some cases, advice was rejected not so much because of 
its content but because of the source that provided it – i.e., those military and civilian 
advisors (e.g., from the CIA and State) who were considered not trustworthy for any of 
several reasons – e.g., they were thought to be biased/to have an agenda of their own or to 
be “stuck in the Cold War” and incapable of providing quality advice in a post-9/11 
strategic environment.633   
It is important to differentiate, to the extent possible, the reasons for rejecting 
advice (whether it was because of the content of the message or because of its source), 
since in some cases civilian leaders could have considered and even accepted the 
dissenting views had they been offered by a trusted source.  (The two reasons, of course, 
are not mutually exclusive and advice could be rejected for both at the same time.) 
The conventional wisdom also has it that in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war there 
was no adequate planning for some aspects of the military operation and especially no 
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planning for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.  But this begs questions.  My research 
shows that actually there was substantial amount of planning conducted by both civilian 
and military officials. But the problem was that it was “bad” planning (i.e., planning 
based on wrong assumptions as it often happens in the policy-making process).634  The 
question then is why, at times, wrong assumptions do get corrected, while at other times, 
they persist and lead to tragic mistakes.  At the time of discussing a war with Iraq in 
2002-03, information existed to contradict perhaps all of the wrong assumptions.  A lot of 
such critically important information was collected and was presented to decision-makers. 
(In other words, there was sufficient information based on which policy-makers could 
have produced very different plans from the ones the administration actually did.)  The 
problem was that top civilian decision-makers did not find some of this information 
persuasive and ignored it.  However, I argue that decision-makers ignored such 
information not necessarily because they disagreed with it (although motivated biases did 
play a role) but because they did not trust the source that provided it.  In order to 
understand why the civilian leadership did not find a lot of the information convincing, 
we should analyze their relationship with the primary source of this information – their 
senior military advisors.  Why in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war top civilian officials 
ignored crucial information, as well as the shortcomings of the decision-making process, 
more broadly, could at least in part be explained with the help of my theoretical 
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framework, which emphasizes the level of civil-military preference divergence, in 
addition to the type of civilian control. 
More specifically, this chapter tests the following propositions expected to hold 
for cases falling in Quadrant 1:  
1. A high level of civil-military preference divergence (i.e., big differences in the 
views, ideas, and goals of civilian and military leaders), will affect negatively the way 
decision-makers seek and process information and advice.  The civilians and the military 
would have an interest in concealing or distorting information in order to bolster their 
own preferred option.  
1-a When there is a high civil-military preference divergence, there will not be a 
free flow and exchange of information between civilian and military leaders.  Both sides 
will be less likely to share information with each other. 
1-b When there is a high level of civil-military preference divergence, civilian 
officials would be more likely to disregard advice and information provided by their 
military advisors.  They may try to exclude the military from the discussions. 
1-c When there is a high level of civil-military preference divergence and the 
civilian side is dominant, during deliberations the weaker side (the military) would not 
necessarily feel free to provide honest advice or to challenge the views of the dominant 
side.   
2. When civilian and military officials hold highly diverging preferences, both 
sides have little incentive to cooperate with each other.  High preference divergence leads 
to problems in the interaction and coordination between civilian and military leaders 





2-a A high civil-military preference divergence could lead to a more conflictual 
civil-military relationship.   
2-b When there is a high civil-military preference divergence, the civilians are 
less likely to trust that the military will follow closely dominant civilian preferences.   
2-c When civilian and military preferences diverge highly, the military is more 
likely to resist civilian wishes.  (Such resistance could take the form of foot-dragging, 
leaks to the media or Congress, and others.)   
2-d When there is a high civil-military preference divergence, civilian officials are 
likely to monitor intrusively the military in order to ensure that their decisions are not 
thwarted.  Hence, civilian micromanagement is more likely. 
2-e When preferences diverge highly, civilian officials may be tempted to appoint 
to high positions officers with similar preferences regardless of their competence.  With 
less capable military leaders, decision-making and implementation would suffer.  
If the above propositions hold, we are not likely to have an effective decision-
making and implementation process.  Diplomatic and military considerations are less 
likely to be integrated, and it would be difficult for decision-makers to match successfully 
political objectives with military and non-military means.   
 This chapter proceeds as follows: First, I discuss briefly the balance of 
power between civilian and military officials under Rumsfeld and the means which the 
Defense Secretary used to assert civilian control.  Second, I analyze the highly divergent 
preferences of political and military leaders on key issues regarding military 
transformation and the use of force to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.  The 
third section explores the process of decision-making and war planning on Iraq and, more 





between civilian and military preferences affected the making of US military strategy and 
policy.  The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of my findings for national 
security decision-making. 
 
The Civil-Military Balance of Power under Donald H. Rumsfeld 
In order to establish the civil-military balance of power for the 2003 Iraq war, I 
start by analyzing the various bureaucratic changes at the Defense Department, instituted 
gradually after Rumsfeld took office. 
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld began his second tour at the helm of the 
Pentagon with the firm determination to reassert civilian control.  He and his top civilian 
aides believed that, under the Clinton Administration, the generals and admirals had 
become too political, too influential, and not very responsive to civilian orders.  Rumsfeld 
was determined to reverse this.635  From the very beginning of his tenure, he started 
instituting some bureaucratic changes which diminished the influence of the armed 
services over decision-making and shifted more power to the civilian side of the 
Pentagon.636  As a result, the Defense Secretary managed to consolidate decision-making 
power in his office to a degree unseen since Robert McNamara.  
Rumsfeld started to increase his influence by showing the military that he was 
firmly in charge and that he would be involved in details much more than his predecessor.  
From their very first encounters with the new Secretary, the military was given to 
understand that there was no detail too small for him.  For example, while working on the 
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Quadrennial Defense Review, Rumsfeld “personally drove the train in great detail, right 
down to the sentences and the commas in the documents.  He involved himself in a very 
close, tight view of the details” which was his way of showing he was in charge.637  Even 
at times when his popularity was low, Rumsfeld was able to draw additional influence 
from the support he enjoyed in the White House and the fact that the military knew he 
spoke for the President.  For example, President Bush supported fully Rumsfeld’s views 
on transformation and on many other issues the two men agreed completely.638  Also, 
Vice President Cheney, himself a former Secretary of Defense, from the very beginning 
showed he was firmly behind Rumsfeld and his efforts to re-assert civilian control.  For 
Cheney and Wolfowitz, one of the most important lessons from the Gulf War of 1991 
(when they served together with Colin Powell) was to keep a tight lid on the military and 
not let the generals acquire as much power as the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.639   
As another means of strengthening his influence, the Defense Secretary took 
control of the military promotion process.  Parting with previous practice, Rumsfeld 
decreed that all promotions to three- and four-star rank go through his office.  He 
involved himself in tasks that in the past were left in the prerogatives of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 640   The military, did not like it and resentment in the ranks 
grew.  Military officers complained of what they called Rumsfeld’s imposition of an 
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unprecedented degree of civilian control over the services’ selection of flag officers, 
general and admirals.  The new procedures required them to send up the names of at least 
two or three candidates for every promotion to three- and four-star rank and all 
nominations to the Joint Staff.  A Rumsfeld staffer and the then Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, Gen. Peter Pace, interviewed personally all the candidates.  Defense experts 
worried that such measures could lead to a dangerous politicization of the promotion 
process and that they would fill in the high ranks with yes-men and decrease military 
professionalism.641 Some analysts claim that gradually Rumsfeld succeeded in replacing 
some of the senior officers on the Joint Staff who challenged his views. 642   
In reality, when Rumsfeld intervened in senior promotions it was not necessarily 
to make sure he would be surrounded with pliable officers but in order to make sure he 
would receive the highest quality advice.  For example, the Secretary noticed early on 
that the names suggested by the services for the senior promotions reflected service 
parochialism, while he wanted and needed to encourage jointness, as the Goldwater-
Nichols Act instructed.  As he explains in his memoirs, these officers “needed to be able 
to work in Washington with other departments and agencies that were out of their well-
established comfort zone.  And above all, they had to be candid and forthright, willing to 
disagree in private with me and with the President if their military advice differed from a 
course being considered.  I felt that the only way to ensure I was recommending those 
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kinds of candidates to the President was to be personally involved in the selection 
process.”643 
Furthermore, in another attempt to restrict military influence, the Defense 
Secretary sought to limit contacts between the military and Congress.  On his second day 
on the job, at his first collective meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rumsfeld 
“ordered the services to stop briefing members of Congress on perceived money 
shortages, something they had been doing in great detail just before the new broom 
installed itself on the Pentagon’s third floor.”644  Officers alleged that the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) had even ordered no officer to talk to Congress without 
Rumsfeld’s permission, but then realized the absurdity of such an order and modified it to 
require prior “notice before any meetings.”645 
As another sign of re-established civilian dominance, Rumsfeld ordered the re-
naming of the CINCs, the enormously powerful (after the passing of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act) regional and functional commanders-in-chief. 646   The CINCs were no 
longer to be called “Commanders-in-Chief” but “Combatant Commanders”, lest anyone 
forget that the President of the United States is the only Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces.  Needless to say, the regional commanders or the proconsuls, as some 
called them, because of their significantly expanded influence on US foreign policy in the 
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1990s647, did not like such a back scaling.  Although quite innocent in itself, because this 
initiative came when the civil-military relationship had already gone sour, the uniforms 
perceived it as “frivolous micromanagement.”648  
The CINCs were not the only ones whose influence was curbed.  The same 
happened to the Joint Chiefs themselves.  According to dominant interpretations, 
“[R]umsfeld left no doubt in anyone’s mind that the armed forces worked for him. 
Regardless of Goldwater-Nichols, which made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
the president’s chief advisor on military affairs, Rumsfeld was determined to decide what 
role, if any, the Chiefs would play.  If he wanted them advise the president, he would say 
so – although in practice this would not happen often.”649  The Secretary of Defense had 
even suggested to his first Chairman that military advice should go through Rumsfeld 
rather than directly to the president.650  However, the reality is again a little more nuanced.  
If one compares the relationship between Rumsfeld and the generals in this regard and 
the one between McNamara and the top military advisors, we see that Rumsfeld is no 
McNamara in that he has offered much more freedom to the generals, both in relation to 
him and in relation to the President.  Unlike McNamara, Rumsfeld did not constantly 
accompany the top military advisors in meetings with the President in order to contradict 
their views. At times, Rumsfeld encouraged senior military officers to meet alone with 
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Bush so they can establish their own personal relationship with the Commander-in-Chief.  
One good example of that is the relationship between W. Bush and Gen. Franks.        
The strong influence of top civilian officials was felt times and again during the 
decision-making process on the use of force against Iraq, when civilian preferences 
dominated over the views of the military on a variety of issues.  As a senior government 
official noted, “the military has limited influence in this administration.”651  However, as 
I show later, firm civilian control, while essential, is not sufficient for an effective 
decision-making process. 
 
Civil-Military Preference Divergence in the Lead-Up to the 2003 Iraq War   
 
Civilians are from Mars, the military are from Venus 
There was a wide gap between civilian and military views on almost all fronts – 
from military “transformation” to the use of force.  In the lead-up to the 2003 war on Iraq, 
civil-military relations at the top were rife with conflict.  The Pentagon’s civilian 
leadership and the military clashed on a variety of issues with serious implications for 
U.S. foreign and defense policy ranging from the number of troops needed for the war 
and the reconstruction of Iraq to the overall size and mission of US forces.  
 
Diverging Civilian and Military Preferences About “Transformation” 
Much before Rumsfeld and the military clashed over whether and how to use 
force against Saddam Hussein, their relationship was strained because of conflicts over 
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military transformation.  From the very beginning of his tenure, Donald Rumsfeld started 
his “war” against what he viewed as the U.S. military’s Cold War mentality and the 
Pentagon bureaucracy that was supporting it. He advocated a top-to-bottom 
transformation in the way the military fights and was convinced that such a 
transformation could not happen without also changing the ways the Pentagon conducted 
its business.652  The DOD documents of the time emphasize that military transformation 
is not only about how the US fights its wars, but also about “how we do business inside 
the Department.”653  Rumsfeld’s vision of transformation included remaking the military 
into a lighter, agile, more mobile fighting force, able to deploy anywhere in the world on 
short notice.654   According to this vision, the US military should be turned into a leaner 
fighting force, relying on speed and technological superiority rather than size and heavy 
armor.655  “The transformation process must develop forces capable of defending the U.S. 
population, homeland, and interests, as well as swiftly defeating an adversary from a 
posture of forward deterrence with minimal reinforcements.” 656   Precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs), higher-resolution intelligence censors and rapid communication 
networks would achieve victory without the need of a significant number of boots on the 
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ground.657  In some important ways, this vision was a direct challenge against the Powell 
doctrine of overwhelming force, preferred by the military, or at least of what constitutes 
overwhelming force.  
As some fiery meetings with high-ranking officers from all services revealed, 
Rumsfeld was up against strong resistance.658  The military’s views of how much change 
was needed and how rapidly change should happen were different.  As one defense 
official noted, 
the military leadership has a very different perspective from Rumsfeld and his 
allies.  The civilians around Rumsfeld are saying ‘Take on a ton of risk so we can 
get where we want to be 20 years from now.’  But … everybody on the uniformed 
side is saying, ‘No, you’ve got enough risk right now.’ To deal with the current 
threats, he said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff essentially have told Rumsfeld that they 
don’t believe any major changes should be made in the size and shape of the 
military.659 
 
The officers were concerned, for example, that the Defense Secretary would 
propose cutting conventional forces (troops, ships, and planes) in order to pay for 
controversial initiatives such as national missile defense.  
Especially conflictual was the relationship between Donald Rumsfeld and the 
Army, the service who stood to lose most from the Secretary’s ideas about 
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transformation.660  Some analysts even went so far as to note that in the lead-up to the 
Iraq war, the Defense Secretary was already fighting three wars: one with Afghanistan, a 
global war on terrorism, and another war with the U.S. Army.  Rumsfeld’s view of the 
Army, according to many, was unflattering.  The Secretary thought the Army was too 
cautious and unwilling to take risks.661   “He considers the Army’s senior leaders cold 
war dinosaurs unable to adapt to a 21st Century environment and thinks the Army is too 
big, too heavy and too slow to respond to rapid developments abroad.”662  The dislike and 
distrust soon became mutual.  The Army Chief of Staff was publicly humiliated when 
Rumsfeld picked Shinseki’s successor and his name was leaked to the media about 15 
months before Shinseki’s term has expired. Reportedly, the general learned about it 
through The Washington Post.  Rumsfeld categorically denies he leaked the information 
or told someone to leak it.  Furthermore, the name that leaked was not the person who 
later became the Army’s Chief of Staff.  Myth or reality, this story worsened even more 
the already bad relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief and 
increased resentment in the military to which it was inconceivable that anyone would 
treat one of its leaders, a highly-respected Vietnam-war hero, in such a disgraceful way.  
A retired Army general accused Rumsfeld and the Pentagon civilians of making the 
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Army “a second-class citizen, denigrating its chief in public and ignoring the counsel of 
uniformed leadership.”663 
One of Rumsfeld’s transformation efforts, which led to a big fight with the Army, 
was the cancellation of the Crusader artillery system – an $11 million top priority 
program of that service.664  Worse, neither the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Vice 
Chairman, or the theater commanders of the Army were consulted about it.  Army 
officials, who tried to convince Congress to help them by reversing this decision, were 
publicly rebuked by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.  Furthermore, the Defense Secretary and 
most of his civilian advisors wanted to cut an additional two divisions and a corps out of 
the Army which, at that time, was already down to 480, 000.  The argument was that by 
cutting about 20 percent of the Army’s combat units, the Pentagon would be able to pay 
for modernization and new weapons systems. Gen. Shinseki, although he himself was an 
advocate of transformation, opposed this plan.  In general, if one thinks of the source of 
advice and what civilians thought of many in the Army at the time, it would not be 
surprising that Army advice, even if not dissenting, may not be considered favorably. 
 
A Wide Gap between Civilian and Military Preferences on the Use of Force 
in Iraq 
Regarding the use of force in general, civilian and military preferences diverged 
highly.  Especially after 9/11 (and contrary to some statements made in the election 
campaign), civilian officials had no desire to abide by the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, 
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which was still preferred by the military.  Expressing his disapproval of some of the most 
cherished tenets of this doctrine (e.g., use of overwhelming power in a decisive way to 
achieve victory, and clearly defined and limited objectives), Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
stated: “forget about ‘exit strategies’; we’re looking at a sustained engagement that 
carries no deadlines.  We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops.”665  
Rumsfeld stated that victory, in the new strategic environment, is difficult to define. “I 
say that victory is persuading the American people and the rest of the world that this is 
not a quick matter that is going to be over in a month or a year or even years.”666   
Regarding the use of force against Iraq, in particular, there were significant 
differences in the views of top civilian and military officials as well.  An analysis of the 
three key questions, pertaining to the use of force against Saddam in debates during 
2001-03 illustrates the very high level of civil-military preference divergence.  First, 
should the US use military force to achieve regime change in Iraq?  Second, if force is to 
be used, what is the best way to use it in order to accomplish US political objectives?  
Third, what should US post-war strategy look like? 
 Should force be used to depose Saddam Hussein?  Regarding whether the 
US should invade Iraq, although there were some exceptions in both the civilian and the 
military camps 667 , one can clearly document a civil-military split.  The leading 
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proponents of the use of force for toppling Saddam Hussein were the civilian leaders at 
the Pentagon, including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and William Luti, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Near East and South Asian Affairs, who State Department officials 
characterized as being obsessed with the overthrow of Saddam.668  Regarding whether to 
use force, gradually, after September 11, the dominant civilian view became that 
containment of Iraq had become dangerously inadequate and Saddam’s forceful 
overthrow would enhance US security.669  In this case, as in many previous cases in the 
past when the use of force was discussed, the military was more cautious than its political 
leaders and was attempting to put the brakes on a military invasion.670 
In the first months of the George W. Bush Administration, not many high-ranking 
decision-makers were bent on forcefully removing Saddam Hussein from office.  It is by 
now almost forgotten that the initial (pre-September 11) Bush administration policy 
toward Iraq resembled that of the Clinton Administration.671  Even some civilian officials 
who later became ardent supporters of the use of force believed at the time that Saddam 
was deterrable.672  It was only after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
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the Pentagon when policy changed dramatically and top civilian policy-makers in the 
DOD began perceiving the use of force as the only way to achieve regime change.673  
Some influential policy-makers in the Bush administration (e.g., Donald Rumsfeld, Paul 
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle) had long argued that the 1991 Gulf War should have ended 
with the overthrow of Saddam.  Later on, being outside the government, they (together 
with Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi) had even tried to persuade the Clinton 
administration to make ending Saddam’s regime a primary objective of US foreign 
policy.674  After returning to power and energized by 9/11, they thought the time had 
finally come to achieve this goal.675  Top civilian policy-makers argued that the attacks of 
9/11 showed that the US could and should no longer wait for threats to become imminent 
before it acts.  As President Bush himself asserted: “Facing clear evidence of peril, we 
cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a 
mushroom cloud.”676  Top civilian decision-makers at the Pentagon claimed that force 
should be used to depose Saddam because everything else had already been tried and had 
not worked.  They became convinced that nothing short of US military action could bring 
Saddam’s downfall and that time was running out.  Some of them also thought that Iraq’s 
military has been seriously weakened and could be defeated relatively quickly.  Military 
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action would be less costly than inaction.  They argued that the use of force was justified 
because Iraq constituted an unacceptable threat – Saddam had WMD or was firmly 
committed to acquire them and was likely to share them with anti-US terrorist groups.  
Since Iraq had defied numerous UN resolutions and had obstructed the work of UN 
inspectors, civilian decision-makers claimed, military force may be the only way to 
eliminate the perhaps imminent threat posed by his WMD.677 
On the contrary, many active-duty and retired military officials saw a possible 
attack on Iraq as a risky adventure, which might end up in disaster.678  The military, as in 
many other cases when the US has contemplated the use of force, tried to slow down the 
drive toward war.679  Its position was cautious – abandoning containment of Saddam and 
attacking him was so risky that it might be unwise.  The uniformed leadership of the 
Pentagon believed that force did not have to be used because the strategy of containment 
was working well and Saddam could be “kept in the box” for as long as necessary.680  
Deterrence of Iraq, they believed, was robust, as it was supported by economic sanctions, 
the enforcement of the no-fly zones, and by the overwhelming US superiority. They also 
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warned of the serious military and political risks of an invasion, including the possibility 
of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against American and 
coalition forces, and the enormous challenges of urban warfare and the resulting large 
number of civilian casualties. Already fighting a war in Afghanistan, the military was 
also concerned about leaving American armed forces overstretched and, hence, unable to 
respond to emerging crises.  When in November of 2001, Rumsfeld (directed by Bush) 
ordered Gen. Franks to start working on a war plan against Iraq, the CENTCOM 
Commander “was incredulous. They were in the midst of one war, Afghanistan, and now 
they wanted detailed planning for another, Iraq?  ‘Goddamn, what the fuck are they 
talking about?’”681  From what we can tell, the uniformed leadership argued that military 
action against Iraq could hinder US efforts in the global war on terrorism and could 
destabilize the entire Middle East.  According to reports, Gen. Tommy Franks told Sen. 
Bob Graham (D-Fla.) that this country should be fighting terrorism in places like Somalia 
and Yemen, rather than invading Iraq. More than a year before the war started, the 
General complained to the Senator that “his resources were being shifted in preparation 
for taking on Saddam Hussein.”682  Also, since many of the Arab and Muslim countries 
were against a US invasion of Iraq, were the US to attack, they would be less willing to 
support America in its fight against al-Qaeda.683  The U.S. military, steeped in the Powell 
doctrine, was reluctant to undertake a mission for which there was no clear domestic and 
international support.   
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At least at the beginning, the military was united in its attempts to convince the 
civilian leadership to rethink its willingness to invade Iraq.  In the Spring of 2002, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff held several meetings during which they formed a common position, 
highlighting the difficulties of a military campaign against Saddam Hussein.  The Chiefs’ 
main concerns were that:  (1) if the Iraqi leader believes that the US was determined to 
overthrow him no matter what, he would not feel constrained from using chemical or 
biological weapons against US troops; (2) the US might get bogged down in a bloody 
urban warfare which could result in massive American and Iraqi civilian casualties; (3) 
While Saddam, they believed, could be contained, there was a danger that his successor 
could be more hostile and unruly.  Having in mind the costs and risks of a military 
campaign to overthrow Saddam, top military officials, just like before the 1991 Gulf War, 
were pointing to alternative means for achieving regime change.684 
In regard to the second question, how to use force, the views of civilian and 
military officials diverged significantly as well.685   The former preferred a military plan 
that resembled the one used in Afghanistan in 2001 and relied on surprise and the 
mobility of a light force.   Civilian leaders advocated a combination of massive air strikes 
and US special operations forces on the ground, helping Iraqi opposition groups.  They 
preferred an option that required “a small, mobile attack force of Iraqi dissidents and 
American Special Forces.”686  Political leaders advocated a brief air campaign conducted 
almost simultaneously with the ground offensive.  By contrast, the military preferred a 
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variation of Desert Storm, including an intense air campaign and a massive ground-force 
invasion.  The attack plan favored by the military required decisive use of force in order 
to guarantee success in the post-war stage of the operation as well.  The attack plan of the 
political leadership in the Pentagon was in sharp contrast with the Powell Doctrine, 
favored by the military. The civilians argued for an invasion force much smaller than the 
one that fought in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, stressing that new technological 
developments since the Persian Gulf War had enormously improved US offensive 
capabilities. Secretary Rumsfeld and his advisors asserted that air power and information 
dominance could achieve more with a smaller force.687  Such views were an extension of 
Rumsfeld’s vision of a transformed military, relying more on special operations forces, 
technology, and intelligence and de-emphasizing heavy ground forces. Since the 
Secretary had rather strong views on the need for military transformation, it is not 
surprising that in this case dissenting advice would likely be rejected because it did not fit 
with his preferences.  As Gordon and Trainor argue in Cobra II, Rumsfeld’s views on 
transformation made him determined to attack with a “lean” force and that’s why he 
rejected more traditional military plans calling for a bigger number of troops. This point 
is confirmed by the bulk of the evidence.  For example, in the words of Joseph Collins: 
“Rumsfeld wanted to conduct a quick, lightning-like operation in Iraq, followed by a 
swift handover of power to the Iraqis.  He did not want a large scale, ponderous operation 
like Desert Storm, which he saw as wasteful and outmoded.  He also did not want U.S. 
troops unnecessarily bogged down in an endless postwar peace operation. Long, costly, 
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man-power intensive post-combat operations were anathema to Rumsfeld who was as 
interested in force transformation as he was in a potential war in Iraq.”688 
Furthermore, civilian leaders saw the 2001 war on Afghanistan as a resounding 
confirmation of their vision of transformation.  They asserted that the defeat of the 
Taliban was possible by a massive air campaign and the deployment of only a small 
contingent of special operations forces, aiding the Northern Alliance on the ground, and 
without a prolonged massive build-up of US troops as it would have been under a more 
conventional scenario.  Civilian officials and Rumsfeld, in particular, saw Afghanistan as 
a vindication of their preferences as to how force should be used, and as a success that 
could be repeated in Iraq.  More than that, since the military at least at the beginning had 
opposed the civilian preferred plan for Afghanistan, this case for Rumsfeld was perhaps 
another example that confirmed his low opinion of military advice.  In Afghanistan, he 
believed, he was right and the military was wrong.  Rumsfeld most likely thought that the 
same was true in the heated debates on the strategy for Iraq.  
The military disagreed with the strategy civilians preferred.689  In fact, in the 
debate within the Bush administration, the uniformed leadership (including former and 
present top officers at CENTCOM) was the biggest critic of the civilian-preferred 
option.690  Retired Gen. Anthony Zinni, for example, called it a strategy for a “Bay of 
Goats.”691  Furthermore, the generals were concerned that such a plan did not take into 
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account the possibility of a stiff resistance from the Iraqi military, as well as the fact that 
Iraqi opposition groups were hardly a reliable partner.692  Officers in both the US and the 
UK expressed strong concerns with US top civilians’ plans for the invasion of Iraq.693  
The American military (especially the Army and the Marine Corps) believed the war plan 
of the civilian leadership with poorly secured supply lines and lacking heavy 
reinforcements, was too risky and marked a sharp departure from good military 
practice.694   
Civilian and military views on force strength differed significantly as well.695  Not 
surprisingly, the generals advocated a force according to the standards of the Powell 
doctrine -- “overwhelming force” from the very beginning of the campaign, rather than a 
small force at the beginning of the invasion, with trickling reinforcements at later stages.  
Some in the military preferred the air campaign to be longer than just a few days in order 
to cripple the Republican Guard before the rest of the invasion force crosses into Iraq.  
Gen. Franks’ original attack plan required substantial forces, close to 400, 000.696  This 
was in sharp contrast with Rumsfeld’s opinion that a force of about 70, 000 would be 
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sufficient to do the job.697  For an invasion, the military wanted “at least six combat 
divisions… Franks is … insisting, despite pressure from civilians in the Pentagon, on an 
intense and careful American buildup in the region before Iraq can be attacked.”698 
Regarding the third question – what should be done in the “post-war” phase, 
many in the military were not confident that civilian policy-makers had a sufficiently 
clear plan for dealing with the long-term security consequences of an armed invasion.  
Particularly severe was the contradiction over the number of troops necessary for a 
successful post-war occupation of Iraq.  The military, and especially the Army, believed 
that defeating Saddam was the easier part of the job and that the U.S. would need more 
troops for the post-war occupation stage of the campaign.  The Army insisted on going in 
strong because it was concerned about occupying a big and ethnically divided country 
like Iraq.  The uniformed leadership was concerned that the plan favored by the 
politicians did not provide enough forces for the post-war phase of the operation.  For 
example, senior military officials, including Gen. Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the start of the George W. Bush first administration, warned that more 
troops would be needed in order to prevent chaos in Iraq after ousting Saddam. 699  
Furthermore, military officials prepared a study, which analyzed US experience in seven 
recent nation-building operations and especially the number of troops required to 
successfully maintain security in a post-conflict environment.  The military presented this 
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study to then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Stephen 
Hedley, but there is no evidence they took it into account.700 
Days before the start of operation Iraqi Freedom, General Shinseki and Secretary 
of the Army White testified before the Defense Subcommittee of the House 
Appropriations Committee.  In response to a question by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) 
about the troops required for the “pacification effort”, Gen. Shinseki suggested a number 
“as high as several hundred thousand”701 for the post-war phase.  “We’re talking about 
post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant…  It takes a 
significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure 
that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along 
with administering a situation like this.” 702  The general based his estimate on his 
experience in Bosnia703 and the number of troops the US had there per 25, 000 people.  
(US and allies had 60, 000 troops to secure 4-million Bosnia, and 40, 000 troops for 
Kosovo with population of 2 million people.  For Iraq’s population of 23 million, 
however, the Pentagon had approximately 140, 000.)  In support of his position, Gen. 
Shinseki also used various studies, produced by the Army, which emphasized the critical 
importance of the time immediately after the fall of a regime.  This time was to be used 
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by the occupying power for establishing a controlling presence on the ground.  If not, 
experts warned, chaos will ensue and the US will lose the initiative.  At the same time, 
however, with the exception of General Shinseki, not many military leaders expressed 
openly much of a disagreement with the war plan or with the number of troops for the 
war or the post-war period. 
As shown, serious conflicts and fundamental differences of opinion characterized 
relations among senior political and uniformed leaders. Top civilian and military officials 
held very different philosophies as to when and how force should be used.  There were 
major disagreements between statesmen and soldiers as to the most important aspects of 
war-planning on Iraq as well.  The next section discusses how this high degree of civil-
military conflict combined with assertive civilian dominance, affected the making of US 
strategy for the war and the post-war period. 
 
 
The Decision-Making Process 
This section confirms that an effective decision-making process requires more 
than simply military subordination and assertive civilian leadership.  It necessitates 
relations between top civilian and military leaders that facilitate the deliberations among 
them, lead to a productive exchange of ideas that helps statesmen cope with the 
complexity and uncertainty of their external and internal environments and the issues at 
stake.  As Russell Weigley so ably put it:  
The most desirable civil-military relations in a democracy are not simply those in 
which civilian leadership almost always prevails.  The most desirable civil-military 





the soldier and the statesman, along with a consequent founding of a policy and strategy 
upon a real meeting of minds.  Only the former, lesser ideal has been realized most of the 
time in American history. The meeting of the minds has been relatively rare.704 
In order to analyze the effectiveness of the decision-making process and how high 
levels of civil-military preference divergence affect it, I focus on some of the key 
activities of top civilian and military leaders during the policy-making and 
implementation process, such as: 1) information gathering, analysis and evaluation of 
alternative options; 2) interaction and coordination between civilian and military officials; 
3) choosing a policy from existing alternatives. 705  In the case of the 2003 Iraq war, in 
particular, we see that some of the benefits of assertive civilian dominance (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5 on the 1991 Gulf War) were not realized mainly because of the high 
level of divergence between civilian and military preferences on issues related to the use 
of force.  First, I discuss how high levels of civil-military preference divergence affect 
key aspects of the communication and information exchange between top civilian and 
military decision-makers in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, by examining how top 
officials analyzed and evaluated the information available to them at the time.  Second, I 
examine the influence of high preference divergence on the cooperation and collaboration 
between civilian and military officials.  As the following paragraphs show, high 
preference divergence affected negatively the sharing of information between civilian and 
military leaders, the depth and rigor of their analysis of alternative military and political 
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options, and the coordination between statesmen and soldiers during the decision-making 
process and the implementation of the chosen strategy.   
Civil-military relations did have a significant impact on the way policy-makers 
collected and processed information and on the quality of their analysis of the strategic 
situation. Regarding information sharing and analysis and evaluation of options, I 
examine the extent to which there is a free flow and exchange of information between 
civilian and military officials, as well as the number and quality of alternative options 
proposed during the deliberations; the extent to which key assumptions are challenged 
and whether participants in the process attempt to address contradictory information and 
ambiguities; whether top political and military decision-makers feel free to offer their 
honest advice; the extent to which either side (civilian or military) attempts to 
prematurely foreclose less preferred options (through manipulation of information or 
through leaks, threats of firing or resignation or by any other means).   
The free flow of information is crucial for a rigorous analysis of alternative 
strategies.  But when their preferences on key issues diverge significantly, statesmen and 
soldiers may have an incentive to manipulate or withhold information from each other in 
order to bolster their preferred options. In such situations, the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process would suffer. When civil-military preference divergence is high, 
principal-agent theory expects the problem of private information to be more severe.  The 
civilian and the military side would not necessarily be willing to exchange information 
and this will impede discussion and analysis of policy options.  In this particular case, 
one can find evidence for almost all of the problems related to information-sharing and 
analysis of options, which are anticipated under high preference divergence and civilian 





concealing information and/or suppressing discussions of basic assumptions underlying 
alternative options; or the weaker side (the military) not feeling free to provide honest 
advice; decision-makers ignoring relevant information because it comes from a source 
with whom they disagree strongly on most issues; the civilians resorting to outside 
advisors because they distrust the information provided by their military aides. 
In the lead-up to the 2003 war on Iraq, civil-military discord and disagreement 
strained communications and impeded the flow of information between the civilians and 
the military.  As Bob Woodward wrote, “Communications between the civilian and 
military sides of the Defense Department [were] catastrophically broken.”706  Early on, 
for example, Gen. Shinseki felt he could not get a meeting with the Secretary to discuss 
the on-going Army re-organization.  The lack of communication, according to many 
military leaders, made them think Rumsfeld was keeping them at arm’s length.707     
As expected, the sharp divergence in the views of civilian and military leaders on 
key issues led civilian officials to withhold information from the military, which further 
harmed the decision-making process. 
As the campaign against Iraq intensified, a former aide to Cheney told me, the 
Vice-President’s office, run by his chief of staff, Lewis (Scooter) Libby, became 
increasingly secretive when it came to intelligence about Iraq’s WMDs.  As with 
Wolfowitz and Bolton, there was a reluctance to let the military and civilian analysts on 
the staff vet intelligence.”  “It was an unbelievably closed and small group.708 
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The major differences in the views of civilian and military leaders revealed in the 
early stages of their interaction and the way conflicts were resolved (i.e., by imposing 
civilian preferences rather than by discussing matters and trying to convince the other 
side) were significant in that they solidified Rumsfeld’s unfavorable opinion of the 
military (of the ground forces, in particular) as incapable of fully understanding and 
adapting to the new realities.  He thought the uniforms were stuck in the Cold War, very 
risk-averse and with no desire to modify the way they prepare for and fight America’s 
wars.709  Such major disagreements led to attempts on the part of the civilian leadership 
to exclude some military leaders from discussions because, as the civilians were 
convinced from previous interactions, the views of military officials were not really that 
valuable.  The Secretary distrusted the Chiefs and believed the officers were obstructing 
his transformation efforts.  As Dale Herspring writes, “Making no attempt to hide his 
disdain for many in the military, Rumsfeld allowed very few officers into his inner circle 
of decision-makers.  He was convinced that he and his civilian cadre understood the 
threats facing the United States far better than those who had worn their country’s 
uniform for many years.  They lived in the past, while he was looking to the country’s 
future.”710  This case confirms the importance of analyzing what decision-makers think of 
the source of advice and not only its content.  Often, when decision-makers do not 
believe that their advisors are competent and loyal, the advice is not going to register with 
them regardless of its content.  Such conditions did not favor serious and open 
discussions of the political and military challenges of the situation in Iraq and the making 
of strategy suffered.   
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Another factor that had a negative impact on the decision-making process was the 
feeling of the military that they could not disagree with Rumsfeld.  They were convinced 
that the civilian leadership was not interested in their advice and that it could be 
dangerous for one’s career to offer dissenting opinions. Unlike in the lead-up to the 1991 
Gulf War, when civilian and military leaders frequently and openly discussed a variety of 
political and military issues, in this case many in the military did not feel free to give 
their honest advice because they thought the civilian leadership would punish 
dissenters.711  The officers believed that the “command climate” did not always favor a 
free and open discussion where they could speak truth to power.712  They believed they 
would be criticized for “old thinking” were they to advocate more troops for Iraq.713   
Accounts of participants in the decision-making process at various levels show 
that some in the military were convinced that the secretary of defense would not tolerate 
dissenting views from the officers.  In one case when the Senate Armed Services 
Committee had called senior officers to testify on issues related to Iraq and regime 
change, Rumsfeld, anticipating that such testimonies could deviate from official policy, 
denied the Senate’s request.714  Even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard 
B. Myers, according to associates, “had to bite his tongue in public several times to avoid 
the appearance of major differences with Rumsfeld or others in the administration.”715 
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Under such conditions, military leaders are disinclined to provide information and advice 
that differs from the preferences of their civilian bosses.  Because officers are censoring 
their advice, the civilian leadership would not benefit from a complete analysis and 
evaluation of all of the political and military aspects of the situation.  Information-sharing 
would be impeded and the quality of the decision-making process would suffer because 
critical views and alternative options would hardly be presented or discussed.  This was 
the exact opposite atmosphere from the one during World War II when FDR and 
Churchill, despite disagreements, communicated a lot and worked effectively with their 
military staffs.  “Both men had military advisors who could speak with frankness, and 
who could, when necessary, point out the pitfalls and shortcomings of their political 
masters’ suggestions and strategies.”716 And also,  
The conversations that took place at the CCS level were complex, competitive, 
and, in many instances, filled with rancor. But they were genuine conversations: they 
brought to light multiple perspectives; they forced ongoing analyses of the relationship 
between ends and means, and they demanded that ideas be supported by logic, evidence, 
and rigorous argumentation. They facilitated reflection and forced compromise in the 
same way that the institutions of a well-structured democratic government do.717   
Rumsfeld actually seems to have been much more tolerant to dissenting views 
than he is given credit for.  Zakheim contends that Rumsfeld’s style actually confused 
people and in reality, Rumsfeld was significantly more open to disagreement than many 
in the military felt.  He recalls that the Secretary “would not hesitate to vent his 
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annoyance when he felt a briefer was unprepared or when he perceived that someone had 
not done his or her homework.  Many of were on the receiving end of comments like ‘a 
trained ape could do better than that’ and not everyone grasped that Rumsfeld was not 
being personal.”718  Furthermore, evidence shows that what he did not like was major 
differences in opinion between civilian and military leaders appearing in public while he 
did not mind dissenting views in principle. On the contrary, he encouraged them.  
However, public disagreements between top decision-makers concerned him because he 
believed they were quite harmful - they could encourage the enemy, be that Saddam or 
Osama bin Laden, to think that the US is not serious enough when, for example, it 
threatens military force.  Hence, such differences, he argued, should be kept from the 
media.  As far as internal dissent goes, more than one “snowflakes” sent to military 
officers at various levels encouraged them to speak out, constantly, when asked and when 
not asked.  “I made it clear to all senior military officials that they owed me their best 
advice not only when I asked for it but whenever they had something to recommend.”719 
He periodically sent memos asking for dissenting views (and views that differed from 
whatever seemed to be the broad consensus).   One time he actually pleaded for 
dissenting views saying he was willing to accept anonymous opinions just to make sure 
they were candid.  As he wrote to Gen. Myers, “I would like to know what the general 
officers, and possibly some key colonels, in Iraq think about the various options we face.   
I don’t need to know names, but it would be helpful for me to have a sense of what the 
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commanders at various levels think on these issues.  Please include minority opinions and 
their reasoning.”720   
Similarly, his memo on the war on terror (which was leaked) shows him willing 
to entertain a variety of views rather than being complacent or close-minded.  This is 
indirect evidence that in the case he has rejected advice, this does not mean advice has 
been rejected because it did not fit with his preferences and beliefs.  It may have been 
because he did not trust the people providing the advice while he may have been willing 
to listen to such views were they offered by a trusted source. 
A case of Rumsfeld accepting a dissenting view from a general (who he trusted) is 
when Gen. Abizaid convinced him that the fighters in Iraq constituted an insurgency.  
Although at the beginning Rumsfeld had refused to use the word “insurgency” and did 
not think it was correct to define the anti-US opposition in that way, after many talks with 
Gen. Abizaid he changed his mind.  The General had consistently made his case in 
private with the Secretary, shown evidence for his arguments, and managed to convince 
Rumsfeld he was right. 
The intense civil-military preference divergence could explain why some of the 
faulty assumptions of decision-makers were not successfully challenged even though at 
the time there was sufficient information to show those assumptions were incorrect.  
Policy-makers tend to discount or disregard advice coming from a source, which they 
define as “adversarial” – the way Rumsfeld was seeing many in the military.  Trying to 
avoid the benefits of hindsight, one should ask whether decision-makers could have 







by the regime of Saddam Hussein), the options they had at their disposal, and whether 
they could have anticipated some of the difficulties and challenges of the military 
campaign and its aftermath, and, hence, whether they should have been better prepared 
for what followed.721  Based on the information that was available to decision-makers at 
the time (both from the situation on the ground in Iraq and from US experience with 
previous cases of “nation-building”), this was certainly not impossible.  Evidence shows 
that many of the serious problems the US encountered during the war and its aftermath, 
especially after the official end of military operations on May 1, 2003, were predicted or 
at least anticipated by various government agencies, such as the Army and the Marine 
Corps, the State Department, the CIA, and various non-governmental organizations and 
defense-related think tanks, who prepared numerous policy papers on Iraq.722  Analyzing 
the relationship between civilian leaders and their top military advisors helps explain why 
civilian decision-makers did not find convincing and ignored some of the information 
presented to them by military officials – information which, if taken seriously, could have 
led to better policy choices. 
For example, the different war strategies preferred by civilian and military 
officials had different underlying assumptions regarding the capabilities of the Iraqi 
military and its willingness to resist, the readiness of Iraqi opposition groups to overthrow 
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Saddam, the possibilities for cooperation from governments in the region, and others. 723  
Civilian leaders held an optimistic view, believing that it would not take long for the 
Hussein regime to capitulate and that many Iraqis, especially the Shia population, would 
welcome US and coalition troops as liberators.724  Vice President Cheney and Deputy 
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz were predicting that greatful Iraqis would greet US 
forces on the streets of Iraq and that there would be an “explosion of joy” in the country.  
Another assumption was that after the military campaign ended, Iraq would not be too 
devastated and it would not take much time or effort to put the pieces back together.725  
Iraqi oil would largely pay for the reconstruction. Because of these optimistic 
assumptions, civilian leaders were not inclined to plan seriously for the post-war stage, 
believing that the Iraqis (led by Chalabi and his exiles) would be able to take care of the 
situation themselves, once Saddam was gone. 
Ideally, during the decision-making process, all of these assumptions should have 
been widely debated since critical strategic and tactical decisions were based on them.  
There did exist information at the time to contradict most of these claims.  Were these 
assumptions critically vetted, many of the flaws could have been exposed earlier and the 
Bush administration would have had a more accurate estimate of the cost of invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. Some military leaders did try to object and questioned the 
assumptions driving the options proposed by the civilian leadership, but were simply 
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ignored or, at times, publicly contradicted.  For example, the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. 
Shinseki, and the Commander of the Marine Corps, Gen. James Jones, disagreed with the 
assertion that Saddam’s government was going to collapse quickly.726  The wisdom of 
drawing lessons from the war on the Taliban was also questioned.  Military critics of 
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz argued that strategies that might have worked in Afghanistan 
would not necessarily be successful in Iraq because there were more differences than 
similarities between the two countries. 727  When some in the military were warning the 
civilian leadership (both openly -- through testimonies to Congress, and privately) of the 
possible dangers of post-war Iraq that should be planned for, they were not listened to 
either.728   
Since Gen. Shinseki was the only one among senior decision-makers at that time 
who had on-the-ground experience in running a stabilization force, one would expect his 
opinion to be given some weight, especially because this view was supported by many 
senior officers, as well as by other officials with extensive experience in peace-keeping. 
However, shortly after Shinseki’s testimony, top civilian officials, most notably Paul 
Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld himself, openly criticized his view, saying that the 
Army Chief of Staff was “wildly off the mark.”729  A senior administration official is 
quoted as having said that the general’s remark was “bullshit from a Clintonite enamored 
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of using the army for peacekeeping and not winning wars.”730  The military argued that 
the post-war reconstruction phase would be more difficult than the military part itself and 
the US would need more troops for the post-Saddam period. 731   On the contrary, 
Rumsfeld claimed: “It’s not logical to me that it would take as many forces following the 
conflict as it would to win the war.”732  The Defense Secretary and other top civilian 
officials believed that air power and space technology could substitute for the number of 
ground forces the military said were needed.  At the end, civilian preferences on this 
crucial issue remained unchanged.  “Donald Rumsfeld forced his military chiefs to accept 
his idea that a relatively small, lightly armed force should go to war with Iraq...”733  
Again, insights from communication and persuasion theories help explain why the 
Defense Secretary and other civilians did not find the arguments of Gen. Shinseki 
convincing. Because of civilians’ unfavorable attitudes towards the source of information 
(i.e., their lack of trust in Shinseki and other military leaders, civilians perceiving them as 
having different interests and trying to oppose them, and seeing the outlook of the 
military as outdated and in conflict with their own), top political leaders did not accept 
the recommendations of their uniformed advisors.734 
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Other, similar to Shinseki’s, warnings about the difficulties of a post-Saddam Iraq 
were disregarded again because civilian leaders perceived a high level of preference 
divergence between themselves and the sources of such warnings.  For example, many 
specialists from the military and intelligence communities, as well as from the State 
Department, warned that the gravest difficulties would come in the days after Saddam 
was overthrown. Paul Pillar, who at the time worked as the National Intelligence Officer 
for the Near East and South Asia, regrets that many of the warnings by the intelligence 
community have been ignored by decision-makers.  He maintains that the CIA provided 
information and analysis implying that avoiding war is the right thing to do,  
or, if war was going to be launched, to prepare for a messy aftermath. … Before 
the war, on its own initiative, the intelligence community considered the principal 
challenges that any post-invasion authority in Iraq would be likely to face. It 
presented a picture of a political culture that would not provide fertile ground for 
democracy and foretold a long, difficult, and turbulent transition. It projected that 
a Marshall Plan-type effort would be required to restore the Iraqi economy, 
despite Iraq's abundant oil resources. It forecast that in a deeply divided Iraqi 
society, with Sunnis resentful over the loss of their dominant position and Shiites 
seeking power commensurate with their majority status, there was a significant 
chance that the groups would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying 
power prevented it. And it anticipated that a foreign occupying force would itself 
be the target of resentment and attacks -- including by guerrilla warfare -- unless it 
established security and put Iraq on the road to prosperity in the first few weeks or 
months after the fall of Saddam. 735   
 
Most often experts warned about the danger of not being able to provide security 
and to take care of basics such as electricity and water.  There were numerous studies that 
predicted quite accurately a variety of problems the US could face.  For example, starting 
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in April of 2002, the State Department conducted the Future of Iraq Project (FOI).736   
While the FOI was certainly not an actionable plan for post-war Iraq, it did contain a lot 
of pertinent information which could have shaken decision-makers’ confidence in the 
validity of some of assumptions.  The FOI project accurately predicted the widespread 
looting and the chaos, which would result from ousting the Iraqi leadership, stating that 
“the period immediately after regime change might offer … criminals the opportunity to 
engage in acts of killing, plunder, and looting.”  As one expert recalled the warnings, 
“There has been major looting in every important post-conflict situation of the past 
decade.”737  This study also emphasized the importance of restoring basic services to 
Iraqis as soon as possible after the war, and warned about the dangers created by a total 
disbanding of the Iraqi military.  Civilian officials were warned more than once that their 
plans did not provide for sufficient troops on the ground to police Iraq once the military 
campaign is over. 
The rejection of the FOI project could also be seen as a case of not accepting 
information because it comes from the wrong source and not because it is critical of one’s 
own views.  From recent memoirs (and taking into account all the difficulties of using 
such sources as evidence) we know that the State department was not seen exactly as a 
loyal ally, but quite on the contrary. It was seen as unruly and, often, not very supportive 
of the White House.738  (This is not unique to the W. Bush Administration, of course.  
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and Warren P. Strobel, “Lack of Planning Contributed to Chaos in Iraq,” Miami Herald, July 12, 2003.   
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The State Department has been perceived in similar ways in previous administrations as 
well.  Nixon and Kissinger, among others, distrusted the professional diplomats and often 
bypassed them without much consideration, if any.) Colin Powell as Secretary of State 
was a target of even greater suspicions.  Rumsfeld explains well that regardless of the fact 
that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was valued as an experienced advisor, the 
relationship between Powell and W. Bush started to deteriorate gradually and this 
decreased the likelihood that Bush and the other top decision-makers would find Powell’s 
arguments convincing.  It did not help that people like Joe Biden, the then chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who worked very closely with Powell, called 
him “the good guy” in the Bush Administration and “the only person in America who 
doesn’t understand he is a Democrat.” For Cheney and Rumsfeld, Powell was  
“not on the team.”  Under the circumstances, little that Powell said would register with 
his colleagues, again not necessarily because they would disagree with the message but 
because they would distrust the source of the information.  The quality of the decision-
making process in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion would have certainly benefited from 
Powell’s views but, having in mind his status among his colleagues, we can see why this 
did not happen.   
Dov Zakheim is even more categorical that information and advice from the 
diplomats were rejected precisely because they were coming from the “wrong” source 
and not because of their content.  Because of the “war” between DoD and State in the 
lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War the decision-making process was affected very negatively, 
in his words.  “A second equally compelling reason that the Defense Department rejected 
State’s planning effort for Iraq is that the two agencies were in a turf war and 





State proposed was immediately rejected at some level of Defense simply because the 
idea was State’s.  And State reciprocated in kind.”739   
The war game “Dessert Crossing,” conducted in 1999 by then CENTCOM Chief 
Anthony Zinni, was another planning exercise that could have provided valuable lessons 
for decision-makers.  As Zinni explained740, this war game examined problems that could 
arise if Iraq were invaded and what US planners should do to handle the situation.   “It 
brought out all the problems we’re seeing now.  It shocked the heck out of me.”741  Zinni 
and the other planners in 1999 were concerned with the security situation after an 
invasion and suggested that as many as 400, 000 troops might be necessary to “flood” the 
towns and villages and establish firm control.742 By the time Zinni left CENTCOM in 
2000, the plans for the post-invasion period, including strategies for dealing with a post-
Saddam power vacuum, social turmoil, and looting, were in an advanced stage.  After 
2001, however, no one seemed to even know of the existence of such plans, not to 
mention to have made use of them.743 
Other projects that could have helped decision-makers in their planning include 
the study conducted by the Army War College and the National Defense University 
Exercise.  The Army War College study reads:  
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U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and 
must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill 
dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab 
nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility of terrorism 
being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and 
even a small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for 
an occupation force. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely 
than a terrorist campaign, but is still possible if the occupation is poorly 
managed.744 
 
The possibility of the Unites States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq 
is real and serious … The United States may find itself in a radically different 
world over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein 
seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America’s own making. 745 
 
The product of many hours of regional experts’ work, these studies offered 
numerous valuable suggestions for dealing with the challenges of what was by then 
called Phase IV (the period of post-war reconstruction). 746  Had decision-makers 
encouraged a more candid exchange of ideas with their military advisors, many of the 
mistaken beliefs would not have withstood the test of common sense.  However, on more 
than one occasion, civilian leaders disregarded military recommendations, as well as 
other similar advice provided by sources who they defined as “adversarial” because of 
the high preference divergence.  (For example, Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld would 
characterize key officials from the State Department, such as Thomas Warrick,  as “not 
being on the team” because of their initial opposition to a war with Iraq and later on, 
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would disregard advice coming from such people precisely because they were not sharing 
their strategic preferences). Regarding military advice in particular, as a senior 
intelligence official recalls, “Rumsfeld just beat up on the military.  And so they just shut 
up.”747  The dominance of the Pentagon civilians allowed discussions to be suppressed 
and the views of military advisor to be undercut. 
Why did not civilian leaders pay more attention to such warnings and did not plan 
accordingly?  The common argument is that they were so determined to go to war that 
nothing could have stopped them and that’s why they ignored information and advice 
challenging their optimistic assumptions. This claim, however, applies only partially and, 
hence, does not provide a fully satisfactory explanation.  Even if some top civilians 
firmly believed that war was the best choice under the circumstances, there were different 
options as to how to prosecute the war, and they could have listened to military advice in 
this regard.  (Certainly, it was in their interest to conduct that war in the best possible way 
– their reputation and place in history were at stake, in addition to the security of this 
country, so one would expect them to  have been open to professional advice regarding 
the “how” to use force question, even if not to “whether” to use force.)  In this case, 
advice was rejected mainly because of its source and not its content; the source was top 
military leaders and others, whose preferences were highly diverging from the 
preferences of civilian leaders, and/or were not considered sufficiently competent and 
trustworthy to be listened to.748  In other words, civilian leaders were not listening to the 
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military’s recommendations not necessarily because they did not like the content of the 
message.  They were not listening because they did not trust the source because they saw 
it as having goals and interests that were very different from their own.   Because of the 
high level of preference divergence, civilians were unlikely to find the military’s claims 
persuasive.  They took the warnings about the severe difficulties of a post-war Iraq as the 
generals’ way of trying to prevent the war itself.  They thought the military’s arguments 
were just another attempt by reluctant generals to stop the country from going to a war 
they did not want from the start.   
This discussion confirms the importance of analyzing whether advice is being 
rejected because of its content or its source and delving in more depth into the dynamics 
of the relationship between top political leaders and their advisors in order to understand 
better the attitudes of leaders toward these advisors and their perceptions of them.   
The importance of decision-makers’ perception, in particular, of the intentions of 
their advisors is confirmed by the evidence. One such case which affected negatively the 
already poor relationship between Rumsfeld and the Army was the argument over the 
Crusader program (in 2002) which the SecDef had decided to terminate and use the 
money for buying an array of precision munitions for other Army artillery systems.  For 
many in the military, this story confirmed their view that the SecDef was biased against 
them, especially against the Army.  But in the words of Dov Zakheim,  
That was not true.  What Rumsfeld had was a bias against hidebound thinking and 
excessive parochialism wherever and whenever he encountered it.  In this case Rumsfeld 
felt that the Army had placed its own parochial interests over the overall needs of the 





recovered; the essential trust so necessary between the secretary’s office and the service 
had disappeared. 749     
We have to also consider decision-makers’ past experience with the military. In 
the case of Rumsfeld, he was no stranger to the Pentagon and the government, in general, 
and he knew how bureaucracies, not to mention such a huge bureaucracy like the military, 
could sabotage policy-makers if they so choose.  He has experienced first-hand how the 
uniforms have skewed information in order to influence the choices of civilians and to get 
a decision in their favor.750  That is why, this time around, he was determined to monitor 
even technical details, such as deployment orders, to make sure the military was not 
going shirk.  
While many criticize Rumsfeld for not tolerating dissenting views, it may be more 
precise to say that Rumsfeld had nothing against dissent, as long as military officers 
disagreed in private.  What he wanted from high-ranking military officers was “above all, 
they had to be candid and forthright, willing to disagree in private with me and with the 
President if their military advice differed from a course being considered.”751  He could 
not stand leaks, regardless of whether they were coming from the Pentagon or from State 
because he believed they were done to benefit the leakers and not the decision process or 
the national security of the country.752  As he writes:  
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I expected Defense Department officials to tell me their views, debate with me, 
and try to persuade me when they believed I might be wrong or misinformed about 
important matters – right up until a decision was made and it was time to implement.  I 
have always felt that if officials were in the room when substantive issues are discussed, 
they were there for a reason.  I considered it their duty, whether military or civilian, to 
speak up and voice opinions, even if – especially if – they disagreed with me or with 
others taking part in the discussion.  Even after I made a decision on a matter, I remained 
open to people in the Department asking me to reconsider, so long as the decision was 
being implemented in the meantime.753             
 
While we may discount such statements as self-serving, there are other high-
ranking officials at the time who also testify that Rumsfeld did not have a problem with 
dissenting views.754   
Both Rumsfeld and Cheney are very critical of Secretary Powell particularly for 
not disagreeing during the internal debates of the administration on Iraq while, at the 
same time, hinting publicly that there are some serious differences between his views and 
theirs.   
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In his memoirs, then Vice President Cheney expresses his disappointment with 
Gen. Powell about his alleged failure to criticize and disagree with Administration’s 
policies openly during the debates and argues Powell’s sharing his misgivings with 
people outside the Administration was a mistake, which affected negatively the attitude 
towards him and made his advice less valuable:  
Like the president I had believed that Colin Powell would be an effective 
secretary of state. I had long admired his talents and had personally selected him for 
appointment by George H. W. Bush to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  He was 
superb in that job. But it was not the same when he was at the State Department. I was 
particularly disappointed in the way he handled policy differences. Time and again I 
heard that he was opposed to the war in Iraq. Indeed, I continue to hear it today. But 
never once in any meeting did I hear him voice objection. It was as though he thought the 
proper way to express his views was by criticizing administration policy to people outside 
the government.755 
Specifically about the war plan in Iraq, Rumsfeld writes: “Powell did not raise 
any questions about troop levels, the war plan, or the numbers of troops in a postwar 
environment though press stories, to my great surprise, reported that Powell later 
indicated that he had.”756  Says Rumsfeld:  
The reality was that Powell tended not to speak out at NSC or principals meetings 
in strong opposition to the views of the President or of his colleagues.  This was 
regrettable since Powell had important experience as a leader in both military and 
civilian capacities, and headed a major element of American’s national security 
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apparatus. … I believe that the administration would have benefited had State 
more often proposed strategies for discussion with the President instead of the 
anonymous hindsight critiques that appeared from time to time in the press 
accounts and books.  Powell’s associates in the State Department seemed to 
suggest, in lower-level meetings and in press interviews often attributed to ‘senior 
administration officials’, that he quite often did not favor the President’s course 
on a given subject.757    
 
Certainly, there is no guarantee that had Secretary Powell disagreed more often 
during the internal debates, his arguments would have been more likely to convince 
President Bush or his colleagues.  That would have hardly been the case on the issue of 
going to war with Iraq, but is uncertain on other issues. Either way, it is important to keep 
in mind that some top-ranking officials may not have a problem with advisors 
disagreeing with them but only with them voicing criticism publicly without having done 
so during the internal debates.  The above discussion confirms that for how influential 
advice would be there are other factors that matter, and not only the content of advice.   
These factors are related to the source of advice – dissenting advice has a higher 
chance of being accepted if offered by a trusted source and in private.  Arguably, the 
same message could have been more convincing were it to come from a friendly, trusted 
source.  As shown earlier, evidence shows that Rumsfeld was actually more open to 
criticism and dissenting views than is commonly believed.  General Ronald Fogleman 
(Ret.), former member of the Defense Policy Board, for example, remembered, “My 
experience with Secretary Rumsfeld is he doesn't brook fools. But if you come to the 
table with a solid position, he's going to listen and he's going to make a decision based on 
                                                            





your input.”758  And it is also true that some of the accusations that the Defense Secretary 
did not listen come from people who, at the time, did not have much to say and now feel 
it is easier to blame Rumsfeld for “being ignored.”  In his so-called “snowflakes” or 
“Rummygrams,” Rumsfeld himself was questioning everything and searching for 
alternatives.  The Secretary was asking some of the most penetrating questions.  His 
critics often forget that Rumsfeld wrote some of the most critical Memos about what 
could go wrong in Iraq and about the ways the US is fighting the “war” on terrorism.759  
In his October 15, 2002 Memo, for example, the Defense Secretary listed 29 catastrophic 
scenarios for Iraq, including chemical warfare, escalation of ethnic strife, house-to-house 
combat in Baghdad, and others, in an attempt to “do everything humanly possible to 
prepare.”760  This shows that Rumsfeld was not unwilling to think of various scenarios 
and alternative options.  He simply did not trust some of his top military advisors to 
provide the solutions because of the high level of preference divergence between them.  
For similar reasons, some key State Department officials were excluded from different 
task forces dealing with post-Saddam Iraq, and information and advice coming from 
them was disregarded because of the clash of preferences between State and DOD at the 
time. 
Thus, examining the advisory process at the pinnacle the government through a 
framework which includes preference divergence as a variable, leads us to a counter-
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intuitive observation – the so-called “yes-men” (hear defined as advisors sharing the 
preferences of top decision-makers without the derogatory connotation this term usually 
has) surrounding top decision-makers are very important for the effectiveness of the 
decision-process and may help enhance it.  Conventional wisdom is that it is harmful for 
decision-makers to surround themselves with yes-men because this would lead to a 
failure to consider the full range of alternatives.  However, it could be the case that at 
times these “yes-men” are the only possibility for transmitting of dissenting views.761  In 
other words, if a decision-maker receives a dissenting opinion from someone with whom 
she disagrees on almost everything, this dissent would be discounted because it could be 
attributed to the “bias” of the “adversarial” source.  If, however, the contrary opinion 
comes from an advisor whose views and ideas have been similar to hers most of the time, 
the decision-maker is likely to take such advise seriously and may even reconsider her 
own position.  In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, without of course being guided by 
theories of preference divergence, some military leaders instinctively understood this.  
Seeing that their views and opinions were not getting through to Rumsfeld, they decided 
to find someone Rumsfeld listens to in order to convey their concerns.   Being perturbed 
about the Secretary’s frequent interference in military planning they complained to none 
other than Newt Gingrich, who was then a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising 
Rumsfeld.  Gingrich agreed to “press the secretary to stop messing around with tactical-
level decisions.”762  
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The conventional explanation of what went wrong in this case, namely -- “there 
was no planning,” is incomplete and unsatisfactory at best.  Both at the Pentagon and at 
Central Command there was a lot of planning and preparation for various emergencies 
many of which did not occur. 763   High-ranking participants in the decision process 
confirm as much.  For example, former CJCS Gen. Richard Myers has discussed this 
issue at length in interviews and in his memoirs.  The General says that there has been 
sufficient planning, at least from the civilians and he reserves some criticism for Gen. 
Franks and CENTCOM on this count.  “Well, there was a lot of planning done for the 
postwar environment, I will say that.  There was an awful lot of planning that was done 
for that, every possible contingency was thought about and there were plans laid for 
it.  … A lot of planning was done on the civilian side of the house, not necessarily on the 
military side of the house, but Central Command knew they were going to be responsible 
for the phase of operations we call Phase 4.”764  In the words of James Dobbins, the Bush 
administration special envoy to Afghanistan and the Clinton Administration special 
envoy to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, “It’s not that there wasn’t adequate 
planning.  There was a volume of planning.  More than the Clinton administration did for 
any of its interventions.  They planned on unrealistic set of assumptions.”765  It is also 
insufficient to say the problem was not that there was no planning or not enough planning, 
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but that the planning was based on wrong assumptions.766  While it is certainly true that 
faulty assumptions affected negatively the decision-making process, this is insufficient as 
an explanation unless we explain why faulty assumptions at times are being corrected 
during the decision process, while this time, most of these assumptions were not 
corrected when there was enough information at the time to do so.  After all, in many 
cases when the use of force is considered, both civilian and military officials have often 
held incorrect assumptions at the start.  One also needs to explain under what 
circumstances faulty assumptions and beliefs are more likely to be challenged and 
corrected.  Such an explanation requires a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
top decision-makers and their military (and  other) advisors, and especially the level of 
preference divergence between them – faulty assumptions are more likely to be corrected 
if the corrective view comes from a source who shares the beliefs, ideas, and goals of the 
decision-makers.   
Regarding information sharing and analysis, in this particular case, as shown, 
most of the needed information did exist at the time, but was either disregarded or 
explained away because: a) there was a high level of preference divergence between the 
civilian leadership and the military, which was trying to present this information.  Biases 
in information processing lead decision-makers to discount advice which comes from a 
source with which they disagree on many fundamental issues; b) the civilians were 
dominant and, hence, able to restrict the role of the opposing side.   
As expected by my theoretical framework, under conditions of high civil-military 
preference divergence, civilians would be unlikely to trust military advice and more 
                                                            
766 For such an argument see Nora Bensahel, “Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi 





likely to look for outside advisors.  In the lead-up to the war with Iraq, the military 
quickly learned that the civilians would rather consult with defense intellectuals like 
Newt Gingrich and Richard Perle than with their own generals.  Not surprisingly, what 
most of these outside consultants had in common, besides lack of military experience, 
was that they shared the views of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. Particularly unnerving for 
top officers at the Pentagon was that during the heated debates on Iraq Rumsfeld would 
keep forwarding them Newt Gingrich’s e-mails, which covered a variety of topics 
including ground combat, military tactics, weaponry, and others. 767   The military 
wondered why the Secretary would not use their professional advice on such issues and 
would lightly ignore the experience of his most senior officers.  However, this would not 
be much of a puzzle after one has analyzed the civil-military relationship and the views 
and ideas of top decision-makers at the time – the Secretary of Defense would be 
unwilling to accept recommendations provided by his military advisors with whom he 
was at loggerheads over so many critically important issues.  Since there were severe 
conflicts in the preferences of civilian and military officials, it was not a surprise that 
Secretary Rumsfeld was tempted to get advice from sources he trusted more. 
Certainly, there is nothing wrong if a Secretary of Defense is seeking outside 
advice.  After all, the military has its own institutional biases and interests and a good 
civilian leadership should make sure it does not become their hostage.  However, in this 
particular case, the problem was that (1) many of the outside consultants used in the 
process had very little knowledge and understanding of military affairs and/or of Iraq and 
the Middle East, and that (2) they held the exact same views as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz 
                                                            





on the specific issues under consideration; hence, there was little chance these views 
would be carefully analyzed or subjected to a critical scrutiny.  In order to avoid such 
situations, when choosing their outside advisors, policy-makers should make sure to look 
not only for people who they trust and with whom they share largely similar interests and 
views but who also represent a variety of opinions on the subject in question; in this way, 
the leadership would have a multiplicity of views from which to choose, even if it decides 
to disregard the military’s.  Totally overlapping preferences are not good for an effective 
decision-making process either.        
Thus, a civil-military relationship characterized by high preference divergence is 
unlikely to lead to free flow and exchange of information between civilian and military 
leaders.  In sharp contrast to the 1991 Gulf War case, the intense civil-military 
disagreements in views and attitudes in this case led to truncated discussions and missed 
opportunities to debate a full range of military and non-military alternatives and to 
correct flawed assumptions.     
The level of preference divergence affects not only the communication between 
top civilian officials and their military advisors, and the information gathering and 
analysis during the decision process, but also the cooperation between them.  Regarding 
interaction and coordination, an effective decision-making process on the use of force 
(and other issues of national security) requires a constant dialogue between top civilian 
and military leaders in order to match military means to political objectives and to be 
responsive at all times to the constantly changing conditions of the diplomatic and 
military situation.768  Smooth coordination between civilian and military officials is very 
                                                            






important because it affects the degree to which political and military concerns would be 
integrated in the final strategy and, ultimately, the extent to which the military instrument 
would serve properly the political goals of a state.   While firm and assertive civilian 
control could be beneficial to the decision-making and implementation processes769 , 
civilian micromanagement is not, and that is why it would be useful to highlight the 
conditions under which civilian assertiveness could degenerate into counter-productive 
meddling in military affairs.  Including the level of civil-military preference divergence 
as an explanatory variable helps in doing that.   
In order to judge the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation and how it is 
affected by the level of preference divergence, we can examine how top civilian and 
military leaders interact with each other and how they participate in the joint advisory 
councils.  For example, what is the level of trust between them?  Is one group deliberately 
marginalized by the other?  Are there attempts at civilian micromanagement?  When 
civilians are firmly in control, does the military still try to sabotage the process by foot-
dragging or leaks?  Evidence for “pathologies” in this respect, for example, include: one 
side being marginalized or completely cut out of the decision process, threats of firing or 
resignation, leaks to the media, end runs to Congress, and others.  In regard to the 
choosing of the final policy, one could look at whether at the end either the civilian or the 
military side has the power to impose its preferences and whether the final decision is a 
result of deliberations or whether the choice is “imposed” unilaterally and has little to do 
with the merits of the preceding arguments.      
                                                            





Regarding the interaction and coordination between top civilian and military 
officials during the lead-up to the war, there were many examples of the dysfunctions one 
expects to observe when there is strong civil-military conflict and one of the sides (in this 
case, the civilians) dominates.  Such problems could include: civilian leaders resorting to 
micromanagement or using more intrusive mechanisms of civilian control in order to 
ensure that the final outcome is closer to their preferred option; civilian leaders trying to 
exclude military leaders from the debates and/or ignoring or disregarding military advice; 
military views not being entirely integrated in the decision because of civilian dominance. 
A high level of preference divergence between statesmen and soldiers may often 
lead to attempts at micromanaging because civilians would want to ensure that their own 
preferences are implemented strictly. In this case, differing views between civilian and 
military officials on key issues led to increasing distrust.  Secretary Rumsfeld and his 
civilian aides believed the generals were “frozen” in the Cold War and slow to adapt to 
the radical changes in the environment.  The suspicion and mistrust between civilian and 
military leaders signficantly affected the decision-making process.  They led to what the 
civilian leadership saw as a necessary close monitoring of military planning in order to 
ensure its compliance with political objectives, and what the military said was 
Rumsfeld’s micromanagement of the deployment of forces to Iraq and, more generally, 
his intrusive involvement in all the details of the planning process.  
Military leaders felt that they were not trusted and were either left out of the 
decision-making process or were so closely monitored that they feared military 
effectiveness would suffer.  After his retirement, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Henry “Hugh” Shelton, told a reporter that he “was shocked to be 





if the military said one thing, the civilians said, ‘Well, prove it.’ ”770  Precisely because 
the civilian leadership distrusted the military, it was tempted to use more intrusive 
mechanisms of civilian control in order to ensure that civilian preferences would be 
carried out.  In the lead-up to the war, analysts counted numerous examples of civilian 
micromanagement, some of which are detailed in the next paragraphs. Micromanagement 
then became another cause for the increased tension between Rumsfeld and the uniforms 
as well as an indicator of a dysfunctional relationship. 
Planners of military operations in the Pentagon complained of Rumsfeld’s 
micromanaging of operational details and of what they saw as his disregard for 
professional advice.  According to them, the evolution of the Iraq war plan from the 
original Plan 1003771 was a painful and torturous process during which the Secretary and 
his key civilian advisers disregarded military advice, ignoring officers who had spent a 
life-time working on logistics.  Especially annoying for some military planners was the 
“killing” of the Time Phased Forces Deployment List (TPFDL)772, a document which 
describes in detail the forces to be sent in battle, the sequence of their deployment and 
logistical support.773  In the words of a former intelligence officer, “When you kill the 
tip-fiddle, you kill centralized military planning.  The military is not like a corporation 
that can be streamlined.  It is the most inefficient machine known to man.  It’s the 
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redundancy that saves lives.”774  Then Secretary of the Army Thomas White also believes 
that Rumsfeld’s decision to involve himself with the smallest details of the deployments 
“drove everybody just about to the point of distraction.”775    
Accounts of participants in the decision-making process show how the Iraq war 
plan (Plan 1003) was repeatedly updated and presented to Rumsfeld who returned it 
again and again with the insistence to cut the number of ground troops.  When presented 
with re-iterations of Plan 1003, this planner recalls, the Secretary would say: “You’ve got 
too much ground force – go back and do it again.”776  In this way, crucial deployments 
were significantly delayed because “the meddler-in-chief”777 kept changing again and 
again Central Command’s deployment plan.  “The civilians in Rumsfeld’s office vetoed 
the priority and sequencing of joint forces in the region – as it was requested by the war 
fighters – and manipulated it to support their priorities. When they did this, it de-
synchronized not only the timing of the arrival of people and their organic equipment, but 
also the proper mix of combat and combat support units.”778  The military, socialized in 
Huntingtonian “objective” control principles, strongly disliked such interference in its 
domain of expertise and believed it ultimately hurt military effectiveness.      
These interactions between Rumsfeld and the generals should be analyzed in the 
context of Rumsfeld’s views of the military (as a cumbersome bureaucracy with ideas, 
                                                            
774 Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, April 7, 2003, op. cit., p. 43.   
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interests and agenda different from his own) and the way he saw civil-military relations 
under Clinton.  As explained earlier, Rumsfeld believed that civilian control has been 
severely weakened under his predecessors.  This attitude could be summarized best in a 
joke, often quoted by Mackubin Thomas Owens: “When the army did not want to do 
something – as in the Balkans in the 1990s – it would simply overstate the force 
requirements: ‘The answer is 350, 000 soldiers.  What is the question?’ ”779  Knowing the 
ways the military had tried to sabotage civilian policies it did not like in the past, 
Rumsfeld thought that the TPFDL was also just a tool used by the military bureaucracy to 
block him, rather than a genuine request for specific force levels.  That’s why he showed 
he was willing not only to probe but even change the numbers and the sequence of 
deployment of particular units.  Had there been more trust in the civil-military 
relationship, the TPFDL would have been discussed with much less suspicion.  But trust 
is precisely what is most often lacking under conditions of high civil-military preference 
divergence.  
A comparison with the 1991 Gulf War strengthens the argument that if assertive 
civilian control is combined with high levels of civil-military preference divergence, 
attempts at civilian micromanagement are very likely to occur.  When civil-military 
preference divergence is low, as in the administration of George Bush Sr. even 
assertively dominant civilians would not feel much of a need to micromanage because 
they trust that the military would follow closely political preferences (since these, more 
or less, happen to be the preferences of the military as well).  Hence, what many 
perceived as the more hands-off approach of the Bush Sr. administration in the 1991 Gulf 
                                                            





War (a case which belongs in Quadrant 3 in Table 1).  In contrast, in the lead up to the 
2003 Iraq war Rumsfeld’ and Wolfowitz’s assertiveness was often turning into 
micromanagement in part because they were faced with a very high level of divergence 
between their preferences and the preferences of the military.  In such situations, civilians 
fear that the military has an agenda of its own.  They think they have to monitor the 
uniforms very closely in order to ensure that the military would follow civilian preference 
rather than its own.  That is why my theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of 
examining the level of civil-military preference divergence, together with the civil-
military balance of power (or who is in control). 
Ironically, Rumsfeld was putting all this effort into close monitoring in the name 
of strengthening civilian control over the military.  He believed, correctly, that assertive 
political leadership is crucial for success.  However, as the above examples show, when 
assertive political control is combined with a high level of civil-military preference 
divergence, the decision-making process could be affected negatively.  This is not to 
argue against assertive political leadership but to show that its value should not be 
asserted out of context.  As the chapter on the 1991 Gulf War shows, assertive civilian 
control could be very beneficial and lead to a more effective decision-making process. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom780, civilian leaders should not be unwilling to involve 
themselves in the details of strategy-making (after they understand them) since, at times, 
what seems like a tactical or technical purely military detail may have profound 
political/strategic significance. Precisely because war is fundamentally political, effective 
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civilian leaders, as history shows, have not trusted blindly military professionalism.   
However, they have involved themselves in military detail not in order to always second-
guess the generals or plan military campaigns themselves, but in order to help the 
military see the bigger political and diplomatic picture and to avoid being trapped by 
parochial interests.  This is possible if civilian leaders have good grasp of matters of 
national security and are willing to enter into a constant and vigorous dialogue with their 
military counterparts in finding the best way of matching military means to political 
objectives.   
The problem, of course, was not that Rumsfeld (in the name of Bush) ran the war 
– after all, that is how it should be since it is the elected political leaders who bear 
ultimate responsibility for a war’s success or failure.  The problem was that the severe 
preference divergence between civilian and military officials often prevented the much-
needed dialogue between them.  The making of strategy suffers when the vigorous and, at 
times, tense and unpleasant dialogue between political and military leaders is absent.781  
The high level of preference divergence between statesmen and soldiers under 
Bush/Rumsfeld explains the lack of effective dialogue – decision-makers simply tend to 
ignore communications from sources with whom they disagree sharply and toward whom 
they have negative attitudes.  Under Rumsfeld, the dialogue between civilian and military 
leaders was deficient or lacking much of the time because of the highly diverging views 
and ideas held by civilian and military leaders. 
Regarding the process of choosing a policy from existing alternatives, it was often 
the case that civilian preferences dominated at the expense of military views.  When, for 
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example, Gen. Franks presented the original invasion plan, Secretary Rumsfeld found it 
insufficiently creative and not reflecting what he thought were the technological advances 
the US had made after the 1991 Gulf War.782  Civilian policy-makers accused military 
leaders of being unimaginative and risk-averse. The civilians were growing increasingly 
frustrated with Franks himself and the rest of the “overly reluctant” officers, as they 
thought of the military, and the Army, in particular. They held a meeting of the Defense 
Policy Board, specifically discussing how to overcome military reluctance.  At the 
meeting, “one defense expert [suggested]: You have to have a few heads roll, especially 
in the Army.”783  Gen. Franks found himself squeezed between Rumsfeld and a tight 
circle of his closest aides who insisted on a much smaller invasion force than the military 
felt comfortable with.  While the number of troops in the final war plan was higher than 
Rumsfeld wanted originally, many analysts hesitate to call this a genuine compromise 
between the civilian views and the preferences of CENTCOM.  In the words of Gordon 
and Trainor, “General Tommy Franks … would draw up the new plan, but Rumsfeld 
would poke, prod, and question the military at every turn. Defense Department civilians 
would move into Franks’s planning cells to monitor his work, and the general would be 
summoned to Washington repeatedly to present his evolving plan and receive new 
guidance from his civilian masters.”784  A high-ranking Pentagon officer noted, “Franks 
may be the draftsman, but Rumsfeld is the architect [of the plan].”785  “Rumsfeld just 
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ground Franks down,” according to former Secretary of the Army John White.  “If you 
grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say, ‘Screw it, I’ll do the 
best I can with what I have.’  The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing 
with him.”786  (At the time of this writing, evidence is inconclusive as to how exactly Gen. 
Franks changed his original preferences and his views became closer to Rumsfeld’s.  
There are several (related) possibilities – the CENTCOM commander was gradually 
persuaded by Rumsfeld’s arguments, he was bullied by an unrelenting Secretary of 
Defense, or warned down – but as of now we cannot say which exactly was the case.)  
In January of 2003, in order to put an end to the infighting between the 
departments of State and Defense, President Bush assigned responsibility for post-war 
Iraq to the Pentagon, which made it easier to ignore the planning conducted by other 
agencies and departments.  Many military and intelligence officials, as well as analysts 
with inside knowledge of the decision-making process, observed that the usual planning 
procedures had been disregarded. 787  Because of the differences in the preferences of 
civilian and military officials on key issues of military planning on Iraq, the civilians 
tended to leave the uniformed leadership out of the planning process.  There was much 
less involvement by the Joint Chiefs and their chairman, Air Force General Richard 
Myers, in the deliberations.  As Ricks and others have argued, “The influence of the Joint 
Chiefs on military policy appears to have diminished under Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld.”788  Analysts of the decision-making process charge that the military was 
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being more or less excluded from high-level policy councils from the very start of 
Rumsfeld’s tenure during the QDR process. 789  To the extent that the usual preliminary 
studies under the control of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were conducted at all, they were not given much weight, but were substituted by advice 
from outside consultants trusted by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.  Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, and the Joint Chiefs themselves, were apparently 
excluded from many of the meetings at which strategy was discussed.  It appears that the 
Joint Chiefs had not been consulted on key issues during the planning process. For 
example, in the words of William Arkin:  
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is 
excluded from much discussion.  And the service chiefs, ostensibly the senior military 
advisors for the Defense secretary and the president, have less opportunity to provide 
input.   In fact, sources say, the emerging Iraq plan was never officially brought into “the 
tank,” the Joint Chiefs’ super-secure meeting room, for a discussion among the heads of 
all the services.790   
Rumsfeld’s attempts to make the Joint Chiefs subordinate to him (rather than the 
president) could hurt the advisory process.  If the independence of the Chairman is 
undermined, the President would not have any alternative views to consider – this 
situation could be particularly dangerous in case the civilian view (coming from the 
Secretary) proves to be wrong, as it has happened on occasions.  After all, Congress 
passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, making the Chairman the primary military advisor to 
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the President, precisely so that the President could hear the military’s views and be able 
to consider alternatives. 
Conclusion 
While neither the civil-military balance of power nor the level of civil-military 
preference divergence alone could explain the decision-making process leading up to the 
2003 Iraq war, in combination, those two factors provide important insights.  Although in 
this case civilian control was not at stake (the military dutifully fulfilled the wishes of its 
civilian masters) 791 , the high level of preference divergence between statesmen and 
soldiers affected negatively the making and implementation of strategy on Iraq.  A high 
level of preference divergence between policy-makers and their advisors often leads to 
distortion of information, truncated discussions and insufficient analysis of policy options, 
and attempts at micromanagement.  In cases like this, characterized by a high degree of 
civil-military preference divergence and a clear dominance of the civilian side, the 
dominant side has both the motive and the ability to manipulate the decision-making 
process so that the final outcome reflects its preferences rather than the preferences of the 
opposing group.  In such circumstances, the stronger side has not only a reason to try to 
exclude the weaker from the debates or keep discussions short (i.e., they strongly 
disagree), but also the ability to do so because of the favorable balance of power.  Hence, 
under these conditions (a combination of high level of conflict and clear dominance), 
regardless of personality types or the management style of key decision-makers, there 
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would always be the temptation to impose one’s preferences by skewing the decision 
process. 
This chapter highlights the impact of high levels of civil-military preference 
divergence on the decision-making process, and more specifically, on the ways policy-
makers seek and process information and advice.  By analyzing not only the preferences 
of top civilian and military officials but the degree of preference divergence between 
them during the decision process, we could predict how influential military advice would 
be in a particular case (i.e., how likely it is that statesmen would be convinced by the 
recommendations of their military advisors).  Decision-makers are likely to discount 
advice (or not seek it at all) from sources with whom they disagree on many key issues or 
who they perceive as having different interests in a given situation.  As Arthur Lupia 
shows, “perceived common interest [is] necessary for persuasion… persuasion is 
impossible when the speaker and listener have conflicting interests.  For when the listener 
perceives a speaker to have conflicting interests, her best response is to ignore the 
cue.”792  Secretary Rumsfeld and the top civilian leadership could have probably been 
easier to persuade on the question of how to use force if they did not believe that there 
was a fundamental clash between their views and the preferences of their top military 
advisors on the first question – whether to go to war or not.  Knowing that the military 
had argued against the war in the first place, the Defense Secretary saw higher estimates 
for the required troops levels as the military’s way of putting roadblocks to any invasion 
plan against Iraq.  Rumsfeld was convinced that when the services were against a mission, 
they wanted at least twice as many troops as they actually needed.  He was not going to 
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pay much attention to advice from people who he perceived as having an agenda of their 
own. 
This chapter shows that a high degree of divergence between civilian and military 
preferences, combined with clear civilian dominance, interferes with the making of 
strategy in at least several ways.  High civil-military preference divergence affects the 
functioning of the advisory process at the pinnacle of government by impeding the 
collection, sharing, and analysis of information by civilian and military officials, and 
their interaction and cooperation during the planning and implementation of  the chosen 
policy.  In this particular case, there were significant problems with the exchange and 
analysis of information as well as with coordination and collaboration between civilian 
and military leaders.  The severe differences between the views of Secretary Rumsfeld 
and the uniformed leadership of the Pentagon over military transformation and on 
whether and how to use force against Saddam Hussein led to the marginalization of 
military leaders.  Excluding the military from many of the debates at the highest levels 
and ignoring or disregarding their advice led to a dysfunctional analysis of alternative 
options for action and, ultimately, undermined US strategy.  Diverging civil-military 
preferences and civilian dominance caused the military to be afraid to give its honest 
advice on key issues of war planning.  As expected under the circumstances, the weaker 
side (the military) tried various forms of passive resistance, such as foot-dragging and 
leaks to the media, sympathetic members of Congress and/or retired officers who could 
more easily voice objections against the strategy proposed by top civilian decision-
makers.  At times, the military was even able to create a united front with some members 





habit of keeping them in the dark.793  But, at times, the generals were simply overruled by 
Rumsfeld and the civilian leadership.  While some level of “creative” tension794 could 
improve the decision-making process, the high levels of distrust and friction between 
Rumsfeld and the military contributed to the poor analysis and formulation of strategy. 
Civil-military conflict also impeded the coordination and collaboration among leaders at 
the top and this led to a failure to fully integrate military considerations with political and 
diplomatic policy.   
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms the significance of studying not 
only civilian and military preferences on key issues related to the use of force and 
national security, more broadly, but also the level of divergence between statesmen and 
soldiers’ preferences at any given time.  This level of preference divergence and its 
impact on the decision-making process are often overlooked.  If we study the preferences 
of top political and military leaders on when and how to use or threaten force, we could 
predict the type of action they would recommend in a given situation. If, in addition, we 
analyze the degree of conflict in the views of statesmen and soldiers, we could anticipate 
the level of influence advisors’ recommendations would have (e.g., when preference 
divergence is high, advice is more likely to be disregarded), as well as the quality of 
interaction and coordination between the two sides.  In other words, studying the 
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intensity of preference divergence between civilian and military leaders is important 
because it can explain when and why decision-makers would be more open to accepting 
the recommendations of their military advisors, as well as when the two sides would be 
willing to share information rather than to conceal or distort it. 
In addition, as shown, under the condition of civilian dominance, “assertive” 
civilian control becomes an option and this may have both advantages and disadvantages.  
On the positive side is the fact that assertive and engaged leaders could prod an unwilling 
military to come up with more alternative options from which they could choose.  
Furthermore, assertive leaders would not allow to be misled by military parochialism.  At 
the same time, however, when civilian dominance is accompanied by high levels of civil-
military preference divergence, civilian leaders tend to resort to more intrusive 
mechanisms of control in order to ensure the dominance of their preferences in the final 
decisions. Some of these mechanisms, however, are seen by the military as 
“micromanagement” and they only increase the conflict between statesmen and soldiers.  
Increased levels of civil-military conflict may further diminish the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process. 
Another lesson from this case study is that dissenting advice is accepted primarily 
from a trusted source, someone with whom decision-makers have a low preference 
divergence and if offered in private. Hence, from the standpoint of the effectiveness of 
decision-making we have to make sure not that decision-makers are surrounded with 
people with whom they disagree in order to provide diverging views but with people who 
they trust and with whom they share similar views.  These people can provide the 
diverging opinions as well and are more likely to be listened to.  That is why it is 





cases, especially if what is rejected turns out to be valuable information that can make the 
difference between victory and defeat.  If advice is not registering with some officials not 
because of its content but because of its source, we should change the messenger in order 
to manage to get through to decision-makers.   
With hindsight, we know that in this case the views of the military happened to be 
correct more often than those of its civilian leaders.  But this is not to argue that if only 
civilian leaders in war do exactly what their uniformed advisors tell them to do, there 
would be no problem.  This would be the wrong lesson since, if history is any guide, 
military leaders, at times, have been very wrong about purely military matters.  In this 
case as well, the generals made their fair share of mistakes or failed to speak up when 
they disagreed.795  In order to be successful war leaders, civilian decision-makers should 
not be afraid to challenge the judgment of their generals.  “The finest democratic war 
statesmen of the past … prodded, nagged, questioned, and harassed subordinates, 
although they rarely issued direct orders or overruled them.”796 Correctly and quite in line 
with Cohen’s recommendations for assertive civilian leadership 797 , Rumsfeld was 
pressing and pushing the military, requiring them to question their own assumptions and 
not allowing them to be guided by outdated concepts or rigid beliefs.  Many analysts give 
Rumsfeld credit for instilling more flexibility in the military and fundamentally changing 
the way commanders plan for conflict, first exemplified by the war on Afghanistan and 
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later Iraq.798  At the same time, they are puzzled by how someone like him, always 
insisting on “thinking outside the box” and willing to question the military on everything, 
would not be as willing to listen to challenges to his own assumptions, ideas, and beliefs.  
By analyzing the civil-military relationship under Rumsfeld (and especially the high level 
of preference divergence) we can provide another explanation as to why at key junctures 
in the decision process the Defense Secretary was not convinced by military advice.  
While civilian leaders were right to question their military commanders, challenge their 
assumptions, and even overrule them when they thought this was needed799, high levels 
of civil-military preference divergence (combined with civilian dominance) led to a 
deficient process of deliberation and assessment at the top, whereby the views of civilian 
officials, who dominated at the end, were not scrutinized as tightly as they should have 
been and there was little chance to correct flawed assumptions and evaluate alternatives. 
This case is a good reminder that civilian dominance and assertive civilian 
leadership do not automatically translate into a high-quality decision-making process and 
do not always produce good strategy.  This case further shows why scholars should take 
into account not only the civil-military balance of power (or who is in control) but also 
the level of preference divergence between political and military leaders.  If assertive 
civilian dominance is combined with high levels of preference divergence on most of the 
                                                            
798 Michael O’Hanlon, for example, describes Rumsfeld as “… one of the three or four most gifted 
secretaires of defense to hold the job since it was created…”  In: Michael O’Hanlon, “Secretary on the 
Defensive,” Newsday, May 7, 2004. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-
ed/ohanlon/20040507.htm.  
799 After all, this is part of the definition of civilian control or, as Peter Feaver put it: “Civilians have the 





key issues regarding the use of force, the decision-making process would most probably 
be plagued with problems similar to the ones discussed in this chapter.800 
  
                                                            
800 How could have things been different?  Should we always expect poor quality of decision-making under 
conditions of civilian dominance combined with high preference divergence?  At least in theory, the strong 
civilian dominance at the Pentagon could have been counterbalanced to a certain extent by civilian officials 
from the State Department like Colin Powell whose preferences were closer to the military ones.  In this 
case, this did not happen since President Bush put the Pentagon in charge of everything related to the Iraq 
war and, hence, opposition from State and other departments was not difficult to ignore.  Congress and the 
media could have also played a stronger role in checking and balancing the Executive.   Why the system of 
checks and balances did not quite work in this case is an extremely interesting question, which, however, 









By examining different patterns of civil-military relations, this dissertation sheds 
light on questions, such as: How do political and military leaders make decisions on war 
and peace?  How are we to explain the variance in the effectiveness of decision-making 
on the use of force?  Under what circumstances are decision-makers more likely to 
miscalculate while making decisions on the use of force, to misjudge their strategic 
environments and design ineffective military strategies, and thereby, endanger their own 
security and the wellbeing of others?  This study shows that civil-military relations affect 
directly and significantly the decision-making process on the use of force.  A good-
quality decision-making process includes: having a continuous and vigorous dialogue 
between top civilian and military officials - free and open communication and exchange 
of information and ideas, which bring multiple perspectives on issues801, and smooth 
coordination, interaction and cooperation between them. A healthy civil-military 
relationship significantly increases the ability of the United States government to design a 
coherent strategy, successfully integrating political and military considerations.   
                                                            
801 The best way to assure this, according to Alexander George, is the system of “multiple advocacy.” In: 
Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).  
For more recent interpretations, see James Pfiffner, “Policy Making in the Bush White House,” Issues in 







This dissertation shows that firm civilian control, while necessary, is not a 
sufficient condition and does not automatically translate into effective national security 
decision-making or victorious military strategies.  We need to shift focus away from 
traditional conceptions of civilian control and focus instead on the way the relations 
between top civilian and military officials affect the process by which states decide to use 
or threaten military force.  Civilian control, traditionally understood as the ability to 
prevent a military coup, has been overemphasized as a dependent variable at the expense 
of other variables, which are at least as important and much more interesting in cases like 
the U.S. and other mature democracies, where civilian control is not in question and 
where a military coup is highly unlikely.  Traditional notions of civilian control do not 
address adequately many of the fundamental issues involved in strategy and policy-
making.802  That is why the firmness of civilian control (or the balance of power between 
civilian and military officials) needs to be examined in the context of other important 
factors, such as the level of preference divergence between top civilian and military 
officials, as this study does. 
This dissertation shows that the effectiveness of a state’s decision-making process 
on issues related to the use of military force depends primarily on the quality of the civil-
military dialogue, which, in turn, depends on two key variables of the civil-military 
relationship: (1) the level of divergence between civilian and military preferences (views, 
ideas, beliefs) on issues related to foreign policy and national security, and (2) the 
“balance of power” between civilian and military officials (defined as the relative power 
of top civilian and military officials over decision-making).  Combinations of these two 
                                                            
802 John Garofano, “Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the Role of Senior Military Leaders?,” 





variables create distinct patterns of civil-military relations which affect the quality of the 
decision-making process or a state’s ability to design effective military strategies and to 
achieve its political objectives.  In general, preference divergence held constant, assertive 
civilian dominance is preferable.  Regarding the differences in views and ideas between 
civilian and military officials, low levels of preference divergence is associated with a 
more effective decision-making process, while high levels of preference divergence 
usually lead to poor civil-military communication and coordination and inability to 
integrate political and military considerations into the strategies and policies.    
More specifically, the case studies confirm the expectations of my theoretical 
framework about the variance in the effectiveness of the decision process as a result of 
the different patterns of civil-military relations.  
Under conditions of civilian dominance and intense preference divergence 
between statesmen and soldiers (Quadrant 1), the high preference divergence (even when 
combined with strong civilian dominance) creates dynamics that affect negatively all 
aspects of the policy-making and implementation processes.  Intense civil-military 
preference divergence usually leads to significant problems with the exchange of 
information as well as with coordination and cooperation between civilian and military 
leaders.  As shown, the dominant side (in Quadrant 1 - the civilians) may try to 
marginalize opposing views by excluding some military leaders from policy debates or 
discounting the merits of their judgment.  Excluding the military from many of the 
debates at the highest levels and ignoring or disregarding their advice leads to a 
dysfunctional analysis of alternative options for military action and, ultimately, 
undermines strategy and policy.  Strong civil-military preference divergence undermines 





different outcome.  This often leads to a failure to fully integrate military views with 
political and diplomatic policy.  As in the case of the 2003 Iraq war, intense differences 
in civilian and military preferences also led to lack of trust.  Distrust then caused civilian 
micromanagement of the military, which further intensified civil-military conflicts. 
Cases in Quadrant 2, characterized by military dominance and high civil-military 
preferences divergence, are the worst possibility from the stand-point of decision-making.  
In its attempts to protect its own preferences, each side tries to distort the decision-
making process by undermining effective information gathering and analysis, as well as 
coordination and cooperation.  Because of the high level of preference divergence, there 
rarely is a free flow of information or an extensive analysis of alternative options.  Each 
side has incentives to manipulate or withhold information.  High preference divergence 
also leads to the use of leaks, foot-dragging, and other tactics for blocking the preferred 
option of the other side.  Also, because of military dominance, civilians would not 
necessarily get what they want; the political and diplomatic perspectives may not 
necessarily be included in the analysis of options.  The implementation process would 
often be characterized by lack of integration between political objectives and military 
means.  At the same time, in order to restore the balance of power, civilians may be 
tempted to use intrusive monitoring, which may intensify the conflict with the military.  
Such dynamics, characteristic for decision-making processes in Quadrant 2, are 
illustrated by my case study on the first Clinton Administration and the conflict in Bosnia. 
Civilian dominance and low civil-military preference divergence (cases in 
Quadrant 3) seems to be the best of all worlds from the point of view of the quality of the 
decision-making process.  Civilian and military leaders are in agreement and, hence, 





to share private information since they have an incentive to ensure that their mutually 
preferred outcome is realized in the best possible way.  The political leadership benefits 
from a more complete analysis and evaluation of the military aspects of the situation 
since military advisors feel free to speak their mind.  The military also benefits from a 
more open and frank discussion of the political constraints as seen by the civilian 
leadership and this increases their mutual understanding and facilitate coordination.  
Because of civilian dominance, assertive civilian control becomes an option.  Assertive 
control, however, would not deteriorate into micromanagement in such cases (unlike in 
Quadrant 1) because of the commonalities in civilian and military perspectives.  Civilians 
would not feel the need to employ intrusive mechanisms of control because they would 
expect the military to carry out their orders without foot-dragging and in accordance with 
civilian preferences (which happen to be military preferences too).  We can expect a good 
integration of political objectives and military means.  My case study on the 1991 Gulf 
War illustrates such dynamics.   
One caveat is in order here. While low levels of preference divergence usually 
lead to a more effective decision-making process, an almost total convergence of civilian 
and military preferences could have some negative consequences as well.  Too much 
agreement between political and military officials could lead civilians to relax their 
oversight of the soldiers.  As an extreme in such situations civilians could abdicate 
authority and this could lead subsequently to the inability of the state to achieve its 
political objectives (since the military would be satisfied with the achievement of military 
victory and would expect the political leadership to take care of the foreign-policy 
objectives).  For example, as my 1991 Gulf War case shows, civilian abdication at the 





led to inability to turn the military triumph into a political victory.  Key decisions as to 
the timing of war termination, for which the civilian leadership deferred to the military, 
and mainly to Colin Powell, as well as the preparation for the armistice talks at Safwan, 
were made without much civilian guidance from Washington and with insufficient 
civilian assertiveness and this led to the failure to integrate military strategy and political 
policy.  Excessive civil-military preference convergence could be as debilitating for the 
decision-making process as excessive divergence between civilian and military views.     
The quality of the decision-making process in cases falling in Quadrant 4 
(military dominance and low level of civil-military preference divergence) is “mixed.”  
On the one hand, decision-making benefits from the low level of divergence between 
civilian and military preferences; on the other, however, military dominance may lead to 
difficulties in integrating the military instrument with the political view.  As one of my 
case studies shows (in the final stages of the 1991 Gulf War, when civilian leaders 
abdicated control), even though military victory was achieved, the political objectives 
were not fully achieved because such integration was lacking.  The armistice talks at 
Safwan, which Schwarzkopf had to conduct almost entirely on his own illustrate this 
point.  The insufficient civilian involvement at the end of the 1991 Gulf War led to the 
failure to integrate military and political policies and ultimately, caused the inability of 
the U.S. to turn a big military victory into a political one as well.  In this case, civilian 
leaders failed to ensure that their ground commander, Gen. Schwarzkopf, would take into 
account not only the purely military but the wider political and diplomatic implications of 
a tactical issue such as the Iraqi negotiators’ request to be allowed to use armed 
helicopters.  Schwarzkopf agreed to that request after making sure that the helicopters 





however, this decision had much broader (and tragic) consequences -- Saddam Hussein 
used the helicopters to brutally suppress the Shiite uprising and keep himself in power.  
Such developments could have most probably been prevented had civilian leaders 
intervened in time to explain to the military commander the political implications of the 
Iraqi domestic situation and the importance of this decision for the overall success of US 
political objectives in the war. 
Contrary to Samuel Huntington’s dominant “objective control” model, the 
findings in this dissertation firmly support a model of assertive civilian control. 
Huntington’s model is found deficient both descriptively and prescriptively.  There are no 
“purely” military opinion and advice that could be helpful to policy-makers while making 
decisions on the use of force. 803  Cases of effective decision-making show that in order 
to be useful, military advice should be politically informed.  Such is the case of then 
Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, for example, who violated the 
prescriptions to stay within the purely military realm and provided policy-makers with a 
more thorough assessment of what it would mean to commit U.S. forces in Indochina 
when President Eisenhower was considering the issue in 1953-54.  
This dissertation provides additional new evidence in support for Eliot Cohen’s 
argument that a constant exchange of ideas between statesmen and soldiers and assertive 
civilian control lead to a more effective decision-making and conduct of wars although I 
                                                            
803 For a similar argument, and also for a detailed analysis as to how and why American civil-military 
relations have not conformed to Huntington’s “objective control” theory, see Peter Feaver, “The Civil-
Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and 
Society (Winter 1997), pp. 149-178.  See also Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians; Eliot Cohen, 
Supreme Command, Chapters 1, 7, and Appendix (“The Theory of Civilian Control”); John Garofano, 
“Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control,” Orbis (Spring 2008); Matthew Moten, 
“A Broken Dialogue,” in American Civil-Military Relations, the Soldier, and the State in a New Era, 





find some deficiencies in his model as well, as discussed earlier.804  In Cohen’s “unequal 
dialogue,” civilian leaders, rather than sitting back, are querying, probing, and prodding, 
but without “dictating in detail” what the military should do.805  My case studies show 
why Cohen is correct in emphasizing the importance of an on-going, uninterrupted 
dialogue between civilian and military leaders during the planning and the conduct of a 
war.  Such a vigorous civil-military dialogue is needed in order to make military force 
serve the political objectives of a state.  It is crucial for an effective policy-making 
process.  For example, my analysis of the decision-making in the lead-up to the 1991 
Gulf War shows that assertive civilian control and civilian involvement in operational 
matters actually enhanced the effectiveness of the strategy- and policy-making process in 
several ways: by expanding the number of alternative strategies considered by decision-
makers, by stimulating more creativity and novel ideas from both the civilian and the 
military sides, by “keeping the military honest” and thus providing more accurate 
information during the policy discussions, and ultimately, by helping to match better 
military means and political ends. 
At the same time, my 2003 Iraq war case study shows that Cohen’s model also 
falls short because it does not convincingly draw a line between assertive civilian control 
and civilian micromanagement and does not explain when assertive control can 
contribute to a more effective decision-making process rather than turn into civilian 
meddling.  Assertive civilian control is insufficient for effective decision-making.  Based 
                                                            
804 As explained in previous chapters, I use Peter Feaver’s concept of “assertive” civilian control, which 
overcomes many of the problems of Huntington’s typology of “objective” and “subjective” forms of 
control, developed in The Soldier and the State.  Assertive civilian control is a more pro-active form of 
control than “objective” control, and allows “direct civilian supervision over the military, particularly over 
military operations.”   See Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians:  Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in 
the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 9. 





on Cohen’s model alone, it is very difficult to define the parameters of a civil-military 
relationship that would be conducive to effective strategy- and policy-making and 
implementation.  My theoretical framework goes a step further by specifying some of the 
problems with Cohen’s model and the circumstances under which assertive civilian 
control would be likely to turn into civilian micromanagement of the military and would 
have negative consequences for decision-making and policy implementation (i.e., when 
assertive control is combined with intense civil-military preference divergence, as we 
observed, for example, in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war and in the Clinton 
Administration). 
Some of the problems with assertive civilian control (and with Cohen’s model 
more generally) could not be easily seen if assertive control is analyzed out of a broader 
context, including variables such as preference divergence.  Assertive civilian control, 
when combined with high civil-military preference divergence, brings incentives to limit 
delegation of authority and to monitor the military very intrusively.  That is why, this 
study contends, contrary to both Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen, that we cannot 
define the kind of the civil-military relationship that would best serve the decision-
making and implementation process based solely on the type of civilian control (e.g., 
assertive or delegative) or lack of it, and whether civilians or the military interfere or stay 
out of each other’s domain.  We also need to take into account another key variable, 
namely, the intensity of preference divergence between civilian and military officials. 
This approach is also useful in highlighting the importance of studying the 
preferences of policy-makers on issues of war and peace and their impact on the decision-
making process (in addition to systemic variables).  If we study the preferences of top 





the type of action they would recommend in a given situation. The civil-military balance 
of power tells us whose preferences (civilian or military) are likely to dominate in the 
final decision.  If, in addition, we examine the level of divergence in the views of 
statesmen and soldiers, we could anticipate how effectively they would share and analyze 
information, and how well they are likely to interact and coordinate with each other in the 
process of strategy-making and implementation.  For example, high levels of preference 
divergence affect negatively decision-makers’ processing of information and advice – top 
political leaders are more likely to discount advice (or not seek it at all) from military 
advisors with whom they disagree strongly.  Also, policy-makers would be less likely to 
share information with such advisors.  Furthermore, intense civil-military preference 
divergence leads civilian leaders to attempt to monitor the military very closely in order 
to make sure that the final decisions (and their implementation) reflect their preferences, 
and not the highly diverging preferences of the military.806  Such overly close monitoring 
often turns into micromanagement of the military with very negative consequences.  High 
preference divergence very often produces alienation between political and military 
leaders and a rupture in the civil-military dialogue, which is indispensable for a healthy 
decision-making process.  Hence, in order to have an effective decision-making process, 
it is important that the divergence between civilian and military preferences on the main 
issues is not so intense as to provide incentives to civilian and military leaders to distort 
the decision-making process in the ways described above.807 
                                                            
806 For the relationship between preference divergence and delegation of authority see, for example, Peter 
Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
807 For a similar argument, see Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic 





Focusing on the level of preference divergence also allows us to integrate findings 
from communication and persuasion theory, which further demonstrate the central role 
the relationship between decision-makers and military advisors plays in the foreign 
policy decision-making process.  The dynamics created by this relationship affect directly 
the quality of decision-making.  For example, the persuasiveness of information and 
advice depends, to a large degree, on what decision-makers think of the source of the 
information and not only of its content.  They are more easily persuaded by information 
coming from advisors who they believe share their interests and values, whom they trust, 
and consider knowledgeable on the issues in question.808  Decision-makers are more 
receptive to advice when they perceive there is only a low level of preference divergence 
between them and their advisors.   
Examining the advisory process at the pinnacle of government through my 
theoretical framework leads to some counter-intuitive findings as well.  For example, my 
research shows that the so-called “yes-men” (here defined as the advisors who share the 
preferences of top decision-makers without the pejorative connotation this term usually 
carries) could enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process.  Conventional wisdom has it that it is harmful for decision-makers to surround 
themselves with “yes-men.”  In this view, the lack of vigorous dissent would lead to a 
failure to consider the full range of alternative options and, as a result, the policy choice 
would be sub-optimal.  However, by focusing on the effects of high preference 
                                                            
808 See, for example, Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelley, Communication and Persuasion: 
Psychological Studies of Opinion Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), especially Chapter 2, 
“Credibility of the Communicator;” Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, eds., 
Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); and Arthur Lupia, "Who Can Persuade Whom? Implications from the Nexus of Psychology 
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divergence on the ways decision-makers search for and process information, my research 
reveals a more complicated picture.  Actually, at times, these “yes-men” are the only 
possibility for transmitting of dissenting views rather than being a barrier to 
alternatives. 809   As shown, decision-makers often disregard advice and information 
coming from a person whose views, ideas, and interests are highly divergent from their 
own.  If a decision-maker receives a dissenting opinion from someone with whom she 
disagrees on almost everything, this dissent would be discounted because it could be 
attributed to the “bias” of the “adversarial” source.  If, however, the contrary opinion 
comes from an advisor whose views and ideas have been similar to hers most of the time 
(i.e., a “yes-man”), the decision-maker is more likely to take such advise seriously and 
may even reconsider her position. 
For example, in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, without necessarily being 
guided by academic theories of preference divergence, some military leaders instinctively 
realized this.  When they understood that their views and opinions were not getting 
through to Rumsfeld, they decided to find someone Rumsfeld listened to in order to 
convey their concerns. Being perturbed about the Secretary’s frequent interference in 
military planning they complained to none other than Newt Gingrich.  At the time, 
Gingrich was a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising Rumsfeld, and was known 
for sharing many of Rumsfeld’s preferences on key issues and having the Secretary’s 
trust and respect.  The former Speaker of the House agreed to “press the secretary to stop 
messing around with tactical-level decisions.” 810   We do not know exactly how 
                                                            
809 For somewhat similar reasoning, see Randall Calvert, “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational 
Choice Model of Political Advice,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 530-555. 
810 Michael R. Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War,” New York Times, October 





successful Gingrich’s intervention was; it may be the case that the Secretary of Defense 
did not change his approach all that much.  But the point here is that Gingrich had much 
more of a chance to successfully bring this dissenting view to Rumsfeld and be heard 
than, for example, Gen. Shinseki or some of the other top military leaders whose 
preferences on key issues diverged significantly from Rumsfeld’s views and whose 
advice he did not trust. 
By studying the preferences of top civilian and military leaders, we can also see 
other trends that may look counter-intuitive.  For example, especially after the Vietnam 
war, in US foreign policy and national security strategy debates, civilian leaders have 
been the ones more often pushing for the use of force, while military leaders have been 
more dovish, often resisting the use of the military instrument and pushing for other 
means, such as diplomacy and economic sanctions.  Hence, to the extent that we observe 
a militarization of U.S. Foreign policy, it has been a civilian militarization – i.e., brought 
about by the more hawkish preferences of civilian leaders.811  In this connection, in their 
study of the differences in civilian and military preferences on the use of force, Peter 
Feaver and Christopher Gelpi find that as the percentage of veterans serving in the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government increases, the probability that 
the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines.812   
In addition, by analyzing the impact of different patterns of civil-military relations 
on decision-making, we can challenge a thesis taken for granted by scholars steeped in 
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the Democratic Peace literature, namely that democracies make better decisions on war 
and peace.  This study shows that a democratic form of government is not sufficient for 
explaining the variance in the effectiveness of the decision-making process.  As this study 
shows, democracies are not immune from making poor decisions on war and peace. A 
democratic government which is characterized by high levels of civil-military preference 
divergence could be prone to ineffective decision-making.  Even with firm civilian 
control, such a state would be more likely to misjudge its strategic environment, to be 
unable to develop adequate understanding of its own capabilities and/or the capabilities 
of its adversaries, to have problems in designing effective strategies and coordinating 
military policy with political objectives, and, hence, would likely be more dangerous to 
international security.  Based on my theoretical framework, which allows exploring 
variation within regime type, one could make a classification of “better” or “worse” 
democracies, depending on which of those would be more prone to ineffective decision-
making and miscalculations, and, hence - more dangerous to international security.  That 
would be a government characterized by military dominance (even though under civilian 
control) and a high level of civil-military preference divergence. 
What could be done to improve the quality of decision-making? As this study 
shows, the quality of the civil-military dialogue is the best determinant of the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process.  Both the civilian and military sides must 
participate actively in this dialogue in order to analyze and evaluate critically the 
situation at hand and to be able to expose flawed assumptions, mistaken beliefs, etc.  One 
of the best examples of healthy civil-military relations that resulted in continuous 
dialogue that helped the decision-making process is the relationship of FDR and the 





rancorous.  But they were very important because “they brought to light multiple 
perspectives; they forced ongoing analyses of the relationship between ends and means, 
and they demanded that ideas be supported by logic, evidence, and rigorous 
argumentation.”813  The quality of policy-making cannot be improved without focusing 
on the factors on which the civil-military dialogue depends.  One should not focus on the 
military side of the equation alone as has often been the case.  While menace to civilian 
control and national security policy-making can certainly come from the military, it can 
also come from the civilian leadership itself and that latter possibility should not be 
overlooked. Often we ask “who’s to guard the guardians?” without asking who’s to guard 
the military from incompetent civilians.  Civilian leaders’ lack of understanding of the 
military institution and the uses and, most of all, limitations of force as a tool of foreign 
policy can lead to disasters.  Civilians’ limited knowledge and expertise in national 
security can cause problems in either of two ways.  First, ignorant and assertive 
statesmen could mismanage the military, committing it to imprudent missions or 
interfering with or micromanaging its every action.  Alternatively, civilian ignorance 
could also manifest itself as uncritical deference to military judgment, either because 
politicians cannot exercise the necessary oversight or because they lack the authority to 
oppose military leaders.  In both cases, national security policy is in danger.814 In the past, 
some initiatives have been taken to improve civilian understanding of military affairs but 
efforts in this direction should continue. There are other programs that try to include 
broader parts of the civilian society, which has been alienated from the military ever 
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since the end of the draft.  The Defense Department Public Outreach Initiative, for 
example, aims at increasing the understanding and trust between the military and the 
American public. The Marine Corps’ One Year Out Program also has the purpose of 
bridging the gap between the military and civilian society and increasing the mutual 
understanding between the military and civilians. For this purposes, the program places 
some of the best officers in civilian work places for one year.  The ROTC has been 
expanding as well. We should not focus improvement of quality of education and training 
only on one side – the civilian or the military, since we saw that if the balance of power is 
too much in favor of one side, this affects negatively the decision-making process 
because the stronger side can easily dominate over the weaker and could dismiss its 
views.  We do have more responsibility, however, to improve the quality of civilian 
decision-makers since the principle of civilian control puts the heavier burden on them; 
ultimately, the civilians are responsible not only for the quality of the civil-military 
relationship, but  and for the national security decision-making process as well.        
Because national security decision-making depends so heavily on the quality of 
the professional and personal relationships among top civilian and military leaders, it has 
been recommended that future administrations institutionalize procedures for team-
building between top political and military leaders. 815   Civil-military team building 
exercises and procedures could be helpful in enhancing the understanding of both sides 
about their cultural and organizational differences although of course they are not going 
to make such differences disappear completely.816  While it is true that the selection and 
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education process for senior military leaders could be significantly improved by focusing 
professional military education on more of the areas that are relevant to the conduct of 
“new wars,” 817  such changes will not be sufficient if they are not accompanied by 
changes in the civilian realm.   
Some legal and institutional reforms are also very tempting on the surface but 
caution should be in order here.  As the chapter on the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) 
shows, such reforms may have unintended negative consequences which outweigh the 
benefits.  Many experts have proposed a radical reform of the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation.  They argue, correctly, just as I show in the chapter on the GNA, that contrary 
to its intent, it has weakened civilian control and increased the influence of the military.  
Civilian control was reduced because of the strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Chairman at the expense of the individual services.  By creating a unified military 
position and centralized military power in the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
who became the primary military advisor of the Secretary of Defense and the President, 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the unity of the military and this decreased the 
power of the civilian leadership because it became more difficult for political leaders to 
play the services off one another.  Hence, some have recommended legislative changes to 
decrease the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and increase the power of 
the Service Chiefs.  In this case, it is argued, political leaders will be presented with a 
multiplicity of military views from which they could choose.   
However, while it is true that the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened 
significantly the voice of the Chairman as the nation’s highest ranking and most powerful 
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officer, this study shows that such legislative/institutional reforms are not determinative – 
i.e., this act in and of itself does not guarantee that military advice will be dominant.  As 
my case study on the 2003 Iraq war and the relations between Secretary Rumsfeld and 
CJCS Gen. Myers show, and as my comparison between the ways Generals Powell and 
Myers fulfilled their duties as Chairmen, this legislation gives top military leaders the 
right to be heard, but not heeded.  Furthermore, we cannot rely only on such legislative 
reforms to improve the effectiveness of the decision-making process. They may not work 
because they do not take into account the psychological and political aspects of the 
process, discussed earlier.  The President and the Secretary of Defense can have 
multiplicity of views available but this is no guarantee that these views will be taken into 
account because this depends, to a great extent, on the relationship between top decision-
makers and their military advisors. 
This study also leads to some ideas on the reform of the system of professional 
military education, which still pays little attention to problems of civil-military relations.  
This professional military education is the primary means of shaping the professional 
values and norms of the officers.  Hence, it should address the main aspects of the civil-
military relationship in more depth.   The subject of civil-military relations needs a more 
thorough coverage at every level. Recent studies find that the curricula at war colleges 
and military academies are not very effective in providing officers with “a coherent 
understanding of American society, its culture, and the tradition of American civil-
military relations.  In some cases military education accentuates civil-military 
differences.”818  Even the most senior officers seem to have had little preparation for 
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dealing with their civilian bosses.  In his memoirs, Gen. Richard Myers admits as much 
when he discusses his reflections on civil-military relations: “Fortunately, I had met Dr. 
Dick Kohn… He sent me a couple chapters of Eliot Cohen’s book Supreme Command.”  
As Eliot Cohen argues, to further improve military education the material that deals with 
civilian control needs to be thoroughly reviewed. “The clichéd notion that civilian control 
consists of giving the military unambiguous (and unchanging) goals, providing resources, 
and stepping aside—a notion particularly prevalent following the Persian Gulf War—
needs to be replaced with a more discriminating, if less comfortable, view.”819  The 
whole Huntington’s concept of separate and distinct civilian and military realms needs to 
be reconsidered.  The idea that civilian and military leaders “can question the 
professional expertise of the other realm” should not be considered anathema but should 
be encouraged.820    
Improving the quality of the civilian leadership, however, should take precedence, 
especially since the GNA resulted in increased competence and enhanced experience of 
top military staffers, which in some cases led to enhanced military power at the expense 
of civilian influence.  Some scholars have proposed ways to change this, emphasizing the 
importance of providing incentives for DOD civilians to pursue professional development 
through education, training, or interdepartmental and interagency rotations. The goal 
would be to better educate civilians about the military institution, military culture and 
preferences, the changing nature of warfare, and others.  This would increase the 
competence of civilians to better participate in debates on a variety of defense and 
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national security matters. For example, the Beyond Goldwater–Nichols study 
recommends that “Congress establish a new Defense Professional Corps to attract the 
best and brightest civilians to DOD and to expand opportunities for professional 
development and career advancement.”821 More specifically, Eliot Cohen and others have 
proposed (and already designed) some programs for legislators, journalists and others, 
including: “lectures on the organization and function of the DOD; visits to a variety of 
facilities, such as training instalations; participation in simulations and exercises; and 
academic work through case studies, seminars, and cite visits in the field of military 
history.”822  After the debacle in Iraq, many experts have stressed the importance of 
improving interagency planning, which would necessitate top officials to gain more 
experience in the interagency world.  In order to avoid inexperienced staffers to occupy 
positions in NSC staff directorates, Joseph Collins recommends that “every executive 
department should insist on interagency experience for its most senior civilians and make 
it mandatory for promotion to the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign Service. 
Interagency experience should count as the equivalent of joint experience for military 
officers. Too often, the best and brightest avoid interagency assignments, where the hours 
are terrible and the rewards are less than those at the home agency.”823     
Ultimately, the case studies show that improving national security decision-
making is not a question of either enhancing the quality of the people in top positions or 
improving the quality of the process but of both – people and process.  In the words of 
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Joseph Collins, “…no matter how the decision-making process is designed, it will be 
strongly affected by the beliefs and experience of the officials involved, especially the 
President who will set the tone for his or her administration. Sound national security 
decisions will require great people and effective and efficient processes. Both of these 
will require an engaged President attuned to both policy and process.”824 
  
                                                            







Addington, Larry H. 1966. From Moltke to Hitler: The Evolution of German Military 
Doctrine, 1865-1939. Charleston, SC: The Citadel. 
_____ . 1994 Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Aker, Frank. 1985. October 1973: The Arab Israeli War. Hamden, CT: Archon Books. 
Albertini, Luigi. 1953. The Origins of the War of 1914. Volume 2. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Avant, Deborah D. 1994. Political Institutions and Military Change. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
_____ . 1996-97. "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military Is 
Averse to Responding to Post-Cold War Low Level Threats." Security Studies 6, no. 2 
(Winter), 51-90. 
Bacevich, Andrew J.  2007. “Joint Failure,” The Boston Globe, June 17. 
Be'eri, Eliezer. 1970. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. New York: Praeger. 
_____ . 1976. "The Changing Role of the Military in Egyptian Politics." In Military 
and State in Modern Asia, edited by Harold Z. Schiffren. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic 
Press. 
Beg, Mirza Aslam. 1999. "Kargil Withdrawal and 'Rogue Army' Image." Defense 
Journal 3, no. 8 (September). 
Belkin, Aaron. 2005. United We Stand? Divide and Conquer: Politics and the Logic of 
International Hostility. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Ben Meir, Yehuda. 1995. Civil-Military Relations in Israel. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Bendor, J. A. Glazer, and T. Hammond. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." Annual Review 
of Political Science 4 (June), 235-69. 
Bendor, Jonathan, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. 1987. "Politicians, Bureaucrats 
and Asymmetric Information." American Journal of Political Science 31, no. 4 
(November): 796-828. 
Bensahel, Nora. 2006. "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi 





Betts, Richard K. 1991. Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises. 2d ed. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Militaiy Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle. 1996. "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and 
Warfare in the Developing World: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness 
in Developing States.  Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (June), 171-212. 
Bikbayev, Rafael, and Andrei Palaria. 1998. "Syria Denies Explosions on Its Territory 
Near Turkish Border." ITAR-TASS News Agency, October 11. 
Binder. Leonard. 1978. In a Moment of Enthusiasm. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1991. Shins of Steel. London: I. B. Tauris. 
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press. 
Bond, Brian. 1968. "Soldiers and Statesmen: British Civil-Military Relations in 1917." 
Military Affairs 32, no. 2 (October), 62-75. 
Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry. Lanham, PA: 
Roman and Littlefield. 
Brinkley, Joel, and Eric Schmitt. 2003. "Iraqi Leaders Say US Was Warned of Disorder 
after Hussein, but Little Was Done." New York Times, November 30. 
Brooks, Risa. 2008. Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of 
Political Leaders." American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (December), 841-55. 
Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein. 1989. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on 
Vietnam, 1954-1965. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Clinton, Bill. 2004. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Cohen, Eliot. 2002. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. 
New York: Free Press. 
Colton, Timothy. 1979. Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The 
Structure of Soviet Military Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
_____ . 1990. "Perspectives on Civil-Military"Relations in the Soviet Union." In 
Soldiers and the Soviet State, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2003. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons. 





Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R. Wagner. 1990. The Lessons of Modern War, 
Volume 1: The Arab Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Crane, Conrad C., and W. Andrew Terrill. 2003. Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, 
Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 
David, Edward. 1970. "The Liberal Party Divided, 1916-1918." Historical Journal 13, no. 
3 (September), 509-32. 
Desch, Michael C. 1999. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security 
Environment. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Diamond, Larry. 2004. "What Went Wrong in Iraq." Foreign Affairs 83 
(September/October), 34-56. 
Dormont, Josh. 2005. “The Powell Factor: Analyzing the Role of the Powell Doctrine in 
U.S. Foreign Policy,” Gaines Junction, Vol. 3, no. 1. 
Drew, Elizabeth. 1994. On the Edge. New York: Simon & Schuster.   
Fallows, James. 2004a. "Blind into Baghdad." Atlantic Monthly, January/February. 
_____ . 2004b. Frontline special, "The Invasion of Iraq." Original air date February 26. 
Transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pro- grams/2004.html. 
_____ . 2006. Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq. New York: Vintage Books. 
Feaver, Peter D. 1995. "Civil Military Conflict and the Use of Force." In U.S. Civil- 
Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition, edited by Don Snider and Miranda Carlton- 
Carew. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
_____ . 2003. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 
Feaver, Peter D., and Christopher Gelpi. 2004. Choosing Your Battles. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn. 2001. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil- Military 
Gap and American National Security. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Finer, Samuel. 1962. The Man on Horseback. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. 
Franks, Tommy. 2004. American Soldier. New York: Harper Collins. 
Frieden, Jeffrey. 1999. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations." In Strategic 
Choice and International Relations, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gacek, Christopher. 1994. The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American 





Gartner, Scott. 1997. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Garrison, Jean. 1999. Games Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter 
Administrations. Texas A&M University Press. 
George, Alexander. 1980. Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective 
Use of Information and Advice. Boulder: Westview Press. 
_____ . 1991. "Findings and Recommendations." In Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis 
Management, edited by Alexander George. Boulder: Westview Press. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: BCSIA Studies in International Security, MIT Press. 
Gibney, Frank. 2004. "The General Who Got It Right on Iraq." Los Angeles Times, 
December 26. 
Gibson, Christopher. 1998. Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and 
National Security through Madisonian Concepts. Ph. D. Dissertation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Gibson, Christopher P., and Don Snider. 1999. "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential 
to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-making Process." Armed Forces 
and Society  no. 2 (Winter), 193-218. 
Gibson, Christopher and Don Snider. 1997. “Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military 
Relations: A New Institutional Approach,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Harvard University. 
Gordon, Michael R. 2004. "The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a Second War." 
New York Times, October 19. 
Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. 2006. COBRA II: The Inside Story 
of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon. 
Haass, Richard. 1999. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold 
War World. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Heller, Mark. 1996. "Iraq's Army: Military Weakness, Political Utility." In Iraq's Road to 
War, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Hersh, Seymour. 2003. "Offense and Defense; the Battle between Donald Rumsfeld and 
the Pentagon." New Yorker, April 7. 
Herspring, Dale R. 2005. The Pentagon and the Presidency. Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas. 
Herwig, Holger H. 1988. "The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during 
the First World War." In Military Effectiveness. Volume 1: The First World War, edited 





_____ . 1994. "Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-State: Prussia-Germany, 1871— 
1918." In The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, edited by Macgregor Knox 
and Williamson Murray Alvin Bernstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hooker, Gregory. 2005. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Washington, DC: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
_____ . 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
Janowitz, Morris. 1965. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New 
York: Free Press. 
Janowitz, Morris, and Roger W. Little. 1974. Sociology and the Military Establishment. 
Beverly Hills: Sage 
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Jones, Owen Bennett. 2002. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Kagan, Frederick W. 2004. Frontine special, "The Invasion of Iraq." Original air date 
February 26. Transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
programs/2004, html. 
Kaiser, David E. 1983. "Germany and the Origins of the First World War." Journal of 
Modern History 55, no. 3 (September), 442-74. 
Kakutani, Michiko. 2006. "All the President's Books (Minding History's Whys and 
Wherefores)." New York Times, May 11. 
Kanter, Arnold. 1975. Defense Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Keegan, John. 2004. The Iraq War. New York: Vintage Books 
Kennydy, Paul . 1983. Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the 
Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 





Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Kohn, Richard. 1993/94. "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," 
National Interest, no. 35 (Spring), 3-17. 
Korb, Lawrence. 1993. “Less No More: How the Pentagon Undid the Defense Secretary,” 
Washington Post, December 19,  p. C3. 
Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
_____ . 2003. "On Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First Blush Assessment," testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee, October 21. 
Kukreja, Veena. 1985. Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Politics. New 
Delhi: NBO Publishers. 
Kupchan, Charles. A. 1994. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Leng, Russell. J. 2000. Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Levy, Jack S. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and 
Analytical Problems." World Politics 36, no. 1 (October), 76-99. 
_____ . 1991. "The Role of Crisis Management in the Outbreak of World War I." In 
Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, edited by Alexander George. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Loeb, Vernon, and Thomas Ricks. 2002. "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in 
Pentagon." Washington Post, October 16. 
Luttwak, Edward. “Washington’s Biggest Scandal,” Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5, pp. 29-
33. 
McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychological in International Relations. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
MacKintosh, John P. 1962. "The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defense before 
1914." English Historical Review 11, no. 304 (July), 490-503. 
McManus, Doyle, and Esther Schräder. 2003. "War with Iraq/Policy." Los Angeles Times, 
April 2. 
McMaster, H. R. 1997. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins. 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational 






Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick. 1972. "Intrigues of the War." In The Maurice 
Case, edited by Nancy Maurice. London: Leo Cooper. 
Mazari, ShireenM. 2000. "Re-examining Kargil." Defense Journal 3, no. 11. June). 
Mazzetti, Mark, and Jim Rutenberg. 2006. "Pentagon Memo Aims to Counter Rumsfeld 
Critics." New York Times, April 16. 
Mendenhall, Robert. 2005. Pre-War Planning for a Post-War Iraq. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
U.S. Army War College. 
Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. 1988. "The 
Effectiveness of Military Organizations." In Military Effectiveness. Volume 1: The First 
World War, edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In Can the Government 
Govern? edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings. 
_____ . 1995. "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bu-
reaucracy" In Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, 
edited by Oliver E. Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____ . 2005. "Power and Political Institutions." Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 2 
(June), 215-33. 
Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution 
versus Information." International Organization 48, no. 3, 387-423. 
Mufson, Steve. 1998. "Indian Tests Pose 'Difficult Choice' for Pakistan, Even in Nuclear 
Choice." Washington Post, May 18. 
Murray, Williamson, and Mark Grimsley. 1994. "Introduction: On Strategy." In The 
Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, edited by Williamson Murray, MacGregor 
Knox, and Alvin Bernstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Newbold, Gregory. 2006. "Why Iraq Was a Mistake." Time, April 9. 
Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Engle- 
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
O'Hanlon, Michael E. 2004-05. "Iraq without a Plan." Policy Review, no. 128 
(December/January). 
Oneal, John R. 1982. Foreign Policy-making in Times of Crisis. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press. 
Oren, Michael B. 2002. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern 
Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press. 





Packer, George. 2005. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. 
Packer, Ian. 1998. Lloyd George. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Palmer, Bruce. 1984. The 25-Year War. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 
Peceny, Mark, et al. 2002. "Dictatorial Peace?" American Political Science Review 96, no. 
1 (March), 15-26. 
_____ . 1977. The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians 
and Revolutionary Soldiers. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Peterson, Steve W. 2004. "Central but Inadequate: The Application of Theory in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom." Manuscript, National War College, Washington, DC, 
available at http://handle.dtic.miI/100.2/ADA441663. 
Phillips, David L. 2005. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Phillips, Kate, Shane Lauth, and Eric Schenck. 2006. U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: 
Planning, Combat and Occupation. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute. 
Pierson, Paul, and Theda Skocpol. 2002. "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary 
Political Science." In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by Ira 
Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Pion-Berlin, David. 1992. "Military Autonomy in Emerging Democracies in South 
America." Comparative Politics 25, no. 1 (October), 83-102. 
_____ . 1997. Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in 
Argentina. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Pollack, Kenneth. 1998. "Egyptian National Security." In Sadat and His Legacy: Egypt 
and the World, 1977-1997, edited by Jon B. Alterman. Washington, DC. Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy. 
_____ . 2002. Arabs at War, Military Effectiveness 1948-1991. Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press. 
Posen, Barry. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Powell Walter W., and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991. The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 






Press, Daryl. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Evaluate Military Threats. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Purdum, Todd S. 2003. "Rumsfeld's Imperious Style Turns Combative." New York Times, 
March 30. 
_____ . 2004. Frontline special, "The Invasion of Iraq." Original air date February 
26. Transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/ 2004.html. 
Rapoport, David C. "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality and Impotence." In 
Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats, edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski. 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
Rashid, Ahmed. 1997. "Sharif Stages Constitutional Coup." Daily Telegraph, April 10. 
Rathmell, Andrew. 2005. "Planning Post-conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We 
Learn?" International Affairs 81, no. 5 (October), 1013-38. 
Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." Perspectives on Politics 1, 
no. 1. 
Reiter, Dan, and Allan Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Riad, Mahmoud. 1981. The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East. London: Quartet 
Books. 
Ricks, Thomas E. 2001a. "For Rumsfeld, Many Road-blocks." Washington Post, August 
7. 
_____ . 2001b. "Review Fractures Pentagon." Washington Post, July 14. 
_____ . 2001c. "Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs Spar over Roles in Retooling Military." 
Washington Post, May 25. 
_____ . 2001d. "Rumsfeld on High Wire of Defense Reform." Washington Post, 
May 20. 
_____ . 2001e. "Rumsfeld's Hands-on War." Washington Post, December 9. 
_____ . 2002a. "Military Bids to Postpone Iraq Invasion." Washington Post, May 24. 
_____ . 2002b. "Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq." Washington 





Ricks, Thomas. 2003. "Rumsfeld Stands Tall after Iraq Victory." Washington Post, April 
20. 
_____ . 2004a. Interview in PBS Frontline special, "The Invasion of Iraq." Original air 
date February 26. Transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/programs/2004.html. 
_____ . 2004b. Interview in PBS Frontline special, "Rumsfeld's War." Original air date 
October 26. Available at http://ivww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/ 2004.html. 
_____ . 2005. "Pentagon Blamed for Lack of Postwar Planning in Iraq." Washington 
Post, April 1. 
_____ . 2006. Fiasco. New York: Penguin Press. 
Ricks, Thomas E., and Vernon Loeb. 2003. "Iraq Takes a Toll on Rumsfeld." Washington 
Post, September 14. 
Rieff, David. 2003. "Blueprint for a Mess." New York Times, November 2. 
Riker, William. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the 
Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74, 432-47. 
Ritter, Gerhard. 1970. The Sword, and the Scepter. Miami: University of Miami Press. 
_____ . 1958. The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. New York: Praeger. 
Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Röhl, John C. G. 1969. "Admiral von Muller and the Approach of War, 1911- 1914." 
Historical Journal 12, no. 4 (December), 651-73. 
Rosecrance, Richard, and Arthur A. Stein, eds. 1993. The Domestic Bases of Grand 
Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1996. Societies and Military Power. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
_____ . 2005. War and Human Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
"Rumsfeld Did Not Intimidate Joint Chiefs, Ex-Chairman Says." Associated Press, April 
17, 2006. 
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2003. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate 
Renewed. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Sakallioglu, Umit Cizre. 1997. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political 





Sapolsky, Harvey M. 1997. "Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem." 
Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 15 (Spring), 50-53. 
Schepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational 
Choice Approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2. 
Schmidt, Gustav. 1990. "Contradictory Postures and Conflicting Objectives: The July 
Crisis." In Escape into War?, edited by Gregor Schollgen. Oxford: Berg. 
Schofield, Julian. 2000. "Militarized Decision-making for War in Pakistan: 1947- 1971." 
Armed Forces in Society 27, no. 1 (Fall), 131-48 
Schollgen, Gregor. 1990. "Introduction: The Theme Reflected in Recent German 
Research." In Escape into War?, edited by Gregor Schollgen. Oxford: Berg. 
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sechser, Todd. 2004. "Are Soldiers Less War Prone Than Statesmen?" Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (October). 
Segev, Tom. 2007. 1961: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle 
East. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Shafqat, Saeed. 1997. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Shane, Scott. 2006. "Civilians Reign over U.S. Military by Tradition and Design." New 
York Times, April 16. 
Shanker, Thorn. 2004. "In Memoir, U.S. General Tells of Gaps in War Plans." New York 
Times, August 1. 
Shanker, Thom, and Eric Schmitt. 2003. "Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus through Jousting." 
New York Times, March 19. 
Sharp, U. S. Grant. 1978. Strategy for Defeat. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press. 
Shinseki, Eric. 2003. "The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Budget." Testimony at Hearing of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25. 
Shlaim, Avi . 1976. "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom 
Kippur War." World Politics 28, no. 3 (April), 348-80. 
Sicker, Martin. 2001. The Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Simpson, Keith. 1991. "The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig." In The First World War 
and British History, edited by Brian Bond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Singer, Stacey, and Christy McKerney. 2000. "Overseas Ballots Get Turn—Usually 





Singh, Jasit. 1999. Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. New Delhi: 
Knowledge World. 
Slevin, Peter, and Dana Priest. 2003., "Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors." Washington 
Post, July 24. 
Snider, Don, and Miranda Carlton-Carew, eds. 1995. U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In 
Crisis or Transition. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Snyder, Jack. 1991a. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 
1984." In Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, edited by Steven E. 
Miller. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
_____ . 1991b. Myths of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Stein, Janice Gross. 1980. "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and 
Decision in Israel, 1973. Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 1, 147-77. 
_____ . 1991. "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War through Miscalculated 
Escalation." In Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, edited by Alexander 
George. Boulder: Westview Press. 
_____ . 1996. "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 
1948-73." Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn), 104-52. 
Stein, Janice Gross, and Raymond Tanter. 1980. Rational Decision-making: Israel's 
Security Choices. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Stepan, Alfred. 1988. Re-Thinking Military Politics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Stephanopoulos, George. 1999. All Too Human (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999), George 
Stephanopoulos, All Too Human.  Boston: Little, Brown. 
Stevenson, Charles A. 2006. Warriors and Politicians: U.S. Civil-Military Relations 
under Stress. London: Routledge. 
Stevenson, David. 1997. The Outbreak of the First World War. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
Strachan, Hew.  2006. "Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq." Survival 48, 
no. 3 (Autumn), 59-82. 
Summers, Harry. 1982. On Strategy. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. 
Taylor, A.J.P. 1965. Politics in Wartime and other essays. New York: Atheneum. 
Taylor, Brian. 2003. Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689- 2000. 





Terraine, J. 1963. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. London: Cassell. 
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." The 
Annual Review of Political Science 2:369-404. 
Third Infantry Division After Action Report; Operation Iraqi Freedom. Accessed on June 
25, 2005 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003 /3id-aar-jul03.pdf 
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. History and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Trubowitz, Peter. 1998. Defining the National Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Tsouras, Peter. 1994. Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World's Armies, 1945 to the 
Present. New York: Facts on File. 
Tuchman, Barbara. 1962. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan. 
Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson. 1999. Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the 
Czech and Russian Armed Forces. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Van Evera, Stephen. 1991. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World 
War." In Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, edited by Steven 
Miller. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 . 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 . 2001. "More Causes of War: Misperception and the Roots of Conflict." 
Manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Van Riper, Paul. 2004. Frontline special, "Rumsfeld's War." Original air date October 26. 
Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fi-ontline/programs/2004.html. 
Wagner, Harrison R. 2000. "Bargaining and Wat." American Journal of Political Science 
44, no. 3 (July), 469-84. 
Weigley, Russell F. 1993. "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control 
from McClellan to Powell" Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (October), 27-58. 
Weingast, Barry R. 2002. "Rational Choice Institutionalism." In Political Science: The 
State of the Discipline, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
Weinraub, Bernard, with Thom Shanker. 2003. "Rumsfeld's Design for War Criticized on 
the Battlefield." New York Times, April 1. 
Weinroth, Howard. S. 1970. "The British Radicals and the Balance of Power, 1902- 
1914." Historical Journal 13, no. 4 (December), 653-82. 
Welch, Claude E., Jr. 1987. No Farewell to Arms: Military Disengagement from Politics 





Welch, Claude E., Jr., and Arthur K. Smith. 1974. Military Role and Rule: Perspectives 
on Civil-Military Relations. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press. 
White, Harrison C. 1991. "Agency as Control." In Principals and Agents: The Structure 
of Business, edited by John W. Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser. 2d ed. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
White, Thomas. 2004a. Interview in PBS Frontline special, "The Invasion of Iraq." 
Original air date February 26. Transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/programs/2004.html. 
 . 2004b. Interview in PBS Frontline special, "Rumsfeld's War." Original air date 
October 26. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/ 2004.html. 
Williamson Jr., Samuel R., and Russell Van Wyk. July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen and the 
Coming of the Great War. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. 
Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. 1969. The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France 
Prepare for War, 1904-1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wolfowitz, Paul. 2003. Testimony at Hearing on Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Budget. 
House Budget Committee, February 27. 
Wood, David. 2000. "Military Breaks Ranks with Non-Partisan Tradition; Many in 
Service Turn to Bush, Reject Political Correctness." Plain Dealer (Cleveland), October 
22. 
Woodward, Bob. 2004. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Woodward, David R. 1983 .Lloyd George and the Generals. East Brunswick, NJ: 
Associated University Presses. 
Zegart, Amy. 1999. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Zisk, Kimberly Marten. 1993. Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet 
Military Innovation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Zuber, Terence. 2002. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871- 1914. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
